COURSE DESCRIPTION

This is a course on matching theory and market design at the Ph.D. level. The course includes standard theoretical models of one-sided and two-sided matching. A solid background in graduate microeconomics is required. The focus of the course is both a deep understanding of the theory as well as an analysis of recent real-life applications. Topics include stable matching, on-campus housing, school choice, kidney exchange and cadet branching.

REFERENCE READING


GRADE AND COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Grade will be based on your in-class participation, in-class presentation and a referee report on an assigned paper of the field.

SCHEDULE

1. One-to-One matching problems.
   (a) R-S Chapters 2 and 3.

2. One-to-One matching problems: Incentives.
3. Many-to-One matching problems.

(a) R-S Chapter 5.

4. Housing Market and House Allocation:

(a) S-Ü Section 2.


5. Housing Market and House Allocation: Ordinal Efficiency


6. School Matching:

(a) S-Ü Section 4.


7. Kidney Exchange

(a) S-Ü Section 3.


8. Matching with Contracts:

(a) R-S Chapter 6.


9. Cadet-Branch Matching


10. Various Resource Allocation based on Matching Theory


