Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ido Oren Author-X-Name-First: Ido Author-X-Name-Last: Oren Title: Capability and hostile behavior in arms race models Abstract: The interplay of capability and hostile behavior as indicators of threat is under‐conceptualized in arms‐race research. I propose that the motivation (intentions) attributed to a state's hostile acts depends on its capability: the less capable it is, the stronger the motivation. Controlling for the amount of hostile acts, if a state's capability level rises overtime its intentions would appear less malign, hence the state might seemless threatening (if threat perception is sensitive to intentions). In a static arms‐competition model this implies a hypothesized negative sign for the arms‐reaction coefficient. I support this interpretation primarily by testing a statistical model of the U.S.‐Soviet arms competition and, secondarily by showing that past quantitative research also generated considerable, yet little‐noticed, evidence of negative coefficient signs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 309-334 Issue: 4 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434871 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434871 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:309-334 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Will H. Moore Author-X-Name-First: Will H. Author-X-Name-Last: Moore Author-Name: Ronny Lindström Author-X-Name-First: Ronny Author-X-Name-Last: Lindström Author-Name: Valerie O'Regan Author-X-Name-First: Valerie Author-X-Name-Last: O'Regan Title: Land reform, political violence and the economic inequality‐political conflict nexus: A longitudinal analysis Abstract: This study seeks to persuade the reader that students of political violence should shift their focus away from nomological explanations of violent political conflict sui generis. Instead, scholars should concentrate on theoretically demarcating specific types of violent political conflict. Alas, we do not offer a new typology in this paper; rather, we seek to explain an anomaly in the political violence literature: the contradictory set of findings in statistical studies of the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. We contend that contradictory findings exist because some scholars have included cases in their studies where different conflict processes have produced violence in different countries. When these different cases are treated as if they are equivalent in a cross‐sectional study, it is not surprising that the studies produce inconsistent findings. We suggest that the positive findings in these studies are most likely spurious. To systematically explore our contention, we use both statistical and descriptive‐historical methods to examine the impact that land reforms had on political violence in Chile, Cuba and the Philippines. Our statistical analyses demonstrate that a positive relationship between agrarian inequality and political violence does not exist while our qualitative analyses show that the issue of land inequality is not necessarily relevant to understanding the conflict process in these cases, even though these cases were included in past cross‐national studies. We conclude the paper with a discussion of future directions in which students of violent political conflict should focus their efforts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 335-363 Issue: 4 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434872 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434872 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:335-363 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Frank C. Zagare Author-X-Name-First: Frank C. Author-X-Name-Last: Zagare Title: Classical deterrence theory: A critical assessment Abstract: This essay summarizes and critically evaluates the conceptual underpinnings of Classical (or Rational) Deterrence Theory. The paradigm's origins are traced to Realist political thought and balance of power politics. Two distinct, yet compatible, strands of the theory are identified: Structural Deterrence and Decision‐Theoretic Deterrence Theory. Structural (or Neorealist) Deterrence Theory sees the key to international stability in the distribution of power within the system in general, and among the great powers in particular. By contrast, Decision‐Theoretic Deterrence Theory focuses upon the interplay of outcomes, preferences and rational choices in determining interstate conflict behavior. The critical deductions of both strands of the theory are at odds with the empirical record and each is hard put to explain the stability of the post—war period. As well, mainstream Decision‐Theoretic Deterrence Theory is logically inconsistent. The essay concludes with a brief discussion of some potential responses to the theory's inadequacies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 365-387 Issue: 4 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434873 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434873 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:365-387 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Richard T. Cupitt Author-X-Name-First: Richard T. Author-X-Name-Last: Cupitt Author-Name: Rodney L. Whitlock Author-X-Name-First: Rodney L. Author-X-Name-Last: Whitlock Author-Name: Lynn Williams Whitlock Author-X-Name-First: Lynn Williams Author-X-Name-Last: Whitlock Title: The (IM)Morality of international governmental organizations Abstract: In this article, the authors apply standard population statistics to assess the durability of conventional international governmental organizations (IGOs) in the international system for the years 1865--1989. Following a brief discussion of IGOs and why institutions tend to persist (with examples from the literature on international relations, the U.S. bureaucracy, and international business), the authors examine infant mortality, average age at death, median age, the birth rate, and the death rate for conventional IGOs. The authors find that all of these measures vary considerably over time. The authors conclude that both neorealist and institutionalist expectations about the durability of international cooperation are realized in different eras, suggesting that both approaches are time‐bound and misspecify fundamental theoretical issues. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 389-404 Issue: 4 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434874 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434874 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:389-404 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gregory A. Raymond Author-X-Name-First: Gregory A. Author-X-Name-Last: Raymond Title: Demosthenes and democracies: Regime‐types and arbitration outcomes Abstract: Recent empirical research has found that democracies almost never wage war against each other. One explanation for this finding is that when given the same opportunities, joint‐democracy dyads are more willing than other types of dyads to entrust third parties with judicial competence to settle their disputes with binding arbitration. But while joint‐democracy dyads show a greater propensity than other pairs of states to use international arbitration, little research has been done on the success of these efforts. In order to determine whether there are any differences in the outcomes of arbitrations among different types of dyads, 221 cases of international arbitration were analyzed. No support was found for the hypothesis that joint‐democracy dyads experience significantly greater success using arbitration than other types of dyads. Joint democracy is an important predictor of whether states will choose a binding method of third‐party conflict resolution, but it does not predict whether a salient outcome will emerge from the arbitration. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-20 Issue: 1 Volume: 22 Year: 1995 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434877 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434877 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1995:i:1:p:1-20 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James Meernik Author-X-Name-First: James Author-X-Name-Last: Meernik Author-Name: Steven C. Poe Author-X-Name-First: Steven C. Author-X-Name-Last: Poe Title: U.S. Foreign aid in the domestic and international environments Abstract: This study is an initial empirical investigation of domestic and international environment variables on U.S. foreign aid allocation, from 1947--1990. We hypothesize that both of these environments affect aggregate aid levels, and are therefore important to the aid allocation process as contextual factors that influence the amounts of aid that will be available for allocation among recipient countries. When we test domestic and international environmental models separately, we find each performs quite well. However, in our most stringent test of these hypotheses, in which both international and domestic factors were included, we find that international variables, on the whole, tend to be more important. Variables identifying years in which the U.S. was a participant in war, the degree of conflict in U.S. Soviet relations, and the Marshall plan period are found to have had statistically significant impacts on aggregate levels of foreign aid once other factors are controlled. We also find that the domestic factor of economic hardship, which we measure with a misery index, is associated with fewer funds being devoted to the aid budget. We close by discussing the implications of these findings to U.S. foreign aid allocation, and outline some ideas for future research on foreign aid. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 21-40 Issue: 1 Volume: 22 Year: 1995 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434878 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434878 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1995:i:1:p:21-40 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joseph Lepgold Author-X-Name-First: Joseph Author-X-Name-Last: Lepgold Author-Name: Bruce Bueno De Mesquita Author-X-Name-First: Bruce Bueno Author-X-Name-Last: De Mesquita Author-Name: James D. Morrow Author-X-Name-First: James D. Author-X-Name-Last: Morrow Title: The struggle for mastery in Europe, 1985--1993 Abstract: The demise of the Soviet threat and the growing importance of economic affairs have led to a loosening of international coalitions. We propose a spatial model to help understand the dynamics of international coalitions. States form coalitions to realize preferred outcomes of international issues. A coalition's ability to shift the status quo to such preferred outcomes depends on its members’ capabilities. Shifts in the issue positions that states hold or shifts in their capabilities lead to changes in coalition membership. We show how the end of the Cold War and its aftermath can be explained by the spatial model. We conclude by identifying several feasible post‐Cold War alternative futures. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 41-66 Issue: 1 Volume: 22 Year: 1995 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434879 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434879 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1995:i:1:p:41-66 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Suzanne Werner Author-X-Name-First: Suzanne Author-X-Name-Last: Werner Title: Absolute and limited war: The possibility of foreign‐imposed regime change Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between foreign imposed regime change and war participation. The oppertunity and willingness of an opponent to impose a new regime on a war participant affects the likelihood that such a change will occur. Results from a logistic regression model suggest that (1) winning or losing the war, (2) the amount of war costs the participant endures, (3) the power of the participant relative to its opponent, (4) the amount of war costs the opponent endures, (5) the occurrence of a domestic regime change during the war, and (6) the difference between the authority structures of the war participant and its opponent all have a significant and sizable impact on the probability that a war participant endures a foreign imposed regime change. The first three variables measure the opponent's opportunity to force a regime change, while the last three measure its willingness. I suggest that these results increase our ability to evaluate the likely consequences of a war, and may have important implications for our understanding of the decision to enter and terminate a war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 67-88 Issue: 1 Volume: 22 Year: 1995 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434880 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434880 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1995:i:1:p:67-88 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Harvey Starr Author-X-Name-First: Harvey Author-X-Name-Last: Starr Author-Name: Randolph M. Siverson Author-X-Name-First: Randolph M. Author-X-Name-Last: Siverson Author-Name: James D. Morrow Author-X-Name-First: James D. Author-X-Name-Last: Morrow Title: Editorial announcement Journal: International Interactions Pages: 87-87 Issue: 2 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434882 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434882 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:87-87 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Schafer Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Schafer Title: Altering conflict attitudes through prenegotiation contact Abstract: This experiment investigates the hypothesis that prenegotiation contact improves conflict attitudes between adversaries. Many different literatures theoretically support variations on this theme, but there has been very little empirical work which directly tests the idea. Using experimental methodology and an international conflict simulation to collect data, the findings from this study demonstrate that there is a strong recasting effect associated with prenegotiation contact. Attitudes are changed in relation to the conflict in general, views of the opponent, and views of self. While the results strongly support the positive effect of prenegotiation contact upon conflict attitudes, important questions are raised regarding other theoretical and empirical dimensions of the process as it relates to international conflict resolution. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 89-104 Issue: 2 Volume: 22 Year: 1995 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434883 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434883 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1995:i:2:p:89-104 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John R. Oneal Author-X-Name-First: John R. Author-X-Name-Last: Oneal Author-Name: Hugh Carter Whatley Author-X-Name-First: Hugh Carter Author-X-Name-Last: Whatley Title: The effect of alliance membership on national defense burdens, 1953--88: A test of Mancur Olson's theory of collective action Abstract: Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) offered the first theoretical explanation for variation in the defense burdens of allies. Since then, the theory of collective action (Olson, 1971 [1965]) has been extensively tested using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WTO). While most studies indicate that allied defense burdens (the ratio of military expenditures to gross domestic product) are correlated with economic size, this relationship has rarely been assessed for non‐allied states. Here we examine the association between national defense burdens and economic size, 1953--1988, for NATO, the WTO, the Rio Pact, and the Arab Collective Security Pact in a nested test using most of the non‐allied nations of the world as a control group. Our results generally support the theory. NATO and the Warsaw Pact consistently conform to theoretical expectations, and evidence regarding the Rio Pact, on balance, is positive. Defense burdens are not correlated with economic size within the Arab Pact, however. In addition, nations’ defense burdens are affected by the external threat, as indicated by arms races and war; but the effect of involvement in war is surprisingly small. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 105-122 Issue: 2 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434884 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434884 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:105-122 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Joseph Hewitt Author-X-Name-First: J. Joseph Author-X-Name-Last: Hewitt Author-Name: Jonathan Wilkenfeld Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan Author-X-Name-Last: Wilkenfeld Title: Democracies in international crisis Abstract: One of the most widely researched theoretical perspectives in international politics in recent years has been the so‐called theory of democratic peace. Although democracies may be no less prone than non‐democracies to engage in violence in pursuit of their interests, they rarely employ war as a means for resolving conflicts with other democracies. We extend the well‐known argument and propose that for nations locked in international crises, the presence or absence of democratic norms of conflict resolution will dictate whether or not such crises are likely to escalate to violence. Using data on international crises in the twentieth century, an indicator of democratic composition is proposed which is sensitive to both the coalitional proportion and overall proportion of democracies in crisis. We posit that as the prevalence of democracies in a crisis increases, the likelihood of escalation of military hostilities decreases, while the likelihood of involvement and effectiveness of international organizations increases. The findings confirm the dampening effect of democratic composition on the escalation of violence, while democratic composition impacts only marginally on the involvement and effectiveness of international organizations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 123-142 Issue: 2 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434885 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434885 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:123-142 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas Lemke Author-X-Name-First: Douglas Author-X-Name-Last: Lemke Author-Name: William Reed Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Reed Title: Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace Abstract: A tremendous amount of attention is paid to whether or not joint democracy precludes wars within dyads. Although there now seems to be some measure of consensus that democracies rarely or never fight one another, the scholarly debate continues to be heated, lengthy, and occasionally negative. Part of the reason why the democratic peace proposition has met so much opposition might lie in the threat it poses to many established theories of international relations. However, the empirical phenomenon of the democratic peace may be compatible with at least one established theory of international relations: power transition theory. If it can be shown that democracies evaluate the status quo similarly, then power transition theory predicts that wars between them should be exceedingly rare. Further, if non‐democracies comprise the bulk of states dissatisfied with the status quo, then wars between democracies and non‐democracies are to be expected. Regime type is tentatively linked to status quo evaluations in this article, suggesting that it may be possible to incorporate the empirical observation of a democratic peace within power transition theory. Rather than contradicting established theory, the results associated with the democratic peace might indicate how strong an influence the status quo plays in restraining international conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 143-164 Issue: 2 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434886 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434886 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:143-164 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kunihiko Imai Author-X-Name-First: Kunihiko Author-X-Name-Last: Imai Author-Name: Peggy Ann James Author-X-Name-First: Peggy Ann Author-X-Name-Last: James Title: Dynamics of a trilateral game of influence: Interactions between major powers’ foreign policy instruments and the behavior of weaker states Abstract: Since no work has been done to empirically test the impact of a bipolar structure on developing countries, this article serves as the first systematic attempt to operationalize the concept of bipolar competition. By using the case of U.S.‐Soviet rivalry during the Cold War period, we scientifically operationalize the concept based on the geopolitical approach to international relations. Also, since few works have tried to analyze the relative impact among the foreign policy instruments used by major powers—namely, arms transfers, trade, and economic aid—this article incorporates all of them to examine their relative impact, as well as that of the competition, upon the consensus between each of the superpowers and developing countries. Furthermore, it analyzes the critical link between the global system and foreign policy instruments by examining the mutual influence between the foreign policy instruments and the influence of various structural variables, such as the competition, upon the instruments. The results of the pooled time‐series, multiple regressions—run by using Two‐Stage Least Squares—demonstrate our success in measuring the concept, Competition, and its, as well as the other structural variables’, impact on the Consensus and the foreign policy instruments. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 165-195 Issue: 2 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434887 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629608434887 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:2:p:165-195 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott E. Tarry Author-X-Name-First: Scott E. Author-X-Name-Last: Tarry Title: Competing interests and technology policies: A rational choice approach Abstract: This paper explores the competition over technology policies by various domestic and foreign interest groups or stakeholders. An expected utility model is used to simulate the competition over the nature and direction of the American supersonic transport (SST) program in the 60s and 70s. The simulation shows that this rational choice approach offers a powerful analytical tool for examing technology and other foreign economic policy processes. The expected utility simulation allows for a more rigorous inspection of the explanations presented in the political economy literature which should allow scholars to’ further explore expectations and conclusions about strategic trade and other foreign economic policies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 197-223 Issue: 3 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434889 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434889 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:3:p:197-223 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: T. Clifton Morgan Author-X-Name-First: T. Clifton Author-X-Name-Last: Morgan Author-Name: Glenn Palmer Author-X-Name-First: Glenn Author-X-Name-Last: Palmer Title: A two‐good theory of foreign policy: An application to dispute initiation and reciprocation Abstract: We develop a general theory of foreign policy based on the assumption that states pursue two goals: security, defined as the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo, and proaction, defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways. We also assume a relationship between state power and production advantages for security and proaction. The model produces specific hypotheses relating state power and changes in power with security‐ and proaction‐seeking behaviors. For instance, weak states gaining power are the most likely to engage in security‐seeking behavior while strong states gaining power are the most likely to seek proaction. We associate proaction‐seeking behavior with conflict initiation and security‐seeking behavior with conflict reciprocation and test several hypotheses using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set. While hypotheses are generally supported, the evidence suggests that some modifications of the theory are in order. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 225-244 Issue: 3 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434890 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434890 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:3:p:225-244 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew J. Enterline Author-X-Name-First: Andrew J. Author-X-Name-Last: Enterline Title: Fledgling regimes: Is the case of inter‐war Germany generalizable? Abstract: This paper formulates a three‐phase model of regime change, domestic conflict, and interstate conflict inspired by the case of Germany between the First and Second World Wars. In the first phase of the German case, democratization during the Weimar regime was followed by chronic political instability and conflict. During the second phase, a weak Weimar regime set the stage for the emergence of the National Socialists and the erosion, and subsequent elimination, of democracy under the dictatorship of Adolph Hitler. In the third phase, automatization of the German state was followed by an increasingly aggressive foreign policy during the late 1930s ‐ the prelude to the Second World War. I examine whether this familiar, if spectacular, example of democratization, instability, democratic erosion, and aggressive foreign policy is generalizable across a larger spatial and temporal domain. Testing hypotheses derived from the model's three phases, I draw the following primary conclusions. First, new democracies are subject to significant levels of mild and severe forms of domestic conflict, although the findings suggest that new autocratic states are also subject to more severe domestic conflict for a longer duration than conflict experienced by new democracies. The empirical results for the second phase of the model indicate that polities afflicted with high levels of domestic conflict are more likely to become more autocratic. Lastly, I find support for the model's third hypothesis that new autocracies are more likely to originate conflict with other states, and this relationship is fairly strong across pre‐and post‐WWII samples. Interestingly, new democracies are found to be more likely to initiate disputes in the pre‐WWII sample, but not in the post‐WWII sample. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 245-277 Issue: 3 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434891 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434891 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:3:p:245-277 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Evelyn C. Fink Author-X-Name-First: Evelyn C. Author-X-Name-Last: Fink Author-Name: Brian D. Humes Author-X-Name-First: Brian D. Author-X-Name-Last: Humes Author-Name: Valerie L. schwebach Author-X-Name-First: Valerie L. Author-X-Name-Last: schwebach Title: The size principle and the strategic basis of an alliance: Formalizing intuitions Abstract: At the end of the Cold War, attention is keenly turned towards predicting alliance behavior in the international system. As such the lessons from past history are important in helping us guide our expectations. One recent lesson, Schweller (1993), argued that the strategic basis of a coalition was decisive in determining the size of coalitions; offensive coalitions would be minimum winning while defensive coalitions would be maximal. We show that by formalizing in game theoretic terms what ‘seems reasonable,’ in fact does not yield these predictions. We find no support for the strategic basis of a coalition being determinate in predicting the size of a coalition. As such, formalizing the intuitions from the lessons of the past help guide us in our search for usable lessons in alliance formation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 279-294 Issue: 3 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434892 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434892 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:3:p:279-294 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gary Goertz Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Goertz Title: Guest editor's introduction Journal: International Interactions Pages: 295-298 Issue: 4 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434894 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434894 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:4:p:295-298 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacob Bercovitch Author-X-Name-First: Jacob Author-X-Name-Last: Bercovitch Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Conflict management of enduring rivalries: The frequency, timing, and short‐term impact of mediation Abstract: In this study, we explore the frequency, timing, and impact of a particular form of conflict management—namely, mediation—and we do so in the dangerous context of international militarized rivalries over the period 1816--1992. We wish to explore how often does mediation actually occur in the context of enduring rivalries and understand at what phase mediation efforts are undertaken (if indeed they are made at all). Are mediation efforts only made in the most severe rivalries, or are they attempted in rivalries before they become enduring? At what stage in the rivalry is mediation attempted, and how does this fit in with the prescriptions derived from the extensive literature on timing and mediation success? Beyond a description of mediation in the context of rivalries, we wish to assess its impact on the short‐term dynamics of rivalries. Do mediation efforts make a difference? Do they help to postpone the onset of violence, lessen conflict severity, or prevent a war? The results indicated that enduring rivalries experience more mediation efforts than other conflicts. Compared to other less intense rivalries, enduring ones were up to ten times more likely to involve a third party (more than a majority of enduring rivalries actually had at least one mediation effort), and the average number of mediation attempts was significantly greater in the enduring rivalry context. Contrary to some prescriptions, we did not find mediation efforts to occur necessarily later in rivalries; mediations generally occurred at various stages of the rivalry process, regardless of whether it was a isolated, proto, or enduring rivalry. Overall, we found mediation attempts to have relatively little impact on the behavior of states in rivalries. They did not apparently influence the likelihood of subsequent war between rivals nor the level of severity for conflict that fell short of the war threshold. The most notable effects of mediation were found in their relationship to dispute “waiting times” or the interval from one dispute to the next. We found that positive mediation outcomes could, in some rivalries, lead to a delay in the onset of new militarized conflict, but the effect was modest. As anticipated, mediation attempts occurring in the latter stages of a rivalry did increase waiting times, but we judge this relationship to be spurious given the basic trend in rivalries toward greater time between disputes as rivalries mature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 299-320 Issue: 4 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434895 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434895 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:4:p:299-320 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gary Goertz Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Goertz Author-Name: Patrick M. Regan Author-X-Name-First: Patrick M. Author-X-Name-Last: Regan Title: Conflict management in enduring rivalries Abstract: Conflict management and security regimes have generated much interest in international relations, ong‐term conflict management, in particular, requires a framework that privileges a longitudinal perspective; enduring rivalries provide a coherent reference point from which to examine these issues. Before one can explain successful or unsuccessful conflict management one must have a clear conception of what is meant by the term. There exists no clear definition of what successful conflict management actually consists of. We develop three different interpretations of what this can mean in the enduring rivalry context. ‘Success’ can mean (1) reduce the average level of conflict in the rivalry, (2) reduce the occurrence of more severe militarized conflicts, or (3) reduce the ‘volatility’ or variation of conflict levels. In short, the article takes the first step in explaining successful and unsuccessful medium‐ and long‐term conflict management by providing three conflict management dependent variables from which further analysis can proceed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 321-340 Issue: 4 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434896 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434896 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:4:p:321-340 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas M. Gibler Author-X-Name-First: Douglas M. Author-X-Name-Last: Gibler Title: Control the issues, control the conflict: The effects of alliances that settle territorial issues on interstate rivalries Abstract: Research has shown that a large number of interstate disputes frequently occur between the same pairs of states and that these rivalries tend to include wars more often than not. This article examines whether states involved in rivalry can take steps to manage disputed issues and decrease the probability of the rivalry escalating to war. The analyses presented here suggest that states can and do take steps to manage their disputes. It is shown that certain alliance commitments are actually attempts to manage conflict between rival states by removing territorial issues from their agendas. These territorial settlement treaties fundamentally change the nature of the rivalry by changing the issues of contention. Once this occurs, the nature of future disputes is altered and the probability of repeated disputes decreases. Even in enduring rivalries, rivals that have formed prior territorial settlements experience much less conflict than other rivals. Lastly, it is also shown that major‐major, enduring rivalries with prior territorial settlements take much longer before going to war—they will suffer through twice as many disputes and four times as many years of rivalry before going to war than other enduring rivals. Methodologically, this paper utilitizes the “rivalry approach” recently advocated by Goertz and Diehl (1996) in addition to the more familiar cross‐sectional, dyad‐year approach. The use of the rivalry approach is believed to be especially warranted considering this issue's focus upon rivalry termination. Traditional cross‐sectional approaches often obscure dynamic relationships that exist between rivals and ignore fundamental changes that occur over time. Obviously, the termination of the rivalry is just such a fundamental change and cannot occur without prior shifts in the rivalry relationship. Therefore, rivalry termination should provide excellent testing ground for this new approach. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 341-368 Issue: 4 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434897 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434897 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:4:p:341-368 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: D. Scott Bennett Author-X-Name-First: D. Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Bennett Title: Democracy, regime change, and rivalry termination Abstract: I examine how certain domestic political conditions affect if and when interstate rivalries end. I argue that rivalries are more likely to end (1) when regime changes occur, (2) when a rivalry involves democratic states, and (3) when rivals are democratizing. I also test the proposition that both states in a rivalry must be democratic in order for the probability of rivalry termination to increase. I assess the argument using a hazard analysis of rivalry duration, using two data sets of rivalries from 1816 to 1988, and using different measures of democracy. I find strong support for the existence of a relationship between polity change and the end of rivalries, and somewhat weaker support for the existence of a relationship between democracy and the end of rivalries. It appears that it is in fact the joint presence of two democracies in a rivalry that helps lead to their termination. However, the process of democratization appears to have little effect, either positive or negative, on rivalry duration. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 369-397 Issue: 4 Volume: 22 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434898 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434898 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:22:y:1996:i:4:p:369-397 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Peter J. Partell Author-X-Name-First: Peter J. Author-X-Name-Last: Partell Title: Escalation at the outset: An analysis of targets’ responses in militarized interstate disputes Abstract: The manner in which states behave within interstate disputes is of particular theoretical interest to those concerned with the question of why some disputes between states escalate to war while others do not. Much of the literature on interstate crises suggests that the way in which a state responds to a challenge from another state is a useful predictor of the way that crisis will end, i.e., whether the crisis will escalate to war. This analysis uses data on militarized disputes and finds this to be the case. The analysis goes further, however, in that it isolates some of the important factors influencing how targets of militarized challenges respond to those challenges. The results suggest that moving from interstate war to a finer level of analysis, such as the intra‐dispute behavior of states, can provide a more complete picture of how commonly held theoretical notions are related to the presence or absence of interstate war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-35 Issue: 1 Volume: 23 Year: 1996 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434899 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434899 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:1-35 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jeffrey S. Morton Author-X-Name-First: Jeffrey S. Author-X-Name-Last: Morton Title: The international law commission of the United Nations: Legal vacuum or microcosm of world politics? Abstract: Classical realists and Utopian idealists have long disagreed over the nature of international law. While classical realists from E.H. Carr to Hans Morgenthau contend that law is the product of power realities in international relations, Utopian idealists reject such power explanations, focusing instead on the institutions that create international law. This study addresses that theoretic struggle by empirically examining the intervention of world politics in the debate process of the International Law Commission. A data base is created from the debate record of Law Commission members from 1983 to 1989. Content analysis is performed to test explicit hypotheses that examine the Utopian assumption of an apolitical Law Commission found in the Commission's Statute. The findings indicate that the Law Commission functions in a manner that is greatly constrained by global politics and power realities. The focus on institutions, prevalent in the literature, is misleading and fails to capture the essence of the debate process in the Commission. The strength of the findings underscores the necessity for students of international law to employ a more empirical, systematic methodology in their research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 37-54 Issue: 1 Volume: 23 Year: 1996 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434900 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434900 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:37-54 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Francine Friedman Author-X-Name-First: Francine Author-X-Name-Last: Friedman Title: To fight or not to fight: The decision to settle the Croat‐Serb conflict Abstract: The contemporary Croat‐Serb conflict is the result of long‐standing misconceptions, competing historical claims, and political cynicism. Nevertheless, it was possible to anticipate the basic outlines of the outcome of this conflict even before the negotiations had begun and even though the driving force of the conflict appeared to have been the allegedly irrational force of nationalism. Expected utility analysis applied to expert evaluations of important domestic and external actors was used effectively to detail the likely development of the settlement among the Serbs, Croats, and other ethnic groups within the former Yugoslav state. The findings not only indicated in December 1991 that the Serbs and Croats would in the end settle for Croatian independence with some Croatian (territorial) concessions to Serbia but also that the Bosnian Muslims were the next likely target for extremist Serbian forces. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 55-78 Issue: 1 Volume: 23 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434901 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434901 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:55-78 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alastair Smith Author-X-Name-First: Alastair Author-X-Name-Last: Smith Author-Name: David R. Hayes Author-X-Name-First: David R. Author-X-Name-Last: Hayes Title: The shadow of the polls: Electoral effects on international agreements Abstract: Using Putnam's (1988) metaphor of two‐level games, we consider the relationship between international agreements and domestic elections. We develop a Reversion Point game to reflect the anarchy of the international system. In this game, deals last only as long as both sides continue to support them. When nations form international agreements, they do so knowing how these agreements affect future renegotiations. Rather than model the electorate as an informal ratifier of agreements, we assume that voters make deliberate choices about which party to elect. Since agreements made prior to an election affect the deals that are renegotiated following an election, today's agreements affect which party the electorate prefer to renegotiate agreements in the future. Thus, agreements affect the outcome of elections. A government's strategy in negotiations is therefore affected by how deals influence future renegotiation and elections. We characterize the circumstances under which elections compel governments to accept agreements that myopically they do not support or reject agreements that are myopically favorable. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 79-108 Issue: 1 Volume: 23 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434902 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434902 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:79-108 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew Krain Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: Krain Author-Name: Marissa Edson Myers Author-X-Name-First: Marissa Edson Author-X-Name-Last: Myers Title: Democracy and civil war: A note on the democratic peace proposition Abstract: Democracies may not fight each other, but do they fight themselves? Despite the need to better understand internal wars, empirical investigations of the democratic peace have focused on international war between democracies. We test the effect of regime type on civil wars, a class of events that is widely overlooked in the study of conflict. We find that regime type strongly affects civil war participation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 109-118 Issue: 1 Volume: 23 Year: 1996 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434903 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434903 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1996:i:1:p:109-118 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Fiona McGillivray Author-X-Name-First: Fiona Author-X-Name-Last: McGillivray Author-Name: Alastair Smith Author-X-Name-First: Alastair Author-X-Name-Last: Smith Title: Institutional determinants of trade policy Abstract: A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral districts receive the most protection. In the United States, a plurality system with low party discipline, large industries geographically dispersed over many electoral districts receive the most favorable protection. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 119-143 Issue: 2 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434904 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434904 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:2:p:119-143 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lui Hebron Author-X-Name-First: Lui Author-X-Name-Last: Hebron Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Title: Great powers, cycles of relative capability and crises in world politics Abstract: Connections to cycles of relative capability suggest that conflict among the great powers may exhibit certain regularities. Evolutionary changes in national capabilities and role, if manifested in cycles, may have implications for crises in world politics. The objective of this study is to use data on crises in foreign policy to test propositions derived from the theory of power cycles. There are five stages to this investigation. The first presents the theory and revises it through introduction of insights from prospect theory. The second phase derives implications for foreign policy crises from power cycle theory in its elaborated form. Third, measurements are developed for various aspects of crises and critical points in relative capabilities among the great powers. The fourth stage is analysis of data on the experiences of the great powers in foreign policy crises from 1918 to 1985. The fifth and final task is to assess implications of the findings and suggest directions for future research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 145-173 Issue: 2 Volume: 23 Year: 1996 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434905 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434905 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1996:i:2:p:145-173 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tansa George Massoud Author-X-Name-First: Tansa George Author-X-Name-Last: Massoud Title: The war process: Military and diplomatic dimensions during the cold war Abstract: The quantitative study of war, although one of the most important topics in the discipline of international politics, remains incomplete due to a lack of data about the evolution of events once war begins. This paper addresses the need for such data by focusing on the behavior of states during war using a new data set containing information on the military and diplomatic events of 20 interstate wars. A discussion of the war process is followed by a description of the new data set and coding procedures. The last section of the article explores the preliminary results of the data. A number of trends is examined, including initiation of events, casualties, diplomatic concessions, and military and diplomatic outcomes. The findings suggest the following: First, there is a strong association between the initiator of a military event and the winner of that event. Second, the concession rate of actors is not solely a function of military casualties but includes other intervening variables. Third, a significant association is found between a country's military performance and its negotiating behavior for those wars with a clear military outcome. Finally, the results suggest that war is more likely to be an effective tool of foreign policy when two conditions exist: (a) the military outcome is decisive, and (b) no outside powers intervene to nullify the ending of war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 175-206 Issue: 2 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434906 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434906 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:2:p:175-206 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas J. Volgy Author-X-Name-First: Thomas J. Author-X-Name-Last: Volgy Author-Name: Lawrence E. Imwalle Author-X-Name-First: Lawrence E. Author-X-Name-Last: Imwalle Author-Name: Jeff J. Corntassel Author-X-Name-First: Jeff J. Author-X-Name-Last: Corntassel Title: Structural determinants of international terrorism: The effects of hegemony and polarity on terrorist activity Abstract: This research focuses on a relatively unique approach to the study of international terrorism: systemic explanations of terrorist activity. Using the post‐1945 world ‐of international politics, the research explores the extent to which fluctuations in hegemonic capabilities, acceptance of hegemonic leadership, bipolar conflict, bipolar balance, and contagion effects can account for variation in international terrorist activity. Five hypotheses are tested, using five different measures of the dependent variable The results consistently underscore the importance of systemic approaches, and especially that of the diminution of hegemonic capabilities, as salient contextual considerations for a comprehensive explanation of international terrorism. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 207-231 Issue: 2 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434907 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434907 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:2:p:207-231 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Author-Name: Yi Feng Author-X-Name-First: Yi Author-X-Name-Last: Feng Title: Foreword Journal: International Interactions Pages: 233-234 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434908 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434908 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:233-234 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Author-X-Name-First: Bruce Bueno Author-X-Name-Last: de Mesquita Title: A decision making model: Its structure and form Abstract: I explain the logic and real‐time track record of the expected utility model used for forecasting the outcome and dynamics of political choices. The model represents an example of applied modeling. It is a tool designed for practical application. As such, some sacrifices in theoretical or analytic purity are made to gain empirical leverage. At the same time, the model remains faithful to the rational choice perspective that suggests that decision makers do what they believe is in their best interest. Decision makers are modeled as individuals with bounded rationality, who are not able to look ahead over an unbounded time horizon, but instead see only one move ahead of their current choice. Furthermore, while they update information, they do so crudely. I also attempt to explain limitations of the model and areas for further improvement. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 235-266 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434909 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434909 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:235-266 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Andrew Abdollahian Author-X-Name-First: Mark Andrew Author-X-Name-Last: Abdollahian Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Title: Unraveling the ties that divide: Russian political succession Abstract: This work presents a clear picture of the domestic transformation which has followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. It demonstrates that the integrity of the Soviet Union was secondary to the integrity of Russia. The contest over economic reform was central in generating the Parliamentary Revolt in 1993 and in influencing the elections of 1996. However, it was only partially involved in the coup against Gorbachev in 1991 and was secondary in the development of the succession crisis in Chechnya. Yeltsin's political brilliance was in recognizing that support for reform by itself was insufficient to ensure the strength of the Presidency or even his reelection. A nationalistic posture on Russia did not contradict his anti‐nationalistic stance toward the Soviet Union. Our analysis shows that Yeltsin was able to strengthen the Presidency and ensure political stability because he adroitly cultivated support along reformist and nationalistic dimensions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 267-281 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434910 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434910 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:267-281 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Author-Name: Michael Lusztig Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Lusztig Title: Quebec's economic and political future with North America Abstract: Through use of the expected utility forecasting model, we make predictions about the prospects for constitutional negotiations that would satisfy Quebec, as well as the likelihood that member governments of the NAFTA would accommodate Quebec and seek further integration of the North American economies. The investigation unfolds in four stages. The first section describes the historical background to the political and economic conflict associated with Quebec's problematic role in Confederation. Second, expert‐generated data on constitutional and trade issues is presented, with specific attention to Quebec's political autonomy and degree of integration in the NAFTA. The third phase contains the expected utility model's forecasting of Quebec's political and economic future with North America. Fourth, and finally, implications of the results are discussed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 283-298 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434911 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434911 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:283-298 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Doris Andrea Fuchs Author-X-Name-First: Doris Andrea Author-X-Name-Last: Fuchs Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Author-Name: Harry Pachon Author-X-Name-First: Harry Author-X-Name-Last: Pachon Title: NAFTA: From congressional passage to implementation woes Abstract: This paper reviews the decision making process during the 1993 NAFTA debate and Congressional vote, and evaluates the likelihood that key provisions on trucking will be implemented. We provide empirical evidence that a combination of expert knowledge and modeling allows analysts to accurately obtain insights and anticipate outcomes of political processes. Utilizing the Expected Utility approach to analyze the NAFTA negotiations prior to the Congressional vote in November 1993, we show that the outcome of this “uncertain” vote according to most expert and media until the very last days, was correctly forecasted months before the actual vote. Furthermore, we show that the benefits of possessing such political knowledge translate directly to the economic sphere. We then show that the same approach can be used to account for the failure to implement key NAFTA provisions on trucking, and anticipate their likely resolution. Finally, we demonstrate that the information provided by the combination of expert knowledge and modeling is superior to either of them separately, and cannot be matched by even a thorough contextual analysis of the situation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 299-314 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434912 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434912 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:299-314 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yi Feng Author-X-Name-First: Yi Author-X-Name-Last: Feng Title: Economic reform in China: Logic and dynamism Abstract: This article uses the expected utility model to study the logic and dynamism of China's economic reform. Framed as an endogenous policy phenomenon, the reform implies some hypotheses for testing. The model successfully explains the progression of the reform from the agricultural to the industrial dimension. It accurately identifies the median provinces in the two stages of the reform, thus providing important insights into the rationale and logic of initiating and continuing a reform which has significant political and economic consequences. Through examining the median provinces, particularly, Liaoning Province, we have gained a substantial grasp of how far and how fast the China reform will go in its next phase. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 315-332 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434913 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434913 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:315-332 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: A. F. K. Organski Author-X-Name-First: A. F. K. Author-X-Name-Last: Organski Author-Name: Ellen Lust‐Okar Author-X-Name-First: Ellen Author-X-Name-Last: Lust‐Okar Title: The tug of war over the status of Jerusalem: Leaders, strategies and outcomes Abstract: This analysis of the Middle East negotiations on Jerusalem has two purposes. First it forecasts and analyzes the potential settlement over the future status of Jerusalem. Second it uses this issue to examine whether political leadership or coalitional structures play the major role in determining political outcomes. The analyses conclude that coalitional politics have a significant impact on the nature and stability of negotiated outcomes, while political leadership plays only a minor role. Specifically, under Rabin and Peres, a stable arrangement over Jerusalem's future was expected. Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control, and this with the agreement of Arafat and the Palestinian National Authority. Under Netanyahu, Israel continues to control Jerusalem, but now with the bitter opposition of all Palestinian forces. Indeed, the analysis shows that even after Netanyahu and other key Israeli actors become willing to make dramatic concessions, no peaceful settlement over the city's future remains possible. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 333-350 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434914 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434914 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:333-350 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Francine Friedman Author-X-Name-First: Francine Author-X-Name-Last: Friedman Author-Name: Ismene Gizelis Author-X-Name-First: Ismene Author-X-Name-Last: Gizelis Title: Fighting in Bosnia: An expected utility evaluation of possible settlements Abstract: The military conflict over the future of Bosnia was long and vicious. In this article we analyze the negotiation period over two years utilizing the expected utility model. We demonstrate the merits of modeling in capturing the dynamics of the bargaining process. We show that the progressive shift in American policies was the catalyst that led to the Dayton agreement. We conclude that if the United States maintains an active role, the local actors will not challenge its institutional framework. If American troops withdraw from the area before securing peace, conflict will reignite. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 351-365 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434915 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434915 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:351-365 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James Lee Ray Author-X-Name-First: James Lee Author-X-Name-Last: Ray Title: A post‐mortem on the predictions: Criteria, complaints, and compliments Abstract: Rational choice, or expected utility models have garnered considerable skepticism in many quarters in recent years. Much of that skepticism is deserved. However, the model on which the forecasts in this collection are based is different from many of its competitors in ways which address quite directly the shortcomings that have generated most of the skepticism. Attempts to apply this model can be evaluated according to several criteria, such as the information provided about the experts that generate the data, whether or not the actual data on which the forecasts are based are provided to readers, whether those numbers or data conform with fairly straightforward logic, or intuitive ideas about the political events being analyzed, whether the issue being analyzed is truly one dimensional, and how specific, as well as how controversial, or counterintuitive the forecasts are. The forecasts here are intriguing, intelligent, and conscientious attempts to demonstrate the virtues of a forecasting model that has produced a rather lengthy record of success in both public policy‐oriented arenas, as well as the private sector. It is to be hoped that in the not‐too‐distant future, these attempts will appear rather crude and preliminary. Even if this occurs, the pioneering nature of these efforts should not be overlooked. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 367-386 Issue: 3-4 Volume: 23 Year: 1997 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434916 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629708434916 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:23:y:1997:i:3-4:p:367-386 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Harvey Starr Author-X-Name-First: Harvey Author-X-Name-Last: Starr Author-Name: Randolph M. Siverson Author-X-Name-First: Randolph M. Author-X-Name-Last: Siverson Title: Editors’ note Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-1 Issue: 1 Volume: 24 Year: 1998 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434919 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434919 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1998:i:1:p:1-1 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Zeev Maoz Author-X-Name-First: Zeev Author-X-Name-Last: Maoz Title: Realist and cultural critiques of the democratic peace: A theoretical and empirical re‐assessment Abstract: Over the last four years, a number of criticisms have been addressed at the democratic peace proposition. These criticisms challenged both the basic argument that democracies do not fight each other as well as the explanation for this phenomenon. The present study re‐evaluates the democratic peace proposition in light of two types of criticisms: relaist and cultural. Realist criticisms argue that the democratic peace proposition is either a statistical artifact or that the lack of conflict between democracies can be explained by realist factors such as power balances or common interests. Cultural criticisms challenge the “objectivity” of conceptions of democracy, and accuse democratic peace notions as being culturally biased. The examination of these criticisms leads to a number of empirical replications and novel statistical tests of the democratic peace proposition. The overall conclusion is that none of these criticisms damages the basic fact of the democratic peace. The conclusion urges moving on to solving new puzzles raised by the democratic peace research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 3-89 Issue: 1 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434920 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434920 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:1:p:3-89 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Margaret G. Hermann Author-X-Name-First: Margaret G. Author-X-Name-Last: Hermann Author-Name: Charles W. Kegley Author-X-Name-First: Charles W. Author-X-Name-Last: Kegley Title: The U.S. use of military intervention to promote democracy: Evaluating the record Abstract: Given the foreign policy priority that the Clinton administration has placed on the “enlargement” of the democratic community, a relevant question is whether military intervention is an effective instrument for achieving such a purpose. This research explores the impact of American interventions since 1945 on the political systems of the targets. What happens when U.S. presidents pursue “pro‐liberalization policies” through military interventions? Merging several inventories of interventionary actions, we examine what sorts of interventions are associated with liberal changes in the nature of the targets’ political regimes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 91-114 Issue: 2 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434922 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434922 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:2:p:91-114 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John H. P. Williams Author-X-Name-First: John H. P. Author-X-Name-Last: Williams Author-Name: Mark J. Webber Author-X-Name-First: Mark J. Author-X-Name-Last: Webber Title: Evolving Russian civil‐military relations: A rational actor analysis Abstract: Recent analyses agree that Russia is experiencing considerable difficulty adapting to its new circumstances, but differ as to where these problems will lead. Some authors expect that the current regime will continue muddling through, while others fear that what remains of the former Soviet defense community could try to intervene against weaker pro‐democratic actors. We use a rational actor model to assess the interplay of policy preference, strength and perceptions of risk among the major players in Russian politics. The results support the contention of those who argue that the current regime will continue muddling through. Though politically significant, potential challengers to the regime cannot concentrate enough support to move the regime from the path of political and military reform. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 115-150 Issue: 2 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434923 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434923 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:2:p:115-150 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joe Eyerman Author-X-Name-First: Joe Author-X-Name-Last: Eyerman Title: Terrorism and democratic states: Soft targets or accessible systems Abstract: This study evaluates the relationship between democracy and the decision calculus of terrorist organizations. Starting with a simple formalization of the budget constraint for terrorist organizations, this project evaluates two schools of thought regarding the role of democracy. The first school, labeled the strategic school, argues that democratic regimes decrease the price of violence and therefore encourage terrorism. The second school, labeled the political access school, argues that democratic regimes decrease the price of non‐violent political expression and thereby decrease the probability of terrorism. These competing explanations are evaluated against the ITERATE cross‐national time series data for the years 1968 to 1986, using a negative binomial regression event count model. The results show that established democracies are less likely to experience terrorism than non‐democracies, but that newly formed democracies are more likely to experience terrorism than other types of states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 151-170 Issue: 2 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434924 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434924 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:2:p:151-170 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Uk Heo Author-X-Name-First: Uk Author-X-Name-Last: Heo Author-Name: Kwang H. Ro Author-X-Name-First: Kwang H. Author-X-Name-Last: Ro Title: Military expenditures and economic growth in South Korea and Taiwan Abstract: It is generally believed that high levels of military expenditures hamper economic growth because it crowds out investment. Contrary to this popular belief, South Korea and Taiwan have achieved a miraculous economic development while maintaining heavy defense burden. In this study, we investigate how defense spending affects economic growth in these two countries employing the Mintz‐Huang model. The results reveal that there is no significant relationship between defense spending and economic growth in South Korea. However, defense spending indeed deters economic growth in Taiwan when its externality effects are considered. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 171-186 Issue: 2 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434925 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434925 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:2:p:171-186 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Davis B. Bobrow Author-X-Name-First: Davis B. Author-X-Name-Last: Bobrow Author-Name: Simon Reich Author-X-Name-First: Simon Author-X-Name-Last: Reich Author-Name: Steve Chan Author-X-Name-First: Steve Author-X-Name-Last: Chan Title: Trade, power and APEC: Hirschman revisited Abstract: This paper is about the relationship between foreign trade and national power in the contemporary Asia Pacific. Imports and exports among the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Community) members are studied over time in order to assess the extent to which this trade has evolved in ways which ceteris paribus provide the larger trading states with more or less leverage to influence the smaller ones. We offer a conceptual discussion of conditions that are likely to shape the incentives to actually use such leverage and, if actually exercised, the prospects that such attempts may succeed. A pattern analysis of trade in the Asia Pacific then follows from which we conclude that the smaller non‐Latin American APEC countries have diversified their trading partners recently and thus reduced their exposure to leverage based on asymmetric dependence in their trade relations. At the same time, we expect from our conceptual discussion that the larger APEC countries are generally more likely to exercise self restraint than to use trade to extract gains on other issues. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 187-223 Issue: 3 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434929 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434929 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:3:p:187-223 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lisa J. Carlson Author-X-Name-First: Lisa J. Author-X-Name-Last: Carlson Title: Crisis escalation: An empirical test in the context of extended deterrence Abstract: The effort to explain escalation processes using formal and empirical models has yielded numerous insights. However, there have been relatively few attempts to integrate these two approaches such that the results from an empirical test of escalation behavior are interpreted within and based on a well specified theory of escalation. This paper bridges that gap by developing a formal theory of escalation processes to derive hypotheses that identify the conditions under which states escalate in conflict. A player's decision to escalate or back down is based on an estimate of the opponent's cost tolerance—the maximum costs a player will withstand to achieve a demand in the game. The hypotheses derived from the theory are general and applicable in many contexts that involve escalation processes. In this paper, the hypotheses are tested empirically in the context of extended deterrence crises. The test confirms the theory's expectations and reveals strong support for the hypotheses. The theory offered here, I argue, provides a better explanation for the patterns found in the data than do the theories used in previous studies of extended deterrence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 225-253 Issue: 3 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434930 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434930 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:3:p:225-253 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Ley‐Borrás Author-X-Name-First: Roberto Author-X-Name-Last: Ley‐Borrás Title: Probabilistic forecasting of political events Abstract: Political conflicts are modeled as Markovian processes where the states are the possible outcomes and the forecast is the steady‐state probability of each outcome. The input variables are the power of the actors, the salience of the issue to the actors and the desirability of each possible outcome to the actors. The modeling flexibility of the proposed method is verified by its application to twenty‐eight actual conflicts that include economic and political issues resolved on national and international settings. The predictive capability of the method is established by close agreement between probability intervals of the forecasts and the actual outcomes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 255-285 Issue: 3 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434931 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434931 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:3:p:255-285 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Richard J. Stoll Author-X-Name-First: Richard J. Author-X-Name-Last: Stoll Title: Nice states finish ... pretty well: Collective security behavior in militarized interstate disputes, 1816--1992 Abstract: Political Realism is an approach that never seems to die. In its latest reincarnation, neorealists have reiterated an old claim: states that behave according to collective security principles will fare poorly in a realist world. This paper examines interventions in disputes that are consistent with collective security principles, and compares the results to other forms of dispute action that are more consistent with realist thought. The results indicate that while interventions consistent with collective security principles are likely to produce higher casualties, the chances of success in collective security interventions is no lower than for other dispute activity. This finding offers a significant challenge to conventional realist thought. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 287-313 Issue: 3 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434932 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434932 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:3:p:287-313 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alastair Smith Author-X-Name-First: Alastair Author-X-Name-Last: Smith Title: Extended deterrence and alliance formation Abstract: Inductive approaches have little conclusive to say about whether alliances make war more or less likely. Moreover, the empirical associations are ambiguous. Modeling alliance formation in an incomplete information setting reveals that alliances have predictable effects on the behavior of nations. The primary effect of alliances is to increase the probability that a nation will intervene in an ongoing war. Since an alliance provides a signal that a nation is likely to intervene, alliances affect the behavior of other states. Specifically, the formation of a defensive alliance deters potential aggressors from attacking, and encourages those nations that are attacked to resist. Although an alliance helps deter enemies and helps reassure friends, success is not guaranteed; deterrence failures occur. Although alliances have a predictable effect on the behavior of nations, the aggregate relationship between alliance formation and the occurrence of war is ambiguous. As well as providing an explanation of much of the empirical evidence, this model generates new testable hypotheses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 315-343 Issue: 4 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434934 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434934 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:4:p:315-343 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew Sobel Author-X-Name-First: Andrew Author-X-Name-Last: Sobel Title: Domestic policy choices, political institutional change, and financial globalization-super-1 Abstract: Active global capital markets existed before the Depression. These markets shrunk to minuscule levels during the Depression and remained that way until 1960. The reawakening of global finance since 1960 constitutes one of the most important transformations in social relations during the twentieth century. Popular explanations of this transformation emphasize systemic pressures external to the state such as technology and economic competition. These “outside‐in” explanations are consistent with “open‐economy” frameworks, but they neglect or discount the causal role of domestic politics and the activities of states. At most, state policy makers, state policies, or domestic political institutions intermediate such pressures to produce different “faces” of globalization across nations. But, external pressures originate somewhere. I marshal systematic empirical evidence to demonstrate that such exogenous pressures originate endogenously in a few key states. The interaction of public policy choices and private choices in such states spill over to produce the exogenous pressures, which then affect the deliberations of all governments. This refinement emphasizes the interaction of public and private, domestic and international, and context and individual choice. Such interactions led to four shifts that fundamentally transform the international financial environment: (1) capital's increasing international mobility, (2) growing securitization and disintermediation, (3) emergence of intangibles as commodities, and (4) participation by Russia, Eastern Europe, and China in global financial markets. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 345-377 Issue: 4 Volume: 24 Year: 1997 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434935 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434935 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1997:i:4:p:345-377 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Marissa Myers Author-X-Name-First: Marissa Author-X-Name-Last: Myers Title: When biased advice is a good thing: Information and foreign policy decision making Abstract: The conventional wisdom holds that good advisors are unbiased and neutral. Calvert's (1985) rational choice model of political advice challenges this view. Following Calvert, I argue that biased sources of information are useful to decision makers because an unexpected recommendation from a biased advisor alerts a decision maker to the deleterious consequences of a policy proposal, providing ex ante information that a neutral advisor cannot. Such advice is particularly salient to political leaders who are held accountable for foreign policy mistakes. In this paper, I apply a model of political advice, assess its implications for foreign policy decision making, and analyze three historical examples of foreign policy decision making that illustrate the impact of biased advice. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 379-403 Issue: 4 Volume: 24 Year: 1998 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629808434936 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629808434936 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:24:y:1998:i:4:p:379-403 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas M. Gibler Author-X-Name-First: Douglas M. Author-X-Name-Last: Gibler Title: An extension of the correlates of war formal alliance data set, 1648--1815 Abstract: Arguing that most empirical studies of war arbitrarily limit themselves to analyses of the state system after 1815, this paper develops extensions of the Correlates of War formal alliance and system membership data sets from 1648 to 1815. An initial comparison of summary statistics indicates that alliance patterns in the post‐Westphalian period were similar, in most respects, to the alliance patterns of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, inclusion of the new alliance data in re‐analyses of alliance war‐proneness (Levy, 1983) and alliance polarization (Wayman, 1984) show that the often noted inter‐century difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may be exaggerated. Nineteenth century alliances were not less likely to be followed by war than alliances formed in other centuries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-28 Issue: 1 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434939 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434939 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:1-28 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Henrik Sommer Author-X-Name-First: Henrik Author-X-Name-Last: Sommer Author-Name: James R. Scarritt Author-X-Name-First: James R. Author-X-Name-Last: Scarritt Title: The utility of reuters for events analysis in area studies: The case of Zambia‐Zimbabwe interactions, 1982--1993 Abstract: Principal investigators in the Global Events Data System project (GEDS) and others have argued that Reuters Library Report is a superior global source of events data because its coverage of the world's regions is relatively even and it is easily accessible on‐line for automated or semi‐automated coding. The question if Reuters should be coded in conjunction with regional and local sources is left open. We test three expectations: Reuters yields a greater number of events as well as more even reporting across COPDAB issue‐areas than a regional and a local source; Reuters has high face validity; and analysis of data from Reuters, a regional, and a local source will yield very different results. We perform tests of the ‘concurrence’ of data from Reuters, Africa Research Bulletin, and the Zimbabwe Herald covering interactions between Zambia and Zimbabwe from January 1st 1982 to December 31st 1993. Interrupted ARIMA time series and OLS measures of covariation are used to test whether substantive results change depending on the source(s) used. Reuters yields the highest number of events, but the frequency of events varies greatly and so did the emphasis on different COPDAB issue‐areas. Reuters does not tend to report the same events as the regional and local sources; it has low face validity for selected quarters and leads to very different inferences from those based on data from all three sources. These results indicate that Reuters is not a substitute for traditional newspaper sources but an important source to use in conjunction with them. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 29-59 Issue: 1 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434940 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434940 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:29-59 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kjell Hausken Author-X-Name-First: Kjell Author-X-Name-Last: Hausken Author-Name: Thomas Plumper Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Plumper Title: The impact of actor heterogeneity on the provision of international public goods Abstract: The article formally analyses the conditions under which actor heterogeneity may have positive effects on the likelihood that international public goods will be provided, and when a hegemon chooses to act benevolently versus coercively toward the other actors. Within the theory of international cooperation the game‐theoretic model crucially rests on the key concepts of hegemonic stability theory. It illustrates with Nash equilibria the conditions under which a hegemon, which may act benevolently versus coercively, rationally chooses to give up the unilateral provision of international public goods under which followers rationally switch from free‐riding in their consumption of the public goods to taking part in leading. One implication of the model is that the emergence of joint economic leadership leads to multiple equilibria in the sense of allowing for multiple stable leadership constellations. The actors are in a mixed‐motive or coordination game where they have different preferences for the equilibria, and thus different preferences for which strategies to choose, and for who is to take part in covering the cost of the production of the public goods. This constellation gives rise to a second‐order conflict about which equilibrium to choose. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 61-94 Issue: 1 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434941 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434941 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:61-94 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Brecke Author-X-Name-First: Peter Author-X-Name-Last: Brecke Author-Name: William J. Long Author-X-Name-First: William J. Author-X-Name-Last: Long Title: War and reconciliation Abstract: Many scholarly disciplines as well as popular opinion recognize reconciliation as a powerful force in restoring social order following conflict. Reconciliation between countries following a war or a series of wars has attracted little attention from international relations scholars, however. This paper uses four international events datasets developed by others and a reconciliation events dataset assembled by the authors to determine whether reconciliation events lead to a discernable decrease in the level of conflict between former belligerents. The results suggest that reconciliation events signal a change towards more cooperative and less conflictual bilateral relations in a number of cases. The impact of reconciliation is hardly uniformly positive, however, and limitations of the data constrain what can be asserted. The paper concludes with thoughts on continuing this inquiry to determine the forces that give rise to reconciliation and the factors that might explain the variance in the dependent variable—post‐reconciliation relations between former belligerents. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 95-117 Issue: 2 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434944 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434944 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:95-117 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert G. Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Robert G. Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Title: Structure and behavior in the world trading system Abstract: A panoply of visions regarding the economic “new world order” have followed the end of the cold war. While some foresee an increasingly globalized and borderless world, others stress the increasing importance of geography in ordering trade relations, while still others argue that economic competition among major powers will simply replace strategic interests. Such arguments all assess a common issue: the structure of global economic relations. Each argument posits a principle for the ordering of economic relations, whether preferential trading arrangements, geography, or military alliances, and provides implications for the structure. Despite the prevalence of such arguments, empirical assessments of the overall structure of the global trading order are rare, and comparative testing of alternate structures is nonexistent. It is the purpose of this study to fill this analytic gap. As such, this study has two primary goals: 1. To empirically examine the structure of the world economy, as evidenced by trading relations, and assess the relative utility of four alternate “visions” for the global trading order. 2. To examine the implications of the trading structure with regards to patterns of trade, conflict, and cooperation between countries. Results most strongly support the structure espoused by world systems analysis. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 119-144 Issue: 2 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434945 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434945 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:119-144 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sean McCluskie Author-X-Name-First: Sean Author-X-Name-Last: McCluskie Author-Name: Jack E. Vincent Author-X-Name-First: Jack E. Author-X-Name-Last: Vincent Title: Research note: Examining the scaling methods of the WEIS data set Abstract: This article examines the scaling methods of the WEIS data set. In particular, the study examines the difference between the Vincent and Goldstein scaling methods at predicting the fluctuations in behavior between nations throughout the international system. In a previous article, Goldstein concluded that his and Vincent's scale results converged when examining the behavior of the United States, the Soviet Union and China toward one another. The results show that Goldstein and Vincent scaling methods converge at the international system level. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 145-151 Issue: 2 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434946 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434946 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:145-151 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Shoon Kathleen Murray Author-X-Name-First: Shoon Kathleen Author-X-Name-Last: Murray Author-Name: Jonathan A. Cowden Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan A. Author-X-Name-Last: Cowden Author-Name: Bruce M. Russett Author-X-Name-First: Bruce M. Author-X-Name-Last: Russett Title: The convergence of American elites’ domestic beliefs with their foreign policy beliefs Abstract: Contemporary scholarship on elites’ foreign policy beliefs is based upon the implicit assumption that the dimensions underpinning these attitudes are separate and distinct from those which undergird attitudes about domestic politics. Indeed, the dominant conception of Americans’ foreign policy beliefs uses labels to describe dimensions—militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism—which are relevant to international affairs but meaningless to domestic policy attitudes and disputes. Such accounts imply that people do not possess common principles, or ideology, that structure beliefs across both issue domains. We argue that the analytical barrier between foreign and domestic policy beliefs is artificial, at least for elite beliefs. Data from the 1988 Foreign Policy Leadership Project survey and the 1988--1992 Leadership Opinion Project panel study demonstrate that foreign and domestic policy beliefs share a common structure. Since this structure is strongly associated with simple self‐placement scores on a left/right continuum, we label it liberalism/conservatism. This finding reaffirms earlier research about the importance of ideology in constraining elites’ beliefs. It also provides a possible explanation for the evidence that elites’ general stances towards militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism have remained remarkably stable despite the end of the Cold War: because these dimensions are anchored in ideology and reflect core values, they were not moved much by transformations within the international arena. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 153-180 Issue: 2 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434947 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434947 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:153-180 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Schafer Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Schafer Title: Explaining groupthink: Do the psychological characteristics of the leader matter? Abstract: Do psychological characteristics of leaders affect groupthink? This paper investigates the extent to which presidents’ Conceptual Complexity, Belief in Ability to Control Events, and Need for Affiliation affect foreign policy decision making structures and processes in 19 Cold War crises. Independent variables are derived from personality‐at‐a‐distance techniques using presidential press conferences. Comparative data on the presidential characteristics produce several findings including Truman's low conceptual complexity, Johnson's high belief in his ability to control events, and Nixon's low trait stability. Only Conceptual Complexity is strongly linked to groupthink phenomena using OLS regression equations, though there is directional support for the link for Affiliation and Control. Using one‐way ANOVA tests to further investigate these latter two variables we find that those with the highest Affiliation and Control scores average more indicators of groupthink in their decision‐making processes than those with the lowest scores. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 181-212 Issue: 2 Volume: 25 Year: 1998 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434948 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434948 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:181-212 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John R. Oneal Author-X-Name-First: John R. Author-X-Name-Last: Oneal Author-Name: Bruce Russett Author-X-Name-First: Bruce Author-X-Name-Last: Russett Title: Is the liberal peace just an artifact of cold war interests? Assessing recent critiques Abstract: Recent research indicates that democracy and economic interdependence reduce the probability that a pair of states will engage in a militarized interstate dispute. These analyses were largely confined to the cold war era, however, leading some to argue that the results are an artifact of the particular bipolar configuration of alliances and interests characteristic of that period. To determine whether this is so, we present two sets of analyses here. First, with new trade data for sixteen countries, 1870--1989, we use logistic analysis of cross‐sectional and time‐series data to test whether democracy and economic openness (total exports as a proportion of gross domestic product) had the same conflict‐reducing effects before World War II as after. We find they did, while the effect of alliances is weak. Moreover, our theoretical model offers a plausible explanation of the outbreak of World War I that is consistent with the liberal peace. Second, for the cold war era, we address the question of whether states’ interests or preferences offer a better explanation of interstate conflict than do democracy and interdependence. We conclude that states’ preferences, as indicated by the similarity of states’ voting in the UN General Assembly, are closely associated with the probability of a dispute; but these preferences are in turn significantly influenced by the character of states’ political regimes and their economic relations. Liberal states do not fight because they have little to fight about, but they have little to fight about because of the shared interests reflected in democratic institutions and open markets. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 213-241 Issue: 3 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434950 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434950 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:3:p:213-241 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert A. Hart Author-X-Name-First: Robert A. Author-X-Name-Last: Hart Author-Name: William Reed Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Reed Title: Selection effects and dispute escalation: Democracy and status quo evaluations Abstract: Recent research offers inconsistent evidence on the relationship between regime type and the escalation of disputes that do not go to war. We add to this ongoing discussion by evaluating the effect of regime type and status quo evaluations on state decisions to escalate international disputes. We analyze 1,530 bilateral Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1816--1985 using ordered probit models to estimate the effects of regime type and status quo satisfaction on ordinal levels of escalation. Our Findings suggest that democratic initiators and targets are pacific in their escalatory behavior. This finding persists even when we control for the fact that targets are selected into militarized disputes and once we control for the ratio of capabilities between the two disputants. Satisfaction with the status quo also has a significant pacifying influence on escalation. The lack of a pacifying relationship between joint democracy and dispute escalation is suggested to be the product of a dyadic selection effect since pairs of democracies are less likely to experience militarized disputes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 243-263 Issue: 3 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434951 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434951 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:3:p:243-263 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jonathan R. Strand Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan R. Author-X-Name-Last: Strand Title: State power in a multilateral context: Voting strength in the Asian development bank Abstract: This article assesses how weighted voting in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) impacts members’ abilities to influence the formation of winning coalitions in its Board of Directors. Voting weights do not adequately measure an actor's ability to affect outcomes because they do not account for either the possible number of coalitions that may form or the number of votes needed to pass a resolution. In short, weighted voting systems cannot be straightforwardly analyzed with reference to voting weights but instead require the determination of . relative voting power. Using the Johnston index of voting power, values are presented for all members at four time points starting in 1980. Results indicate that the United States and Japan, as expected, hold the largest percentages of voting power. Also as expected, most borrowing members do not hold voting power in the Board of Directors. Unexpectedly, there is a pattern of dictators in the syndicates that comprise the Board of Directors whereby some members are able to ensure their election to the Board. Hence, non‐dictatorial members of these syndicates have no formal influence on the Board of Directors. These countries include relatively large donors such as the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, and New Zealand. This raises the question, posed in the conclusion, of why a member would provide substantial monetary support for an organization where it holds little or no voting power. The answer I offer is simply that formal institutional rules do not always result in the intended political outcomes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 265-286 Issue: 3 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434952 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434952 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:3:p:265-286 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew Melko Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: Melko Title: Cycles of general war in world history Abstract: Scholars who have studied general war tend to agree that there is at least a rough cycle to be discerned. A general war ends with the establishment of a hegemonic power that plays a major role in reducing conflict within the international system. Eventually the hegemon is challenged by a rising power and this challenge leads to another general war in which either the hegemon defends its position, the rising power replaces it, or a third power replaces both. A study of general wars in ten civilizations suggests that in 38 cases examined, the model suggested above was found only three times, twice in Western Civilization. In various combinations, six factors intervened to modify the cycle or prevent its occurrence. The study suggests that the idea of a functional, long‐term cycle culminating in general war may need further examination. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 287-299 Issue: 3 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434953 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434953 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:3:p:287-299 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Majeski Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Majeski Author-Name: David Sylvan Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Sylvan Title: How foreign policy recommendations are put together: A computational model with empirical applications Abstract: This paper presents and applies empirically a computational model of the way in which bona fide high level foreign policy recommendations by U.S. policy makers are assembled. We begin by pointing out that policy making can be seen as the connection of certain strings of words to other strings. We then discuss how these connections constitute certain types of foreign policy making phenomena as such. To theorize about such connections, one first needs to specify essential features of these phenomena, and we do so for one phenomenon: bona fide recommendations. We next turn to a discussion of the theory that links together the categories by which these features are represented. That theory explains how certain strings of words are assembled into new proximate goals, missions, and tools. The theory can be modeled computationally using the programming language Scheme, and we next present that model. We conclude by presenting a run of the model, showing the close fit between actual and generated strings. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 301-332 Issue: 4 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434955 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434955 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:4:p:301-332 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nehemia Geva Author-X-Name-First: Nehemia Author-X-Name-Last: Geva Author-Name: J. Mark Skorick Author-X-Name-First: J. Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Skorick Title: Information inconsistency and the cognitive algebra of foreign policy decision making Abstract: This paper explores a special feature of the information complexity that underlies foreign policy decision making, i.e., inconsistency in information. We use the actor and action images to categorize types of inconsistency. The consequences of inconsistency for process and outcome are analyzed within the framework of a cognitive algebra model. Finally, we demonstrate the implications of the model in an experimental study. Our findings show that not every inconsistency is detected and those that are detected do not always affect the choice. The critical inconsistency is the one that presents an imbalanced structure of the actor and the action image. This inconsistency affects the choices made by decision‐makers and sensitizes them to the within image inconsistency. Furthermore, the results suggests that in the context of the scenarios employed in this experiment the actor image has a more dominant status for the foreign policy decision making process than the action image. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 333-362 Issue: 4 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434956 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434956 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:4:p:333-362 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jeffrey Pickering Author-X-Name-First: Jeffrey Author-X-Name-Last: Pickering Title: The structural shape of force: Interstate intervention in the zones of peace and turmoil, 1946--1996 Abstract: Two structural models are analyzed using data on foreign military interventions over the past half‐century. A vertical model posits constancy in center‐periphery ties, while a horizontal model suggests that the center and the periphery will gradually decouple when it comes to the use of force. The latter, horizontal, view is more commonly accepted. Because of dwindling interest in the periphery with the end of the Cold War and the increased militarization of that part of the world, it is assumed that developed states will become more reluctant to use military force in the hinterlands. Hence, the use of force should primarily consist of horizontal interaction within the periphery rather than vertical interaction between the center and the periphery. Despite such conventional wisdom, the data on interstate military intervention provides considerable support for the vertical model over the past fifty years. My findings also challenge common assumptions about the world dividing into a “zone of peace” among developed states and a “zone of turmoil” encompassing all other actors in the post‐Cold War era. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 363-391 Issue: 4 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434957 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434957 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:4:p:363-391 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kristian S. Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Kristian S. Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Author-Name: Michael D. Ward Author-X-Name-First: Michael D. Author-X-Name-Last: Ward Title: A revised list of independent states since the congress of Vienna Abstract: We examine the criteria for membership in the international system as applied in the widely employed system membership list maintained by the Correlates of War Project. Some problems with existing classifications are illustrated and some analytical and empirical consequences of these problems are detailed. Using updated criteria and information, we develop a revised and updated list of the composition of the international system of nation state actors in world politics from the Congress of Vienna to the present. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 393-413 Issue: 4 Volume: 25 Year: 1999 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629908434958 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629908434958 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:25:y:1999:i:4:p:393-413 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kurt Taylor Gaubatz Author-X-Name-First: Kurt Taylor Author-X-Name-Last: Gaubatz Title: Political competition and foreign policy power sharing Abstract: In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-19 Issue: 1 Volume: 26 Year: 1999 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434959 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434959 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:1999:i:1:p:1-19 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew J. Enterline Author-X-Name-First: Andrew J. Author-X-Name-Last: Enterline Author-Name: Kristian S. Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Kristian S. Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Title: Threats, opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948--1982 Abstract: This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948--82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 21-53 Issue: 1 Volume: 26 Year: 1999 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434960 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434960 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:1999:i:1:p:21-53 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James R. Scarritt Author-X-Name-First: James R. Author-X-Name-Last: Scarritt Author-Name: Solomon M. Nkiwane Author-X-Name-First: Solomon M. Author-X-Name-Last: Nkiwane Author-Name: Henrik Sommer Author-X-Name-First: Henrik Author-X-Name-Last: Sommer Title: A process tracing plausibility probe of uneven democratization's effects on cooperative dyads: The case of Zambia and Zimbabwe 1980--1993 Abstract: In this article we conduct a plausibility probe of the hypothesis that uneven democratization decreases cooperation within primarily cooperative dyads. This hypothesis is derived from a combination of Remmer's theory of democratization and international cooperation with democratic peace theory. The case of cooperation and conflict between two small powers, Zambia and Zimbabwe, from the latter's independence in 1980 to 1993 fits Eckstein's criteria for a useful plausibility probe. In addition to overall, bilateral and regional interactions between the two countries, we examine relations in the political, economic, strategic, and physical environment issue areas. Methodologically, we combine time series analysis of events coded in the COPDAB format and interviews with policy makers. We find that, although net cooperation between the two countries remained positive during the entire 1980--1993 period, it decreased significantly overall and in economic issues after the beginning of the Zambian democratic transition in June 1990. Our data allow us to trace the process involved in this decline in net cooperation, ruling out some alternative explanations but not concurrent Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and showing how even slightly uneven democratization was an important cause because it decreased similarity and trust, while not decreasing transparency, and increased uncertainty and thus nationalist responses. We conclude that this plausibility probe justifies further systematic research on the effects of uneven democratization on cooperative dyads to test our hypothesis on cases with and without SAPs, and suggests the utility of further probes of the effects of different types of uneven change on various types of dyads. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 55-90 Issue: 1 Volume: 26 Year: 1999 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434961 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434961 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:1999:i:1:p:55-90 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kyungmo Kim Author-X-Name-First: Kyungmo Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: George A. Barnett Author-X-Name-First: George A. Author-X-Name-Last: Barnett Title: The structure of the international telecommunications regime in transition: A network analysis of international organizations-super-1 Abstract: This paper examines the structure of the international telecommunications regime in terms of networks of social interaction and institutional affiliation among international actors. Social interaction and overlapping membership data of 69 international telecommunications organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995 are analyzed to describe the social structure of the international telecommunications system through network analysis. The analysis reveals a center‐periphery structure with the Western industrial countries at the center and the less developed countries at the periphery. The international telecommunications system is also regionally structured suggesting influence by geopolitical and cultural proximity. The results indicate that inter‐governmental global organizations such as the ITU and UNESCO play intermediate and coordinating roles at the central linking‐pin positions (or cut‐points) in the international telecommunications regime. In summary, this research shows that transitional trends in international telecommunications have affected the interaction patterns of international actors. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 91-127 Issue: 1 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434962 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434962 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:1:p:91-127 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Heejoon Kang Author-X-Name-First: Heejoon Author-X-Name-Last: Kang Author-Name: Rafael Reuveny Author-X-Name-First: Rafael Author-X-Name-Last: Reuveny Title: An exploration of multi‐country political conflict/cooperation interdependence Abstract: Previous investigations of dynamic conflict actions and reactions among major countries have generally assumed the unit of analysis to be either a dyad or a triad. Our objective of the papa‐is to explore this assumption. The empirical analysis employs quarterly political conflict/cooperation among the United States, the (former) Soviet Union, China, Japan, and (West) Germany from 1950 to 1991. The model consists of a system of dynamic multiple regression equations. Various groups formed among mese countries are tested to find out whether they can be considered an autonomous unit of analysis. The analysis reveals several groups of countries whose political relations can be considered to be autonomous. In particular, either the United States‐the Soviet Union dyad or the United States‐the Soviet Union‐China triad is not an appropriate, autonomous unit of analysis in dynamic conflict action‐reaction models, because these countries are significantly influenced by the presence of other countries. New directions for future research are also suggested. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 129-152 Issue: 2 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434963 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434963 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:2:p:129-152 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian Efird Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Efird Author-Name: Ambassador Peter Galbraith Author-X-Name-First: Ambassador Peter Author-X-Name-Last: Galbraith Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Author-Name: Mark Abdollahian Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Abdollahian Title: Negotiating peace in Kosovo Abstract: We systematically analyze and forecast key developments before and during the Kosovo Crisis. Prior to the air campaign, we anticipated the breakdown of negotiations at Rambouillet and the subsequent initiation of hostilities. Without Russia as a mediator, we predicted that Milosevic would engage in military activity and strengthen his domestic control. As the war was being waged, we took a second look at settlement opportunities. Russia was identified as the key mediator needed to reach a settlement We show that a European‐led settlement offered promising prospects for peace. Finally, we demonstrate that the settlement achieved after the air war was not much different than the settlement that could have been achieved at Rambouillet The settlement on Kosovo offers only short‐term stability. To gain long‐term stability, the Serbians must either agree to the existing ethnic makeup in Kosovo or allow it to be partitioned. Otherwise, conflict in this region will likely revive. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 153-178 Issue: 2 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434964 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434964 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:2:p:153-178 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: D. Scott Bennett Author-X-Name-First: D. Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Bennett Author-Name: Allan C. Stam Author-X-Name-First: Allan C. Author-X-Name-Last: Stam Title: Eugene: A conceptual manual Abstract: The study of international relations using quantitative analysis relies, in part, on the availability of comprehensive and easily manipulable data sets. To execute large‐n statistical tests of hypotheses, data must be available on the variables of interest, and those data must be manipulated into a suitable format to allow the inclusion of appropriate control variables as well as variables of central theoretical interest This paper introduces software designed to eliminate many of the difficulties commonly involved in constructing large international relations data sets, and with the unavailability of data on expected utility theories of war. In order to solve these two problems, we developed EUGene (the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program). EUGene is a stand‐alone Microsoft Windows based program for the construction of annual data sets for use in quantitative studies of international relations. It generates data for variables necessary to incorporate key variables from implementations of the so‐called “expected utility theory of war” into broader analyses of international conflict EUGene is also designed to make building international relations data sets simple. It accomplishes this by automating a variety of tasks necessary to integrate several data building blocks commonly used in tests of international relations theories. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 179-204 Issue: 2 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434965 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434965 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:2:p:179-204 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas A. Van Belle Author-X-Name-First: Douglas A. Author-X-Name-Last: Van Belle Title: Regime change and system stability: Simulating complex anarchical environments over the internet Abstract: This article uses data from a seven‐player simulation of a complex anarchical environment to analyze hypotheses on domestic political regime changes and system stability. By conducting the simulation over the Internet, a tremendous number of runs through the simulation can be completed in a relatively short time, thereby generating sufficient data for the statistical analyses. The analyses demonstrate that even in a research simulation designed to emphasize and isolate systemic factors, regime changes increase the threats to the survival of actors and significantly reduce the probability that the system will remain stable. This suggests that there may be a systemic mechanism in addition to the linkage politics mechanism described in the democratization and war literature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 205-228 Issue: 2 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434966 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434966 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:2:p:205-228 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas J. Volgy Author-X-Name-First: Thomas J. Author-X-Name-Last: Volgy Author-Name: Lawrence E. Imwalle Author-X-Name-First: Lawrence E. Author-X-Name-Last: Imwalle Title: Two faces of hegemonic strength: Structural versus relational capabilities Abstract: We examine two concepts associated with hegemonic strength: relational versus structural capabilities. We develop a measurement strategy for each, and test the salience of each for status inconsistency, frequency of wars and crises, and the incidence of terrorism in the international system. The tests correspond to our predictions regarding the relative salience of each concept for understanding the importance of hegemonic strength in the international system. We explore the implications of these findings for the emerging world order. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 229-251 Issue: 3 Volume: 26 Year: 1999 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434967 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434967 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:1999:i:3:p:229-251 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Kinsella Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Kinsella Title: Arms production in the third tier: An analysis of opportunity and willingness Abstract: Major determinants of third world military industrialization operate at the domestic, regional, and global levels. I summarize these and then examine their relative importance by analyzing time‐series cross‐section data for twelve arms producers from 1968 to 1990. Overall, there is considerable support for the various factors identified in the literature. However, my findings do highlight the importance of opportunity, perhaps more than willingness, as an explanation for changing levels of third tier arms production. Resolution of the tensions that drive regional militarization and the eruption of military conflict should have some positive effects ‐on restraining the expansion of arms production capacity. But there also seems to be a certain inevitability to the process, a process that is limited primarily by states' resources, industrial capacities, and access to weapons‐production technologies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 253-286 Issue: 3 Volume: 26 Year: 1999 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434968 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434968 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:1999:i:3:p:253-286 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yi Feng Author-X-Name-First: Yi Author-X-Name-Last: Feng Title: Measuring international conflict: Developing cross‐country time‐series data Abstract: This paper develops a new time series of conflict data from 1948 to the present through statistical estimation of a pooled time‐series of the two most frequently used dyadic events data sets: Conflict and Cooperation Data Bank (COPDAB) (1948--1978) and World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) (1966‐present). The resulting data series is the longest possible time‐series annual data of dyadic interaction based on daily events. The paper also provides an example of performing a Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis of conflict and trade in a three‐country setting, utilizing the integrated data. Compared to the COPDAB and WEIS data, the integrated data have a large degree of variation and produce forecasting results that are more complex than those from the COPDAB and WEIS separately. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 287-319 Issue: 3 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434969 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434969 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:3:p:287-319 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas A. van Belle Author-X-Name-First: Douglas A. Author-X-Name-Last: van Belle Author-Name: Steven W. Hook Author-X-Name-First: Steven W. Author-X-Name-Last: Hook Title: Greasing the squeaky wheel: News media coverage and us development aid, 1977--1992 Abstract: This study explores the role that news media coverage plays in influencing US foreign policy in general, and foreign aid policy in particular. It is expected that foreign policy officials will be responsive to the content of the domestic news media and will attempt to align their actions with what they expect is the public's perception of the importance of a particular issue. In this study, it is hypothesized that that higher levels of news coverage of a potential recipient country will lead to higher aid commitments. The analysis examines the levels of US aid commitments to those it provided aid during the period 1977--1992. Even with an admittedly simple measure of news media coverage, the empirical findings are clear. The level of news coverage is a statistically significant factor in the levels of aid offered by the US. Thus a domestic political motive may be considered to be operative along with more widely studied determinants of aid based upon humanitarian motives and national self‐interests. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 321-346 Issue: 3 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620008434970 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620008434970 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:3:p:321-346 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Claudio Cioffi‐Revilla Author-X-Name-First: Claudio Author-X-Name-Last: Cioffi‐Revilla Author-Name: David Lai Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Lai Title: Chinese warfare and politics in the ancient East Asian international system, CA. 2700 B.C. to 722 B.C. Abstract: Ancient East Asia is the second oldest “protobellic area” and pristine state system of international relations within the global international system, after West Asia (ancient Near East). In a previous study Cioffi‐Revilla and Lai (1995) reported the first findings on the origins and evolution of war and politics in ancient China (Legendary, Xia [Hsia], Shang, and Western Zhou [Chou] periods), ca. 2700 B.C to 722 B.C In this paper we make public an expanded data set (N = 104 cases, 12 variables; version 2.0), explaining our sources, measurements, and data quality control procedures. The new data set will permit investigators to test hypotheses about warfare distributions, ethnic and protracted conflicts, time series, periodicity, system dynamics, and structural relationships (e.g., war‐polarity theories). This new long‐range data set should also promote a new stage in comparative analyses of the universal and particular properties of warfare and international systems, both cross‐polity and longitudinally. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 347-378 Issue: 4 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434971 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434971 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:4:p:347-378 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel W. Drezner Author-X-Name-First: Daniel W. Author-X-Name-Last: Drezner Title: Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals* Abstract: Despite a marked increase in research on economic sanctions, empirical work has been constrained to a set of cases where sanctions are used for political or security issues, i.e., “high politics.” Since most theories of sanctions are generalizable to cases of political economy, i.e., “low politics,” this ad hoc empirical restriction is puzzling. This paper examines how well the existing theories of economic coercion can explain sanctions used to extract concessions on trade or regulatory issues. These theories are tested on a data set of 86 observations of the United States using or threatening section 301 action against a variety of target states. The results indicate that a conflict expectations approach is able to explain these cases as well as cases of high politics sanctions. Approaches stressing domestic politics or the use of sanctions as signals are of little use. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 379-410 Issue: 4 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434972 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434972 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:4:p:379-410 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brandon C. Prins Author-X-Name-First: Brandon C. Author-X-Name-Last: Prins Title: Domestic politics and interstate disputes: Examining US mid involvement and reciprocation, 1870--1992 Abstract: Increasingly scholars have become interested in conflict behavior that falls short of war. Chan (1997), for example, has insisted that a concern for less intense engagements is crucial for fully understanding the conflict‐proneness of different regimes. Chan (1997) furthermore noted that scholars have generally failed to account for whether a state was the initiator or target of a dispute. Such a distinction, however, is crucial for discriminating the pacific effects of democratic culture and institutions. In this paper, I investigate the domestic determinants of US MID involvement and reciprocation from 1870 to 1992. I find that politics does not stop at the water's edge. Unlike Gowa (1998) who found no relationship between the use of force and dissatisfaction with the status quo, I uncover an association between US domestic conditions and whether the US was an initiator or target of a MID. Not only is the US more likely to be targeted during periods of domestic political weakness, but Democratic administrations also appear to be challenged to a greater extent than their Republican counterparts. Furthermore, when targeted, the US is much more likely to reciprocate when the initiating state is a non‐democracy suggesting that regime type continues to play an important role in conflict propensity even after a demand has been made. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 411-438 Issue: 4 Volume: 26 Year: 2000 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434973 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434973 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:26:y:2000:i:4:p:411-438 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Richard Sherman Author-X-Name-First: Richard Author-X-Name-Last: Sherman Title: Democracy and trade conflict* Abstract: The record of formal disputes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is largely one of conflict among democracies. I develop a theoretical argument to explain the prevalence of democratic states in the GATT's dispute process. Democracies face stronger pressures to initiate disputes; they are more attractive as dispute targets due to the political influence enjoyed by interest groups; they share norms of juridical dispute resolution; and they are more likely to uphold their policy commitments than nondemocracies. I develop an empirical model of the incidence of disputes among GATT members, finding that democracies are more likely to participate in disputes than nondemocratic states. I also find that democratic dyads are more likely to resolve their disputes cooperatively. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-28 Issue: 1 Volume: 27 Year: 1999 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434975 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434975 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:1999:i:1:p:1-28 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dierdre L. Wendel Author-X-Name-First: Dierdre L. Author-X-Name-Last: Wendel Title: Modeling alliance membership in a three‐dimensional space Abstract: Both Altfeld (1984) and Morrow (1991) offer theoretical foundations that explain why alliances form. Security concerns and autonomy desires are the driving force for the pursuit of allies. While this response explains why states become allies, it does not address which do. To explain with which potential allies states choose to share alliance membership, I construct a three‐dimensional space in which security, autonomy, and political system structure are each represented as one of the three dimensions of ally choice. Every state that shared alliance membership with any other given state from 1946--1992, on a yearly basis, is assigned a unique, tri‐component point in the three‐dimensional space. The distances in the space between each state and all other states’ tri‐component points are calculated, and this distance is then incorporated into a probit estimation of ally choice. By examining the role that security and autonomy trade‐offs and level of political system structure similarity play in determining ally choice, I conclude that two states are more likely to share alliance membership the more symmetrical they are in security and autonomy considerations and the more similar they are in political system structure. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 29-60 Issue: 1 Volume: 27 Year: 2000 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434976 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434976 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:1:p:29-60 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: R. William Ayres Author-X-Name-First: R. William Author-X-Name-Last: Ayres Title: Strategies, capabilities, and demands: Explaining outcomes in violent intrastate nationalist conflicts Abstract: The study of nationalist and ethnic conflict has undergone considerable growth since the end of the Cold War. Much of the effort has been focused on ascertaining the nature and origins of such conflicts, and less on their process and termination. Those studies that do focus on conflict termination have generally done so using case‐study or idiosyncratic methods. Hence, we do not yet have much large‐N or statistical evidence that might suggest broad trends in how such conflicts end, or even much experience in measuring the relevant concepts in a manner conducive to such methods. This paper will address these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the outcomes of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts. It will discuss measurement issues for relevant independent variables, and present data for a group of 75 violent, intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945--1996. This data will then be used to test propositions derived from the model. The aim is to provide a useful building block for the study of the process and outcome of conflicts which political scientists now recognize to be some of the most important for the coming century. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 61-93 Issue: 1 Volume: 27 Year: 2000 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434977 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434977 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:1:p:61-93 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jean‐Marc F. Blanchard Author-X-Name-First: Jean‐Marc F. Author-X-Name-Last: Blanchard Author-Name: Norrin M. Ripsman Author-X-Name-First: Norrin M. Author-X-Name-Last: Ripsman Title: Rethinking sensitivity interdependence: Assessing the trade, financial, and monetary links between states Abstract: International relations scholars do not adequately conceptualize or measure economic interdependence, a crucial variable in studies of trade and conflict, economic sanctions, and globalization. Most studies conflate vulnerability with sensitivity and confuse interconnectedness with genuine interdependence by relying on inadequate indices of interdependence such as unadjusted trade as a percentage of GDP. Such measures fail to capture the true cost to states of a termination of normal trading relations and ignore completely interstate financial and monetary ties. In this article, we offer a new method, the Contextual Sensitivity Estimator (CSE), for gauging sensitivity interdependence. The CSE addresses existing shortcomings in several noteworthy ways. First, it takes into account the strategic and domestic economic context of external economic linkages. Second, it assesses the composition of trade and the uses of trade proceeds. Third, it provides a detailed conceptualization of critical channels of sensitivity like foreign investment and exchange rate ties. Using Arab‐Canadian economic relations in 1979, after a threatened boycott of Canada, as a case study, we show that our CSE yields a more accurate assessment of sensitivity interdependence than traditional measures. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 95-128 Issue: 2 Volume: 27 Year: 2000 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434979 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434979 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:2:p:95-128 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Author-X-Name-First: Bruce Bueno Author-X-Name-Last: de Mesquita Author-Name: Rose McDermott Author-X-Name-First: Rose Author-X-Name-Last: McDermott Author-Name: Emily Cope Author-X-Name-First: Emily Author-X-Name-Last: Cope Title: The expected prospects for peace in northern Ireland Abstract: Negotiations over implementation of the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreements are used to compare predictions made by prospect theory and an expected utility model. The ex ante predictions were made in May 1999 and are evaluated against developments through August 2000. The study shows that prospect theory is capable of more limited predictions than expected utility models because the latter can be imbedded in a framework that attends to strategic interaction while the former is strictly decision theoretic at this time. Prospect theory proved accurate in 40--70 percent of its predictions, depending on how one interprets the meaning of “implementation.” The expected utility model proved accurate in 100 percent of the issues evaluated here. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 129-167 Issue: 2 Volume: 27 Year: 2000 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434980 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434980 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:2:p:129-167 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Juliet Kaarbo Author-X-Name-First: Juliet Author-X-Name-Last: Kaarbo Title: The domestic politics of international negotiations: The effects of state structures and policy making processes Abstract: Putnam's metaphor of a two‐level game that state representatives play when they face the dual constraints of international bargaining and domestic pressures has been applied across different political systems. This paper argues that it is important to take into account differences in state structures and political processes in the study of international negotiations. That state structures and processes are important has become a common theme in current research on foreign policy, decision making, and international conflict. Building on this literature, this study involves a meta‐analysis of existing case studies of two‐level games. The previously completed cases provide evidence of variation in the characteristics of two‐level games. Independent measures of the institutional structures of the states involved in the set of case studies are collected from the POLITY III dataset. Hypotheses on how differences in state structures might influence the characteristics of two‐level bargaining are then examined. The study finds that differences in state structures do influence the dynamics of two‐level games. Some of the results support the conventional wisdom on this relationship, while other results suggest counter‐intuitive insights. A framework conceptualizing state characteristics at three levels is proposed for future research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 169-205 Issue: 2 Volume: 27 Year: 2000 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434981 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434981 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:2:p:169-205 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chad Rector Author-X-Name-First: Chad Author-X-Name-Last: Rector Title: Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games* Abstract: Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it Journal: International Interactions Pages: 207-238 Issue: 3 Volume: 27 Year: 2000 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434984 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434984 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:3:p:207-238 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Pelle Andersen Author-X-Name-First: Pelle Author-X-Name-Last: Andersen Author-Name: Justin Bumgardner Author-X-Name-First: Justin Author-X-Name-Last: Bumgardner Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Turning down the heat: Influences on conflict management in enduring rivalries Abstract: Enduring rivalries represent the most difficult challenges for policy makers seeking to promote international peace and security. Once in place, enduring rivalries account for a disproportionate number of crises, militarized disputes, as well as wars, and include conflicts that are more likely to escalate than those falling in other conflict contexts. Unfortunately, we know very little about conflict management in enduring rivalries from either a theoretical or policy perspective. This study seeks to account for why some rivalries are successfully managed while others persist at high and unabated levels of conflict In addressing these concerns, we explore 35 enduring rivalries over the period 1945--1992. We find that although enduring rivalries are quite resistant to influences that produce changes in their dynamics, both endogenous and contextual influences can exercise a significant impact upon the prospects for conflict management between enduring rivals. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 239-274 Issue: 3 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434985 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434985 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:3:p:239-274 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert G. Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Robert G. Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Author-Name: Shannon Lindsey Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Shannon Lindsey Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Title: Democracy, human rights, and U.S.‐Africa trade Abstract: The nexus of economic and political relations is a central issue in international relations, and the influence of political liberalization upon trade ties lies at the center of much liberal theory. However, many facets of the empirical linkage between political liberalization—including democratization and the respect for human rights—and trade remain uninvestigated. Examining the case of U.S.‐Africa trade, this study considers two unexplored facets of these political determinants of trade: (1) the role of human rights conditions, and (2) the robustness of the relationship between democracy, human rights, and trade across a subset of vertical dyads. Using a gravity model to assess trade patterns, we find that neither democracy nor human rights conditions has a significant impact upon U.S. trade to Africa. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 275-295 Issue: 3 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434986 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434986 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:3:p:275-295 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ranan D. Kuperman Author-X-Name-First: Ranan D. Author-X-Name-Last: Kuperman Title: Rules of military retaliation and their practice by the state of Israel Abstract: A major issue intriguing students of international relations is determining to what extent, if at all, do norms and standard operating procedures (SOPs) affect foreign policy. This question is addressed in this article in the case of Israel's policy of military retaliation. Alternative rules of conduct associated with this policy were deduced from strategic and normative arguments presented by Israeli decision‐makers in order to justify military reprisal attacks against Arab countries. These rules of conduct were then formulized into hypotheses and empirically tested with the aid of a database that contained daily accounts of Arab and Israeli acts of aggression towards each other between 1949 and 1982. In this manner it was possible to identify different decision rules that dominated Israel's reprisal policy at different periods of time. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 297-326 Issue: 3 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434987 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434987 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:3:p:297-326 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Joseph Hewitt Author-X-Name-First: J. Joseph Author-X-Name-Last: Hewitt Author-Name: Garry Young Author-X-Name-First: Garry Author-X-Name-Last: Young Title: Assessing the statistical rarity of wars between democracies Abstract: The ‘small numbers objection’ to the democratic peace claims that the relative rarity of militarized conflict between democracies is due to their small numbers coupled with the infrequency of violent interstate conflict, not to an alleged pacifying effect of democracy. This study assesses this objection directly by treating the number of militarized disputes between democracies as a random variable. Since the historical record provides only one observation for this variable, full estimation of its distributional characteristics requires repeated simulation of the process by which dyads are ‘selected’ for conflict We employ Monte Cario techniques to carry out this process. The simulation results indicate no support for the small numbers objection. The results remain stable when important control variables are introduced and when the analysis employs a weaker definition of democracy. Finally, the simulation enables a precise identification of the point within the 1816--1992 temporal domain when the democratic peace moved from an apparent statistical artifact to significant phenomenon. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 327-351 Issue: 3 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434988 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434988 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:3:p:327-351 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rose McDermott Author-X-Name-First: Rose Author-X-Name-Last: McDermott Author-Name: Jonathan A. Cowden Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan A. Author-X-Name-Last: Cowden Title: The effects of uncertainty and sex in a crisis simulation game Abstract: We conducted an experimental test of spiraling behavior, sex differences, and uncertainty in a simulated crisis situation. We investigated the relationship between weapons acquisition and the likelihood of engaging in aggressive behavior, such as going to war. The sample included 100 male and female subjects who participated in a crisis simulation in same‐sex dyads; each student was instructed to role play the leader of a country in conflict with another leader over a nearby island replete with newly discovered oil resources. Participants were randomly assigned to stimulus materials that manipulated the certainty of the information they received about their partner's force structure. In four cycles of decision‐making, each participant made procurement decisions, took an action related to the conflict, including decisions about going to war, completed questionnaires on characteristics such as the hostility and trustworthiness of themselves and their opponents, and wrote messages to the other member of the pair. The results of the study demonstrate a strong relationship between weapons acquisition and hostility. In addition, we found large and robust sex differences, showing that men are much more likely than women to acquire weapons and engage in aggressive behavior at every stage. There was no effect of uncertainty on either arms procurement or aggression. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 353-380 Issue: 4 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434990 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434990 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:4:p:353-380 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Adam L. Resnick Author-X-Name-First: Adam L. Author-X-Name-Last: Resnick Title: Investors, turbulence, and transition: Democratic transition and foreign direct investment in nineteen developing countries Abstract: Do profit‐seeking foreign direct investors value a country's transition to democracy? If they do, they should vote with their pocketbooks, resulting in a post‐transition increase in foreign direct investment flows. This study attempts to uncover links between transition to democracy and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, In doing so, it addresses existing arguments about connections between democracy and investor behavior. The regions examined have not only experienced democratic transitions, they also account for the majority of the increasing flow of FDI to the developing world. This research employs time‐series cross‐sectional (TSCS) economic and political data, using ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors. The central finding is that transition to democracy has a negative effect on FDI. Secondarily, political instability and higher levels of democracy also deter foreign direct investors. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 381-398 Issue: 4 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434991 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434991 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:4:p:381-398 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cameron G. Thies Author-X-Name-First: Cameron G. Author-X-Name-Last: Thies Title: Territorial nationalism in spatial rivalries: An institutionalist account of the argentine‐chilean rivalry Abstract: The rivalry concept explored in the conflict literature during the past decade offers considerable potential for theory building in international relations. This paper explores one possible avenue to this end by applying insights from historical institutionalism to a case of spatial rivalry in order to explain many of the findings from the quantitative literature. As I demonstrate in this paper, the focus on issues is a good start at explaining rivalry, yet it masks important underlying domestic processes that initiate, maintain, and terminate rivalries. I explain how the “issue” of territory came to be fused with national identity in the case of Argentina‐Chile resulting in a history of conflict and classification as an enduring rivalry. I draw on this case to argue that territorial nationalism may explain why seemingly disparate territorial conflicts separated by time and space can be considered linked to form a spatial rivalry. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 399-431 Issue: 4 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434992 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434992 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:4:p:399-431 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christopher Zorn Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Zorn Title: Estimating between‐ and within‐cluster covariate effects, with an application to models of international disputes Abstract: Students of international politics often use data in which the covariates vary both within and across units of observation. This is particularly true for dyadic data, which has come to dominate quantitative studies of international conflict, but is also a concern in any work involving a time‐series cross‐sectional component. Standard regression methods treat both types of covariates as equivalent with respect to their influence on the dependent variable, ignoring possible differences between cross‐dyad and within‐dyad effects. Here, I discuss the potential pitfalls of this approach, and show how between‐ and within‐dyad effects can be separated and estimated. I then illustrate the approach in the context of a logistic regression, using data on international disputes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 433-445 Issue: 4 Volume: 27 Year: 2001 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434993 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620108434993 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2001:i:4:p:433-445 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: William Reed Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Reed Title: Selection Effects and World Politics Research Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-3 Issue: 1 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620210392 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620210392 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:1-3 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James Fearon Author-X-Name-First: James Author-X-Name-Last: Fearon Title: Selection Effects and Deterrence Abstract: The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical "case" is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 5-29 Issue: 1 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620210390 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620210390 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:5-29 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul Huth Author-X-Name-First: Paul Author-X-Name-Last: Huth Author-Name: Todd Allee Author-X-Name-First: Todd Author-X-Name-Last: Allee Title: Questions of Research Design in Developing New Tests of the Democratic Peace Abstract: We argue that the prevailing dyad-year research design employed in quantitative tests of the theoretical literature on the democratic peace suffers from several limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on three different stages or "games" that typically emerge in the evolution of international disputes over time. In this type of research design the units of observation are the policy choices of "challenger" and "target" states in each of these three games. We argue that this alternative research design has several advantages, such as requiring researchers to test a more complete and extensive set of hypotheses as well as helping them to address statistical issues related to strategic behavior and selection effects. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 31-57 Issue: 1 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620210393 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620210393 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:31-57 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Irfan Nooruddin Author-X-Name-First: Irfan Author-X-Name-Last: Nooruddin Title: Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy Abstract: Sanctions rarely work but they continue to be used frequently by policymakers. I argue that previous studies of sanctions ignore the problem of strategic censoring by focusing only on cases of observed sanctions. In this paper, I develop a unified model of sanction imposition and success and test it using a simultaneous equation censored probit model. This selection-corrected sanction model finds that the process by which sanctions are imposed is linked to the process by which some succeed while others fail, and that the unmeasured factors that lead to sanction imposition are negatively related to their success. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 59-75 Issue: 1 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620210394 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620210394 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:59-75 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: William Reed Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Reed Author-Name: David Clark Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Clark Title: Toward a Multiprocess Model of Rivalry and the Democratic Peace Abstract: In this paper we examine recent efforts to combine quantitative research on the democratic peace with research on interstate rivalry. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we highlight problems with separately analyzing the processes associated with rivalry and the democratic peace. Specifically, we specify a multiprocess model and demonstrate that previous research on this topic may overestimate the pacifying effect of democracy on enduring rivalries. Since pairs of democracies are unlikely to experience interstate rivalry in the first place, the true effect of joint democracy is difficult to ascertain in a censored sample of interstate rivals. Our simulation results are consistent with historical data analysis that suggests that the pacifying effect of democracy is most pronounced in the enhanced probability of jointly democratic dyads averting the onset of rivalry. More generally, this article fits into a larger body of research that examines the confounding effect of selection bias on world politics research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 77-92 Issue: 1 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620210391 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620210391 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:77-92 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Curtis Signorino Author-X-Name-First: Curtis Author-X-Name-Last: Signorino Title: Strategy and Selection in International Relations Abstract: It is widely recognized that many of the samples we use for statistical analysis in international politics are the result of some selection process. Not surprisingly, selection models are becoming increasingly popular. At the same time, the role of strategic interaction has begun to play a more important role in statistical analyses. However, it has not been clear how statistical strategic models and selection models relate to each other, or what the effects are of employing one when the other is the more appropriate model. In this article, I 1) clarify why international relations scholars cannot shield themselves from selection bias simply by assuming their results are limited to a given sample; 2) show how recent statistical strategic models relate to traditional selection models and generalize the two sets of models by deriving a correlated strategic model; and 3) examine the effects of misspecifying either correlated errors or strategic interaction. My results indicate that failure to model the strategic interaction produces worse specification error than failure to account for correlated disturbances. In fact, traditional bivariate probit models appear to be superior only when states are almost completely uncertain about each others' preferences. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 93-115 Issue: 1 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620210389 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620210389 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:93-115 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Anne Miers Author-X-Name-First: Anne Author-X-Name-Last: Miers Author-Name: T. Morgan Author-X-Name-First: T. Author-X-Name-Last: Morgan Title: Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? Abstract: In this article, we consider the puzzle of whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state's behavior. Policymakers maintain that multilateral sanctioning efforts will be more likely to succeed, while the majority of empirical academic research suggests otherwise. We present an argument, based on multidimensional spatial models, to explain why multilateral sanctions may not be more effective than unilateral sanctions. We present the basic model and show that they can explain why, in general, multilateral sanctions fail more often than do unilateral sanctions. We also show that the model leads to additional, testable hypotheses. We conduct a simple empirical test of the major hypothesis produced by the spatial application and show that it is consistent with the historical record. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 117-136 Issue: 2 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620212099 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620212099 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:2:p:117-136 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Mousseau Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Mousseau Title: An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation Abstract: The zone of democratic peace and cooperation is the premier nontrivial fact of international relations. Recent research, however, has shown that the democratic peace is substantially limited to the economically developed democracies (Mousseau, 2000). Is the zone of democratic cooperation also limited to the economically developed democracies? With the observation of most nations from 1919 to 1992, robust support is found for this hypothesis. It appears that economically developed democracies are more than eight times more likely than other states to engage each other in an intense form of interstate cooperation: collaboration in militarized conflict. Democracies with per capita incomes of less than $8,050, in contrast-77 percent of all joint democratic dyads-appear less likely than other types of states to collaborate with each other in militarized conflict. This result is consistent with the view that liberal political culture arises from economic development, and it is liberal political culture that explains the global zone of democracy, peace, prosperity, and interstate cooperation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 137-164 Issue: 2 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620212100 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620212100 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:2:p:137-164 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Errol Henderson Author-X-Name-First: Errol Author-X-Name-Last: Henderson Author-Name: J. Singer Author-X-Name-First: J. Author-X-Name-Last: Singer Title: "New Wars" and Rumors of "New Wars" Abstract: Recently, there has been a growing tendency to suggest "new" classes of wars that are presumably different from all wars we have known and studied. In this article, we discuss the extent to which the landscape of armed conflict has changed so dramatically that it has necessitated a revision of the prevalent typology of war, a reconsideration of the correlates of war, and a reconceptualization of the theoretical assumptions regarding the etiology of war. While it is clear that patterns of warfare shift across time and space, it is not clear that war itself has changed "fundamentally" and has become inexplicable in light of theoretical arguments in world politics as many "new war" theorists suggest. Our analysis demonstrates that many of the "new wars" are simply amalgamations of various interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars-i.e., the "old wars"-that have been lumped into a single category. The result is a hodgepodge of armed conflicts whose different correlates derive from their diverse morphologies rather than their novelty as wars unlike any we have experienced previously. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 165-190 Issue: 2 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620212098 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620212098 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:2:p:165-190 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Karl DeRouen Author-X-Name-First: Karl Author-X-Name-Last: DeRouen Author-Name: Jeffrey Peake Author-X-Name-First: Jeffrey Author-X-Name-Last: Peake Title: The Dynamics of Diversion: The Domestic Implications of Presidential Use of Force Abstract: Several studies report evidence of diversionary behavior by presidents, while others dispute findings that suggest domestic politics are part of the use of force decision calculus. We argue that previous studies of U.S. force short of war have failed to articulate what diversion actually means. We approach this important debate from a perspective that brings to bear presidential agenda-setting theory. Rather than treating the use of force solely as a dependent variable, we assess whether the use of force diverts attention by modeling the percent of the American public identifying the economy as the nation's most important problem. We also include presidential approval in the model. We treat the public opinion measures as endogenous variables that may or may not affect the decision to use force. We employ Vector Autoregression (VAR) methods to evaluate the causal direction of force and public opinion while controlling for the state of the economy and war. VAR is a multiple-lagged time-series approach that allows us to test a variety of hypotheses derived from diversionary and agenda-setting theory. Our results indicate that uses of force by the president have a notable agenda-setting effect, shifting public attention away from the economy. The shift in attention also causes a long-term effect on the president's public-approval rating. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 191-211 Issue: 2 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620212101 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620212101 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:2:p:191-211 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Harvey Starr Author-X-Name-First: Harvey Author-X-Name-Last: Starr Author-Name: G. Thomas Author-X-Name-First: G. Author-X-Name-Last: Thomas Title: The 'Nature' of Contiguous Borders: Ease of Interaction, Salience, and the Analysis of Crisis Abstract: This paper presents the dataset developed from an NSF-supported project on reconceptualizing borders through the use of geographical information systems (GIS). After presenting an overview of the 301 contiguous land borders which were remeasured in terms of ease of interaction (opportunity), and salience/importance (willingness), the dataset is used to revisit hypotheses dealing with territory and borders, specifically four hypotheses developed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) from their International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project. The results support the design and purpose of the GIS project of reconceptualizing borders, which breaks away from the dichotomous characterization of states as contiguous or non-contiguous in order to examine the "nature" of borders. Our results do not fit the expectations of the "standard" adversarial proximity conflict model, and demonstrate that the border reconceptualization presented here can be used to investigate a number of related questions in the study of international politics involving both cooperative processes as well as conflictual ones. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 213-235 Issue: 3 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620213655 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620213655 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:3:p:213-235 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brett Leeds Author-X-Name-First: Brett Author-X-Name-Last: Leeds Author-Name: Jeffrey Ritter Author-X-Name-First: Jeffrey Author-X-Name-Last: Ritter Author-Name: Sara Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Sara Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Author-Name: Andrew Long Author-X-Name-First: Andrew Author-X-Name-Last: Long Title: Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944 Abstract: This article introduces the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset. We begin by describing the rationale for collecting the ATOP data, its scope, and some general coding rules for the project. Then we offer some descriptive statistics for phase one of the dataset, which covers the years 1815-1944, and reveal some interesting trends in alliance politics. Finally, we replicate a study of alliance formation originally conducted by Lai and Reiter (2000) to demonstrate the effect the use of ATOP data may have on past inferences about alliance politics. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 237-260 Issue: 3 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620213653 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620213653 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:3:p:237-260 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jaroslav Tir Author-X-Name-First: Jaroslav Author-X-Name-Last: Tir Title: Letting Secessionists Have Their Way: Can Partitions Help End and Prevent Ethnic Conflicts? Abstract: This study examines partition's success in ending old and preventing new ethnic conflicts. Opponents of partition often claim that partition only invites (further) conflict by its inability to divide existing multiethnic countries in ways satisfying to all concerned ethnic groups. In contrast, proponents of partition argue that partition is the only ethnic conflict solution that provides ethnic separation, an element that is key if conflict prevention is of concern. By separating the belligerent groups, partition provides safety and a decrease in the need for interaction between groups that do not get along. When domestic and international violence is considered, partition's consequences largely depend on the timing of partition. In cases of partitions resulting from ethnic secessionist conflicts, there is a widespread continuation of serious domestic conflict but its frequency does decrease significantly, to a level that can be considered "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of violently partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict in more than one-third of the cases. In cases of peaceful (i.e., preventative) ethnic partitions, domestic conflict starts up in about half of the cases, but despite the significant increase in its frequency, the frequency remains "normal." Internationally, dyads made up of peacefully partitioned countries avoid militarized conflict almost completely. Accordingly, peaceful ethnic partitions produce dyads that are significantly less likely to engage in militarized conflicts and wars than dyads emerging from violent ethnic partitions. Contrary to some expectations, partitions do not create overwhelmingly nondemocratic countries; however, in cases of violent ethnic secessions, democratic institutions do not exhibit significant pacifying effect on subsequent domestic conflict. Important caveats notwithstanding, the overall results indicate that peaceful ethnic partitions have conflict management potential. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 261-292 Issue: 3 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620213654 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620213654 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:3:p:261-292 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jeffrey Pickering Author-X-Name-First: Jeffrey Author-X-Name-Last: Pickering Title: Give Me Shelter: Reexamining Military Intervention and the Monadic Democratic Peace Abstract: Increasing empirical evidence points to the existence of a monadic democratic peace. However, the quantitative literature on international conflict has yet to produce any compelling evidence that such a peace holds for one of the most prominent types of interstate force in use today, foreign military intervention. This study tests the hypotheses that democracies are less prone to intervene militarily and less likely to be the targets of such incursions. In doing so, it compares six overlapping theoretical perspectives on the monadic democratic peace. No empirical support is lent to the hypothesis that democracies intervene less often than nondemocracies, but considerable evidence indicates that democracies are rarely the targets of foreign military intervention. The latter result remains consistent across six different intervention populations from 1975 to 1996. Of the six theoretical perspectives analyzed, the institutional approach recently advanced by Bueno de Mesquita and his associates fares best. Its predictions match the empirical outcomes exactly. None of the other theoretical frameworks is even half right. In sum, it seems that democratic governance provides a barrier against foreign military intervention, but it does not limit intervention abroad. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 293-324 Issue: 4 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620214756 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620214756 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:4:p:293-324 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Derekh Cornwell Author-X-Name-First: Derekh Author-X-Name-Last: Cornwell Author-Name: Michael Colaresi Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Colaresi Title: Holy Trinities, Rivalry Termination, and Conflict Abstract: In this article we attempt to correct a number of gaps in the current literature on strategic rivalry. First, we argue that liberal and realist theories of conflict and cooperation have been generally ignored by scholars engaged in rivalry research. Secondly, we argue that current rivalry research fails to disentangle termination processes from conflict within rivalries, mainly due to problems with common operationalizations of rivalry. To bridge these gaps, we test the effects of liberal variables-manifested in the Kantian tripod (democracy, interdependence, and IGO membership)-and what we more loosely term the realist tripod (bipolarity, shared threat, and capability balance) on both rivalry termination and the probability that rivals will engage in a militarized conflict. We conduct this test utilizing a new data set of strategic rivalries compiled by Thompson (1999, 2001) which corrects the tautological operationalization of rivalry commonly used in rivalry research when conflict is the dependent variable. Overall, our results paint a variegated picture, underscoring the importance of rivalry as a special class of dyadic relationship. While realist variables better explain rivalry termination, the direction is opposite that predicted by some realist hypotheses; among liberal variables, only democracy is a robust predictor of both termination and conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 325-353 Issue: 4 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620214757 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620214757 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:4:p:325-353 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matts Hammarstr m Author-X-Name-First: Matts Author-X-Name-Last: Hammarstr m Author-Name: Birger Heldt Author-X-Name-First: Birger Author-X-Name-Last: Heldt Title: The Diffusion of Military Intervention: Testing a Network Position Approach Abstract: This study assesses the fruitfulness of applying network analysis to diffusion of interstate military conflict. Specifically, the network position approach is applied in a statistical analysis, using a new global dataset of interstate military interventions in conflict systems, 1945-1991. We find that the network position approach is consistently supported, whereas competing or complementary approaches are less empirically successful. The findings reported in the present study can be utilized to refine the results of previous studies. While these show that interstate conflict diffusion tends to occur among contiguous states, the network position approach is able to identify which of the contiguous states are most likely to become targets of diffusion. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 355-377 Issue: 4 Volume: 28 Year: 2002 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620214758 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620214758 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:4:p:355-377 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hemda Ben-Yehuda Author-X-Name-First: Hemda Author-X-Name-Last: Ben-Yehuda Author-Name: Meirav Mishali-Ram Author-X-Name-First: Meirav Author-X-Name-Last: Mishali-Ram Title: The Ethnic-State Perspective in International Crises: A theoretical framework applied to the Arab-Israel conflict 1947-2000 Abstract: Interstate and ethnic conflicts have occurred throughout the twentieth century, but in the closing decade of the century ethnic strife has become salient. This study draws upon crisis theory and ethnicity to probe four research questions: (1) Do ethno-national actors create new issues over which states contend? (2) What is the role they play in crises? (3) Do issues and role change over time? (4) How do issues and roles affect core crisis attributes, namely gravity of threat, levels of violence, and the type of outcome in such confrontations? To explore these subjects, we define four concepts: ethnicity in crisis, ethnic-state crisis, Ethno-National Actors (ENAs), and ethnic attributes in crisis-issues and roles. We then outline a conceptual framework, spell out three postulates, and apply them to ICB data on 15 ethnic-state crises in the Arab-Israel conflict during the 1947-2000 period. Findings from these cases indicate: (1) A rise in the scope of ethnic issues, indicating a higher level of ethnic-related regional instability. (2) An increase in centrality of role ENAs play in crises. A change is also observed in the type of role they play: from an escalating one in the 1947-1973 years to a moderating posture since 1974. Postulate 1 on ethnic attributes and threat is rejected because the increase in destabilizing issues and in role centrality is not accompanied by higher gravity of threat but rather by a decrease. Postulate 2 on ethnic attributes and violence, mainly in the war category, is partly supported. Postulate 3 on ethnic attributes and outcome is supported: the increase in destabilizing issues and in role centrality is accompanied by an increase in accommodative crisis outcomes in ethnic-state crises. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-26 Issue: 1 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304596 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304596 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:1:p:1-26 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christina Davenport Author-X-Name-First: Christina Author-X-Name-Last: Davenport Author-Name: Will Moore Author-X-Name-First: Will Author-X-Name-Last: Moore Author-Name: Steven Poe Author-X-Name-First: Steven Author-X-Name-Last: Poe Title: Sometimes You Just Have to Leave: Domestic Threats and Forced Migration, 1964-1989 Abstract: In this study we explore why persons flee their homes to become refugees and internally displaced persons. We contend that individuals will tend to flee when the integrity of their person is threatened. Further, we argue that they will flee toward countries where they expect conditions to be better. We conduct statistical analyses using fixed effects least squares, on a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set, consisting of data from 129 countries for the years 1964-1989. Our findings support the conclusion that threats to personal integrity are of primary importance in leading people to abandon their homes. Measures of state threats to personal integrity, dissident threats to personal integrity, and joint state-dissident threats each have statistically significant and substantively important effects on migrant production. We also find that countries making moves toward democracy tend to have greater number of forced migrants, once other factors are considered. We conclude the analysis by identifying several lucrative areas for further investigation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 27-55 Issue: 1 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304597 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304597 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:1:p:27-55 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Clark Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Clark Author-Name: Robert Hart Author-X-Name-First: Robert Author-X-Name-Last: Hart Title: Paying the Piper? Implications of Social Insurance Payments for Conflict Propensity Abstract: State leaders must often address domestic and foreign-policy concerns simultane-ously, though doing so can be complicated and risky. One way in which leaders can seek to satisfy domestic demands and pursue foreign policy goals simultaneously is by implementing policies that complement one another; i.e., the implementation of one policy influences the ease with which the other policy can be implemented. For instance, one manner in which leaders can placate domestic audiences is via distributive policies such as social insurance payments that provide economic security to individuals. By providing economic security guarantees, leaders may gain greater discretion over other policy areas, including foreign policy. However, while the social insurance effort may satisfy an audience and enable a leader to take foreign- policy action, especially high payment levels may indicate that a leader must devote an inordinate portion of his budget to domestic concerns, making foreign policy more difficult to implement. Thus, guarantees of economic security might provide leaders with greater foreign policy latitude until domestic expenditures reach sufficient levels that foreign-affairs budgets are reduced. We employ zero-inflated event count models to estimate the relationship between social-insurance levels and the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes in which states engage. Our analyses include 69 states between 1975 and 1990. Our models support the hypothesis that lower levels of social insurance lead to greater numbers of disputes, but that, after a certain level of insurance effort is passed, dispute involvement declines. Our findings suggest a differential effect of social insurance on a leader's ability to act in the foreign policy arena and support the notion that leaders may employ the welfare state to enhance their foreign-policy capabilities, though they appear to meet with conditional and limited success. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 57-82 Issue: 1 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304598 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304598 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:1:p:57-82 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rafael Reuveny Author-X-Name-First: Rafael Author-X-Name-Last: Reuveny Author-Name: William Thompson Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Thompson Title: Systematic Leadership and Trade Openness Abstract: Studies of hegemonic stability tend to specify periods when hegemony is present or absent in the world system. Periods in which hegemony is present are expected to exhibit openness for trade. Periods in which hegemony is absent should be associated with trade closure. Partially as a consequence of this nominal measurement strategy, scholars continue to be unsure whether hegemony and systemic leadership are linked to the openness of the world's trading system. We contend that analysts need to devote more attention to the sources of preponderance and less to its arbitrary presence or absence. Focusing on the U.S. from 1870 to 1990, we first articulate a theory linking certain political-economic systemic leadership variables to trade openness, in terms of the directions, signs, and diffusion speed of the causal links. We then estimate Granger causality and distributed lag models to test our predictions empirically. The empirical results support our theoretical interpretation. The Granger causalities between world trade openness and the systemic leadership variables are found to be reciprocal, with the effects of systemic leadership on world trade openness working faster than those of world trade openness on the hegemon. World trade openness exerts a negative effect on systemic leadership, while systemic leadership promotes world trade openness. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 83-110 Issue: 2 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304601 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304601 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:2:p:83-110 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Leander Schneider Author-X-Name-First: Leander Author-X-Name-Last: Schneider Title: The Sirens' Call of Relative Gains Concerns: A Critical Analysis of Their Presumed Rationality in the Prisoners' Dilemma Abstract: The notion that in international interactions state-actors care not only about their own absolute gains, but also about the size of these gains relative to what other actors receive, is one of the pillars on which rests neorealists' pessimism about the prospects of cooperation in repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and, by extension, in international politics. Although there has been a lively debate over the impact of relative gains concerns on the prospects of cooperation, the prior question, whether states should in fact care about relative gains at all, has not been seriously confronted. This article questions the assumption that rational states should care about relative gains in PD. As the literature motivates them, relative gains concerns are best understood as a heuristic device designed to guide states toward inter-temporal optimization of their absolute payoffs. Using simulated tournaments of a model of a dynamic, multi-player PD, this article puts to the test whether relative gains concerns in fact achieve this purpose. Contrary to what has been presumed, the analysis demonstrates that in many contexts it is harmful and dangerous for states to care about relative gains. Furthermore, whenever states are in a position to tell whether, in a particular setting, it might be rational for them to care about relative gains, the heuristic of relative gains concerns is redundant. The important issues that the literature on relative gains has sought to address should continue to be discussed, but not through the lens of the problematic and misleading conceptual apparatus of relative gains concerns. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 111-142 Issue: 2 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304602 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304602 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:2:p:111-142 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Julie Harrelson-Stephens Author-X-Name-First: Julie Author-X-Name-Last: Harrelson-Stephens Author-Name: Rhonda Callaway Author-X-Name-First: Rhonda Author-X-Name-Last: Callaway Title: Does Trade Openness Promote Security Rights in Developing Countries? Examining the Liberal Perspective Abstract: As the global economy expands, there is an increasing opportunity for trade between diverse regime types. Simultaneously, human rights have become an increasingly important issue as regimes are faced with greater pressure to adopt democratic policies. As a result, it is common for contemporary western political rhetoric to advocate the use of trade policies in an attempt to deter human rights violations. Within the political science literature, the liberal position asserts that increased trade will lead to improved human rights practices. Critics of this view, on the other hand, argue that trade policies do not alter a regime's treatment of its citizens. The extent to which the level of trade in a country affects human rights remains a point of contention. This paper sets out to empirically test the liberal perspective regarding the effect of trade on human rights practices. A pooled cross-sectional time series analysis is utilized to investigate the effects of trade on human rights. We examine developing countries from 1976 to 1996. We find support for the liberal position, specifically that trade is negatively related to human rights violations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 143-158 Issue: 2 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304599 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304599 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:2:p:143-158 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Quan Li Author-X-Name-First: Quan Author-X-Name-Last: Li Title: The Effect of Security Alliances on Exchange-Rate Regime Choices Abstract: Because an exchange-rate arrangement by nature involves more than one country and because it has various economic and political implications, it is affected inevitably by interstate political relations. Most previous research explains the exchange-rate regime choice as a function of individual country attributes, ignoring the role of interstate political relations and the anchor-currency choice. In this paper, I examine how security alliances influence a country's choices over the flexible-fixed regime and the anchor currency. Alliances increase the ex ante attractiveness of pegging to one's ally, because security ties can reduce concerns over relative gains, motivate active collaboration by the anchor-currency ally to defend the regime, and signal to the currency market the durability of the regime. Hence, a country is biased toward pegging to its ally, relative to either pegging to a nonally or choosing the flexible regime. I test the argument for both the Bretton Woods and the post- Bretton Woods periods. I find that alliance ties affect both the anchor currency and the flexible-fixed regime choices, as expected. But these effects appear to function through the defense-pact alliance alone and are most pronounced for the developing countries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 159-193 Issue: 2 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304600 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304600 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:2:p:159-193 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mary Caprioli Author-X-Name-First: Mary Author-X-Name-Last: Caprioli Title: Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force Abstract: I examine the role of domestic gender equality in predicting whether or not a state is more aggressive in international disputes. This research adds to a growing body of feminist research in international relations, which demonstrates that states with higher levels of gender equality exhibit lower levels of violence during international disputes and during international crises. Many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence results in a greater likelihood of state use of violence internationally. This argument is most fully developed within feminist literature; however, research in the field of ethno-nationalism has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination and violence on state behavior at the international level. Using the MID data set and new data on first use of force, I test, using logistic regression, whether states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to be aggressive when involved in international disputes, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. Beyond this project's contribution to the conflict literature, this research expands feminist theory by further incorporating it into traditional international relations theory to deepen our understanding of the impact of domestic gender equality on state behavior internationally. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 195-214 Issue: 3 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304595 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304595 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:3:p:195-214 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Long Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Long Title: Time Present and Time Past: Rivalry and the Duration of Interstate Wars, 1846-1985 Abstract: This article sits at the intersection of the rivalry, war duration, and bargaining literatures, suggesting that histories of armed conflict between states increase war duration through their effects on the selectorate and the wartime bargaining process. I argue that the historical relationship between two states plays an integral role in the duration of future conflict. Specifically, historical conflict between states intensifies the preference of national selectorates for military victory and narrows the range of negotiated settlements that leaders might pursue while still maintaining domestic political support. I employ Bennett and Stam's (1996) ex ante data set and Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) International Interaction Score to provide an empirical test of the ability to generalize appropriately coded historical interaction to the topic of war duration. Contradicting earlier studies, the results of this analysis show that a properly operationalized measure of rivalry has significant and positive effects on war duration. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 215-236 Issue: 3 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304594 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304594 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:3:p:215-236 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Benjamin Goldsmith Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin Author-X-Name-Last: Goldsmith Title: Imitation in International Relations: Analogies, Vicarious Learning, and Foreign Policy Abstract: Do states learn from other states' experiences in international relations? This is the expectation of prominent theories. But empirical research indicates that foreign policy learning is based overwhelmingly on direct experience. I argue that vicarious learning has not been uncovered because we have not known where to look: there has been no well-developed theory leading to falsifiable expectations. Here I suggest a theory and test it on data for foreign policy beliefs and analogies used by Ukrainian and Russian elites. The results indicate that learning from vicarious success, or imitation, has a strong impact on beliefs following a major failure. This has implications for foreign policy decision making and for concepts of interests and change in systemic theories of international relations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 237-267 Issue: 3 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620304593 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620304593 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:3:p:237-267 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas Lemke Author-X-Name-First: Douglas Author-X-Name-Last: Lemke Author-Name: Ronald L. Tammen Author-X-Name-First: Ronald L. Author-X-Name-Last: Tammen Title: Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China Journal: International Interactions Pages: 269-271 Issue: 4 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/714950651 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/714950651 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:4:p:269-271 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas Lemke Author-X-Name-First: Douglas Author-X-Name-Last: Lemke Title: Investigating the Preventive Motive for War Abstract: The preventive motive for war is a prominent part of many world politics arguments. However, there are no general statistical investigations of either its prevalence or bellicosity. Consequently, no general conclusions about it can be drawn. In this article I operationally define the preventive motive, determine how often it is observed when wars are fought, and estimate its statistical impact on the probability of war. I find the preventive motive is frequently present in both types of dyads, but has no consistent statistical impact on the probability of war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 273-292 Issue: 4 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/714950650 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/714950650 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:4:p:273-292 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian Efird Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Efird Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Author-Name: Gaspare Genna Author-X-Name-First: Gaspare Author-X-Name-Last: Genna Title: From War to Integration: Generalizing Power Transition Theory Abstract: Generalizing the dynamics implied by power transition theory, we characterize the structural conditions that lead nations to initiate conflict or choose to integrate. The relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction are used to identify the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. Empirical tests for the last two centuries confirm the strength and robustness of this characterization. In addition, long term assessments of Pax Britannica, the Cold War, and China's potential challenge to the United States in this century are used to illustrate the precision of these findings. The fundamental implication is that structural conditions provide the preconditions for conflict and cooperation, but decision makers have leeway in advancing policies that eventually lead to either war or peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 293-313 Issue: 4 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/714950654 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/714950654 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:4:p:293-313 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Rapkin Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Rapkin Author-Name: William Thompson Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Thompson Title: Power Transition, Challenge and the (Re)Emergence of China Abstract: We use power transition theory and leadership long cycle theory's challenger model to investigate ongoing deep structural changes that may affect fundamentally the prospects for twenty-first century Sino-American conflict. We specifically evaluate which of these structural theories most accurately maps the power transition process. Whereas both theories offer important insights, the challenger model's focus on qualitative dimensions of structural change are more important to understanding the dynamics of a potential Sino-American power transition. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 315-342 Issue: 4 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/714950652 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/714950652 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:4:p:315-342 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erich Weede Author-X-Name-First: Erich Author-X-Name-Last: Weede Title: China and Russia: On the Rise and Decline of Two Nations Abstract: In the late 1970s, the economic size ratio between the Soviet Union and China was 4 to 1. In 2001, the ratio between Russia and China was less than 1 to 4, or even less than 1 to 5, if one includes Hong Kong with China. Although the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to this profound reversal of economic strength, domestic factors have been more important: decollectivization of Chinese agriculture versus an unwillingness to reform in Russia, the establishment of township village enterprises in China versus an extremely weak small and medium enterprise sector in Russia, economic openness and market-preserving federalism in China versus limited participation in globalization and confused federalism in Russia. Although Russia was faster than China in privatizing state-owned enterprises, the preferential treatment of insiders and the weakness of the rule of law or functional substitutes for it neutralized this potential Russian advantage. The strength and character of Chinese nationalism might also help it to outgrow Russia. While the rise of China and the corresponding power transitions imply security risks, reinforced by China's central geopolitical location, there are also opportunities, because of the pacifying impact of free trade and globalization and prospects for democratization. By trade China might become prosperous and, ultimately, even democratic. In the long run, a "capitalist peace" between China, Russia, and the West is conceivable. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 343-364 Issue: 4 Volume: 29 Year: 2003 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/714950653 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/714950653 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:29:y:2003:i:4:p:343-364 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Glenn Palmer Author-X-Name-First: Glenn Author-X-Name-Last: Palmer Author-Name: Tamar London Author-X-Name-First: Tamar Author-X-Name-Last: London Author-Name: Patrick Regan Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: Regan Title: What's Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies Abstract: Much of the work on the democratic peace treats democracies as a homogenous set. In this paper we focus on the heterogeneity of established parliamentary democracies and investigate the effects of their domestic constraints on international conflict behavior. We emphasize leaders' vulnerability to removal from office and how this vulnerability varies across democracies as a function of two aspects of a ruling parliamentary coalition: 1) its political position, that is, whether a government is "right" or "left"; and 2) its structural complexity. We present a model of the relationship between levels of conflict and leaders' vulnerability to removal from office. The model concludes that leaders who are more likely to be removed from office, should they use force, are less likely to become involved in militarized interstate conflict; but that once involved, they are more likely to see their conflicts escalate. We find that right governments (whose leaders are less vulnerable to removal from office should they use force) are more likely to be involved in militarized disputes, while left governments (whose leaders are more likely to be removed from office should they use force) are more likely to see the disputes in which they are involved escalate. Our evidence indicates that structural complexity is largely unrelated to the likelihood of either involvement in or escalation of militarized interstate disputes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-24 Issue: 1 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/725289044 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/725289044 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:1:p:1-24 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Karen Petersen Author-X-Name-First: Karen Author-X-Name-Last: Petersen Title: A Research Note: Reexamining Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior Abstract: In this paper I explore the relationship between ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior through a replication, correction, and modification of previous work on the subject. After replicating David Davis and Will Moore's analyses of the relationship between ethnic alliances and foreign policy behavior, I correct and then modify the original model. With the corrected model, I demonstrate that correcting for errors in data coding improves the original results and eliminates the conflicting results reported by the original authors. Davis and Moore argue that ethnic alliances have only a marginal impact on the foreign policy behavior (international interactions) of states. After modification of their model using an improved measure of the foreign policy behavior in a dyad (and improved measures of some of the control variables), I show that ethnic alliances are important predictors of foreign policy behavior. Additionally, I find support for the democratic peace proposition. Democratic dyads have better relationships than nondemocratic dyads regardless of the presence or absence of transnational ethnic alliances. These findings lead me to conclude that the conflict literature deals with the ethnic components of territorial disputes needs to be explored in more detail and that foreign policy behavior should be an integral part of research on militarized conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 25-42 Issue: 1 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/725289045 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/725289045 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:1:p:25-42 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John Tuman Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Tuman Author-Name: Ayoub Ayoub Author-X-Name-First: Ayoub Author-X-Name-Last: Ayoub Title: The Determinants of Japanese Official Development Assistance in Africa: A Pooled Time Series Analysis Abstract: This study seeks to explain the variation in Japanese official development assistance (ODA) in 35 African countries for the period of 1979 and 1998. It tests for the effects of several new variables not examined previously in the quantitative aid literature on Africa, including human rights, democracy, and varied U.S. strategic and economic interests. The findings suggest that humanitarian interests, as measured by poverty, human rights, democracy, and food insecurity, figure prominently in Japanese aid decisions. In addition, we find that Japan's trade with recipient countries and some U.S. security interests have shaped the pattern of Japanese ODA in Africa, although U.S. economic reform initiatives and oil exports were found to have little effect. While previous studies have emphasized the importance of Japanese national economic interests as determinants of ODA disbursements, our results suggest that humanitarian concern and certain U.S. strategic interests are also important in understanding Japanese aid decisions in Africa. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 43-57 Issue: 1 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/725289042 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/725289042 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:1:p:43-57 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Simon Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Simon Title: Asymmetric Proliferation and Nuclear War: The Limited Usefulness of an Experimental Test Abstract: I employ a human subject experiment to assess the relationship between nuclear proliferation and war. I develop a game-theoretic model to predict crisis behavior following four scenarios of dyadic nuclear acquisition. By varying the cash payments allotted to different outcomes, I experimentally alter the payoffs of the participants. Subjects compete for cash payments by playing a competitive game based on the model. The experimental variation (altering the cash payments) allows for an exploration of the difference between nuclear armament scenarios. Tentative results suggest that asymmetric nuclear acquisition would be dangerous. Yet, serious limits exist to the generalizability of experiments on nuclear proliferation, due to the gap between the laboratory setting and actual nuclear decision-making. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 69-85 Issue: 1 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/725289043 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/725289043 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:1:p:69-85 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Quackenbush Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Quackenbush Title: The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory Abstract: Rational choice theory has long been criticized, with several recent critiques of applications in political science in general and international relations in particular. In this paper, I seek to clarify discussion about rationality in several ways. I discuss the role of assumptions in theory and the assumption of rationality in rational choice theory. I demonstrate that many critiques of rational choice theory have been misguided , since instrumental rationality-the rationality of rational choice theory-is applicable to a wide variety of social situations, including situations where various psychological, informational, and structural factors claimed to interfere with rational decision-making are present. I also focus on three applications of rational choice theory in international relations that demonstrate ways that rational choice theorists have potentially added to confusion about the rationality assumption and created disillusionment in others about the rational choice enterprise. Finally, I point out that, since rational choice theory is not a single theory, critics' claims about the non-falsifiability of rational choice are immaterial. An understanding of these issues facilitates movement by the international relations community away from argument over the assumption of rationality and on to more productive and integrative theory building. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 87-107 Issue: 2 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490462595 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490462595 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:87-107 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Shellman Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Shellman Title: Measuring the Intensity of Intranational Political Events Data: Two Interval-Like Scales Abstract: King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, pp. 27-28) argue that we should "maximize the validity of our measurement," "ensure that data-collection methods are reliable," and make all data and analysis replicable. In an effort to improve the measurement of the events data collected by the Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) project, this extension of the project produces two new valid and reliable interval-like scales. Following Azar (1982), Goldstein (1992), and Moore and Lindstrom (1996), I produce interval-like scales of cooperative and hostile political actions based on a group of experts' judgements. The collective scaling procedure produces data suitable for use in OLS regression models as well as a standardized interval-like scale that more accurately represents the true scores of event types. The paper discusses the procedures taken to derive the new measures, proceeds to argue why the new measures are improvements over existing measures, and reports the findings of statistical analytic comparisons. The statistical comparisons demonstrate that the new scales make a difference in various statistical models using different temporal units of aggregation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 109-141 Issue: 2 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490462603 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490462603 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:109-141 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gaspare Genna Author-X-Name-First: Gaspare Author-X-Name-Last: Genna Author-Name: Taeko Hiroi Author-X-Name-First: Taeko Author-X-Name-Last: Hiroi Title: Power Preponderance and Domestic Politics: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1960-1997 Abstract: This article addresses the domestic and international conditions that influence regional integration. The national political elite is assumed to be opportunistic and will opt for regional integration when the domestic and international conditions provide economic gains for their constituencies through greater economic integration. The hypotheses state that increases in regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean (ANCOM, CACM/SICA, CARICOM, and MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) occur during periods of relative power asymmetries among pairs of countries, when mutual trade interests are high, and when alliance portfolios are similar. We test the hypotheses using aggregate data of country dyads from 1960 to 1997. To measure regional integration, we use an index referred to as the Integration Achievement Score. OLS and Cox proportional hazards regression estimates largely support our claims. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 143-164 Issue: 2 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490453450 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490453450 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:143-164 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Shale Horowitz Author-X-Name-First: Shale Author-X-Name-Last: Horowitz Author-Name: Sunw Kim Author-X-Name-First: Sunw Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: Electoral Response to International Financial Crisis: The Role of Dispersed Interest Groups in South Korea's 1997 Presidential Election Abstract: In 1997, South Korea was hit by international financial crisis. In the ensuing presidential election, the primary issue was whether the crisis was best addressed by making structural changes to the old economic regime. Over the past several decades, South Korea's economy has been dominated by chaebol (large business conglomerates). Structural change involved cutting back chaebol financial privileges, changing their centralized system of corporate governance, and rationalizing their business operations and financial structures. Such changes meant massive layoffs. Using individual-level polling data in multinomial logit models of vote choice, we test the most widely used theories of preference formation based on individual economic interests. Vote changes among dispersed interest groups-poorly organized groups facing relatively high costs and low benefits of political mobilization-were crucial in explaining the victory of the more liberally-oriented opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung. Occupation, age and region are significant in the expected direction in explaining changes in vote choice. Education and gender are also significant, but not in the manner expected; and the impacts of regionalism and gender are larger than expected. In general, the significant variables are more likely to have retrospective than prospective rationales, and it seems likely that these retrospective rationales are cultural as well as economic in character. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 165-189 Issue: 2 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490453478 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490453478 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:165-189 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas Volgy Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Volgy Author-Name: Kristin Kanthak Author-X-Name-First: Kristin Author-X-Name-Last: Kanthak Author-Name: Robert Ingersoll Author-X-Name-First: Robert Author-X-Name-Last: Ingersoll Author-Name: Derrick Frazier Author-X-Name-First: Derrick Author-X-Name-Last: Frazier Title: The G7, International Terrorism and Domestic Politics: Modeling Policy Cohesion in Response to Systemic Disturbance Abstract: This work probes the variability in G7 cohesion in response to relatively new disturbances in the international system. Using a domestic politics model, we argue that G7 cohesion weakens in the face of international terrorism in the context of variable domestic consequences to common foreign policy responses to this systemic disturbance. We compare the predictions from our model with predictions stemming from neorealist and liberal/institutionalist explanations. We find that, consistent with the domestic politics explanation, G7 foreign policy cohesion declines as internal terrorism increases. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 191-210 Issue: 3 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490492079 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490492079 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:3:p:191-210 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kelly Kadera Author-X-Name-First: Kelly Author-X-Name-Last: Kadera Author-Name: Gerald Sorokin Author-X-Name-First: Gerald Author-X-Name-Last: Sorokin Title: Measuring National Power Abstract: Power's central role in international relations theory is unsurpassed, yet considerable debate persists over the quality of its most commonly used indicator, the Correlates of War project's Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC). At issue is whether CINC's main feature, its ability to measure a nation's power relative to other nations' power levels, inadvertently creates errors when membership in the comparison group fluctuates. Using mathematical proofs and an empirical investigation of the major power system, we show that Organski and Kugler (1980) and Gleditsch and Ward (1999) are correct: changes in the comparison group do create errors in CINC. In particular, CINC inadvertently mismeasures dyadic power distributions. Using power transition theory as a context within which to evaluate CINC, we find that it creates artificial power transitions, masks actual transitions, changes the timing of transitions, alters the magnitude by which one state overtakes another, and produces specious relationships between transitions and conflict. We also offer a viable alternative measure, called the Geometric Indicator of National Capabilities (GINC), and demonstrate how its use of the geometric mean retains CINC's notion of systemically-based relative power and immunizes it from the problems afflicting CINC. GINC is strongly recommended for dyadic analyses, especially when membership in the comparison group fluctuates frequently. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 211-230 Issue: 3 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490492097 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490492097 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:3:p:211-230 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kristian Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Kristian Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Title: A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002 Journal: International Interactions Pages: 231-262 Issue: 3 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490492150 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490492150 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:3:p:231-262 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Souva Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Souva Title: Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict Abstract: This paper makes two arguments. First, the political and economic institutions of a state affect that state's foreign policy preferences. Second, dyads with similar political and economic institutions are less likely to experience conflict than other types of dyads. After developing the logic of these arguments, I create measures of political and economic institutional similarity and test the hypotheses against the empirical record. The empirical analysis supports the argument that dyadic institutional similarity reduces the likelihood of conflict. The most noteworthy finding is that economic institutional similarity, even when the political institutions in a dyad are dissimilar, reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 263-280 Issue: 3 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490492213 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490492213 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:3:p:263-280 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Volker Krause Author-X-Name-First: Volker Author-X-Name-Last: Krause Author-Name: Christopher Sprecher Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Sprecher Title: Causes and Consequences of Military Alliances: Concepts, Theory, Evidence Journal: International Interactions Pages: 281-283 Issue: 4 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490883949 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490883949 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:281-283 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul Fritz Author-X-Name-First: Paul Author-X-Name-Last: Fritz Author-Name: Kevin Sweeney Author-X-Name-First: Kevin Author-X-Name-Last: Sweeney Title: The (de)Limitations of Balance of Power Theory Journal: International Interactions Pages: 285-308 Issue: 4 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490883976 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490883976 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:285-308 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas Gibler Author-X-Name-First: Douglas Author-X-Name-Last: Gibler Author-Name: Toby Rider Author-X-Name-First: Toby Author-X-Name-Last: Rider Title: Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior Journal: International Interactions Pages: 309-329 Issue: 4 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490883985 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490883985 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:309-329 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christopher Sprecher Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Sprecher Title: Alliance Formation and the Timing of War Involvement Journal: International Interactions Pages: 331-347 Issue: 4 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490884010 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490884010 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:331-347 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Volker Krause Author-X-Name-First: Volker Author-X-Name-Last: Krause Title: Hazardous Weapons? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defense Pacts on Militarized Disputes, 1950-1995 Journal: International Interactions Pages: 349-371 Issue: 4 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490884038 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490884038 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:349-371 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kathy Powers Author-X-Name-First: Kathy Author-X-Name-Last: Powers Title: Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances Journal: International Interactions Pages: 373-395 Issue: 4 Volume: 30 Year: 2004 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620490884065 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620490884065 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:373-395 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chae-Han Kim Author-X-Name-First: Chae-Han Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: Reciprocity in Asymmetry: When Does Reciprocity Work? Abstract: The impact of reciprocity on mutual cooperation in asymmetric situations has been inadequately studied. Asymmetry can include both preference differences and power imbalances. Distinguishing between the conditions under which reciprocity yields a desirable outcome and those under which it does not, the following are suggested: First, if mutual cooperation is preferable to unilateral defection and unrequited cooperation is preferred to mutual defection then cooperate is always the preferred course of action. Secondly, if an actor believes that their opponent will not cooperate but mutual defection represents the worst outcome then unrequited cooperation is the probably outcome. Third, reciprocity is recommended 1) when mutual cooperation represents the best outcome while unrequited cooperation is the worst outcome, 2) when both parties prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection and both prefer mutual defection to unrequited cooperation, or 3) when the opponent surely prefers mutual cooperation most. These suggestions with the exception of unilateral concession can be inferred from symmetric payoff structures. The theories of reciprocity based on symmetry can be extended to asymmetry with some restrictions. This has some implications in controversies over soft power or coercion. This work was supported by a research grant from Hallym University, Korea. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-14 Issue: 1 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590919371 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590919371 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:1-14 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jonathan R. Strand Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan R. Author-X-Name-Last: Strand Author-Name: David P. Rapkin Author-X-Name-First: David P. Author-X-Name-Last: Rapkin Title: Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF Abstract: This paper explores the voting power of hypothetical regional voting blocs in the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund. We first discuss the prospect of regionally defined groups becoming more significant in the Fund’s decision-making process. After briefly outlining the IMF’s formal decision procedures, including its weighted voting system, use of special majorities, and the function of voting groups in the Fund’s Executive Board we define three indices of a priori voting power — the Banzhaf, Johnston, and Shapley-Shubik indices — which are then applied to existing voting groups. Following this we simulate several regionally defined a priori coalitions and their potential to influence outcomes in passing resolutions in the Fund using a simple majority. The coalitions we specify are based on the assumption that members of the IMF will form into voting blocs based on regionally-defined preferences. The procedures employed use existing voting weights to project the relative strengths of alternative regional blocs that could emerge within the IMF. Our results indicate that the United States would have the greatest voting power in almost all scenarios. A voting bloc comprised of European countries, however, would be able to dominate the United States unless the U.S. formed an Asia-Pacific bloc. Japan, the PRC, and other Asian countries appear to be unable to form voting blocs that would provide them with more voting power than the United States. We have benefited from the comments of three anonymous referees. We also thank Thomas Bräuninger for modifying his source code to accommodate our application of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 15-54 Issue: 1 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590919399 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590919399 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:15-54 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John H. P. Williams Author-X-Name-First: John H. P. Author-X-Name-Last: Williams Title: Great Britain and the European Constitution: A Strategic analysis Abstract: Great Britain holds an ambiguous position within the European Union (EU), as it is a full member of many EU institutions, but remains outside of others. Would full participation improve its influence within key EU institutions? Usin g a strategic interaction model, I assess British influence in the critical debate over the new European Constitution, looking both at status quo circumstances and simulating the effect of British entry. The result forecasts the likely outcome of the constitutional debate: significant changes will emerge that strengthen EU powers, but the changes will fall short of the supranationalism sought by some. Although isolated for this issue, the British can promote their preferences whether in or out of the EMU, so entry provides no political advantage. British entry does have a significant impact, however, as such a move improves the political circumstances for other large powers within the EU. The results support coalition theory for explaining and managing Britain’s position within the EU. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 55-85 Issue: 1 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590919443 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590919443 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:55-85 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gregory D. Saxton Author-X-Name-First: Gregory D. Author-X-Name-Last: Saxton Title: Repression, Grievances, Mobilization, and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr’s Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion Abstract: Throughout the 1990s Ted Robert Gurr developed and refined a model of ethnopolitical rebellion built around four key determinants—identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities. Lindström and Moore (1995), Gurr and Moore (1997), and Moore and Gurr (1998) have argued that the explanation Gurr proposes actually implies an interactive model in which these four factors, along with rebellion and repression, work interdependently to determine levels of rebellious ethnic conflict. In this study I utilize a three-stage least squares estimator to test the ability of this interactive model to explain the magnitude of ethnopolitical rebellion in the seventeen regions of Spain from 1977--1996. The use of an original event data set with enhanced indicators allows for the first test of Gurr’s interactive model not based on the Minorities at Risk project, while the cross-temporal design facilitates the first full test of the model’s democracy-rebellion linkages. This test demonstrates even stronger overall support for the theoretical model than previous analyses, which had failed to find evidence for the direct influence of grievances on rebellion, of democratization and repression on mobilization, and of democracy on repression. An important deviation from Gurr’s model is the finding that three of the proposed indicators of deprivation—relative regional GDP, education, and regional autonomy—were found to have the opposite impact from that intended. Implications of these findings are explored in depth. I would like to thank the editors and the reviewers for their helpful comments. Michelle Benson, Thomas Rochon, Gary Segura, Elizabeth Crighton, Jacek Kugler and Yi Feng gave invaluable advice, while the John Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation and the European Union Center of Southern California generously provided financial support. The data used in this article are avilable at http://www .itss.brockport.edu/~gsaxton/papers.html Journal: International Interactions Pages: 87-116 Issue: 1 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590919452 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590919452 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:87-116 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Susan Hannah Allen Author-X-Name-First: Susan Hannah Author-X-Name-Last: Allen Title: The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure Abstract: With an inconclusive track record, questions about the future utility of sanctions continue to plague policy makers and scholars. Drawing on previous episodes, both successful and failed sanctions tell us a great deal about economic coercion, but the causes of failure have been largely understudied. In order to further understanding of the coercive influence of sanctions, the analysis presented here delineates between the determinants of failure and success. To this end, a competing risks event history model is employed to test the impact that domestic politics have on sanctions success as well as sanctions failure, with strong results suggesting that political structures do affect the way states respond to economic coercion. The author wishes to thank Chris Zorn, Brian Lai, Dan Reiter, and Suzanne Werner as well as the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 117-138 Issue: 2 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590950097 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590950097 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:2:p:117-138 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Theodora-Ismene Gizelis Author-X-Name-First: Theodora-Ismene Author-X-Name-Last: Gizelis Title: Globalization, Integration, and the European Welfare State Abstract: This paper considers three challenges to the mature European welfare states posed by economic and social integration, demographic changes, and the alleged decline of state capacity in the form of fiscal extraction in an era of globalization. I argue that the experiences of the older member states in the European Union are difficult to reconcile with the common assertions that globalization necessarily leads to a “race to the bottom” where welfare spending is downsized to the lowest common denominator. I develop a set of hypotheses on plausible linkages between demographic challenges, globalization, political capacity, and welfare spending, and test the propositions in an empirical analysis of 14 European Union member states from 1983 to 1998. My empirical results suggest that economic integration does not pose a threat to European welfare states. Rather, demographic changes such as low fertility rates and the aging of the population and their political implications for political leaders’ incentives are more serious challenges for the continuation of the welfare state in Europe. I am grateful to Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Jeremy Busacca, and Constantine Drakatos for helpful comments and to Jacek Kugler and Yi Feng for providing me with data. This paper is part of a larger project funded by the Research Committee of the Academy of Athens, Athens, Greece. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston, August 2002 and at the Pan-European International Relations Conference in Canterbury, September 2001. E-mail: gizelis@chapman.edu Journal: International Interactions Pages: 139-162 Issue: 2 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590950105 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590950105 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:2:p:139-162 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Joseph Hewitt Author-X-Name-First: J. Author-X-Name-Last: Joseph Hewitt Author-Name: Gary Goertz Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Goertz Title: Conceptualizing Interstate Conflict: How Do Concept-Building Strategies Relate to Selection Effects? Abstract: An essential, but often overlooked, role of concepts lies in how they constitute or define populations. Explicit choices made by researchers about concept structure are tied inextricably to the selection rule for identifying cases to include in analyses. Concept construction issues are absolutely crucial because the concept structure used interacts in various, usually hidden, ways with theories and hypotheses that researchers want to test. The concepts used to select cases may be correlated with common dependent variables hence producing selection bias. We illustrate this potential by exploring international crises as they have been conceptualized by the ICB Project. We show that two alternative conceptualizations of “crisis” produce populations that correlate with common ICB dependent variables. Our empirical analyses pay particular attention to variables related to power because they are particularly susceptible to being influenced by these selection effects. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 163-182 Issue: 2 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620590950114 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590950114 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:2:p:163-182 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brett Ashley Leeds Author-X-Name-First: Brett Author-X-Name-Last: Ashley Leeds Author-Name: Sezi Anac Author-X-Name-First: Sezi Author-X-Name-Last: Anac Title: Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance Abstract: Military alliances are formed with varying degrees of institutionalization. While some alliances involve little initial investment or joint planning, others involve significant peacetime costs in establishing formal structures and engaging in military coordination. Several scholars have addressed the reasons states are willing to pay these governance costs in establishing cooperation—through controlling the risks of opportunism and coordinating policy more extensively, state leaders may be able to achieve higher benefits from cooperation. What has received less systematic empirical attention, however, is the comparative performance of highly institutionalized alliances. Are alliances that represent “deeper” cooperation more reliable than their less institutionalized counterparts? The newly expanded Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset includes detailed information about the institutionalization of alliances formed between 1815 and 1989. Using these data, we evaluate the effects of institutionalization on alliance performance. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that alliances with higher levels of peacetime military coordination or more formal alliances are more reliable when invoked by war. We speculate about directions for future research that might help to explain these results. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 183-202 Issue: 3 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500294135 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500294135 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:3:p:183-202 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lewis W. Snider Author-X-Name-First: Lewis W. Author-X-Name-Last: Snider Title: Political Risk: The Institutional Dimension Abstract: The argument developed in this paper is that the political arrangements and institutions that help leaders stay in office are not necessarily the ones that promote economic growth and prosperity. Indeed political leaders can remain in office more securely by rewarding the groups that keep them in power with privileged access to public resources. The net result is that the leadership remains in office but at the price of poor economic performance. It is not that the consequences of mismanaging the economy are unforeseen; rather the increased chances of an economic crisis are an acceptable price to pay if it means avoiding a political crisis which challenges the leaders' hold on power. Political survival, not peace and prosperity, is what determines the choice of policies. In this way bad economics can be good politics. The principal hypothesis addressed is that the smaller the size of the winning coalition the more the leadership depends on distributing private goods to the coalition members in order to purchase their loyalty, and, therefore the greater is the level of political risk. The ultimate effects of coalition size and the corruption attending the competition for private goods are the reduction of foreign direct investment per capita. These hypotheses were tested in a three stage least squares (3SLS) simultaneous estimation. The results generally supported the theoretical expectations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 203-222 Issue: 3 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500294176 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500294176 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:3:p:203-222 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brock F. Tessman Author-X-Name-First: Brock F. Author-X-Name-Last: Tessman Title: Critical Periods and Regime Type: Integrating Power Cycle Theory with the Democratic Peace Hypothesis Abstract: The absence of war among leading states compels scholars such as John Mueller (1989) to speculate on the obsolescence of major power conflict. Robert Jervis (2002) outlines the challenge that a democratic major power security community presents to existing theories of war. Can any existing theory of war explain conflict in a major power system dominated by democracies? This article integrates the power cycle theory of war with the democratic peace hypothesis in order to show that, although critical periods consistently lead to major power war, democratic states are less affected by these periods than are their nondemocratic counterparts. Using Correlates of War, deterrence, Polity and national capability data from 1816--1995, empirical tests show that — for all major powers — the probability of conflict participation and initiation is higher during critical periods than remaining years. Importantly, however, this difference is statistically significant for nondemocracies, while it is not so for democracies. This paper argues that structural components of democratic government are largely responsible for any immunity that democracies enjoy with regard to the potential maladies associated with critical periods. Brock F. Tessman is a Lecturer at the University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in December, 2004, from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 223-249 Issue: 3 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500294192 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500294192 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:3:p:223-249 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alex Braithwaite Author-X-Name-First: Alex Author-X-Name-Last: Braithwaite Title: Location, Location, Location…Identifying Hot spots of International Conflict Abstract: Abstract This article introduces new variables summarizing the geographic location of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) and “hot spots” of these locations for the years 1816 to 2001. Three exercises are detailed: (1) the specification and collection of geographic location data for each MID onset; (2) the generation of static map representations of these data; and (3) the application of spatial cluster analysis techniques to examine their geographic distribution. Initially, I address the protocol followed while carrying out the first two of these steps - offering thoughts on the coding procedures and examples of the mapped representations of the data. I then detail the techniques used to conduct spatial cluster analysis. The results of these analyses confirm the apparent evidence of the mapped presentations of the data, offering evidence in support of the a priori expectation that dispute onsets are clustered in space and time; revealing apparent “hot spots” of conflict across most regions of the world. I conclude with a discussion of potential applications of this new MID location dataset. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 251-273 Issue: 3 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500294234 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500294234 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:3:p:251-273 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joseph P. Daniels Author-X-Name-First: Joseph P. Author-X-Name-Last: Daniels Title: Religious Affiliation and Individual International-Policy Preferences in the United States Abstract: Empirical examination of individual-level survey data on national identity, in general, reveals a significant relationship between religious affiliation and an individual's international-policy preferences and that this relationship varies across Protestant denominations. Specifically, we test attitudes toward import and immigration policies, the role of international institutions, and unilateral policy actions. The empirical results indicate that individuals affiliated with conservative Protestant denominations are more likely to support positions on international issues that can be regarded as consistent with the anti-globalist right. We also find evidence of a reinforcing regional effect among conservatives in the south, and differences in the preferences of Baptist and non-Baptist African Americans. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 273-301 Issue: 4 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500303324 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500303324 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:4:p:273-301 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nathan Jensen Author-X-Name-First: Nathan Author-X-Name-Last: Jensen Author-Name: Fiona McGillivray Author-X-Name-First: Fiona Author-X-Name-Last: McGillivray Title: Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment Abstract: Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975--1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 303-325 Issue: 4 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500303365 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500303365 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:4:p:303-325 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lester A. Zeager Author-X-Name-First: Lester A. Author-X-Name-Last: Zeager Title: Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises Abstract: The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba and the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made by the players. After the countries implemented deterrent threats, they agreed that Cuba would patrol its borders and the United States would admit 20,000 Cubans each year. We show that the analysis, suitably adapted, also illuminates strategic choices in the 1965 and 1980 Cuban refugee crises. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 327-348 Issue: 4 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500303399 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500303399 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:4:p:327-348 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Seden Akcinaroglu Author-X-Name-First: Seden Author-X-Name-Last: Akcinaroglu Author-Name: Elizabeth Radziszewski Author-X-Name-First: Elizabeth Author-X-Name-Last: Radziszewski Title: Expectations, Rivalries, and Civil War Duration Abstract: What role have states involved in a rivalry with another state played in shaping the dynamics of their rival's civil wars? How can the existence of an interstate rival affect rebel calculations whether to continue fighting or stop the violence and negotiate? And to what extent does rival intervention differ in its impact on civil war duration from interventions by other actors? This paper argues that the existence of an interstate rival can prolong conflict even when actual aid has not been granted. The mere expectation of assistance from a rival, whether in the form of military intervention or provision of funds, can deter rebels from seeking settlement and motivate fighting at least for some time until resources are depleted. We estimate conditions under which interstate rivals are most likely to intervene in civil wars. We then argue that conditions conducive to rival intervention serve as a base upon which rebels form their expectations of forthcoming aid. We use predicted probabilities from the probit and the multinomial logit model to calculate expectations of rival intervention. Finally, using duration analysis we show that expectations of rival intervention can substantially prolong civil wars especially in a transparent society. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 349-374 Issue: 4 Volume: 31 Year: 2005 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620500303449 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620500303449 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:4:p:349-374 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patricia Lynne Sullivan Author-X-Name-First: Patricia Author-X-Name-Last: Lynne Sullivan Author-Name: Scott Sigmund Gartner Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Sigmund Gartner Title: Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes Abstract: Drawing on arguments about the domestic political costs of using force and the ability of states to signal resolve, we develop a selection effects-based model of militarized interstate dispute outcomes. By disaggregating dispute outcomes to capture important theoretical distinctions among different types of “peaceful” resolutions to militarized disputes, we are able to generate new hypotheses about the effects of regime type on conflict escalation. Employing a multinomial logit analysis on disputes since 1816, we find that democracy has both monadic and dyadic effects on dispute escalation and that the effect of regime type varies with a state's role in a dispute. Disputes with democratic initiators are less likely to escalate to violence because democratic initiators are more likely than nondemocratic initiators to obtain target concessions without employing force. Democratic targets, on the other hand, select themselves out of disputes by making concessions at a higher rate than nondemocracies, unless the dispute initiator demands a change in the target's governance or the territorial status quo. Both patterns provide evidence that democracies are more selective about the disputes they escalate to violence, rather than more pacific overall. We thank James Fowler, Robert Powell, Dan Reiter, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith for valuable feedback as this project progressed. We are also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-25 Issue: 1 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600574840 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600574840 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:1:p:1-25 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Steven E. Lobell Author-X-Name-First: Steven E. Author-X-Name-Last: Lobell Title: The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War Abstract: In combining the domestic and international levels, I contend that the international environment can enable a domestic win-set and thereby guide the formation of a state's international security strategy. The trigger is the nature of and changes in the extant international setting. Based on findings from framing effects and prospect theory, I contend that periods of external crisis, conflict, and war will shift the public's domain to one of relative losses. In this realm, it will be easier for foreign policy advisors who favor offensive security strategies to frame the national debate. Periods of international peace, tranquility, and prosperity will shift the public's domain to relative gains, which will make it easier for advisors who favor risk averse and defensive strategies to frame the national discussion. The outcome can be a more offensive or defensive strategy than the state would have otherwise pursued. I apply the model to Britain to examine Britain's decision to adopt a Limited Liability strategy between 1912 and 1914, and to escalate to a Continental Commitment by 1916. A version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual International Studies Association Convention. I would like to thank Jane Cramer, Tom Rice, and Jeffrey Taliaferro for their helpful comments and suggestions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 27-48 Issue: 1 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600574857 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600574857 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:1:p:27-48 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hemda Ben-Yehuda Author-X-Name-First: Hemda Author-X-Name-Last: Ben-Yehuda Author-Name: Meirav mishali--ram Author-X-Name-First: Meirav Author-X-Name-Last: mishali--ram Title: Ethnic Actors and International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918--2001 Abstract: This study explores the role of ethnicity in the universe of international crises during the period from 1918 to 2001. We begin with three concepts: ethnicity in international crisis, ethnic actors, and ethnic issues. We then develop a typology of international crisis comprised of interstate, ethnic-interstate, and NSA-interstate (nonstate actor-interstate) cases. Our research questions address all three types of crisis focusing specifically on: 1. Who are the ethnic actors that play a part in crises? 2. What are the issues they introduce? 3. Do interstate and ethnic-interstate crises differ? We present findings on the “universe” of 434 International Crisis Behavior (ICB) cases, divided by typological category. Then we analyze ethnic actors and issues in the “world” of 130 ethnic-interstate crises, and explore crisis outcome. Finally we examine the “universe” of ICB crises with regard to the three postulates on crisis outcome and violence. In conclusion we highlight the importance of an actor-based approach to ethnicity in world politics. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 49-78 Issue: 1 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600584435 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600584435 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:1:p:49-78 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kathryn Furlong Author-X-Name-First: Kathryn Author-X-Name-Last: Furlong Author-Name: Nils Petter Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Nils Author-X-Name-Last: Petter Gleditsch Author-Name: Håvard Hegre Author-X-Name-First: Håvard Author-X-Name-Last: Hegre Title: Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries, Shared Rivers, and Conflict Abstract: International conflict has been analyzed extensively through the framework of opportunity and willingness. Opportunity has mainly been operationalized as physical proximity. Willingness has been measured in a number of ways, and remains a somewhat more elusive concept. Several scholars have called for boundary length to represent opportunity. Heeding such calls, Harvey Starr has used GIS methods to generate boundary length for 1993 and has found it to be associated with increased propensity to conflict. A number of his measures of willingness were not. Using a new and much more extensive dataset on boundary length for the entire Correlates of War period, this article finds very different results. We study the relationship with shared rivers and water scarcity as measures of neomalthusian factors in willingness over a 110-year period. The results indicate that the neomalthusian factors are significant although not dramatic in their effects. Boundary length, while associated with conflict in a bivariate analysis, fades into insignificance when the neomalthusian willingness measures are introduced. Work on this article was supported by the Research Council of Norway and started when Kathryn Furlong was a research assistant at PRIO on an internship funded by the International Institute for Sustainable Development. We are grateful to several PRIO colleagues -- Naima Mouhleb, Håvard Strand, and Lars Wilhelmsen in particular -- for help at various stages of the process. A presentation of the new boundary data used in this article is found in Furlong and Gleditsch (2003), where we record our gratitude to all of those who helped in generating that dataset. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 44th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Portland, OR 25 February--1 March 2003 and at the Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Edinburgh, March 28--April 2, 2003. We are grateful to participants at both meetings for comments. The replication data to this article can be found on http://www.prio.no/cscw/data sets. We also acknowledge the very useful comments of Harvey Starr and an anonymous referee for this journal. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 79-108 Issue: 1 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600596421 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600596421 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:1:p:79-108 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Frederic S. Pearson Author-X-Name-First: Frederic S. Author-X-Name-Last: Pearson Author-Name: Marie Olson Lounsbery Author-X-Name-First: Marie Author-X-Name-Last: Olson Lounsbery Author-Name: Scott Walker Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Walker Author-Name: Sonja Mann Author-X-Name-First: Sonja Author-X-Name-Last: Mann Title: Rethinking Models of Civil War Settlement Abstract: The current study is a replication and expansion of an earlier piece by Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) exploring civil war settlement characteristics and stability. Their research focused on the importance of territorial autonomy provisions and the role of third party guarantors in predicting settlement success and stability. They employed a model that controlled for such conflict characteristics as international system structure, nature of the previous regime, conflict duration, conflict issue, and conflict intensity. Our study replicates Hartzell et al. using the Regan (2001) civil war dataset, employing a broader definition of conflict and a more stringent definition of when a conflict has ended. The results presented here differ from the previous study to have find that the importance of territorial autonomy provisions as a predictor of settlement stability is greatly diluted when one examines only those conflict settlements that have lasted for six months or longer without reciprocated violence. Third-party guarantors, however, remain a strong factor determining conflict settlement stability in the revised dataset. We also expand the previous work by including cases where the conflict ended through military victories, as well as by adding a dimension to the negotiated settlement variable that separates settlements that were coerced due to external military presence from those that were not coerced. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 109-128 Issue: 2 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/15325020600698728 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/15325020600698728 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:2:p:109-128 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erik Melander Author-X-Name-First: Erik Author-X-Name-Last: Melander Author-Name: Magnus Öberg Author-X-Name-First: Magnus Author-X-Name-Last: Öberg Title: Time to Go? Duration Dependence in Forced Migration Abstract: In this paper we introduce some theoretical and methodological refinements to account for effects of duration dependence in forced migration flows that have not been noticed in previous research. The engine of previous theoretical arguments on forced migration has been a decision theoretic model in which the potential migrants estimate the threat to their security and then weigh this threat against costs and benefits of leaving. Moreover, in previous arguments and empirical tests the costs and benefits for relocating have been treated as being the same for all people in a country. We relax this assumption, allowing the costs and benefits of relocating to be different for different individuals. This implies that some people more readily relocate than others. Over time this generates a selection effect in the population that remains behind, such that the remaining population will become increasingly unwilling or unable to relocate. The implications of our theoretical refinement are borne out empirically. Contrary to previous research we find that the accumulated stock of forced migrants decrease rather than increase the probability of new migration. Furthermore, we find that forced migrant flows abate rather than soar over time. The authors would like to thank Mats Hammarström and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and Tarek Abou Chabake for providing UNHCR data. Replication data and do-files can be downloaded from http://w ww.pcr.uu.se/personal/anstallda/melander.htm. Both authors contributed equally to all parts of the article. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 129-152 Issue: 2 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600574873 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600574873 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:2:p:129-152 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Anne-Katrin Wickboldt Author-X-Name-First: Anne-Katrin Author-X-Name-Last: Wickboldt Author-Name: Nazli Choucri Author-X-Name-First: Nazli Author-X-Name-Last: Choucri Title: Profiles of States as Fuzzy Sets: Methodological Refinement of Lateral Pressure Theory Abstract: One of the most serious challenges in international relations pertains to the theory and measurement of transformation and change. This paper proposes, and then develops a conceptual and methodological extension in the measurement of change within and across states as postulated by lateral pressure theory. It argues, and shows, that by conceptualizing the profiles of states identified by lateral pressure theory using fuzzy logic, we can systematically and precisely locate and track relative changes in the distribution of states within and across profile spaces, across geographical regions, as well as over time. This may be an important step toward identifying and possibly anticipating changes in the configuration of states, including conflict-prone constellations, before they escalate into conflict or war. It may also improve our understanding of those regions of the world and help articulate the implications of significant geopolitical changes as they occur. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 153-181 Issue: 2 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600719122 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600719122 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:2:p:153-181 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Souva Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Souva Author-Name: Brandon Prins Author-X-Name-First: Brandon Author-X-Name-Last: Prins Title: The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950--1999 Abstract: We test a model of the liberal peace by examining the initiation of militarized interstate disputes at the monadic level of analysis from 1950--1999. Liberal peace theory contends that both economic dependence and democratic political systems reduce conflict propensities. Extant empirical analyses of the monadic liberal peace, however, are under-specified. First, the concept of economic dependence not only includes trade, but also foreign investment. Second, existing models do not control for the influence of economic development. Previous research on the monadic liberal peace has also failed to distinguish between the initiation of conflict and participation in conflict. We find evidence for a liberal peace: trade dependence, foreign investment, and democracy reduce a state’s propensity to initiate militarized disputes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 183-200 Issue: 2 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600719361 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600719361 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:2:p:183-200 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Don Moon Author-X-Name-First: Don Author-X-Name-Last: Moon Title: Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analysis of the GATT/WTO Dispute Data Abstract: This article explores the distributive aspects of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization WTO. Even though the strictly binding dispute settlement (DS) system can operate in an unbiased way and thereby minimize power disparity among disputants, in general, the content of law on which the whole DS system is based is favorable to developed countries in the system. This study of the WTO DSM demonstrates that (1) the procedural/substantive dispute outcomes of the WTO are not significantly affected by power disparity between disputants (thus, enhancing the principles of “equality before the law” and “protecting the weak”), but that (2) the strict substantive provisions and the newly included provisions of the WTO agreements are advantageous to developed countries and disadvantageous to developing countries (thus, increased inequality in the content of the law). In order to understand the distributive consequences of the legal DSM, we need to combine an analysis of the operation of the legal body with an examination of the content of the law. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 201-228 Issue: 3 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600837841 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600837841 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:3:p:201-228 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yasemin Akbaba Author-X-Name-First: Yasemin Author-X-Name-Last: Akbaba Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Author-Name: Zeynep Taydas Author-X-Name-First: Zeynep Author-X-Name-Last: Taydas Title: One-Sided Crises in World Politics: A Study of Oxymoron, Violence and Outcomes Abstract: This paper focuses on crises and seeks to extend understanding of escalation processes, outcomes, and legacy. We go beyond Hewitt and Wilkenfeld's (1999) initial study of one-sided crises, which emphasized crisis type as an explanation for violence levels, in three ways: We (1) pursue an explanation for why some crises remain one-sided; (2) include two additional crisis attributes, protractedness of conflict and ethnicity, which are expected to impact upon the role of violence; and (3) link outcomes and subsequent tension levels for adversaries with crisis type (i.e., one-sided versus others) to expand the potential explanatory range of one-sidedness. To achieve these goals, the paper unfolds in four parts. First, the study is placed in the context of ongoing research on crises in world politics, most notably as carried out by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. The second part presents a theoretical overview of the factors that might distinguish crisis type, along with those deemed important in determining violence, outcomes, and subsequent tension. Explicit hypotheses are derived as well. The third part conveys data, variables, data analysis for crisis type (Stage 1) and violence, outcomes, and subsequent tension levels (Stage 2), and a comparison of results for the two stages. The fourth and final part summarizes the paper's accomplishments. Key findings are that (1) we can distinguish crisis type on the basis of characteristics such as contiguity, gravity of threat, and civil war involvement; and (2) the Hewitt and Wilkenfeld model is most successful in explaining violence as opposed to outcome and legacy, which seem especially difficult to account for, even with the addition of theoretically important factors like ethnicity and protracted conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 229-260 Issue: 3 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600837858 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600837858 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:3:p:229-260 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jean-Pierre P. Langlois Author-X-Name-First: Jean-Pierre P. Author-X-Name-Last: Langlois Author-Name: Catherine C. Langlois Author-X-Name-First: Catherine C. Author-X-Name-Last: Langlois Title: Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements Abstract: If the terms of a potential international agreement are interpreted as sharing surpluses generated by cooperation, they can be viewed, on an item by item basis, as giving an advantage to one or the other party. By interpreting bargaining outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to the status quo, we modify Rubinstein's full information bilateral alternative offers bargaining model, and find that this opens up new bargaining tactics in equilibrium. The Rubinstein solution no longer provides unique resolution to the bargaining problem. Instead, negotiators can choose from a continuum of strategies that involve holding tough positions and waiting for the other to concede. The tactic is visible in negotiations as diverse as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or North American Foreign Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This occurs although our negotiators are assumed to be fully informed about each other's priorities. Given the other's offer, a negotiator can choose optimally from a whole range of counteroffers in our model. But all of these leave her with the same ex ante expected utility. By focusing on the possible outcomes of a given strategy choice, we define an expected ex post evaluation of strategy that discriminates between strategies that were equivalent ex ante. Negotiators who seek to maximize this ex post valuation choose a tough bargaining position, offering less than the Rubinstein share, and wait, hoping that the other side will concede before they do. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 261-293 Issue: 3 Volume: 32 Year: 2004 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600837866 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600837866 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2004:i:3:p:261-293 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John James Quinn Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: James Quinn Author-Name: David J. Simon Author-X-Name-First: David J. Author-X-Name-Last: Simon Title: Plus ça change, … : The Allocation of French ODA to Africa During and After the Cold War Abstract: France is frequently identified as the country whose official development assistance (ODA) aid program is most oriented toward the promotion of its foreign policy goals. We examine whether France reoriented the allocation of its aid in Africa to reflect changing priorities in the 1990s. Using panel data, we compare the patterns in French aid allocation to African recipients during the period 1980--1989 with that during the period 1990--2000. We find that nearly all the same political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural variables that explain French ODA allocation during the Cold War apply in the second period as well, though to a slightly lesser degree. The predictive strength of the prior years’ ODA commitments did increase in magnitude, suggesting that bureaucratic inertia increasingly exerts a formidable force in such decisions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 295-318 Issue: 3 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620600856734 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620600856734 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:3:p:295-318 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacob Bercovitch Author-X-Name-First: Jacob Author-X-Name-Last: Bercovitch Author-Name: Scott Sigmund Gartner Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Sigmund Gartner Title: Empirical Studies in International Mediation Journal: International Interactions Pages: 319-328 Issue: 4 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601011008 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601011008 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:4:p:319-328 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacob Bercovitch Author-X-Name-First: Jacob Author-X-Name-Last: Bercovitch Author-Name: Scott Sigmund Gartner Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Sigmund Gartner Title: Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation Abstract: Key mediation attributes, such as mediating actors, the strategy they choose, and previous mediation experiences, are widely thought to influence the nature of a conflict management outcome. But how and when these features shape outcomes is not a straightforward matter, and a standard analysis of these factors does not lead to their widely anticipated results. Why? We develop a new analytical framework that argues that a dispute's intensity alters the conflict management processes. Furthermore, in order to observe this variation, we also need to expand the traditional, dichotomous notion of conflict management outcomes (success or failure) to include a fuller range of observed results. Using the most recent International Conflict Management data set and our new analytical framework, we analyze the effect on conflict management outcome of mediator (a) identity, (b) strategy and (c) history. We find that directive strategies and international mediators are effective in resolving high intensity conflicts, procedural strategies and regional mediators are effective in resolving low intensity conflicts, and that mediation history always affects resolution. Our results have implications for both the study and practice of international dispute mediation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 329-354 Issue: 4 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601011024 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601011024 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:4:p:329-354 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Author-X-Name-Last: Michael Greig Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy Abstract: In this paper, we explore the process by which initially reluctant protagonists come to accept diplomacy to resolve their conflicts; we refer to this as “softening up.” Although some studies exploring mediation and negotiation initiation have identified a number of important factors, they have produced largely modest results. These modest findings may reflect the fact that the conditions that promote diplomacy do so only after disputants have been softened up, thereby producing results that are statistically significant, but not substantively strong, unless one controls for a softening effect. In this paper, we develop and test a model of softening up. We do so by studying all pairs of rival states in the period 1946--1995. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 355-384 Issue: 4 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601011032 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601011032 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:4:p:355-384 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Derrick V. Frazier Author-X-Name-First: Derrick V. Author-X-Name-Last: Frazier Author-Name: William J. Dixon Author-X-Name-First: William J. Author-X-Name-Last: Dixon Title: Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946--2000 Abstract: Past studies regarding the success and/or failure of conflict management activities have brought about a wide range of results. In this paper we attempt to gain more definitive conclusions about effectiveness by accomplishing two tasks. First, using a basic theoretical framework we identify expectations of efficacy as they relate to differences between states, coalitions, and IGOs. Second, we also examine the utility of different conflict management techniques in an effort to place in greater perspective the effectiveness of mediation, the most utilized technique of third party intermediaries. Using a new dataset on third-party intermediary behavior in militarized disputes from 1946 to 2000, we find that while all conflict managers are useful in assisting belligerents in reaching a negotiated settlement, IGOs are the most effective. Additionally, while mediation is an effective technique to produce settlements, military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping, are much more useful. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 385-408 Issue: 4 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601011057 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601011057 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:4:p:385-408 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Zeev Maoz Author-X-Name-First: Zeev Author-X-Name-Last: Maoz Author-Name: Lesley G. Terris Author-X-Name-First: Lesley G. Author-X-Name-Last: Terris Title: Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation Abstract: We study mediation in international conflict as a process of strategic interaction among the two disputants and the (would-be) mediator. We develop a rational model that examines the choice, process, and outcome of mediation. We start with a conflict game of incomplete information played by rational players that examines the conditions under which disputants and would-be mediators would consider mediation a preferred strategy. The mediation game that follows models the mediator's choice of mediation strategy and the possible responses of the disputants offers. Finally, we explore the conditions under which a mediated solution emerges and the conditions under which mediation fails. The credibility of the mediator—defined as the extent to which disputants believe the mediator's statements, threats, or promises and her ability to deliver the promised agreement—emerges as a key factor that drives the model. Each disputant has an assessment of the mediator's credibility. Broadly speaking, the more credible the mediator is perceived by the disputant, the more accepting the disputant will be of her offers. Yet, the mediator does not know how credible she is in the view of the disputants. This uncertainty affects the mediator's decision to intervene and her choice of strategies. We derive testable propositions from this model and test them on a dataset consisting of mediation efforts in international conflicts over the years 1945--1995. The findings generally support the propositions derived from the model, and we explore the theoretical and empirical implications of these findings. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 409-440 Issue: 4 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601011073 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601011073 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:4:p:409-440 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Quinn Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Quinn Author-Name: Jonathan Wilkenfeld Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan Author-X-Name-Last: Wilkenfeld Author-Name: Kathleen Smarick Author-X-Name-First: Kathleen Author-X-Name-Last: Smarick Author-Name: Victor Asal Author-X-Name-First: Victor Author-X-Name-Last: Asal Title: Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises Abstract: International relations scholars have long focused on power relations among nations as an explanatory factor for a wide variety of state behaviors, including alliance formation, strategic interactions, and negotiation strategies. Power transition theorists have argued that war is most likely when power is equally distributed among nations or, more precisely, when the power of the challenger approaches—or begins to exceed—that of its opponent (Organski, 1968; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Kugler and Lemke, 1996). Balance of power theorists, on the other hand, have argued that equality of power among nations diminishes the chance of war, as uncertainty about outcomes caused by approximate power parity leads actors to be more cautious (Claude, 1962; Wright, 1965). The research presented here considers relative power not as a cause of conflict, as these previous studies have done, but as a factor relevant to conflict resolution efforts. In this study, we focus on crises as a specific instance of conflicts in the international system and on mediation as a specific conflict resolution measure. Building upon previous work (Wilkenfeld et al., 2003, 2005), we examine the way mediation styles and power relations among crisis actors interact and impact on whether the crisis ends in an agreement, and whether the crisis outcome leads to long-term, postcrisis tension reductions. This research is intended to extend understanding of the nature of crisis behavior and to inform efforts to manage crises most effectively. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 441-470 Issue: 4 Volume: 32 Year: 2006 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601011107 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601011107 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:4:p:441-470 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lui Hebron Author-X-Name-First: Lui Author-X-Name-Last: Hebron Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Author-Name: Michael Rudy Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Rudy Title: Testing Dynamic Theories of Conflict: Power Cycles, Power Transitions, Foreign Policy Crises and Militarized Interstate Disputes Abstract: Explaining the causes of international strife is one of the most important problems in the social sciences. A wide range of theories have been created to account for conflict, crisis, and war that in some way relate to the dynamics of power. Two of the most prominent are Doran's power cycle and Organski's power transition. Each provides a useful framework within which to examine great power involvement in international conflict, crisis and war. The study unfolds in six sections. The first sets out the paper's agenda. The second section briefly describes modified versions of Doran's power cycle theory and Organski's power transition theory. The third presents hypotheses about the likely effects of the power cycle and power transition on crises and disputes. Fourth, measurements are developed for the crucial ingredients, meaning disputes, crises, critical points, and transitions in relative capabilities for the great powers. The fifth section uses MID and ICB data from 1816 to 1991 to test the hypotheses. Results are mixed for both theories and suggest that further work is needed in terms of the cases selected for application. Sixth, and finally, the findings are reviewed and some general comments concerning the future direction of research on power cycle and power transition theory are offered. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-29 Issue: 1 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601155680 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601155680 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:1-29 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Darren Filson Author-X-Name-First: Darren Author-X-Name-Last: Filson Author-Name: Suzanne Werner Author-X-Name-First: Suzanne Author-X-Name-Last: Werner Title: The Dynamics of Bargaining and War Abstract: Filson and Werner (2002) introduce a formal model of bargaining and war to explore conditions under which states that can negotiate settlements choose to initiate and terminate violence. Filson and Werner (2004) apply the model to obtain testable hypotheses about the impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes. The model could provide a basis for a formal rational actor model of power transition with economic and political variables. However, additional dynamic structure would have to be added; Filson and Werner (2002, 2004) focus on simple environments. In this paper we begin to consider more complex dynamic environments using computational techniques. In doing so, we explore the conditions under which wars endure. The results clarify how the initial distribution of resources (power) and benefits, beliefs, and regime type affect whether wars begin, how quickly they end, and what deals are made. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 31-50 Issue: 1 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601155656 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601155656 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:31-50 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joseph Young Author-X-Name-First: Joseph Author-X-Name-Last: Young Author-Name: Brian Urlacher Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Urlacher Title: Cantankerous Cooperation: Democracies, Authoritarian Regimes, and the Prisoner's Dilemma Abstract: One of the most important debates in the field of international relations is over the effect of regime type on militarized conflict. This debate, however, has rarely extended to how regime type influences other aspects of foreign policy. Using a computer simulated intergroup prisoner's dilemma, we investigate whether democratic decisionmaking groups are more cooperative than authoritarian decisionmaking groups. We argue that differences between cooperation tendencies of groups can be explained by the structure of the decision process. Repeated simulations show that democracies tend to be more consistent in their decisions in comparison to authoritarian groups. Implications for international relations theory and policy are discussed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 51-73 Issue: 1 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601155649 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601155649 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:51-73 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul D. Poast Author-X-Name-First: Paul D. Author-X-Name-Last: Poast Title: Winning the Bid: Analyzing the International Olympic Committee's Host City Selections Abstract: Previous scholarship has relied on case study analysis and anecdotal evidence to explain the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Olympic host city selection process. This has resulted in several provocative claims regarding why the IOC selects particular cities to host the Olympics. Large-n analysis can dispel some of these assertions by identifying the systematic tendencies in the IOC's host city choices. After reviewing the selection process and the different influences on the IOC's choice of a host city, rank-ordered conditional logit estimation is applied to data proxies of bid candidate characteristics from 1959 through 2005. The IOC shows a statistical tendency to base its decision on the economic vitality of a bid city's home country and on the need to maintain continental diversity. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 75-95 Issue: 1 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620601157470 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620601157470 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:75-95 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert G. Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Robert G. Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Author-Name: Shannon Lindsey Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Shannon Lindsey Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Title: Human Rights and Trade: Beyond the “Spotlight” Abstract: Human rights concerns figure prominently on the global economic agenda. Yet little empirical analysis has addressed the prospective impact of human rights for global economic interactions. To gain insight into this linkage, we assess the empirical relationship between human rights and an important facet of the global economy, dyadic trade flows. Traditional arguments posit that respect for human rights and trade are uncomfortable bedfellows at best, and that repression may provide a foundation for increased trade activity. We posit that, alternatively, respect for human rights and trade may be a pragmatic coupling. In addition to the normative value of promoting and protecting human rights, there may be a “business case” as there are ways in which respect for human rights may encourage trade. Using a cross-sectional time-series research design, we test the relationship between human rights and trade for the years 1989--2000. Our results show that human rights conditions have a significant influence on dyadic trade. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 97-117 Issue: 2 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701268300 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701268300 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:97-117 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Uk Heo Author-X-Name-First: Uk Author-X-Name-Last: Heo Author-Name: Sung Deuk Hahm Author-X-Name-First: Sung Deuk Author-X-Name-Last: Hahm Title: The Political Economy of U.S. Direct Investment in East Asian NICs, 1966--2000 Abstract: This paper examines the role of FDI from the United States in the economic performance of East Asian NICs for 1966--2000. To this end, we draw our argument of the role of FDI from the modernization--dependency debate. Then, we test the economic effects of U.S. direct investment on economic growth in East Asian NICs using a neoclassical production function model that captures the economic impacts of both foreign and domestic investment on economic growth. Our empirical results show that U.S. direct investment has a positive and significant effect on economic growth in East Asian NICs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 119-133 Issue: 2 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701277723 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701277723 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:119-133 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jang Hyun Kim Author-X-Name-First: Jang Hyun Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: George A. Barnett Author-X-Name-First: George A. Author-X-Name-Last: Barnett Title: A Structural Analysis of International Conflict: From a Communication Perspective Abstract: The study describes the structure of international conflict with the tools of network analysis to enhance the understanding of multilateral conflict-communication relations and to predict the conflict structure with existing international relations theories (liberal and realist) plus global communication variables. Using data obtained from the Correlates of War Project (http://cow2.la.psu.edu/), the structure of international conflict is described for the period 1993--2001 for 145 nations. The results indicate that this network is very sparse; 42 nations had no conflict, and 36 only one bilateral disagreement. The network is centered about former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Russia, the United States, Iraq, and China. Most conflicts are regional. The paper also evaluates both the liberal, expanded liberal (with communication variables included), and realist (including Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory) perspectives as predictors of conflict. The results indicate that communication variables substantially enhance explanatory power of a predictive model, but the effects of the communication variables are inconsistent. A multiple regression model including history of colonialism and prior conflict, physical proximity and contiguity, whether or not a nation is a democracy, and the communication variables—international telecommunication, freight, and exports—accounted for 30.0% of the variance in the structure of international conflict and each variable was significantly related to conflict. The need for further research is discussed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 135-165 Issue: 2 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701277764 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701277764 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:135-165 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Michael Quinn Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Quinn Author-Name: T. David Mason Author-X-Name-First: T. David Author-X-Name-Last: Mason Author-Name: Mehmet Gurses Author-X-Name-First: Mehmet Author-X-Name-Last: Gurses Title: Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence Abstract: Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 167-193 Issue: 2 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701277673 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701277673 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:167-193 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bert Scholtens Author-X-Name-First: Bert Author-X-Name-Last: Scholtens Author-Name: Daphne Hameeteman Author-X-Name-First: Daphne Author-X-Name-Last: Hameeteman Title: Joint Default Probabilities and Sovereign Risk Abstract: The assessment of sovereign risk is of crucial importance for international lenders and investors. Many existing sovereign risk approaches are opaque and heavily rely on subjective choices. In general, they lack a theoretical basis. To assess sovereign risk, we use the Merton model in which a loan defaults if the value of a firm's assets falls below the value of its debt. In a portfolio context, this implies that default correlations warrant the utmost attention. We analyze defaults for 37 countries during the period 1970--1998. We find that sovereign default correlations are low. Joint defaults are highest in Central and Eastern Europe. They are intermediate in Latin America and they are low in (Southeast) Asia. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 195-210 Issue: 2 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701277772 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701277772 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:2:p:195-210 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michelle Benson Author-X-Name-First: Michelle Author-X-Name-Last: Benson Title: Extending the Bounds of Power Transition Theory Journal: International Interactions Pages: 211-215 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701449009 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701449009 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:211-215 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Siddharth Swaminathan Author-X-Name-First: Siddharth Author-X-Name-Last: Swaminathan Author-Name: John Thomas Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Thomas Title: Saving the Next Generation: Political Capacity and Infant Mortality Decline in India's States Abstract: National political development and its effect on economic and demographic changes are topics extensively addressed by power transition theory. Studies in political demography demonstrate that the political capacity of national governments plays a critical role in altering mortality and fertility patterns in developing nations. We test the effects of political capacity on infant mortality rates in fifteen Indian states in the period 1981 to 2000. We find that the political capacity of a state government lowers infant mortality in the low and middle income states. This effect gets weaker across higher income levels. We also find that the wealthier states tend to be healthier. Female education exerts a negative effect on infant mortality within urban populations but its effects diminish in rural populations. A key implication of our study is that the politically capable states in India are positioned to complete the demographic transition and are likely to emerge as the regional drivers of economic growth. Sustained gains in economic productivity will eventually determine India's role in world politics in the twenty-first century. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 217-242 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701449017 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701449017 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:217-242 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Monica Duffy Toft Author-X-Name-First: Monica Author-X-Name-Last: Duffy Toft Title: Population Shifts and Civil War: A Test of Power Transition Theory Abstract: Do shifts in the distribution of ethnic group populations within a multinational state make civil war more likely? This article tests the proposition that they do using the competing logic of two core theories of interstate politics: power transition (PTT) and balance of power theory (BPT). The universe of potential population transition types are reduced to nine, and the logic of each of the competing explanations of war likelihood are reduced to four testable hypotheses. Overall, PTT fares better than BPT; although the article concludes that, as is the case at the interstate level, the key determinate of war likelihood rests more with how power is perceived than with raw changes in its distribution across the spectrum of meaningful political actors. Finally, the article offers a useful framework for further specifying the conditions under which population shifts alter the likelihood of an escalation to civil war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 243-269 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701449025 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701449025 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:243-269 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michelle Benson Author-X-Name-First: Michelle Author-X-Name-Last: Benson Title: Status Quo Preferences and Disputes Short of War Abstract: This paper suggests that the importance of preferences for the international order extend beyond the conditions proposed by power transition theory. Specifically, a dissimilarity of preferences for the international order should affect relations for all states in the international system for all levels of dispute. In essence, I posit that disagreements over the norms and rules that comprise the international order should increase the domain of conflict for all dyads—even when they have neither the ability nor opportunity to directly affect the construction of the international order. To test the above argument, I propose two new Euclidean-distance measures of dissimilarities of economic and security preferences. Using a series of logits and their predicted probabilities on data from the post-World War II period, I find that a dissimilarity of preferences for the status quo has an important, incendiary effect on the likelihood of dyadic disputes short of war. In fact, dissimilar preferences for the economic and security status quo provide greater leverage in explaining disputes short of war than even such traditionally important variables as the lowest level of dyadic democracy and economic interdependence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 271-288 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701449058 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701449058 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:271-288 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Vesna Danilovic Author-X-Name-First: Vesna Author-X-Name-Last: Danilovic Author-Name: Joe Clare Author-X-Name-First: Joe Author-X-Name-Last: Clare Title: Global Power Transitions and Regional Interests Abstract: A number of studies have examined and largely validated power transitions as necessary conditions for war, yet the second critical element of power transition (PT) theory—a challenger's dissatisfaction with the status quo—has been analyzed to a much lesser degree. This paper is intended to address this research gap. Global power transitions between major powers can indeed be destabilizing, potentially triggering major conflicts, but we also argue that violent conflict is unlikely unless there is a clash of interests between the global contenders in the critical regions of their vital interests. Our study thus provides a modification of the original PT theory by identifying its two essential elements—(1) relative power and (2) attitude toward the status quo—at two different structural levels. Power transitions between major powers are still seen as critical at the global level, as originally stated by Organski and Kugler, whereas dissatisfaction with the status quo concerns the regional context of their interests. The paper provides a theoretical link between these two levels and quantitatively tests the argument, with suggested implications for further refinements of PT theory. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 289-304 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701451138 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701451138 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:289-304 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Frank C. Zagare Author-X-Name-First: Frank C. Author-X-Name-Last: Zagare Title: Toward a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict Abstract: This article seeks to refine the power transition proposition, thereby reducing its permissiveness, by linking it to an axiomatically compatible theory of interstate conflict initiation called perfect deterrence theory. The similarities between the two frameworks are discussed, as are several significant conceptual and terminological differences. The broad conclusions and policy implications of power transition and perfect deterrence theory are shown to be the same. But perfect deterrence theory is much more precise about the conditions associated with the onset, escalation, and resolution of interstate conflict than is power transition theory. These conditions are summarized and discussed; the extensive empirical support for perfect deterrence theory's principal deductions is also reviewed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 305-327 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701451153 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701451153 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:305-327 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Glenn Palmer Author-X-Name-First: Glenn Author-X-Name-Last: Palmer Author-Name: T. Clifton Morgan Author-X-Name-First: T. Clifton Author-X-Name-Last: Morgan Title: Power Transition, the Two-Good Theory, and Neorealism: A Comparison with Comments on Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Abstract: This paper compares the assumptions of three approaches to the study of international relations—neorealism, power transition, and the “two-good theory.” We show that neorealism is an underspecified theory that has limited empirical support. While there are significant differences between them, power transition and the two-good theory have much in common. The paper illustrates the differences between power transition and the two-good theory by applying the later to the recent American foreign policy. Generally, the two-good theory predicts an activist US attempting to impose its preferences in the international arena -- are consistent with what we observe. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 329-346 Issue: 3 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701451187 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701451187 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:3:p:329-346 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jean-Pierre P. Langlois Author-X-Name-First: Jean-Pierre P. Author-X-Name-Last: Langlois Author-Name: Catherine C. Langlois Author-X-Name-First: Catherine C. Author-X-Name-Last: Langlois Title: Dispute Settlement Design for Unequal Partners: A Game Theoretic Perspective Abstract: When signatories of international agreements fail to comply unintentionally, sanctioning rules designed to deter intentional noncompliance are tested. To provide signatories with the best treaty value, we find that remedies in case of unilateral defection must account for the nature of the inequality between treaty partners, as well as the type of mixed motive game they are engaged in. Trigger type schemes, that rely on punishment by mutual defection, are the norm for sanctioning in treaty texts. Inequality is addressed by proposing that the process leading to retaliation be accelerated when a weaker partner faces the noncompliance of a stronger partner. Our analysis suggests instead that the prescription depends on the source of the inequality. If inequality stems from differences in the costs associated to compliance, the stronger partner, with the lower compliance costs, should be given more time, not less, to settle in the shadow of the law if he deviates. Despite their prevalence, trigger schemes are not well suited to the handling of Chicken or Called Bluff games that may define the stakes in environmental accords. This motivates our analysis of an alternative sanctioning scheme that builds in redress for the victim of a unilateral defection. In addition to its ability to handle alternative game structures, we find that this scheme provides better treaty value than trigger type schemes, as well as credible deterrence, to signatories engaged in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We conclude that, in the design of sanctioning schemes, redress for the injured party is better than punishment by defection. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 347-382 Issue: 4 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701681809 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701681809 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:4:p:347-382 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christian H. Fahrholz Author-X-Name-First: Christian H. Author-X-Name-Last: Fahrholz Title: A Nash Threat Game of Passing Through Exchange Rate Mechanism II Abstract: Following entrance into the European Union, Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are expected to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). These countries may incur considerable costs over the course of their passing through the required Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II). However, with enough bargaining leverage, CEECs may be able to pass some of these costs on to current EMU members. In turn, a CEEC's leverage depends on its ability to wield successful brinkmanship via an exchange-rate policy characterized by a “threaten-thy-neighbor” strategy. A two-stage Nash-threat game captures the essentials of the CEECs' phase of ERM-II pass-through. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 383-400 Issue: 4 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701681825 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701681825 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:4:p:383-400 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Y. Kono Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Y. Author-X-Name-Last: Kono Title: Who Liberalizes? Explaining Preferential Trade Liberalization Abstract: Despite the growth in research on preferential trade arrangements (PTAs), few studies have systematically explored why some PTAs have been more successful than others at liberalizing trade among members. In this paper I test four hypotheses concerning intra-PTA liberalization: a regional system structure hypothesis, an international institutions hypothesis, a domestic institutions hypothesis, and an economic hypothesis. Although all four types of variables are statistically significant, only international institutions have substantively large effects on intra-PTA liberalization. This suggests that policymakers have considerable latitude to promote integration, as the impact of “choice” variables such as international institutions far outweighs that of “given” factors such as regional system structure or the nature of member economies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 401-421 Issue: 4 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701681882 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701681882 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:4:p:401-421 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chae-Han Kim Author-X-Name-First: Chae-Han Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: Explaining Interstate Trust/Distrust in Triadic Relations Abstract: Emotion or affect is important to understanding the current international interactions. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships among interstate affects in triads. The hypotheses of structural balance, symmetry, subjectivity and objectivity are tested here. Nations are more likely to trust a target nation when the target trusts them, when their friend trusts the target, when they trust other nations in general, and when other nations in general trust the target. Their attitudes towards the target are not influenced by the fact that their enemy trusts or distrusts the target. The structural balance gives way to some dyads of imbalance. Rather, nations are unlikely to feel friendly towards an enemy of their enemy's. More than 80% of bilateral affects are correctly predicted with the other affect relations only. Some implications on the spread of anti-Americanism and on the role of mediator between two adversaries are discussed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 423-439 Issue: 4 Volume: 33 Year: 2007 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701681932 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701681932 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:4:p:423-439 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rafael Reuveny Author-X-Name-First: Rafael Author-X-Name-Last: Reuveny Author-Name: William R. Thompson Author-X-Name-First: William R. Author-X-Name-Last: Thompson Title: Southern Democracy in the Long Run: A Systemic Analysis Abstract: This paper extends the leadership-long cycle systemic perspective, which so far has tended to focus on major power, rise-and-decline dynamics and global war, to explain Southern democratization. Unlike studies of democratization at the national level of analysis, we conduct a systemic level analysis, with a specific focus on the global South. Our extension the leadership-long cycle perspective predicts that Southern democracy will be driven, in part, by systemic leadership and world economic growth. Other variables also may have a role in Southern democratization, with levels of Southern economic development, Southern conflict, and Southern democratic inertia serving as controls in our model. The leadership-long cycle approach requires one to open the time window of observation to include longer time periods than is typically customary. Using data from 1870 to 1992, the empirical analysis strongly supports our theory. Increases in the level of systemic leadership and the growth rate of the world economy promote Southern democratization. Viewed within the context of our perspective, these empirical results suggest that national democratization processes are subject to global structural processes operating at the larger international system level. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-24 Issue: 1 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701681916 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701681916 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:1:p:1-24 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark J. Mullenbach Author-X-Name-First: Mark J. Author-X-Name-Last: Mullenbach Author-Name: Gerard P. Matthews Author-X-Name-First: Gerard P. Author-X-Name-Last: Matthews Title: Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Abstract: Although the United States has been the most prolific intervener in the international system since the end of World War II, there has been little consensus among scholars regarding the motivations of U.S. interventions in domestic political disputes abroad. In addition, scholars do not agree on the relative effects of international factors and domestic factors on intervention decisions by the U.S. Previous research on the motivations of U.S. interventions has occurred within at least two distinctive “streams” of literature: (1) studies of state interventions; and (2) studies of the use of military force by the U.S. Hypotheses regarding U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes are derived from the previous literature, and the hypotheses are tested using recently-compiled data on intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes occurring between 1945 and 2002. The results suggest a combination of international factors, including geographic proximity and ideological linkage, significantly influence the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes. The results also suggest international factors are generally more important than domestic factors, and the effects of both domestic factors and international factors on U.S. intervention decisions may differ depending on the specific type of intervention and the time period. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 25-52 Issue: 1 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701878835 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701878835 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:1:p:25-52 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gregory Saxton Author-X-Name-First: Gregory Author-X-Name-Last: Saxton Author-Name: Michelle Benson Author-X-Name-First: Michelle Author-X-Name-Last: Benson Title: Means, Motives and Opportunities in Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization Abstract: Building on the most important theoretical tools from the literatures on social movements and nationalism, we propose a model of the intensity of nationalist political behavior in which a community's means, motives, and opportunities assume the central roles in the initiation and escalation of nationalist contentious politics. We then test this model using multinomial logit on original data from the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain over a twenty-year period. The results demonstrate that the means, motives, and opportunities assume vital, yet nonlinear, roles in determining a community's level of electoral, violent, and nonviolent contentious activity. The findings also show that there are crucial differences in what accounts for the moves to electoral contention, to protest, and to rebellion. Several of these factors are uniformly escalatory on the intensity of contention—especially repression, social mobilization, and regime change—while others, most importantly democracy, have a moderating effect on the generation of conflict. The results further imply processes of a diffusion of rebellious activities and of an organizational-level substitution effect between violent and nonviolent forms of political behavior. At the aggregate community level, however, escalation in contention involves a “cumulative effect” rather than a classic “substitution effect.” Journal: International Interactions Pages: 53-83 Issue: 1 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701883546 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701883546 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:1:p:53-83 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John James Quinn Author-X-Name-First: John James Author-X-Name-Last: Quinn Title: The Effects of Majority State Ownership of Significant Economic Sectors on Corruption: A Cross-Regional Comparison Abstract: Given both corruption's and bureaucratic inefficiency's importance for development and good governance, understanding their causes is paramount. This paper argues that majority state ownership of most the most important economic sectors of a country results in higher levels of corruption and inefficiency. When political and managerial elites both own and manage the country's most important economic resources, they have greater incentives for corrupt or inefficient behavior. These elites use national resources at their disposal more for short-term personal and political goals than for long-term economic ones. This paper tests this hypothesis on a relatively underused, but often cited, data set from the 1980s. Using a cross-national, regression analysis, this paper finds that the best predictors a country's level of corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency are these: majority state ownership of significant economic sectors, levels of GDP per capita, levels of government spending, and levels of democracy. Other factors, such as common law heritage, percent of population that is Protestant, federalism, economic freedoms, or mineral/ oil exporting, were not consistent, significant predictors of either bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption. We also argue that Tobit may be the best estimation procedure for these data. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 84-128 Issue: 1 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620701883579 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620701883579 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:1:p:84-128 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mehmet Gurses Author-X-Name-First: Mehmet Author-X-Name-Last: Gurses Author-Name: Nicolas Rost Author-X-Name-First: Nicolas Author-X-Name-Last: Rost Author-Name: Patrick McLeod Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: McLeod Title: Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace Abstract: In this article, we examine the impact of international mediation attempts during civil war on the duration of peace once the war has ended. We include several aspects of the mediation attempt in our theoretical framework and our empirical tests, but we also control for other characteristics of the conflict and the country. While studies often find that decisive victories lead to a more durable peace, we expect that different types of mediation attempts have a distinct impact on the duration of peace after a civil war. In empirical tests on civil wars from 1945--1995 with Cox and Weibull event history models, we find the presence of mediation leads to a longer peace, while mediated agreements and superpower mediation attempts shorten the peace. In addition, several characteristics of both country and previous conflict impact how long the peace will last. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 129-155 Issue: 2 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802043362 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802043362 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:2:p:129-155 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Irfan Nooruddin Author-X-Name-First: Irfan Author-X-Name-Last: Nooruddin Title: The Political Economy of National Debt Burdens, 1970--2000 Abstract: Why did developing country governments find themselves mired in high debt by the end of the twentieth century? This paper develops a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between political institutions, resource wealth, and debt burdens. Hypotheses generated are tested on a time-series cross-section data set of developing countries from 1970--2000. Three main findings are reported: oil wealth has a positive relationship with debt; this relationship is weakly conditional on the country's regime type; and the relationship is independent of general commodity price volatility. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this research for our understanding of the ‘resource curse.’ Journal: International Interactions Pages: 156-185 Issue: 2 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802083228 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802083228 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:2:p:156-185 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Peter A. Furia Author-X-Name-First: Peter A. Author-X-Name-Last: Furia Author-Name: Russell E. Lucas Author-X-Name-First: Russell E. Author-X-Name-Last: Lucas Title: Arab Muslim Attitudes Toward the West: Cultural, Social, and Political Explanations Abstract: We utilize pooled data from Zogby International's 2002 Arab Values Survey (carried out in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) in order to test for “cultural,” “social” and/or international “political” influences on Arab Muslim attitudes toward “Western” countries (Canada, France, Germany, UK, and USA). We find little support for “cultural” hypotheses to the effect that hostility to the West is a mark-up on Muslim and/or Arab identity. We find only limited support for “social” hypotheses that suggest that hostility to the West is predicted by socioeconomic deprivation, youth, and/or being male. We find the strongest support for a lone “political” hypothesis: hostility toward specific Western countries is predicted by those countries' recent and visible international political actions in regard to salient international issues (e.g., Western foreign policies toward Palestine). Journal: International Interactions Pages: 186-207 Issue: 2 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802168797 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802168797 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:2:p:186-207 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Hall Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Hall Title: Testing the Hollowing-Out Thesis Abstract: In recent years, many economists have argued that governments are discarding pegged exchange rates in favor of alternative exchange rate regimes such as monetary unions and currency boards on the one hand, or floating exchange rates on the other. Capital mobility, such economists argue, has made pegged exchange rates costly to maintain for long periods, and thus the pegging option is being “hollowed-out.” Few, however, have tried to present evidence that capital mobility has a direct effect on exchange rate regime choices. I present two sets of tests using different measures of capital mobility that provide qualified confirmation that developing countries peg less as capital mobility rises. These tests indicate that direct measures of capital mobility have some correlation with de facto exchange rate regimes but not with de jure exchange rate regimes. Capital flows, a consequence of capital mobility, may have a direct effect on the choices of both de jure and de facto regimes. Governments do not make changes in their declared exchange rate policies in rational anticipation of the growing costs of pegging associated with increasing capital mobility. Rather, governments normally adapt their declared exchange rate policies after capital flows have increased and actual exchange rates have become more difficult to manage. The tests also indicate that hollowing-out has not only been the result of systemic factors such as increasing capital mobility and capital flows, but also due to domestic factors such as growing public sector indebtedness and the spread of democracy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 208-230 Issue: 2 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 6 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802170561 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802170561 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:2:p:208-230 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cameron G. Thies Author-X-Name-First: Cameron G. Author-X-Name-Last: Thies Title: The Construction of a Latin American Interstate Culture of Rivalry Abstract: This paper merges constructivist theoretical insights into the rival role identity, rival role relationships, and the resulting culture of anarchy that characterizes the interstate system with recent empirical measures of rivalry. This project is carried out through an examination of the Latin American regional subsystem, which has already received some attention from analysts concerned with interstate culture, largely because of the relative lack of interstate conflict in the region. The dyadic relationships of 17 Latin American states and the culture they produce are examined between 1948 and 1992. The paper employs simultaneous equation modeling to capture aspects of the co-constitution of these agents and structures, consistent with constructivist theory. The results indicate that the Lockean culture of anarchy and the adoption of a dyadic rival role relationship are affected by a variety of factors emphasized by realists, liberals, and constructivists in the Latin American context. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 231-257 Issue: 3 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802469872 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802469872 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:231-257 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Shale Horowitz Author-X-Name-First: Shale Author-X-Name-Last: Horowitz Author-Name: Sunwoong Kim Author-X-Name-First: Sunwoong Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: Anti-Americanism in Electoral Politics: Insights from South Korea's 2002 Presidential Election Abstract: Since September 11, 2001, anti-Americanism has emerged as an important issue in international politics. In democratic election campaigns, anti-Americanism should be an attractive issue where it is expected to have a favorable impact on key swing vote constituencies. Anti-Americanism has certain inherent ideological appeals and more varied historically-based attractions. Anti-Americanism should be least attractive where countries continue to rely on U.S. security guarantees. South Korea's December 2002 presidential election, in which winner Roh Moo-hyun openly sympathized with anti-American demonstrators, appears to contradict this expectation. Yet closer analysis of individual-level polling data shows that anti-Americanism was, both statistically and substantively, much less significant than alternative campaign issues. By activating the numerous voters hostile to the North Korean regime, anti-Americanism actually hurt the victor's electoral chances. The approach appears useful in understanding why anti-Americanism is a more prominent ideology and electoral issue in some regions, such as Western Europe and Latin America, and a less prominent one in others, for example Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Oceania. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 258-281 Issue: 3 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802477651 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802477651 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:258-281 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Charles Boehmer Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Boehmer Author-Name: Timothy Nordstrom Author-X-Name-First: Timothy Author-X-Name-Last: Nordstrom Title: Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations Abstract: Why are states jointly members in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) but not others? Despite the proliferation of IGOs and renewed interest in this topic, we lack systematic research to answer this question. Our theory of political community explains why dyads of states are likely to be common members in particular types of IGOs. We analyze and compare functionalist and Deutschian communitarian perspectives about IGO memberships. We test our theory using newly available data on IGO mandates and institutional structure, which allows us to make specific predictions about the types of IGO to which dyads become members. We show that dyads that are economically dependent, and/or democratic and enjoying enduring peace, are more likely to join those IGOs that possess high levels of institutional structure. Militarized interstate conflicts reduce the likelihood of states sharing membership in common IGO, but not substantially, whereas development and alliances also increase IGO memberships between states. Trade ties, however, are the most important determinant of joint membership between states in the most institutionalized IGOs, which is congruent with security communities. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 282-309 Issue: 3 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802495000 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802495000 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:282-309 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Author-Name: Kristin Johnson Author-X-Name-First: Kristin Author-X-Name-Last: Johnson Title: Preface Journal: International Interactions Pages: 311-313 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802574846 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802574846 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:311-313 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ronald L. Tammen Author-X-Name-First: Ronald L. Author-X-Name-Last: Tammen Title: The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program Journal: International Interactions Pages: 314-332 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802561769 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802561769 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:314-332 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Abdollahian Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Abdollahian Author-Name: Kyungkook Kang Author-X-Name-First: Kyungkook Author-X-Name-Last: Kang Title: In Search of Structure: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Power Transitions Abstract: Power Transitions (PT) anticipates interstate conflict or cooperation by examining dynamic changes in the distribution of power across the international system, as well as each nation's (or politically “relevant” nation's) satisfaction with the current international status quo. Using a system of symmetric, coupled nonlinear differential equations, we formalize and test a dynamic PT model to identify to what extent and degree policy makers can maintain stability in rival dyads, such as the US-China case currently. Our formalized dynamic PT model explores some of the structural conditions of how conflict or cooperation affects growth and transition from the PT literature. These formal results are consistent both with theoretical expectations and empirical results. Our results not only suggest specific, strategic policy prescriptions for dyads in hopes of avoiding war, but more importantly highlight the nonlinear and non-monotonic effects of foreign policy actions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 333-357 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802574887 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802574887 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:333-357 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Carole Alsharabati Author-X-Name-First: Carole Author-X-Name-Last: Alsharabati Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Title: War Initiation in a Changing World Journal: International Interactions Pages: 358-381 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802574960 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802574960 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:358-381 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz Author-X-Name-First: Marina Author-X-Name-Last: Arbetman-Rabinowitz Author-Name: Kristin Johnson Author-X-Name-First: Kristin Author-X-Name-Last: Johnson Title: Power Distribution and Oil in the Sudan: Will the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Turn the Oil Curse into a Blessing? Abstract: Insights from A.F.K. Organski's work on parity and war provide robust and rich explanatory power in understanding international conflict. Several recent applications of this theoretical structure to sub national groups also demonstrate strong support for a parity conflict relationship between competing domestic parties (Benson et al 1997; Benson and Kugler 1998). In this paper, we demonstrate that this theoretical structure has general explanatory power in identifying the necessary conditions for conflict both between and within states, and serves as a useful tool in forecasting the prospects for conflict or cooperation. We study the regional distributions of capabilities in the Horn of Africa to account for the context of conflict in the Sudan and then evaluate the prospects for peace following the 2011 anticipated referendum on independence established in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Two major findings emerge. The referendum will not affect the regional hierarchy in the Horn of Africa. However, the necessary conditions for conflict do emerge between Northern and Southern Sudan given the referendum, with most of the posited scenarios suggesting the possibility of renewal of the decades long North South conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 382-401 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802574911 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802574911 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:382-401 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Travis G. Coan Author-X-Name-First: Travis G. Author-X-Name-Last: Coan Author-Name: Tadeusz Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Tadeusz Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Title: The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment: An Interactive Framework Abstract: Recent scholarship on the political determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) point to the importance of a government's level of political capacity. Governments with high levels of capacity, it is argued, have the political power and economic resources to carry out preferred policy objectives. This line of reasoning, however, fails to provide insight into what these policy objectives are likely to include. The present study attempts to overcome this deficiency in the literature by modeling explicitly the interactive relationship between open market policy environments and relative political capacity (RPC). We argue that governments with open market policy frameworks and high levels of political capacity send clear signals of a political environment conducive to sustained profitability. Our empirical results confirm the expected interactive relationship, providing important insight into the expected effects of open market policies and political capacity. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 402-422 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802561462 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802561462 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:402-422 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yi Feng Author-X-Name-First: Yi Author-X-Name-Last: Feng Author-Name: Jacek Kugler Author-X-Name-First: Jacek Author-X-Name-Last: Kugler Author-Name: Siddharth Swaminathan Author-X-Name-First: Siddharth Author-X-Name-Last: Swaminathan Author-Name: Paul J. Zak Author-X-Name-First: Paul J. Author-X-Name-Last: Zak Title: Path to Prosperity: The Dynamics of Freedom and Economic Development Abstract: We present a dynamic general equilibrium model that formalizes the political mechanisms that prompt demographic change and augment economic development. We demonstrate that in addition to well-established economic determinants, fertility decisions, human capital accumulation and economic development are altered by three fundamental political variables: political freedom, political stability, and political capacity. Using the model, we derive a set of conditions that enable poor nations to escape poverty traps. The formal deductions are supported by empirical analysis utilizing a panel of 108 countries from 1960 to 2004. Our findings demonstrate that political change triggers a demographic transition that catapults nations onto the path of sustained economic growth. Our results show that developing nations with capable, free, and stable political systems can substantially close the economic gap that divides rich nations from poor nations within a generation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 423-441 Issue: 4 Volume: 34 Year: 2008 Month: 12 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802561488 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802561488 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:423-441 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen E. Gent Author-X-Name-First: Stephen E. Author-X-Name-Last: Gent Title: Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War Abstract: Proponents of the diversionary theory of war have often argued that domestic reselection incentives induce office-seeking leaders to pursue aggressive foreign policies. To examine the relationship between strategic interaction and diversionary incentives, this article develops a two-state, two-sided incomplete information deterrence model with domestic reselection. According to the model, reselection mechanisms increase a leader's propensity to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Diversionary incentives in attacking states lead to an increase in war outcomes, while diversionary incentives in defending states may or may not increase the probability of war. The model also predicts that there will be nonmonotonic relationships between economic performance and war and between regime type and diversionary behavior, which may explain the discrepancies among many empirical tests of diversionary theory. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-29 Issue: 1 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620802497048 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620802497048 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:1-29 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Badredine Arfi Author-X-Name-First: Badredine Author-X-Name-Last: Arfi Title: Probing the Democratic Peace Argument Using Linguistic Fuzzy Logic Abstract: Why have the numerous debates on the “democratic peace” remained inconclusive? In addressing this question, the paper examines causality in social sciences by using propositional calculus in the framework of linguistic fuzzy logic. The paper does this by taking into account the possibility that some causal relations might be more or less of a sufficient type while others might be more or less of a necessary type, and while still others might be of both types to a lesser or greater degree of truth. The paper shows that depending on how much more or less democratic the two states are, and depending on how much more or less they feel threatened by one another, this more or less sufficiently causes a more or less possibility of fighting between the two states. Therefore, the lack of agreement on the possibility of a democratic peace is strictly speaking neither a problem of empirical validation, nor one of theoretical explanation, although these are still important issues. Instead, the lack of agreement has much to do with taking for granted a Boolean logic approach as a framework for validating the democratic peace argument. A linguistic fuzzy-logic framework predicts a much more diverse set of conclusions than just whether or not two democracies go to war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 30-57 Issue: 1 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902743838 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902743838 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:30-57 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erik Melander Author-X-Name-First: Erik Author-X-Name-Last: Melander Author-Name: Frida Möller Author-X-Name-First: Frida Author-X-Name-Last: Möller Author-Name: Magnus Öberg Author-X-Name-First: Magnus Author-X-Name-Last: Öberg Title: Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Armed Conflict 1993--2004: A New Dataset Abstract: This article presents a new event dataset covering third-party measures in intrastate low-intensity conflict dyads for the period 1993--2004, Managing Low-Intensity Intrastate Conflict (MILC). The rationale behind MILC is to enable the systematic study of third-party conflict management activities that might contribute to preventing these minor conflicts from escalating to the level of full-scale war. Intrastate armed conflict dyads are followed, and third-party activities mapped, until the dyad escalates to full-scale war or the dyad becomes inactive. The dataset contains information on the intermediaries as well as the different types of measures undertaken. The data include measures such as different types of talks, good offices, arbitration, fact-finding missions, permanent observation missions, and peacekeeping. In addition, a wealth of novel descriptive findings is presented, such as the distribution of third-party efforts over regions as well as over individual conflict dyads. We notice that the Middle East attracts the most third-party involvement relative to the number of active conflict dyads. Asia, in contrast, is relatively neglected given the high number of conflicts on the continent. The trend in third-party activity over time is presented, and we show that the number of third-party efforts globally is relatively constant over the period of study with the exception of a dramatic spike in activity related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the years 2000--2002. The distribution of different types of measures and third parties is also presented. The most active third parties include several major powers and intergovernmental organizations, but also a few middle powers. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 58-85 Issue: 1 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902743887 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902743887 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:58-85 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Indra de Soysa Author-X-Name-First: Indra Author-X-Name-Last: de Soysa Author-Name: Thomas Jackson Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Jackson Author-Name: Christin Ormhaug Author-X-Name-First: Christin Author-X-Name-Last: Ormhaug Title: Does Globalization Profit the Small Arms Bazaar? Abstract: Sceptics of globalization attribute the proliferation of light weapons to economic openness. Increasing globalization apparently weakens public authority, leading to social disarray, anomic violence, and general conditions that make handgun ownership and use more likely. Pro-globalists might argue contrarily that trade openness can raise the premium on peace as violence is bad for business. Moreover, greater interdependence allows the diffusion of anti-proliferation norms and facilitates cooperative behavior among trading partners for stemming the demand for and proliferation of small arms. Using a unique dataset on small arms imports, we find that greater openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lowers small arms imports per capita. A policy measure of economic freedom is associated with higher small arms imports, but this association seems to be explained entirely by the association between economic freedom and strong bureaucracies. States that are de facto more open to the global trading system are less likely to be inundated with these weapons, but richer, better-governed countries import more small arms. Global policy should pay closer attention to the seepage of these weapons from the relatively wealthy, who manufacture and buy them in larger quantities, to the poor, among whom the ‘problems’ associated with small arms are often manifested. Curbing those factors that encourage globalization, however, would be counterproductive to reducing the trade in small arms and light weapons. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 86-105 Issue: 1 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902743945 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902743945 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:86-105 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Frank C. Zagare Author-X-Name-First: Frank C. Author-X-Name-Last: Zagare Title: After Sarajevo: Explaining the Blank Check Abstract: This paper uses an incomplete information game model to describe and explain the so-called blank check issued to Austria by Germany in early July 1914. It asks why Germany would cede control of an important aspect of its foreign policy to another lesser power. The derived explanation is consistent not only with the actual beliefs of German and Austrian leaders but also with an equilibrium prediction of the game model. The issue of whether unconditional German support of Austria constituted either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the outbreak of major power war the next month is also addressed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 106-127 Issue: 1 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902743960 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902743960 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:106-127 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John A. C. Conybeare Author-X-Name-First: John A. C. Author-X-Name-Last: Conybeare Title: Survivor: Is There an Optimal Country Size? Abstract: Contemporary manifestations of international integration and national disintegration have stimulated speculation on the optimal size of a country. Economic theories focus on efficient resource allocation, and empirical work on partial equilibrium tests correlating size with variables (limited by data availability to recent times) selected from theoretical models of optimal size. This article questions the assumption that there is an optimal size, offering a test using data covering 500 years. The existence of an optimum, determined by efficiency or other goals, will be revealed by a size category generating an increasing proportion of world income, as more states move into that category. The results of this “survivor” test do not indicate the emergence of an optimal country size, despite data limitations that prevent cross-sectional analysis over a long time period. The absence of evolution toward optimal size suggests alternative directions in the research on country size. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 129-154 Issue: 2 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902864238 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902864238 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:2:p:129-154 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Samuel Lucas McMillan Author-X-Name-First: Samuel Lucas Author-X-Name-Last: McMillan Title: Looking Beyond the National Level: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction in U.S. States Abstract: International relations scholars need to look beyond the national level because U.S. states and governors are increasingly important actors in world politics. One way to look at their international activities is by examining the ways in which U.S. states seek to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), just one research puzzle at the nexus of international relations and U.S. state politics, two fields that rarely talk to one another. After pointing out the gaps within theories from international relations and international political economy, this paper describes the evolving global roles of both U.S. states and governors and shows how U.S. states attract FDI through the use of their international offices and governor-led overseas missions. Empirical findings indicate that U.S. states' international offices and a higher level of economic interdependence help states attract FDI, and the paper argues that extension of institutional approaches from IPE may be valuable for future research about the international capabilities of subnational governments and their leaders. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 155-178 Issue: 2 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902864337 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902864337 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:2:p:155-178 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brandon Valeriano Author-X-Name-First: Brandon Author-X-Name-Last: Valeriano Title: The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models Abstract: Offensive realism is a theory of opportunistic state power maximization. States are said to always seek power so that they may dominate the international system and survive under conditions of anarchy. The theory of offensive realism is both descriptive in the sense that it suggests how states have acted in the past and prescriptive in that it suggests how states should conduct foreign policy. What remains is to empirically test the propositions that offensive realism advocates. Under such testing, we argue that offensive realism fails to accurately explain the “tragedy of great power politics.” We find that two opposing theories, one norm-based and one issue-based, perform better than offensive realism in describing the actions of major powers. If the theory fails to accurately explain past historical events, it is of little use for guiding future actions and policy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 179-206 Issue: 2 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902864493 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902864493 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:2:p:179-206 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David R. Mares Author-X-Name-First: David R. Author-X-Name-Last: Mares Title: Institutions, the Illegal Drug Trade, and Participant Strategies: What Corrupt or Pariah States Have In Common with Liberal Democracy and the Rule of Law Abstract: Institutions generate incentives that guide behavior, but many analysts and policymakers underestimate the power of institutions to affect behavior by ignoring how distinct strategies work to generate similar outcomes in different institutional contexts. This article uses the illegal trade in psychoactive substances to illustrate how outcomes (the size of the illegal drug market) across very distinct political institutions can be the same because individuals adopt different strategies in their pursuit of the same behavior: to participate in the illegal drug trade. The illegal trade in psychoactive substances represents an understudied and poorly studied issue in international relations. Arguments that focus on the deviant characteristics of governments in the developing world and organized crime to explain the trade are misleading for empirical and methodological reasons. I propose a general argument about the proliferation of the illegal drug trade that accounts for its success in countries struggling with poverty, corruption, terrorism, and pariah leaders, as well as in rich, stable democracies in which the rule of law “reigns.” The article takes factors that are often seen as distinct in explaining the drug trade (e.g., civil rights in liberal democracies and corruption in developing countries) and demonstrates that their explanatory logic represents variations on the same causal variable: the ability to conceal oneself. My insight is that the strategies used to achieve concealment vary by the institutional context in which participants find themselves. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 207-239 Issue: 2 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620902873080 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620902873080 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:2:p:207-239 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Editor's Note Journal: International Interactions Pages: 241-242 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084448 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084448 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:241-242 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kyle Beardsley Author-X-Name-First: Kyle Author-X-Name-Last: Beardsley Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Title: Disaggregating the Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction Journal: International Interactions Pages: 243-248 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084497 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084497 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:243-248 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Molly M. Melin Author-X-Name-First: Molly M. Author-X-Name-Last: Melin Author-Name: Isak Svensson Author-X-Name-First: Isak Author-X-Name-Last: Svensson Title: Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars Abstract: This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter- and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 249-271 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084521 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084521 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:249-271 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kyle Beardsley Author-X-Name-First: Kyle Author-X-Name-Last: Beardsley Title: Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators Abstract: Existing research on international mediation emphasizes the importance of leverage in altering the combatants' ability to reach a negotiated settlement. Less understood is the role of third parties that do not have access to sources of leverage even though they comprise a substantial amount of mediation efforts. This paper highlights two potential explanations for the prevalence of “weak” mediators. First, a choice of third parties without leverage might be a product of the “supply side” preferences of the international community, in particular, the great powers. Second, the inclusion of third parties without any leverage can result from actors hedging their commitments to the peace process when they suspect with some uncertainty that one side will use third-party involvement insincerely for ends other than peace. Using data from the Managing Intrastate Low Level Conflicts (MILC) project, in conjunction with the PRIO/UPPSALA Armed Conflict data, empirical results using competing risk models confirm both logics. Mediators with weak leverage are more likely when an actor has strong incentives to stall: specifically, when the immediate costs of conflict are high, there is domestic political pressure in the absence of democratic accountability, and relative bargaining power is shifting. The findings also suggest that supply-side dynamics matter. Weak mediators are less likely in the presence of substantial foreign investment and in neighborhoods with strong states, but mediators of all types are more likely in democratic neighborhoods. To further explore the role of insincere motivations, the paper considers the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka, brokered by Norway. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 272-297 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084547 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084547 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:272-297 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tobias Böhmelt Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Böhmelt Title: International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties Abstract: This study extends the previous literature on actors' incentives in conflict management by examining how direct and indirect links between fighting parties influence the prospects for mediation onset from a social network perspective. The paper argues, contrary to existing research, that direct links, i.e., bilateral ties between warring parties, do not notably increase the likelihood of mediation. Rather, indirect links, i.e., ties that connect two states via one or more than one third party to each other, are more likely to determine whether a conflict sees mediation. Although direct links can indicate mutual interests, shared preferences, and decreased uncertainty between the warring parties, these ties either lose importance or become cut off when states enter a conflict. By contrast, indirect ties create a social network that involves outside parties in the dispute process, and indirect ties increase the exchange of information between belligerents and potential mediators and the chances that third parties will have a vital interest in intervention. My empirical analysis using conflict and social network data in 1946--1995 provides strong support for the theory. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 298-319 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084786 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084786 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:298-319 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Introduction Journal: International Interactions Pages: 320-320 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084836 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084836 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:320-320 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick M. Regan Author-X-Name-First: Patrick M. Author-X-Name-Last: Regan Title: Civil War and Territory? Drawing Linkages Between Interstate and Intrastate War Journal: International Interactions Pages: 321-329 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084844 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084844 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:321-329 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christopher Butler Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Butler Author-Name: Scott Gates Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Gates Title: Asymmetry, Parity, and (Civil) War: Can International Theories of Power Help Us Understand Civil War? Journal: International Interactions Pages: 330-340 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084877 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084877 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:330-340 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: T. David Mason Author-X-Name-First: T. David Author-X-Name-Last: Mason Title: International Relations Theory and How Civil Wars End Journal: International Interactions Pages: 341-351 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084885 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084885 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:341-351 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott Sigmund Gartner Author-X-Name-First: Scott Sigmund Author-X-Name-Last: Gartner Title: Evaluating Claims of Social Connection to International Conflict Casualties Abstract: Recent studies examining the political impact of individuals' connections to the victims of international violence find these ties have a powerful effect on people's attitudes and feelings. How reliable, however, are self-reported claims of ties to a conflict's casualties? Using data from 9/11 and the Iraq War, I examine these claims, analyzing: 1) their influence on both public assessments of foreign policy and voting behavior, 2) whether critical demographic and political factors predict the likelihood of individuals reporting a tie to a conflict casualty, 3) the predicted, aggregate likelihood of survey respondents having connections to conflict victims, and 4) the theoretical distinction between actual vs. perceived casualty connections. The results strongly support the use of casualty connection data for understanding individuals' responses to international violence, and encourage future applications of social network approaches to the study of war and politics. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 352-364 Issue: 3 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084893 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903084893 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:352-364 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Aaron M. Hoffman Author-X-Name-First: Aaron M. Author-X-Name-Last: Hoffman Author-Name: Christopher R. Agnew Author-X-Name-First: Christopher R. Author-X-Name-Last: Agnew Author-Name: Justin J. Lehmiller Author-X-Name-First: Justin J. Author-X-Name-Last: Lehmiller Author-Name: Natasha T. Duncan Author-X-Name-First: Natasha T. Author-X-Name-Last: Duncan Title: Satisfaction, Alternatives, Investments, and the Microfoundations of Audience Cost Models Abstract: In this paper, we suggest that the Investment Model of Commitment, developed in social psychology, offers a solution to an important microfoundational issue in audience cost theory. Audience cost models are useful for thinking about the foreign policy behaviors of democratic and nondemocratic states. However, they often assume that citizens reliably penalize leaders who break their foreign policy promises even though the empirical record suggests this is not always the case. We argue that public commitment to foreign policy assets and relationships is a precondition for the application of audience costs. Using the UN and NATO as case studies, we hypothesize that the commitments people develop to international organizations emerge as a function of (1) their satisfaction with the performance of the organization, (2) the investments in those organizations, and (3) an assessment of the alternatives to these associations. Correlational and experimental tests of the model confirm that the strongest individual-level commitments arise when people are highly satisfied with the performance of specific institutions, believe that much has been invested in support of them, and perceive that the alternatives to particular institutions are poor. Implications for the development of audience cost theory are discussed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 365-389 Issue: 4 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903328274 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903328274 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:4:p:365-389 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andreas Wimmer Author-X-Name-First: Andreas Author-X-Name-Last: Wimmer Author-Name: Brian Min Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Min Title: The Location and Purpose of Wars Around the World: A New Global Dataset, 1816--2001 Abstract: A critical question in the quantitative study of war is how to choose appropriate units of analysis. While most studies link wars to the sovereign states that fight them, several authors have recently offered alternative perspectives, focusing on the the properties of rebel organizations and armies or tracking events in fine-grained geographic spaces. We contribute to these developments by introducing a new dataset of wars fought from 1816--2001 on fixed territorial units of observation that conform to the grid of states in 2001. Compared to standard datasets, we expand the geographic purview to include states not recognized by the international system. We provide location codes that identify the territories on which conflicts are fought, which is especially important for the analysis of imperial wars and colonial rebellions. We also introduce a new typology of wars based upon the aims of warring parties rather than their status in the state system. This dataset is uniquely suited to explore new questions that cannot be addressed with other datasets. To illustrate, we test an institutionalist theory of war and show empirically that the types of wars fought in a territory depend on whether it is governed as a modern nation-state, an imperial dependency, or the center of an empire. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 390-417 Issue: 4 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903328837 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903328837 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:4:p:390-417 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert Pahre Author-X-Name-First: Robert Author-X-Name-Last: Pahre Title: Introduction Journal: International Interactions Pages: 418-419 Issue: 4 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903328969 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903328969 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:4:p:418-419 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Layna Mosley Author-X-Name-First: Layna Author-X-Name-Last: Mosley Author-Name: David Andrew Singer Author-X-Name-First: David Andrew Author-X-Name-Last: Singer Title: The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Opportunities for International Political Economy Journal: International Interactions Pages: 420-429 Issue: 4 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903328993 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903328993 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:4:p:420-429 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Leblang Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Leblang Author-Name: Sonal Pandya Author-X-Name-First: Sonal Author-X-Name-Last: Pandya Title: The Financial Crisis of 2007: Our Waterloo or Take a Chance on IPE? Journal: International Interactions Pages: 430-435 Issue: 4 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903329009 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903329009 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:4:p:430-435 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Benjamin J. Cohen Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin J. Author-X-Name-Last: Cohen Title: A Grave Case of Myopia Journal: International Interactions Pages: 436-444 Issue: 4 Volume: 35 Year: 2009 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903329025 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903329025 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:35:y:2009:i:4:p:436-444 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Molly M. Melin Author-X-Name-First: Molly M. Author-X-Name-Last: Melin Author-Name: Michael T. Koch Author-X-Name-First: Michael T. Author-X-Name-Last: Koch Title: Jumping into the Fray: Alliances, Power, Institutions, and the Timing of Conflict Expansion Abstract: Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others. Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining literatures, we derive hypotheses about how these factors make resolve in the face of credible threats more likely and how this either increases or decreases the time to conflict expansion. We also generate expectations about when specific states are likely to join a conflict. We test our expectations using a dataset of the initial belligerents of militarized disputes and all potential joiner states. The results of our analyses suggest that conflict expansion is more often because of initiators' resolve rather than miscalculation since observable signals of likely expansion, such as alliances and power, decrease the time to expansion. Our findings have important implications for research on alliance reliability, balancing and bandwaggoning, and various proposed causes of the democratic peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-27 Issue: 1 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903328696 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903328696 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:1:p:1-27 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Emilia Justyna Powell Author-X-Name-First: Emilia Justyna Author-X-Name-Last: Powell Title: Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation Abstract: Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 28-59 Issue: 1 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903553855 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903553855 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:1:p:28-59 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen L. Quackenbush Author-X-Name-First: Stephen L. Author-X-Name-Last: Quackenbush Title: General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory Abstract: Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of immediate deterrence. Nonetheless, despite a few exceptions, the quantitative literature has ignored the subject of general deterrence, focusing almost exclusively on situations of immediate deterrence. My purpose in this essay is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting a recently developed theory of general deterrence—Perfect Deterrence Theory—to a systematic test by examining general deterrence from 1816--2000. The results indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are strongly supported by the empirical record. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 60-85 Issue: 1 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903554069 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903554069 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:1:p:60-85 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nils B. Weidmann Author-X-Name-First: Nils B. Author-X-Name-Last: Weidmann Author-Name: Doreen Kuse Author-X-Name-First: Doreen Author-X-Name-Last: Kuse Author-Name: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Kristian Skrede Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Title: The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset Abstract: We describe CShapes, a new dataset that provides historical maps of state boundaries and capitals in the post-World War II period. The dataset is coded according to both the Correlates of War and the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) state lists, and is therefore compatible with a great number of existing databases in the discipline. Provided in a geographic data format, CShapes can be used directly with standard GIS software, allowing a wide range of spatial computations. In addition, we supply a CShapes package for the R statistical toolkit. This package enables researchers without GIS skills to perform various useful operations on the GIS maps. The paper introduces the CShapes dataset and structure and gives three examples of how to use CShapes in political science research. First, we show how results from quantitative analysis can be depicted intuitively as a map. The second application gives an example of computing indicators on the CShapes maps, which can then be used in statistical tests. Third, we illustrate the use of CShapes for generating different weights matrices in spatial statistical applications. All the examples can be replicated using the freely available R package and do not require specialized GIS skills. The dataset is available for download from the CShapes website (http://nils.weidmann .ws/projects/cshapes). Journal: International Interactions Pages: 86-106 Issue: 1 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 2 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050620903554614 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620903554614 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:1:p:86-106 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gerald Schneider Author-X-Name-First: Gerald Author-X-Name-Last: Schneider Author-Name: Nils Petter Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Nils Petter Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Title: The Capitalist Peace: The Origins and Prospects of a Liberal Idea Journal: International Interactions Pages: 107-114 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003784689 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003784689 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:107-114 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erik Gartzke Author-X-Name-First: Erik Author-X-Name-Last: Gartzke Author-Name: J. Joseph Hewitt Author-X-Name-First: J. Joseph Author-X-Name-Last: Hewitt Title: International Crises and the Capitalist Peace Abstract: Recent research suggests that free markets and economic development contribute to a reduction in interstate conflict. This “capitalist peace” has been seen alternately to complement or to supplant the more well-known democratic peace effect. Here, we compare the behavior of democracies and capitalist dyads in the context of the Interstate Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. The ICB data offers a number of advantages in assessing the conflict decisions of national leaders, rather than the accidents of subordinates or others. In particular, we explore as yet untested implications of each perspective, examining the effect of regime type and economic and interest variables on escalation and crisis intensity. Our findings provide new evidence that free markets, economic development, and similar interests account for the special peace in liberal dyads. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 115-145 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003784846 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003784846 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:115-145 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick J. McDonald Author-X-Name-First: Patrick J. Author-X-Name-Last: McDonald Title: Capitalism, Commitment, and Peace Abstract: This paper builds on the growing capitalist peace research program by examining how large quantities of public property influence the likelihood of conflict between states. Drawing on the logic of the commitment problem, it develops two explanations linking the predominance of public property in an economy to the likelihood of being the target of military conflict, defined to include both militarized disputes and war. Empirical support for this hypothesis is generated with a brief illustrative case and a series of statistical tests with monadic and directed dyadic research designs. A final section discusses how these findings suggest that capitalism plays a larger role than democracy in limiting military conflict between states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 146-168 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003784911 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003784911 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:146-168 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John Mueller Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Mueller Title: Capitalism, Peace, and the Historical Movement of Ideas Abstract: A logical and causal exploration of the growing acceptance of capitalism and peace, or war aversion, is part of what Robert Dahl has called “the historical movement of ideas.” Although war aversion and the acceptance of free-market capitalism have undergone parallel and substantially overlapping historical trajectories, support for capitalism does not on its own logically or necessarily imply war aversion or support for peace. Not only must capitalism be embraced as an economic system, but at least three other ideas must be accepted as well: prosperity and economic growth must be taken as a dominant goal; peace must be seen as a better motor than war for development, progress, and innovation; and trade, rather than conquest, must be held to be the best way to achieve the dominant goal. Moreover, the causal direction may well be misspecified: it is not that free-market capitalism and the economic development it spawns cause peace, but rather that peace causes—or facilitates—capitalism and its attendant economic development. This also may explain why peace is more closely associated with capitalism than with democracy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 169-184 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003785066 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003785066 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:169-184 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Mousseau Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Mousseau Title: Coming to Terms with the Capitalist Peace Journal: International Interactions Pages: 185-192 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003785074 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003785074 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:185-192 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Richard Rosecrance Author-X-Name-First: Richard Author-X-Name-Last: Rosecrance Title: Capitalist Influences and Peace Journal: International Interactions Pages: 192-198 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003785108 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003785108 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:192-198 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bruce Russett Author-X-Name-First: Bruce Author-X-Name-Last: Russett Title: Capitalism or Democracy? Not So Fast Journal: International Interactions Pages: 198-205 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003785165 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003785165 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:198-205 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erich Weede Author-X-Name-First: Erich Author-X-Name-Last: Weede Title: The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence Journal: International Interactions Pages: 206-213 Issue: 2 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050621003785181 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050621003785181 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:206-213 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Wonjae Hwang Author-X-Name-First: Wonjae Author-X-Name-Last: Hwang Title: Power, Preferences, and Multiple Levels of Interstate Conflict Abstract: The purpose of this article is to reevaluate arguments that relate states' power to the likelihood of interstate conflict, by highlighting the conditional effect of preferences on the relationship between power and conflict. Also, it examines whether the conditional role of preferences works differently at two different levels of conflict—militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and War. With respect to the onset of MIDs, power disparity is likely to decrease the chances of conflict, and this pacifying effect increases as states' preferences become similar. However, when states have very divergent preferences, this dissimilarity becomes a dominant factor in the process of conflict decision making and thus the pacifying effect of power disparity on MID onsets disappears. In fact, power disparity increases the chances of fighting. Meanwhile, when states make costly decisions of war, relative national capabilities become a significant factor in the decision of fighting, and preferences do not have conditional effects on the exercise of power. In this case, power disparity reduces the chances of fighting, regardless of the level of preference dissimilarity. In sum, this paper provides an explanation for diverse theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the previous studies of power and conflict, highlighting the relative importance of power and preferences at different levels of conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 215-239 Issue: 3 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502424 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.502424 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:215-239 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dursun Peksen Author-X-Name-First: Dursun Author-X-Name-Last: Peksen Author-Name: A. Cooper Drury Author-X-Name-First: A. Cooper Author-X-Name-Last: Drury Title: Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy Abstract: This article seeks to analyze the impact that sanctions have on democracy. We argue that economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, we argue that economic sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties, to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Using time-series cross-national data (1972--2000), the findings show that both the immediate and longer‐term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. The findings also demonstrate that comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited sanctions. These findings suggest that sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 240-264 Issue: 3 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.502436 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:240-264 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ada Huibregtse Author-X-Name-First: Ada Author-X-Name-Last: Huibregtse Title: External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict Abstract: Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from international conflict scholars. This study explores a new aspect of how ethnic composition of states and the power of ethnic kin affect external state interventions in ethnic conflicts. Here it is hypothesized that states with dominant ethnic groups but still-significant ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention in ethnic conflict than states without one of these two characteristics. A new measure is proposed to capture such variation in ethnic composition more precisely. Looking at large-N panel data, it is found that ethnically fractionalized states with dominant ethnic groups are indeed the most likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts. Additionally, the power of the embattled ethnic kin minority, as determined by its settlement patterns in the host state, also increases the likelihood of intervention. Traditional variables like proximity and capability retain statistical significance. However, ethnic variables have the strongest effects on interventions in ethnic conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 265-293 Issue: 3 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502447 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.502447 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:265-293 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alex Braithwaite Author-X-Name-First: Alex Author-X-Name-Last: Braithwaite Author-Name: Dennis M. Foster Author-X-Name-First: Dennis M. Author-X-Name-Last: Foster Author-Name: David A. Sobek Author-X-Name-First: David A. Author-X-Name-Last: Sobek Title: Ballots, Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities Abstract: Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970--2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.” Journal: International Interactions Pages: 294-305 Issue: 3 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502453 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.502453 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:294-305 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jean-Frédéric Morin Author-X-Name-First: Jean-Frédéric Author-X-Name-Last: Morin Title: The Two-Level Game of Transnational Networks: The Case of the Access to Medicines Campaign Abstract: The rapid emergence of transnational networks in world politics calls for an analysis of their power dynamics. By combining the advocacy network literature and the two-level game theory in an innovative manner, this article provides a theoretical conceptualization of the interplay between intra- and inter-network interactions. It argues that the strength of a network as agent springs from its force as a structure. A network win-set is determined by its internal games, thereby affecting both its bargaining power and its chance to reach a consensual agreement with other networks. The issue of access to medicines is used as a factual background to illustrate how the flow of influence within networks affects influence among networks. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 309-334 Issue: 4 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.523656 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.523656 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:4:p:309-334 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Emilia Justyna Powell Author-X-Name-First: Emilia Justyna Author-X-Name-Last: Powell Author-Name: Stephanie J. Rickard Author-X-Name-First: Stephanie J. Author-X-Name-Last: Rickard Title: International Trade and Domestic Legal Systems: Examining the Impact of Islamic Law Abstract: What factors determine countries' international trade relations? Recent theories point to the potential importance of domestic legal traditions. Countries' legal systems influence the enforcement of contracts. This has been shown to affect trade flows in common law and civil law countries. However, these two legal systems do not constitute the universe of legal traditions. Islamic law is an important and fundamentally distinct legal system that has been largely overlooked. In this article, we offer the first direct test of the effect of Islamic law on countries' trade relations. We find that, on average, levels of bilateral trade are lowest among Islamic law states, holding all else constant. This finding suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, shared institutions alone are insufficient to enhance trade flows. Instead, levels of bilateral trade depend critically on the quality of shared institutions. The importance of countries' legal systems for trade declines over time, possibly due to the increased role of international arbitration bodies and/or the standardization of international sales contracts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 335-362 Issue: 4 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.523668 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.523668 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:4:p:335-362 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Author-Name: Stephen L. Quackenbush Author-X-Name-First: Stephen L. Author-X-Name-Last: Quackenbush Title: Not All Peace Years Are Created Equal: Trade, Imposed Settlements, and Recurrent Conflict Abstract: The peace through trade hypothesis receives extensive support from a large empirical literature. However, extant research does not isolate whether this relationship holds for states that have fought in the past, or whether its influence following armed disputes is dependent upon the ways in which states settle their conflicts. Additionally, although recent research finds that imposed settlements are more pacifying than other forms of political settlement, these studies tend not to isolate factors associated with variation in the stability of imposed settlements. In this article, we examine how settlements condition the influence of trade on conflict recurrence, both to overcome a limitation in extant studies of trade and conflict, which tend to ignore the way states settle prior disputes, and to further an understanding of how post-conflict state interaction varies by (and within) settlement type. Looking at dyadic trade and recurrent conflict from 1885 to 2000, we find that imposed settlements foster a pacifying effect of trade, while negotiated settlements and failures to reach settlement lead to relationships in which trade has crosscutting effects on the stability of peace, resulting in an overall null effect of trade on conflict recurrence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 363-383 Issue: 4 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.524509 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.524509 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:4:p:363-383 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Clionadh Raleigh Author-X-Name-First: Clionadh Author-X-Name-Last: Raleigh Title: Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Does Physical Geography Affect a State's Conflict Risk? Abstract: This article considers why and how physical geography may influence conflict patterns within African states. It juxtaposes arguments relating to four features of the physical environment— distance, resources, terrain, and size—to those purporting rebels base insurgency tactics on the strategic value of locations. Using GIS and spatial econometrics, a geographically disaggregated dataset of population, distance to capitals, borders, resources, terrain, and road densities is tested against conflict data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset). ACLED disaggregates data on internal conflict into georeferenced individual events. The analysis covers six of the most conflict prone states in Central Africa. The analysis confirms that an area's physical attributes do not have a uniform effect on the likelihood of experiencing a conflict event. Areas of high strategic value, including densely populated areas and military zones, have a higher risk of conflict than rural, peripheral areas. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 384-410 Issue: 4 Volume: 36 Year: 2010 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.524524 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2010.524524 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:36:y:2010:i:4:p:384-410 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Justin Conrad Author-X-Name-First: Justin Author-X-Name-Last: Conrad Author-Name: Mark Souva Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Souva Title: Regime Similarity and Rivalry Abstract: Explanations for the democratic peace have developed along two broad lines: those that focus on democratic-specific mechanisms and those that focus on institutional similarity mechanisms. We test these competing mechanisms against each other by examining a range of regime types and a variety of institutional mechanisms, and for the first time, test them in logistic multiple regression models of rivalry onset using three rivalry datasets. Our comparative test of the two approaches largely justifies democratic-specific explanations for the democratic peace. That is, more than any other regime pairing, two democracies are less likely to engage in a rivalry. We also find some evidence that socialist single-party dyads are less likely to experience rivalry than other dyads, but overall the support for a broader institutional similarity peace is quite limited. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-28 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546229 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546229 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:1-28 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ursula E. Daxecker Author-X-Name-First: Ursula E. Author-X-Name-Last: Daxecker Title: Shocks, Commitment, and the Risk of Civil War Abstract: This article investigates how shocks to state capabilities are related to the probability of civil war. Drawing on Powell (2004, 2006), shocks are conceptualized as shifts in the domestic distribution of power that can lead to bargaining breakdown and, consequently, violent conflict. Following a shock to the state's capabilities, the leadership has incentives to grant concessions to other groups within the state, yet such promises are not credible given that the leadership may regain its strength. Similarly, opposition groups cannot make credible commitments as they expect to be more powerful in the future. Unable to commit, both actors may use force to achieve their preferred outcome. The study then analyzes how the institutional structure of the state's leadership and opposition groups influences actors' credibility during this bargaining process. Statistical analysis of all leaders for the 1960--2004 time period shows that shocks such as economic recession, war defeat, and changes in the international balance of power increase the risk of civil war as expected. Moreover, results confirm that the relationship between shocks and civil war is mediated by leadership type and the cohesiveness of opposition groups. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 29-54 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546239 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546239 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:29-54 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ulrich Pilster Author-X-Name-First: Ulrich Author-X-Name-Last: Pilster Title: Are Democracies the Better Allies? The Impact of Regime Type on Military Coalition Operations Abstract: This study asks which attributes make states the more valuable partners in military coalition operations. Due to the uncertainty inherent in combat in general and coalition operations in particular, successful military cooperation depends on the amount of discretion given to national armed forces. Since democracies usually have more harmonious civil-military relations, restricting the discretion of military agents is a relatively less attractive and needed tool for democratic principals. This in turn makes democratic states the more valuable allies. The argument has two empirical implications: On one hand, a state conducting a military intervention should be more likely to build a coalition with its allies, the more democratic allies it has. On the other hand, military interventions by democratic military coalitions should end more quickly with success for the interveners than interventions by nondemocratic coalitions. These hypotheses are tested and supported using data on military interventions between 1946 and 2001. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 55-85 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546259 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546259 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:55-85 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jack S. Levy Author-X-Name-First: Jack S. Author-X-Name-Last: Levy Title: Introduction Journal: International Interactions Pages: 86-87 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546713 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546713 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:86-87 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jack S. Levy Author-X-Name-First: Jack S. Author-X-Name-Last: Levy Title: Preventive War: Concept and Propositions Journal: International Interactions Pages: 87-96 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546716 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546716 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:87-96 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul W. Schroeder Author-X-Name-First: Paul W. Author-X-Name-Last: Schroeder Title: Preventive Wars to Restore and Stabilize the International System Journal: International Interactions Pages: 96-107 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546717 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546717 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:96-107 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott A. Silverstone Author-X-Name-First: Scott A. Author-X-Name-Last: Silverstone Title: Preventive War and the Problem of Post-Conflict Political Order Journal: International Interactions Pages: 107-116 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546719 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546719 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:107-116 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dale C. Copeland Author-X-Name-First: Dale C. Author-X-Name-Last: Copeland Title: A Tragic Choice: Japanese Preventive Motivations and the Origins of the Pacific War Journal: International Interactions Pages: 116-126 Issue: 1 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.546722 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.546722 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:1:p:116-126 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John A. Doces Author-X-Name-First: John A. Author-X-Name-Last: Doces Title: Globalization and Population: International Trade and the Demographic Transition Abstract: I study the effect of international trade on birth rates across a large number of countries. A supply-demand model of the birth rate explains that a rise in international trade reduces the demand for children and encourages an earlier onset of the mortality revolution. These two effects caused by the rise of international trade lead to a lower birth rate. A time-series cross-section empirical analysis for a large sample of developed and developing countries exhibits that international trade has a statistically significant and inverse effect on the birth rate. The policy implications relating to trade, economic growth, and conflict are discussed in the conclusion. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 127-146 Issue: 2 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.568838 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.568838 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:127-146 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nicole M. Simonelli Author-X-Name-First: Nicole M. Author-X-Name-Last: Simonelli Title: Bargaining over International Multilateral Agreements: The Duration of Negotiations Abstract: This article examines the duration of international multilateral agreement negotiations. Based on propositions in the literature concerning factors which may have an effect on the length of negotiations, I derive testable hypotheses concerning the involvement of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in the negotiation process, the number of negotiating parties, and the duration of the agreement. These hypotheses are tested using new data collected from the negotiations of 168 multilateral agreements. I find that whether a nonstate actor makes the first proposal does have an effect on the duration of multilateral agreement negotiations, but this relationship is conditional on issue area. In particular, when an intergovernmental organization makes the first proposal for security-related agreements, negotiations are longer, but the opposite is true for non-security agreement. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 147-169 Issue: 2 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.568845 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.568845 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:147-169 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Johannes Urpelainen Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Urpelainen Title: A California Effect for International Environmental Externalities? Abstract: An influential conventional wisdom holds that globalization could induce upward convergence in environmental regulations. Wealthy countries impose environmental regulations that prompt exporters in other countries to adopt sustainable production techniques, so the cost of environmental regulation in these countries decreases. However, previous research has only examined this California Effect for environmental regulations to address domestic externalities. I formally investigate the case of international externalities, such as global warming or ozone depletion. I find that a country can exercise leadership by enacting environmental regulations to strategically induce other countries to regulate in the future, but only if the incentive to free ride is not too strong. Surprisingly, under deep economic integration, environmental regulations are strategic complements with positive spillovers, so that international coordination is necessary to capitalize on the California Effect. In addition to showing that the California Effect is a powerful instrument of environmental statecraft, the results suggest new reasons why liberal trade and investment policies might improve environmental protection. They can also inform a strategy to promote efforts to mitigate global warming. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 170-189 Issue: 2 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.568855 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.568855 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:170-189 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ka Zeng Author-X-Name-First: Ka Author-X-Name-Last: Zeng Title: The Political Economy of Developing Country Antidumping Investigations against China Abstract: This article draws on industry-level data to analyze the political economy of the use of the antidumping statute by 10 less developed countries (LDCs) against China. Test results suggest that Chinese import competition is an important factor explaining the pattern of LDC antidumping initiation against China. Macroeconomic factors such as gross domestic product growth rate also play some role in influencing the pattern of LDC antidumping determination against China. Importantly, statistical analyses did not yield any evidence suggesting that China's membership in the World Trade Organization has disciplined developing countries' use of the antidumping policy. The paper conjectures that China's Most-Favored-Nation status under the World Trade Organization, the designation of China as a nonmarket economy in antidumping investigations until 2016, and the retaliatory incentives generated by the growing deflection of Chinese exports to developing country markets may have overwhelmed the institutional effect of the trade organization in shaping the pattern of LDC antidumping decision making toward China. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 190-214 Issue: 2 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.569233 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.569233 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:190-214 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen E. Gent Author-X-Name-First: Stephen E. Author-X-Name-Last: Gent Title: Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts Abstract: According to bargaining theory, one would expect that governments in intrastate conflicts will only be willing to concede to power sharing agreements when they face relatively strong rebel groups. Previous empirical studies have not found support for this hypothesis because they have not operationalized the capability of civil war combatants in relative terms. I show that once one uses a relative measure of capability, one finds that power sharing is more likely as the strength of a rebel group increases. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the relationship between rebel strength and power sharing is stronger for political power sharing than for territorial or military power sharing. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 215-228 Issue: 2 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.569239 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.569239 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:215-228 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dov H. Levin Author-X-Name-First: Dov H. Author-X-Name-Last: Levin Author-Name: Benjamin Miller Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin Author-X-Name-Last: Miller Title: Why Great Powers Expand in Their Own Neighborhood: Explaining the Territorial Expansion of the United States 1819--1848 Abstract: This article attempts to identify the causes of intraregional great power expansion. Using the state-to-nation balance theory we argue that, in many cases, such great power expansion can be explained as being the result of the incongruence within a given region between the nationalist aspirations and identities of the various peoples inhabiting it and the region's division into territorial states. The existence of the external type of such incongruence within a great power (that is, a pan-nationalist ideology) turns it into a revisionist state eager to expand, using all means available, in order to “resolve” this incongruence. In addition, this incongruence also creates various nationalistic trans-border groups (like terrorists, private military expeditions/filibusters, settlers, etc.). Often these groups try, through various independent efforts (usually in nearby weak states), to achieve these revisionist goals as well, thus complementing and aiding the revisionist great power's own efforts. After demonstrating the weaknesses in other existing explanations, this argument is illustrated in the case of the territorial expansion by the United States in the Southwest at the expense of Mexico in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 229-262 Issue: 3 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.594746 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.594746 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:229-262 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark David Nieman Author-X-Name-First: Mark David Author-X-Name-Last: Nieman Title: Shocks and Turbulence: Globalization and the Occurrence of Civil War Abstract: Several scholars argue that systemic global trends are pulling individuals not only upward toward the global level, but also downward to the local level; the result is a potential loss of authority for the state (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004; Rosenau 1990). Their theory of “fragmegration” can provide a causal mechanism for why longstanding grievances may erupt into civil war at a particular time. While increased global exposure does provide both states and individual citizens with tremendous benefits, sudden “shocks” of globalization can overwhelm a state's capacity to offset the negative impacts of globalization, thus weakening a state's capacity to deal with rival polities for the allegiance of its citizens. The present study conducts a cross-sectional logistic regression with discrete duration analysis to test the impact of globalization shocks on the onset of civil wars between the years 1970--1999. The results demonstrate that increasingly dramatic changes in the level of global integration are associated with an increased risk of civil war onset. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 263-292 Issue: 3 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.594756 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.594756 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:263-292 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yu Zheng Author-X-Name-First: Yu Author-X-Name-Last: Zheng Title: Credibility and Flexibility: Political Institutions, Governance, and Foreign Direct Investment Abstract: This article argues that the relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment is both nonlinear and conditional upon status quo policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment in developing countries, with four veto players being the most attractive institutional arrangement. Countries with too few or too many veto players are not favored because of either high policy uncertainty or high policy rigidity. In addition, the benefits and costs of credibility and flexibility vary in good times and hard times. The benefits of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the costs in countries with good initial regulatory environment. The costs of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the benefits when countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 293-319 Issue: 3 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.596008 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.596008 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:293-319 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Johannes Urpelainen Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Urpelainen Title: Can Unilateral Leadership Promote International Environmental Cooperation? Abstract: Why do governments sometimes exercise unilateral leadership in international environmental cooperation, such as the mitigation of global climate change? It is usually the case that unilateral leadership cannot solve the problem at hand, so it is not clear what the benefits of unilateral leadership are. In this article, I provide a new political rationale for unilateral leadership. I show that if a green politician (worried about environmental destruction) fears that he or she will probably lose power soon, he or she may want to unilaterally implement domestic mitigation policies to reduce the domestic cost of mitigation in the future. By exercising unilateral leadership, this politician ensures that even a future brown politician (only mildly interested in environmental protection) is, due to the domestic cost reduction, willing to engage in international cooperation. The findings imply that while unilateral leadership is not a panacea, it may be a useful commitment device under empirically plausible conditions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 320-339 Issue: 3 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.596018 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.596018 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:320-339 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrea Ruggeri Author-X-Name-First: Andrea Author-X-Name-Last: Ruggeri Author-Name: Theodora-Ismene Gizelis Author-X-Name-First: Theodora-Ismene Author-X-Name-Last: Gizelis Author-Name: Han Dorussen Author-X-Name-First: Han Author-X-Name-Last: Dorussen Title: Events Data as Bismarck's Sausages? Intercoder Reliability, Coders' Selection, and Data Quality Abstract: Precise measurement is difficult but essential in the generation of high-quality data, and it is therefore remarkable that often so little attention is paid to intercoder reliability. It is commonly recognized that poor validity leads to systematic errors and biased inference. In contrast, low reliability is generally assumed to be a lesser concern, leading only to random errors and inefficiency. We evaluate the intercoder reliability of our recently collected data on governance events in UN peacekeeping and show how poor coding and low intercoder reliability can produce systematic errors and even biased inference. We also show how intercoder reliability checks are useful to improve data quality. Continuous testing for intercoder reliability ex post enables researchers to create better data and ultimately improves the quality of their analyses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 340-361 Issue: 3 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.596028 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.596028 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:340-361 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Karin Dyrstad Author-X-Name-First: Karin Author-X-Name-Last: Dyrstad Author-Name: Halvard Buhaug Author-X-Name-First: Halvard Author-X-Name-Last: Buhaug Author-Name: Kristen Ringdal Author-X-Name-First: Kristen Author-X-Name-Last: Ringdal Author-Name: Albert Simkus Author-X-Name-First: Albert Author-X-Name-Last: Simkus Author-Name: Ola Listhaug Author-X-Name-First: Ola Author-X-Name-Last: Listhaug Title: Microfoundations of Civil Conflict Reconciliation: Ethnicity and Context Abstract: Comparative work on reconstruction and peace building in war-torn countries is dominated by a macro-oriented approach, focusing on structural political reforms, legal issues, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of (rebel) soldiers, and repatriation of the displaced. This article offers a different perspective, examining micro-level determinants of reconciliation. Earlier research indicates that political attitudes in post--ethnic conflict societies are shaped by ethnic affinity. A large literature on the importance of contextual conditions for human behavior would suggest that ethnic composition of the local population and physical proximity to the conflict zone also should affect individual support for peace and reconciliation. To test these propositions, we draw on a geo-referenced survey of the Macedonian population that measures respondents' perception of the 2001 civil conflict. Contrary to expectations, the spatial and demographic setting exerts only feeble impacts on individuals' support for the Framework Agreement. Several years after the conflict was settled, the survey data reveal a strongly divided Macedonian society where ethnicity trumps all other individual and contextual factors in explaining the respondents' preferences. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 363-387 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622627 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622627 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:363-387 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Madhav Joshi Author-X-Name-First: Madhav Author-X-Name-Last: Joshi Author-Name: T. David Mason Author-X-Name-First: T. David Author-X-Name-Last: Mason Title: Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post--Civil War States Abstract: We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post--civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post--civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post--civil war peace spells from 1946--2005. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 388-413 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622645 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622645 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:388-413 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Carl Henrik Knutsen Author-X-Name-First: Carl Henrik Author-X-Name-Last: Knutsen Title: Security Threats, Enemy-Contingent Policies, and Economic Development in Dictatorships Abstract: In this article, I introduce, discuss, and formalize the argument that the type of security threat a dictatorial regime faces has implications for economic policy making and, consequently, economic outcomes. Dictators who mainly face internal threats often have incentives to conduct policies that are harmful to economic development, like underproviding productive public investment. However, dictators who mainly face external threats are more likely to conduct economic development--enhancing policies. The type of security threat facing a dictator thus contributes to explaining the large variation in economic development among dictatorships. The argument finds empirical support in cases from different geographical regions and historical periods. One particularly illustrative example, addressed in the article, is Japan in the nineteenth century, where the sharply increased severity of external threats from Western countries induced the selection of development-enhancing policies in the last half of the century. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 414-440 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622650 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622650 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:414-440 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mariya Y. Omelicheva Author-X-Name-First: Mariya Y. Author-X-Name-Last: Omelicheva Title: Natural Disasters: Triggers of Political Instability? Abstract: This study engages with the question: Do different types of natural disasters—droughts, earthquakes, floods, storms, and others—trigger political instability? It revisits an ongoing debate over the nature of association between disasters and conflict and reassesses this relationship using the model of conflict developed by the Political Instability Task Force as well as its data, measures of political instability, and methods of assessment. The study finds only marginal support for the impact of certain types of disasters on the onsets of political instability. The preexisting country-specific conditions, including the resilience of a state's institutions to crisis, account for most of the variance in the dependent variable. Once the characteristics of a state's political regime are taken into account, the effect of disasters weakens or disappears completely, suggesting that natural disasters become catalysts of political instability in only those states which are already prone to conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 441-465 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622653 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622653 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:441-465 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Colin Flint Author-X-Name-First: Colin Author-X-Name-Last: Flint Title: Introduction: Geographic Perspectives on Civil Wars Journal: International Interactions Pages: 466-468 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622657 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622657 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:466-468 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Clionadh Raleigh Author-X-Name-First: Clionadh Author-X-Name-Last: Raleigh Title: Scales of Conflict Research Journal: International Interactions Pages: 469-481 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622663 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622663 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:469-481 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James A. Tyner Author-X-Name-First: James A. Author-X-Name-Last: Tyner Author-Name: Stian Rice Author-X-Name-First: Stian Author-X-Name-Last: Rice Author-Name: Andrew Shears Author-X-Name-First: Andrew Author-X-Name-Last: Shears Title: State Capacity, Scalar Politics, and the Geographic Study of Civil Wars Journal: International Interactions Pages: 481-489 Issue: 4 Volume: 37 Year: 2011 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622660 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622660 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:481-489 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael E. Aleprete Author-X-Name-First: Michael E. Author-X-Name-Last: Aleprete Author-Name: Aaron M. Hoffman Author-X-Name-First: Aaron M. Author-X-Name-Last: Hoffman Title: The Strategic Development of Border Areas: Explaining Variation in Interaction Opportunity Across Land Borders Abstract: The ability to interact with others is a necessary condition for the emergence of both cooperative and conflictual interstate relations. Yet, the spaces separating states vary in terms of the opportunities they offer for contacts to take place: some borders are difficult to traverse, others are not. Building on Harvey Starr and G. Dale Thomas's work on the permeability of land borders, we test the three most prominent hypotheses about the forces that shape cross-border interaction opportunities. The results confirm that that the desirability of trade influences the accessibility of borders. However, the anticipated relationship between state capacity and accessibility does not materialize clearly. Finally, our results suggest that governments invest in transportation infrastructure when facing threatening neighbors, resolving a debate over the relationship between mobility and security in favor of those who argue that accessible borders facilitate military defense. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-28 Issue: 1 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.640207 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.640207 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:1-28 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew Fuhrmann Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: Fuhrmann Title: Splitting Atoms: Why Do Countries Build Nuclear Power Plants? Abstract: Why do countries build nuclear power plants? This article develops a series of arguments for national reliance on nuclear power relating to economic development, energy security, nuclear proliferation, the “supply side,” norms, and nuclear accidents. Statistical tests of these arguments using a dataset on nuclear power plant construction in 129 countries from 1965 to 2000 yield two main conclusions. First, nuclear energy programs emerge and expand largely for innocuous reasons as a means to meet growing energy needs and enhance energy security. The evidence does not support the argument that countries pursue civilian nuclear power to augment nuclear weapons programs. If nuclear power contributes to nuclear proliferation, the former does not appear to take on a sinister dimension from the beginning. Second, major nuclear accidents substantially reduce the probability of reactor construction—especially in democracies and states that have not previously invested in nuclear energy. We are unlikely to observe a true “nuclear energy renaissance” in the aftermath of the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan. Accordingly, it is doubtful that nuclear power will be a meaningful solution to global climate change. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 29-57 Issue: 1 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.640209 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.640209 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:29-57 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John Ishiyama Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Ishiyama Author-Name: Marijke Breuning Author-X-Name-First: Marijke Author-X-Name-Last: Breuning Title: Educational Access and Peace Duration in Post-Conflict Countries Abstract: Does increased access to education after the end of a civil war reduce or increase the risk of the resumption of civil war? As several scholars have argued, increased access to education is linked with the promotion of civil society, reduces economic inequality, and improves the livelihood of the population (Walter 2004). Moreover, by promoting education, the government signals to the population that it is concerned with the citizens of the country (Thyne 2006). Further, the opportunity for education increases the opportunity costs for rebels to fight the government, hence reducing the likelihood that former rebels will reinitiate a conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2002). On the other hand, others have pointed out that education may contribute to conflict particularly if employment opportunities do not keep pace with educational attainment (Buckland 2005; Degu 2005). Despite the claims of a theoretical linkage between access to education and peace duration, most empirical studies have examined the effects of civil war on education (Buckland 2005; Lai and Thyne 2007) as opposed to the effects of educational access on the recurrence of civil conflict or have focused largely on individual cases. In this article, using a stratified proportional hazard analysis, we empirically examine the relationship between increased education enrollments and the likelihood of civil war recurrence from 1990--2008. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 58-78 Issue: 1 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.640211 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.640211 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:58-78 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Solomon Major Author-X-Name-First: Solomon Author-X-Name-Last: Major Title: Timing Is Everything: Economic Sanctions, Regime Type, and Domestic Instability Abstract: Recent scholarship suggests that democracies are more vulnerable to economic coercion than authoritarian regimes; unfortunately, the countries most often targeted by economic sanctions are nondemocratic. While agreeing that authoritarians are indeed more robust to sanctions at most times, this article argues that there exist “windows of opportunity,” created by domestic instability, which make dictatorships particularly vulnerable to sanctions pressures. This is because, while domestic discontent in democracies is often seen a form of politics as usual (even if intensified), public demonstrations against the government in an authoritarian country can be both cause and indication of deep structural problems and crises that may be exploited by sanctioning countries. The hypothesis that the interaction between regime-type and domestic instability leads to greater vulnerability among despots finds strong support in a number of selection-corrected regressions indicating that, when sanctioning authoritarians, timing is indeed everything. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 79-110 Issue: 1 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.640253 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.640253 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:79-110 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati Author-X-Name-First: Krishna Chaitanya Author-X-Name-Last: Vadlamannati Title: Impact of Political Risk on FDI Revisited—An Aggregate Firm-Level Analysis Abstract: Unlike previous studies on political risk and foreign direct investment (FDI) that used macro-level FDI data to test micro-level theories, I make use of aggregate data on U.S. firms' investment activities in 101 developing countries during the period 1997--2007 to reassess the propositions. Using a multilevel mixed-effects linear instrumental variable approach, I find that lower political risk is associated with (a) an increase in U.S. firms with equity stake of 51% and above, (b) a higher proportion of fixed assets, and (c) an increase in the return on investments, after controlling for a host of relevant factors. Further analysis reveals the relationship is also strong with respect to investments in total assets and sales. The results are robust to alternative data, instruments, and estimation techniques. These results bring to fore the multiple risk hedging strategies available for foreign firms operating in high risk environments. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 111-139 Issue: 1 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.640254 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.640254 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:1:p:111-139 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Marit Brochmann Author-X-Name-First: Marit Author-X-Name-Last: Brochmann Title: Signing River Treaties—Does It Improve River Cooperation? Abstract: International water management has lately received increased attention in both scholarly and political circles. Whereas the traditional focus when investigating water issues was on water conflicts, the attention has shifted toward examining more cooperative aspects of shared water relationships. River cooperation is frequently equated with river treaties but cooperation in river basins is much more than that. This article investigates the effect a signed water treaty has on later water-specific cooperation in a dyad. An analysis is conducted for all international river basins in the world for the period 1948--1999. Using data on international rivers, river treaties, and cooperative water events, the results show that river treaties indeed are successful in promoting water cooperation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 141-163 Issue: 2 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.657575 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.657575 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:141-163 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lisa Hultman Author-X-Name-First: Lisa Author-X-Name-Last: Hultman Title: Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic Governments Abstract: Previous research has indicated that democracy decreases the risk of armed conflict, while increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks, but we know little about the effect of democracy on violence against civilians in ongoing civil conflicts. This study seeks to fill this empirical gap in the research on democracy and political violence, by examining all rebel groups involved in an armed conflict 1989--2004. Using different measures of democracy, the results demonstrate that rebels target more civilians when facing a democratic (or semi-democratic) government. Democracies are perceived as particularly vulnerable to attacks on the population, since civilians can hold the government accountable for failures to provide security, and this provides incentives for rebels to target civilians. At the same time, the openness of democratic societies provides opportunities for carrying out violent attacks. Thus, the strength of democracy—its accountability and openness—can become an Achilles heel during an internal armed conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 164-181 Issue: 2 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.657602 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.657602 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:164-181 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yuan-Ming Lee Author-X-Name-First: Yuan-Ming Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Kuan-Min Wang Author-X-Name-First: Kuan-Min Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Title: Capital Mobility and Current Account Imbalance: Nonlinear Threshold Vector Autoregression Approach Abstract: In this study, we utilize the growth rate of gross domestic product as the threshold variable to construct two nonlinear threshold vector autoregression models to re-examine the findings in Yan (2007:23) that “current account imbalance causes capital mobility in developed countries; capital mobility causes current account imbalance in emerging countries.” The nonlinear causality test shows that the findings of Yan (2007) can exist only in certain regimes and the primary factor that affects the causality between current account and financial account (and its components of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment) is the asymmetry caused by the business cycle. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 182-217 Issue: 2 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.657946 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.657946 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:182-217 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Sara McLaughlin Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Author-Name: Cameron G. Thies Author-X-Name-First: Cameron G. Author-X-Name-Last: Thies Title: Resource Curse in Reverse: How Civil Wars Influence Natural Resource Production Abstract: Conflict scholars have argued that natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and gemstones, may increase the chances for civil wars because rebels can sustain their organizations by looting resources and because certain types of resources, such as oil, create weaker state governments that are less capable of putting down insurgencies. Natural resources like oil also raise the value of capturing the state through war. However, empirical studies typically treat natural resources as exogenous variables, failing to consider the possibility that war alters the production levels of various natural resources. This endogenous relationship may help to explain the inconsistent empirical results linking natural resources and civil war onset. This article examines the two-way relationship between natural resources and civil war, focusing on oil, diamonds, and fisheries. The empirical findings suggest that most of the relationships run in the direction from war to resources, with no significant effects of resources on the onset of civil war. States with civil wars experience lower oil and diamond production, while marine fisheries production recovers in civil war--torn states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 218-242 Issue: 2 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.658326 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.658326 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:218-242 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Desirée Nilsson Author-X-Name-First: Desirée Author-X-Name-Last: Nilsson Title: Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace Abstract: Is peace more likely to prevail when the peace accord includes civil society actors such as religious groups, women's organizations, and human rights groups? This is the first statistical study that explores this issue. The article develops key claims in previous research regarding the role of civil society actors and durable peace, and proposes a set of hypotheses that focus on legitimacy in this process. The hypotheses are examined by employing unique data on the inclusion of civil society actors in all peace agreements in the post--Cold War period. The statistical analysis shows that inclusion of civil society actors in the peace settlement increases the durability of peace. The results further demonstrate that peace accords with involvement from civil society actors and political parties in combination are more likely to see peace prevail. The findings also suggest that inclusion of civil society has a particularly profound effect on the prospects for overall peace in nondemocratic societies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 243-266 Issue: 2 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.659139 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.659139 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:2:p:243-266 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert G. Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Robert G. Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Author-Name: Shannon L. Blanton Author-X-Name-First: Shannon L. Author-X-Name-Last: Blanton Title: Labor Rights and Foreign Direct Investment: Is There a Race to the Bottom? Abstract: As global awareness of human rights continues to increase, the practices and investment decisions of multinational corporations have come under increased scrutiny. This is particularly the case with labor rights. Popular arguments concerning a “race to the bottom” abound, though a growing amount of scholarship portrays a more positive relationship between foreign capital and such rights. Yet empirical studies have yielded mixed results. To clarify the linkages between labor rights and foreign direct investment (FDI), we add to the extant literature in two ways. First, we take into account the reciprocal relationship between FDI and labor rights. Second, as FDI is a heterogeneous phenomenon, we assess these linkages across three different industrial sectors. Our findings show that there is a significant relationship between labor rights and FDI, though its exact nature varies across sectors. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 267-294 Issue: 3 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.676496 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.676496 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:267-294 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Skyler J. Cranmer Author-X-Name-First: Skyler J. Author-X-Name-Last: Cranmer Author-Name: Bruce A. Desmarais Author-X-Name-First: Bruce A. Author-X-Name-Last: Desmarais Author-Name: Justin H. Kirkland Author-X-Name-First: Justin H. Author-X-Name-Last: Kirkland Title: Toward a Network Theory of Alliance Formation Abstract: We propose a network-based theory of alliance formation. Our theory implies that, in addition to key state and dyad attributes already established in the literature, the evolution of the alliance network from any given point in time is largely determined by its structure. Specifically, we argue that closed triangles in the alliance network—where i is allied with j is allied with k is allied with i — produce synergy effects in which state-level utility is greater than the sum of its dyadic parts. This idea can be generalized to n-state closure, and, when considered along with factors that make dyadic alliance formation more attractive, such as military prowess and political compatibility, suggests that the network will evolve toward a state of several densely connected clusters of states with star-like groupings of states as an intermediary stage. To evaluate our theory, we use the temporal exponential random graph model and find that the roles of our network effects are robustly supported by the data, whereas the effects of non-network parameters vary substantially between periods of recent history. Our results indicate that network structure plays a greater role in the formation of alliance ties than has been previously understood in the literature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 295-324 Issue: 3 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.677741 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.677741 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:295-324 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew Moore Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: Moore Title: Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration Abstract: Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 325-347 Issue: 3 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.676511 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.676511 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:325-347 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dursun Peksen Author-X-Name-First: Dursun Author-X-Name-Last: Peksen Author-Name: Marie Olson Lounsbery Author-X-Name-First: Marie Olson Author-X-Name-Last: Lounsbery Title: Beyond the Target State: Foreign Military Intervention and Neighboring State Stability Abstract: Despite the abundance of research on the consequences of foreign military intervention for target countries, scant research has been devoted to the possible regional externalities of intervention. This article examines whether large-scale armed operations affect the likelihood of civil conflict onset in countries neighboring the target of intervention. We posit that interventions against the target regime reduce the government's ability to maintain full control over the entire national territory by diminishing its coercive and administrative capacity. This might, in turn, result in safe haven possibilities for neighboring rival groups in the target and facilitate the transnational spread of arms and other illicit activities that increase the risk of civil conflict onset in the contiguous countries. Armed interventions supportive or neutral toward the target state, on the other hand, bolster the government's coercive capacity and mitigate ongoing crises in the target. Such armed intrusions might therefore undermine the likelihood of internal armed conflict in neighboring countries triggered by the factors associated with “bad neighborhoods”: safe haven possibilities, transnational spread of arms, and refugee flows. To substantiate these claims, we use time-series, cross-national data for the 1951--2004 period. Results indicate that hostile interventions increase the probability of civil conflict onset in connected countries while supportive interventions have a regional pacifying effect, reducing the likelihood of domestic unrest in countries neighboring the target state. Neutral interventions, on the other hand, are unlikely to have any discernible effect on regional stability. Further, the primary motive of intervention, whether for humanitarian or other purposes, has no statistically significant impact on the stability of neighboring countries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 348-374 Issue: 3 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.676516 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.676516 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:3:p:348-374 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas Bernauer Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Bernauer Author-Name: Nils Petter Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Nils Petter Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Title: New Event Data in Conflict Research Journal: International Interactions Pages: 375-381 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.696966 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.696966 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:375-381 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sven Chojnacki Author-X-Name-First: Sven Author-X-Name-Last: Chojnacki Author-Name: Christian Ickler Author-X-Name-First: Christian Author-X-Name-Last: Ickler Author-Name: Michael Spies Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Spies Author-Name: John Wiesel Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Wiesel Title: Event Data on Armed Conflict and Security: New Perspectives, Old Challenges, and Some Solutions Abstract: This article presents the Event Data on Conflict and Security (EDACS) dataset, discusses the inherent problems of georeferenced conflict data, and shows how these challenges are met within EDACS. Based on an event data approach, EDACS contributes to the growing number of novel georeferenced datasets that allow researchers to identify causal pathways of violence and the dynamics of (transboundary) violence through spatiotemporal disaggregation. However, the unreflected use of any of these datasets will give researchers unjustified confidence in their findings, as the pitfalls are many and propagating errors can result in misleading conclusions. To identify and handle the different challenges to overall event data quality, we argue in favor of transparency in the data collection and coding process, to empower analysts to challenge the data and avoid cascading errors. In particular, we investigate how the choice of news sources, the handling of geographic precision, and the use of auxiliary data can bias event data. We demonstrate how the EDACS dataset design enables the analyst to deal with these issues by providing a set of variables indicating the news sources, possible sources of bias, and detailed information on geographic precision. This allows for a flexible use of the data based on individual analytical requirements. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 382-401 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.696981 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.696981 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:382-401 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew M. Linke Author-X-Name-First: Andrew M. Author-X-Name-Last: Linke Author-Name: Frank D. W. Witmer Author-X-Name-First: Frank D. W. Author-X-Name-Last: Witmer Author-Name: John O'Loughlin Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: O'Loughlin Title: Space-Time Granger Analysis of the War in Iraq: A Study of Coalition and Insurgent Action-Reaction Abstract: We investigate insurgent-coalition interaction using the WikiLeaks dataset of Iraq war logs 2004--2009. After a review of existing theoretical interventions on the dynamics of insurgency and presenting a baseline model of violent events, we test a conceptual model of reciprocity using an innovative space-time Granger causality technique. Our estimation procedure retains predicted probabilities of reaction in response to a previous opponent's action across different temporal and spatial configurations in Iraq and in Baghdad. Our conclusions about conflict in Iraq are based on these profiles of risk—what we call space-time signatures. We find strong evidence of “tit-for-tat” associations between coalition/Iraq forces on one side and insurgents/militants on the other. Specifically, we find that the action-reaction association varies strongly by majority ethnic region across Iraq and in Baghdad, by urban and nonurban location, and within Sunni-dominated areas, by district income. While violence is strongly temporally dependent in the same location, the effect of distance varies significantly across the different subsets of the Iraq data. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 402-425 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.696996 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.696996 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:402-425 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christopher M. Sullivan Author-X-Name-First: Christopher M. Author-X-Name-Last: Sullivan Author-Name: Cyanne E. Loyle Author-X-Name-First: Cyanne E. Author-X-Name-Last: Loyle Author-Name: Christian Davenport Author-X-Name-First: Christian Author-X-Name-Last: Davenport Title: The Coercive Weight of the Past: Temporal Dependence and the Conflict-Repression Nexus in the Northern Ireland “Troubles” Abstract: After 40 years, we still know very little about how state repression influences political dissent. In fact, to date, every possible relationship, including no influence, has been found. We argue that part of the problem concerns the current practice of treating every repressive event as if it were substantively equivalent, differentiated only by scope (large/small) or type (violent/nonviolent). We advance existing work by arguing that the influence of repression is contingent on when it occurs within the temporal sequences of political conflict. Using new events data on the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1974, results show that when dissent has been decreasing in the recent past, repressive action inspires an increase in dissident action. When dissent has been increasing, however, repression has the opposite effect, decreasing challenging activity. These results provide important insights into resolving a recurrent puzzle within the conflict-repression nexus as well as understanding the interaction between government and dissident behavior. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 426-442 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697005 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697005 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:426-442 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gerald Schneider Author-X-Name-First: Gerald Author-X-Name-Last: Schneider Author-Name: Margit Bussmann Author-X-Name-First: Margit Author-X-Name-Last: Bussmann Author-Name: Constantin Ruhe Author-X-Name-First: Constantin Author-X-Name-Last: Ruhe Title: The Dynamics of Mass Killings: Testing Time-Series Models of One-Sided Violence in the Bosnian Civil War Abstract: Many observers contend that wartime civilian victimization is an instrument of political leaders to achieve a particular goal. This article examines whether retaliation for similar acts by the other side, the developments on the battlefield, or the behavior of international actors accounts for the ups and downs of this so-called one-sided violence. Using information from the Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset and other sources, we evaluate the empirical relevance of these complementary models statistically. Time series analyses of the weekly number of killed and harmed Muslims (Bosniacs) and Serbs during the Bosnian civil war support the military and the massacre logic. We show that the Serbian side decreased one-sided violence following a territorial conquest, but that its one-sided violence was not a reciprocal response to the Bosniac targeting of civilians. Conversely, the Bosniac side resorted to violence during times of increasing Serbian atrocities and when the fighting was particularly intense. The analysis reveals that most international interventions did not reduce the carnage, but that the Serbs responded to Russian moves. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 443-461 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697048 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697048 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:443-461 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Clionadh Raleigh Author-X-Name-First: Clionadh Author-X-Name-Last: Raleigh Title: Violence Against Civilians: A Disaggregated Analysis Abstract: Disaggregated approaches to conflict research have led to new insights into the patterns and processes of political violence in developing countries. This article uses the most comprehensive subnational political violence data (ACLED) to observe where and when violence against civilians occurs within civil wars. Several new conclusions are evident from an event-based analysis of civilian violence: retribution or collateral damage are poor explanations for attacks on the unarmed. Instead, civilians are targeted because they are accessible; rebel groups kill more civilians, often in an attempt to create new frontlines for conflict. However, governments are also responsible for high rates of civilian death, yet they often “contract” this violence out to militias. This analysis confirms that there are multiple violent groups within civil war spaces, and small opposition groups commit higher levels of violence against civilians in local spaces. The strength of a violent group compared to its competition shapes how much civilian violence it commits. The results suggest that theories that emphasize civilian support and retribution as a basis for violence against civilians have overlooked the importance of how multiple violent opposition groups compete within civil wars, and how civilians suffer as a result. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 462-481 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697049 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697049 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:462-481 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joakim Kreutz Author-X-Name-First: Joakim Author-X-Name-Last: Kreutz Title: From Tremors to Talks: Do Natural Disasters Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts? Abstract: This article suggests that natural disasters can produce a ripe moment for conflict resolution because governments faced with the demand for effective disaster relief have incentives to offer concessions to separatist challengers. An analysis of the prevalence of new negotiations, ceasefires, and peace agreements during 12-month periods before and after natural disasters for separatist dyads 1990--2004 reveal some support for this proposition. Natural disasters increase the likelihood that parties will initiate talks or agree to ceasefires but have less effect on the signing of peace agreements. In line with the proposed mechanism, these results are particularly strong in democracies and following more severe disasters where the need to provide relief is most acute. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 482-502 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697404 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697404 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:482-502 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Idean Salehyan Author-X-Name-First: Idean Author-X-Name-Last: Salehyan Author-Name: Cullen S. Hendrix Author-X-Name-First: Cullen S. Author-X-Name-Last: Hendrix Author-Name: Jesse Hamner Author-X-Name-First: Jesse Author-X-Name-Last: Hamner Author-Name: Christina Case Author-X-Name-First: Christina Author-X-Name-Last: Case Author-Name: Christopher Linebarger Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Linebarger Author-Name: Emily Stull Author-X-Name-First: Emily Author-X-Name-Last: Stull Author-Name: Jennifer Williams Author-X-Name-First: Jennifer Author-X-Name-Last: Williams Title: Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database Abstract: We describe the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), a new event dataset for conducting research and analysis on various forms of social and political unrest in Africa. SCAD contains information on over 7,200 instances of protests, riots, strikes, government repression, communal violence, and other forms of unrest for 47 African countries from 1990--2010. SCAD includes information on event dates, actors and targets, lethality, georeferenced location information, and other conflict attributes. This article gives an overview of the data collection process, presents descriptive statistics and trends across the continent, and compares SCAD to the widely used Banks event data. We believe that SCAD will be a useful resource for scholars across multiple disciplines as well as for the policy community. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 503-511 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697426 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697426 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:503-511 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Henrik Urdal Author-X-Name-First: Henrik Author-X-Name-Last: Urdal Author-Name: Kristian Hoelscher Author-X-Name-First: Kristian Author-X-Name-Last: Hoelscher Title: Explaining Urban Social Disorder and Violence: An Empirical Study of Event Data from Asian and Sub-Saharan African Cities Abstract: By 2050, two thirds of the world's population will live in cities, and the greatest growth in urban populations will take place in the least developed countries. This presents many governments with considerable challenges related to urban governance and the provision of services and opportunities to a burgeoning urban population. In the current article, we use a new event dataset on city-level urban social disorder, drawing upon prominent theories in the conflict literature. The dataset spans the 1960--2009 period, covering 55 major cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa and includes data on nonviolent actions such as demonstrations and strikes and violent political actions like riots, terrorism, and armed conflict. We find that urban social disorder is associated in particular with low economic growth rates and hybrid democratic regimes, while level of development, economic inequality, large youth bulges, and economic globalization do not seem to affect levels of urban social disorder. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 512-528 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697427 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697427 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:512-528 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas Bernauer Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Bernauer Author-Name: Tobias Böhmelt Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Böhmelt Author-Name: Halvard Buhaug Author-X-Name-First: Halvard Author-X-Name-Last: Buhaug Author-Name: Nils Petter Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Nils Petter Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Author-Name: Theresa Tribaldos Author-X-Name-First: Theresa Author-X-Name-Last: Tribaldos Author-Name: Eivind Berg Weibust Author-X-Name-First: Eivind Berg Author-X-Name-Last: Weibust Author-Name: Gerdis Wischnath Author-X-Name-First: Gerdis Author-X-Name-Last: Wischnath Title: Water-Related Intrastate Conflict and Cooperation (WARICC): A New Event Dataset Abstract: Water scarcity is widely regarded as a key factor linking climate variability and change with conflict. However, existing research on the water-conflict nexus is hampered by poor data that inhibits drawing firm conclusions on the role of water in shaping societal stability and security. This article reports on the construction of a new dataset on subnational and georeferenced events over domestic water-related cooperation and conflict for 35 countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Sahel for 1997--2009. The main value of this dataset is in its precision. Its key component, the Water Events Scale (WES), records the exact time, location, and intensity of water-related conflictive and cooperative events, as well as the actors involved. A few descriptive statistics and illustrations serve to demonstrate the usefulness of the new dataset for quantitative analyses of intrastate conflict and cooperation over water resources. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 529-545 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697428 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697428 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:529-545 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Philip A. Schrodt Author-X-Name-First: Philip A. Author-X-Name-Last: Schrodt Title: Precedents, Progress, and Prospects in Political Event Data Abstract: The past decade has seen a renaissance in the development of political event data sets. This has been due to at least three sets of factors. First, there have been technological changes that have reduced the cost of producing event data, including the availability of information on the Web, the development of specialized systems for automated coding, and the development of machine-assisted systems that reduce the cost of human coding. Second, event data have become much more elaborate than the original state-centric data sets such as WEIS and COPDAB, with a far greater emphasis on substate and nonstate actors, and in some data sets, the incorporation of geospatial information. Finally, there have been major institutional investments, such as support for a number of Uppsala and PRIO data sets, the DARPA ICEWS Asian and global data sets, and various political violence data sets from the US government. This article will first review the major new contributions, with a focus on those represented in this special issue, discuss some of the open problems in the existing data and finally discuss prospects for future development, including the enhanced use of open-source natural language processing tools, standardizing the coding taxonomies, and prospects for near-real-time coding systems. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 546-569 Issue: 4 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.697430 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.697430 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:4:p:546-569 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David C. Earnest Author-X-Name-First: David C. Author-X-Name-Last: Earnest Author-Name: Steve Yetiv Author-X-Name-First: Steve Author-X-Name-Last: Yetiv Author-Name: Stephen M. Carmel Author-X-Name-First: Stephen M. Author-X-Name-Last: Carmel Title: Contagion in the Transpacific Shipping Network: International Networks and Vulnerability Interdependence Abstract: To what extent are states vulnerable to disruptions in trade networks? We investigate this question by simulating attacks on the intermodal shipping network, whose ubiquitous containers carry 80% to 90% of all global trade in goods. While this network has reduced transportation costs and spurred international trade, the dependence of modern economies on ship-borne trade means disruptions in one region may produce considerable costs for states in another region. We simulate an “optimal terrorist” that learns about the conditions under which attacks on the network in other parts of the world generate economic losses to the United States. The study illustrates that by adopting a network- and process-oriented ontology, the study of interdependence may better anticipate new sources of interstate and transnational conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 571-596 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726151 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726151 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:571-596 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt Author-X-Name-First: Jacqueline H. R. Author-X-Name-Last: DeMeritt Title: International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives? Abstract: Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 597-621 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726180 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726180 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:597-621 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ranveig Drolsum Flaten Author-X-Name-First: Ranveig Drolsum Author-X-Name-Last: Flaten Author-Name: Indra de Soysa Author-X-Name-First: Indra Author-X-Name-Last: de Soysa Title: Globalization and Political Violence, 1970--2008 Abstract: The question of globalization's effect on social harmony continues to be fiercely debated. We use a comprehensive measure of globalization (the KOF index) designed to capture the intensity of connectivity among countries along economic, social, and political dimensions. Our results suggest that globalization, particularly economic and social globalization, predicts a lower risk of civil war and political repression, but economic globalization predicts lower repression even after unit heterogeneity is accounted. When country fixed effects are accounted, political globalization's effect is problematic for human rights, suggesting that politically influential states escape the constraining effects of globalization on political repression. Indeed, globalization generally shows up as more important than per capita income, a variable often found to be one of the most robust determinants of political violence. The results taken together support those who argue that increased globalization may enhance prospects for social progress, not social resistance and political violence as skeptics claim. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 622-646 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726182 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726182 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:622-646 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Yuichi Kono Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Yuichi Author-X-Name-Last: Kono Title: Alliances, Trade Discrimination, and the Global Trade Regime Abstract: Although nondiscrimination is a central tenet of the global trade regime, discrimination was in fact common under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, particularly against developing countries. The latter have recently sought to end such discrimination through World Trade Organization rules: for example, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) prohibited quota discrimination in this sector. I examine the ATC's impact on US discrimination, asking whether the ATC ended the US policy of favoring allies with generous textile and clothing quotas. I find that, while the United States favored allies before the ATC, this favoritism vanished in the post-ATC period. The ATC thus accomplished its goal of ending explicit textile and clothing discrimination. This result underscores the potential for multilateral rules to control trade discrimination and implies that popular theories of trade policy may be contingent on such rules. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 647-669 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726183 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726183 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:647-669 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Weymouth Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Weymouth Author-Name: J. Muir Macpherson Author-X-Name-First: J. Muir Author-X-Name-Last: Macpherson Title: The Social Construction of Policy Reform: Economists and Trade Liberalization Around the World Abstract: We argue that the global spread of ideas contributes to trade liberalization. Building on insights from a rich case-based literature, we suggest an explicit mechanism of trade policy diffusion: US-trained Ph.D. economists, who share a common belief in the benefits of free trade, and who operate with varying degrees of political influence around the world. We offer the first cross-national test of the impact of economists on trade liberalization using a unique dataset recording the country of residence of all 6,493 foreign-based, US-trained American Economic Association (AEA) members over the period 1981--1997. Specifically, we measure the influence of economists on the timing and extent of trade liberalization. First, we endogenize the date of trade liberalization using hazard and probit models. Controlling for alternative diffusion mechanisms and other confounding variables, our results suggest that economists significantly speed up the reform process. Second, we find that countries with greater numbers of economists are more open to trade at the end of the period. All of our results are robust to an instrumental variables strategy that employs the number of Fulbright grants allocated by the United States as an instrument for the number of US-trained economists. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 670-702 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726185 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726185 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:670-702 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christian Davenport Author-X-Name-First: Christian Author-X-Name-Last: Davenport Author-Name: Will H. Moore Author-X-Name-First: Will H. Author-X-Name-Last: Moore Title: The Arab Spring, Winter, and Back Again? (Re)Introducing the Dissent-Repression Nexus with a Twist Journal: International Interactions Pages: 704-713 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726187 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726187 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:704-713 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen M. Saideman Author-X-Name-First: Stephen M. Author-X-Name-Last: Saideman Title: When Conflict Spreads: Arab Spring and the Limits of Diffusion Journal: International Interactions Pages: 713-722 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726186 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726186 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:713-722 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Edward D. Mansfield Author-X-Name-First: Edward D. Author-X-Name-Last: Mansfield Author-Name: Jack Snyder Author-X-Name-First: Jack Author-X-Name-Last: Snyder Title: Democratization and the Arab Spring Journal: International Interactions Pages: 722-733 Issue: 5 Volume: 38 Year: 2012 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726188 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2012.726188 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:38:y:2012:i:5:p:722-733 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bumba Mukherjee Author-X-Name-First: Bumba Author-X-Name-Last: Mukherjee Author-Name: Benjamin E. Bagozzi Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin E. Author-X-Name-Last: Bagozzi Title: The IMF, Domestic Public Sector Banks, and Currency Crises in Developing States Abstract: The stabilization programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—which are often designed to prevent currency crashes and promote exchange rate stability—frequently fail to prevent currency crises in program-recipient developing countries. This leads to the following puzzle: when do IMF programs fail to prevent currency crises in developing states that turn to the Fund for assistance? We suggest that the likelihood that a currency crisis may occur under an IMF program depends on the market concentration of public sector banks in program-participating developing countries: the higher the market concentration of public banks in a program recipient nation, the more likely that the IMF program will be associated with a currency crisis. Specifically, if the market concentration of public banks in a program-participating developing country is high, then banks will compel the government to renege on its commitment to implement banking sector reforms. This induces a financial panic among investors that leads to a currency crisis. Statistical tests from a sample of developing countries provide robust support for our hypothesis. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-29 Issue: 1 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.749748 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.749748 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:1:p:1-29 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: William B. Moul Author-X-Name-First: William B. Author-X-Name-Last: Moul Title: Balances Without Great Powers: Some Evidence on War and Peace in the Americas, 1816--1989 Abstract: Did disputes between non-great powers in the New World, 1816--1989, escalate to war if the disputes involved roughly equal sides or not? Metaphorically and practically, “balances of power” are about measurement, but many of the usual measures prove to be incorrect. Proper assessments of the balances of fighting power qualify counts of the material resources by considering the political-organizational capacity of the state to employ what is counted, the geopolitical location and logistics, and what bystander states might do if the dispute were to escalate. A modest correlation exists between rough equality in power capabilities and war, not peace, in the Americas, 1816--1989. A bare majority of the wars in the Americas from 1816 until 1989 were fought between equal sides, and equal disputants were thirteen times more likely to escalate to war than non-equals were. This relationship found among non-great powers is much less strong than the relationship found among the great powers. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 30-53 Issue: 1 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.749750 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.749750 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:1:p:30-53 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nathan W. Freeman Author-X-Name-First: Nathan W. Author-X-Name-Last: Freeman Title: Domestic Institutions, Capacity Limitations, and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987--2007 Abstract: The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 54-78 Issue: 1 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.751296 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.751296 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:1:p:54-78 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Navin A. Bapat Author-X-Name-First: Navin A. Author-X-Name-Last: Bapat Author-Name: Tobias Heinrich Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Heinrich Author-Name: Yoshiharu Kobayashi Author-X-Name-First: Yoshiharu Author-X-Name-Last: Kobayashi Author-Name: T. Clifton Morgan Author-X-Name-First: T. Clifton Author-X-Name-Last: Morgan Title: Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data Abstract: In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both threats and imposed sanctions. Second, to lessen model dependency of empirical findings, we employ a methodology that permits us to check systematically the robustness of the empirical results under various model specifications. Using the newly released Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data, our analyses of both threats and imposed sanctions show that two factors—involvement of international institutions and severe costs on target states—are positively and robustly related to sanctions success at every stage in sanctions episodes. Our analyses also identify a number of other variables that are systematically related to sanctions success, but the significance of these relationships depends on the specific model estimated. Finally, our results point to a number of differences at the threat and imposition stages, which suggests specific selection effects that should be explored in future work. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 79-98 Issue: 1 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.751298 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.751298 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:1:p:79-98 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dong-Hun Kim Author-X-Name-First: Dong-Hun Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: Coercive Assets? Foreign Direct Investment and the Use of Economic Sanctions Abstract: How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the use of economic coercion? This article argues that while FDI matters, the effect depends on the entry mode of the FDI. The economic interdependence created by FDI does not have a monotonic effect on economic statecraft because the relative costs incurred by economic disruption differ depending on the forms of foreign investment. In particular, the FDI that creates wholly-owned subsidiaries (for example, cross-border mergers and aquisitions) imposes greater costs to the sender's firms than cross-border joint ventures with local partners, while FDI through joint ventures incurs greater costs for the host than the home country and its firms. By utilizing US sanction episodes from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, the empirical analysis supports the argument. The results show that economic sanctions are less likely to occur as the share of FDI through cross-border mergers and acquisitions increases. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 99-117 Issue: 1 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.751305 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.751305 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:1:p:99-117 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jonathan N. Markowitz Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan N. Author-X-Name-Last: Markowitz Author-Name: Christopher J. Fariss Author-X-Name-First: Christopher J. Author-X-Name-Last: Fariss Title: Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power Abstract: The central purpose of this article is to establish the relationship between power projection, technology, and economic power. How economically powerful does a state need to be before it can afford the capital intensive technologies, foreign bases, and military and logistical forces associated with global power projection? The specific research question we focus on in this article is: What determines how far states send their military forces? We argue that as the costs associated with projecting power decrease or as the wealth necessary to project power increases, states will project power more frequently and at greater distances. We use a system level time series analysis from 1870--1936 and a dispute level analysis on all militarized international disputes from 1870--2000 to test these propositions. This article is the first to demonstrate empirically that the distance and frequency of power projection is a function of the cost of projecting power. We close with a discussion of contemporary states building power projection capabilities and how future research might build from our research to explain this behavior. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 119-143 Issue: 2 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.768458 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.768458 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:2:p:119-143 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sung Yong Lee Author-X-Name-First: Sung Yong Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: Lost in Translation: The Problem of Perceptual Limitations in Civil War Peace Negotiation Abstract: This article examines the negative role that actors' perceptual limitations play in civil war peace negotiation by reviewing the Sino-Khmer Rouge interplay during the Cambodian peace negotiations (1987--1993). The study contends that China continually failed to challenge the Khmer Rouge's negotiation strategies, which were founded on the faction's flawed understanding of its situation. Moreover, the inadequate communication between China and its client faction and the Khmer Rouge's lack of institutions for obtaining and analyzing information are identified as the two main reasons for the failure of Chinese intervention. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 144-166 Issue: 2 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.768469 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.768469 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:2:p:144-166 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas Halvorsen Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Halvorsen Author-Name: Jo Jakobsen Author-X-Name-First: Jo Author-X-Name-Last: Jakobsen Title: Democrats, Republicans—or Both? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Composition of State Governments on FDI, 1977--2004 Abstract: Does the partisan composition of state governments in the United States influence the location decisions of foreign multinational companies? This article argues that it does. We contend that partisan differences over state economic development policies still exist. Whereas Republicans tend to prefer an investment-driven (supply-side) growth model, Democrats favor a consumption-driven (demand-side) path to growth. Both sets of policies are of value to foreign direct investment; thus, multinationals do not favor one party over the other. A useful blend of policy measures is sought by foreign firms, making split state government preferable over unified government. Our arguments are comprehensively tested in a time-series cross-section analysis covering the period 1977--2004, with results supporting our claims. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 167-191 Issue: 2 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.768470 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.768470 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:2:p:167-191 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Leonardo Baccini Author-X-Name-First: Leonardo Author-X-Name-Last: Baccini Author-Name: Veronica Lenzi Author-X-Name-First: Veronica Author-X-Name-Last: Lenzi Author-Name: Paul W. Thurner Author-X-Name-First: Paul W. Author-X-Name-Last: Thurner Title: Global Energy Governance: Trade, Infrastructure, and the Diffusion of International Organizations Abstract: Why do states choose to join and form international governmental organizations (IGOs) that regulate energy policy? In this article we make three specific contributions to the literature on international cooperation and diffusion. First, we show that countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships previously gained by direct competitors among oil and gas producers and consumers. Moreover, we demonstrate that energy IGOs diffuse among countries that share oil and gas pipelines. Finally, we provide evidence that the institutional design of established energy IGOs impacts the development of their membership network. To test these hypotheses, we rely on original data on oil and gas pipelines and the design of energy IGOs as well as on a newly compiled dataset that includes 152 countries and covers 38 years (1970--2007). We employ both network analysis and spatial econometrics. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 192-216 Issue: 2 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.768512 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.768512 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:2:p:192-216 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Seung-Whan Choi Author-X-Name-First: Seung-Whan Author-X-Name-Last: Choi Author-Name: Shali Luo Author-X-Name-First: Shali Author-X-Name-Last: Luo Title: Economic Sanctions, Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis Abstract: This study examines the impact of economic sanctions on international terrorism. It is argued that sanctions intensify economic hardships on the poor within countries and this increases their level of grievance and makes them more likely to support or engage in international terrorism. Further, economic sanctions are conceptualized as creating an opportunity for rogue leaders to manipulate aggrieved poor people to terrorize foreign entities who are demonized as engaging in a foreign encroachment on the sanctioned nation's sovereignty. A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 152 countries for the past three decades provides evidence that ceteris paribus, economic sanctions are positively associated with international terrorism. This finding suggests that, although the main purpose of economic sanctions is to coerce rogue countries to conform to international norms and laws, they can unintentionally produce a negative ramification and become a cause of international terrorism. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 217-245 Issue: 2 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.768478 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.768478 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:2:p:217-245 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James A. Piazza Author-X-Name-First: James A. Author-X-Name-Last: Piazza Title: Regime Age and Terrorism: Are New Democracies Prone to Terrorism? Abstract: One of the earlier empirical studies of the relationship between regime type and terrorism published in International Interactions determined that while established democracies were significantly less likely to experience terrorist attacks than were nondemocratic countries, newly established democracies were highly vulnerable to terrorism. Subsequent empirical studies have routinely controlled for both regime type and age, but scholarly understanding of the effect of regime longevity on terrorism remains underdeveloped. This study revisits the relationship between terrorism and regime type and regime age using updated data, analytical techniques, and time-series and finds that while young democracies experience more terrorism than older democracies, dictatorships of any age experience less terrorism than any other type of regime. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 246-263 Issue: 2 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 4 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.768481 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.768481 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:2:p:246-263 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Zeev Maoz Author-X-Name-First: Zeev Author-X-Name-Last: Maoz Author-Name: Errol A. Henderson Author-X-Name-First: Errol A. Author-X-Name-Last: Henderson Title: The World Religion Dataset, 1945--2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends Abstract: This study introduces a new dataset on world religions. The World Religion Project consists of (a) a systematically developed classification of major world religions and religious families within major world religions, which enabled (b) the collection of data on the distribution of the population of all states in the international system across these religious categories, over the period of 1945--2010, and (c) a set of methods to reconcile among conflicting data from multiple sources, to deal with missing data, and to integrate multiple figures for a given observation. In the present study we discuss the significance of the World Religion Project, its internal logic and the development of the religion tree system of classification, and the data collection and data management process. We then provide a number of descriptive statistics about national, dyadic, regional, and global distributions of world religions, as well as some preliminary relationships between the religious similarity of states and their regime type, alliance patterns, and propensity to conflict. We discuss the potential contribution of this dataset to the study of the relationship between religion and international conflict and cooperation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 265-291 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.782306 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.782306 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:265-291 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Byungwon Woo Author-X-Name-First: Byungwon Author-X-Name-Last: Woo Title: Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment Abstract: The article explores how International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design influences foreign direct investment inflows. The author argues that stricter IMF conditionality signals a program-participating government's commitment to economic reforms, as it incurs larger ex ante political cost and risks greater ex post political cost. Thus, the catalytic effect of an IMF program is conditional on conditionality: programs with stricter conditions catalyze more foreign direct investment than those with less stringent conditions. Empirical analysis of the IMF conditionality dataset supports the argument and shows that after accounting for IMF program participation, the more structural conditions included in an IMF program, the more foreign direct investment flows into the country. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 292-315 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.782303 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.782303 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:292-315 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Terrence Chapman Author-X-Name-First: Terrence Author-X-Name-Last: Chapman Author-Name: Eric Reinhardt Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Reinhardt Title: Global Credit Markets, Political Violence, and Politically Sustainable Risk Premia Abstract: How do international financial conditions affect civil unrest? Existing studies examine the domestic economic roots of political violence but say little about the role of external financial conditions. We explore the interactions between international lending, government policy, and domestic unrest. In particular, we note that because of sovereign risk and defensive lending dynamics, credit ratings and interest rate premia are endogenous to expectations about civil violence. We test these claims using instrumental variables techniques and daily data on sovereign bond yield spreads, credit ratings, and episodes of civil violence in 59 developing countries from 1990 through 2004. After correcting for endogeneity, we find that exogenous increases in the price of foreign capital are robustly associated with increased odds of civil conflict. Primary commodity dependence, low economic growth, and poverty can also increase the odds of civil conflict by reducing access to foreign capital. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 316-342 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.782302 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.782302 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:316-342 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ahmer Tarar Author-X-Name-First: Ahmer Author-X-Name-Last: Tarar Title: Military Mobilization and Commitment Problems Abstract: Because of its costliness, military mobilization is generally seen as a mechanism by which high-resolve leaders can credibly signal their high resolve in international crises, thereby possibly overcoming informational asymmetries that can lead to costly and inefficient war. I examine how power-shifts caused by mobilization within a crisis can lead to commitment-problem wars. In a simple ultimatum-offer crisis bargaining model of complete information, war occurs if and only if the power-shift caused by mobilization exceeds the bargaining surplus, which is Powell's (2004, 2006) general inefficiency condition for commitment-problem wars. When private information is added, and hence mobilization potentially has a stabilizing signaling role, under certain conditions the commitment problem overwhelms the signaling role and mobilization leads to certain war. Finally, I analyze an infinite-horizon model that captures the reality that mobilizing takes time, and find that commitment-problem wars occur under broader conditions than the general inefficiency condition implies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 343-366 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.782304 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.782304 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:343-366 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hong-Cheol Kim Author-X-Name-First: Hong-Cheol Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: Hyung Min Kim Author-X-Name-First: Hyung Min Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: Jaechul Lee Author-X-Name-First: Jaechul Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: The Post-Coup Military Spending Question Revisited, 1960--2000 Abstract: Do military regimes spend more on the military than other regime types? All leaders cater to their winning coalition. For military leaders, core supporters are other members of the military. To solicit support from this group, first, leaders are persuaded to spend more on the military to ensure their political survival, while other autocratic leaders tend to view the military as a competing power center. Second, the cost of repressing challenges from the public in military regimes is cheaper than in other regimes; therefore, leaders in military regimes allocate more resources to the military to satisfy them. We test this argument by examining military spending in different regime types for 1960--2000. The empirical results from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors indicate that military regimes allocate more, on average, to the military than other regimes and that military rulers brought into power through military coups or who have experienced military coup attempts against them increase their military resource allocation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 367-385 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.782305 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.782305 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:367-385 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew S. Winters Author-X-Name-First: Matthew S. Author-X-Name-Last: Winters Title: Introduction Journal: International Interactions Pages: 386-389 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.784071 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.784071 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:386-389 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Helen V. Milner Author-X-Name-First: Helen V. Author-X-Name-Last: Milner Author-Name: Dustin Tingley Author-X-Name-First: Dustin Author-X-Name-Last: Tingley Title: Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay Journal: International Interactions Pages: 389-401 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.784090 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.784090 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:389-401 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Axel Dreher Author-X-Name-First: Axel Author-X-Name-Last: Dreher Author-Name: Andreas Fuchs Author-X-Name-First: Andreas Author-X-Name-Last: Fuchs Author-Name: Peter Nunnenkamp Author-X-Name-First: Peter Author-X-Name-Last: Nunnenkamp Title: New Donors Journal: International Interactions Pages: 402-415 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.784076 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.784076 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:402-415 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David H. Bearce Author-X-Name-First: David H. Author-X-Name-Last: Bearce Title: Reconsidering the Effect of Political Regime Type on Foreign Aid Effectiveness Journal: International Interactions Pages: 416-424 Issue: 3 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.784092 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.784092 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:3:p:416-424 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Louise Olsson Author-X-Name-First: Louise Author-X-Name-Last: Olsson Author-Name: Theodora-Ismene Gizelis Author-X-Name-First: Theodora-Ismene Author-X-Name-Last: Gizelis Title: An Introduction to UNSCR 1325 Journal: International Interactions Pages: 425-434 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805327 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805327 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:425-434 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kara Ellerby Author-X-Name-First: Kara Author-X-Name-Last: Ellerby Title: (En)gendered Security? The Complexities of Women's Inclusion in Peace Processes Abstract: As peacebuilding discourses increasingly stress the importance of including women, to what degree have security-related practices taken heed? It has been over 10 years since the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, yet it remains a “confused and confusing” tool for scholars and practitioners in assessing women's inclusion in peacebuilding. This article adds to our understanding on women and peacebuilding by engaging 1325 as an operationalizable concept and then applying it to peace agreements to understand how women's security is addressed as part of formal peace processes. Given previous difficulties in operationalizing 1325’s mandate, this article engages it as a three-level concept useful for studying the ways in which women are “brought into” security, called (en)gendered security. Using this concept of (en)gendered security, I assess intrastate peace agreements between 1991 and 2010 to elucidate where and how women are included in peace processes. This article illustrates the potential of a systematized and practical approach to security embodied in 1325 and a preliminary discussion of what accounts for better approaches to (en)gendered security during peacebuilding. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 435-460 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805130 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805130 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:435-460 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sabrina Karim Author-X-Name-First: Sabrina Author-X-Name-Last: Karim Author-Name: Kyle Beardsley Author-X-Name-First: Kyle Author-X-Name-Last: Beardsley Title: Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking? Abstract: Since the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (2000), which is referenced in most of the mandates for peacekeeping authorizations and renewals as of its adoption, UN peacekeeping forces have begun a process of gender balancing. While we have seen an increase in the numbers of female peacekeepers during the decade 2000--2010 and variation in the distribution patterns of female military personnel, we do not know if female military peacekeepers are deploying to areas that are safest or to areas with the greatest need for gender-balanced international involvement. Because the decision-making authority in the allocation of peacekeeping forces rests with the troop-contributing countries, which might not have bought into the gender balancing and mainstreaming initiatives mandated by the UN Security Council, we propose and find evidence that female military personnel tend to deploy to areas where there is least risk. They tend not to deploy where they may be most needed—where sexual violence and gender equity has been a major problem—and we find only a modest effect of having specific language in the mandates related to gender issues. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 461-488 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805131 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805131 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:461-488 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Henrik Urdal Author-X-Name-First: Henrik Author-X-Name-Last: Urdal Author-Name: Chi Primus Che Author-X-Name-First: Chi Primus Author-X-Name-Last: Che Title: War and Gender Inequalities in Health: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Fertility and Maternal Mortality Abstract: Recent studies have found significant excess mortality in women during and immediately after armed conflicts. This article directly assesses one of the most likely explanations, namely that war negatively affects reproductive health. Armed conflicts may contribute to sustain high fertility levels through increased social insecurity, loss of reproductive health services, and lower female education. Further, war's deteriorating impact on health infrastructure is expected to increase the relative risk that women die from complications associated with pregnancy and childbirth. These claims are tested in a global time-series cross-national study from 1970 through 2005. Three major findings are reported. First, armed conflicts are associated with higher overall fertility in low-income countries only. Second, maternal mortality rates are elevated, albeit moderately, in conflict countries. Third, conflicts in neighboring countries are associated with lower maternal mortality, possibly indicating that health interventions among refugee and host populations are relatively successful. While addressing one of the least successful UN Millennium Development Goals, this study also responds to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, in which Article 16 specifically calls for the “Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls.” Journal: International Interactions Pages: 489-510 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805133 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805133 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:489-510 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ragnhild Nordås Author-X-Name-First: Ragnhild Author-X-Name-Last: Nordås Author-Name: Siri C. A. Rustad Author-X-Name-First: Siri C. A. Author-X-Name-Last: Rustad Title: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation Abstract: While the literature on peacekeeping has mostly focused on whether peacekeeping actually keeps the peace, few studies have systematically addressed the question of what explains variations in unintended consequences of peacekeeping, such as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). This study presents the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers data, a new dataset covering the 36 international peacekeeping missions by the UN, NATO, ECOWAS, and the African Union, active in the years 1999--2010. Using this dataset, it also presents the first statistical study that explores the issue of what can account for variations in reported SEA across peacekeeping operations. The systematic analysis of this data indicates that SEA was more frequently reported in situations with lower levels of battle-related deaths, in larger operations, in more recent operations, the less developed the country hosting the mission, and in operations where the conflict involved high levels of sexual violence. Our discussion and conclusion highlights data restrictions and identifies key challenges for future research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 511-534 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805128 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805128 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:511-534 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Helen S. A. Basini Author-X-Name-First: Helen S. A. Author-X-Name-Last: Basini Title: Gender Mainstreaming Unraveled: The Case of DDRR in Liberia Abstract: In the past women have been excluded from peace initiatives. However, with the advent of UNSCR 1325 (2000) women's agency in the process has been heightened through a new framework for involvement. UNSCR 1325 is a policy document that acknowledges the link between women, peace, and security and uses gender mainstreaming as a mechanism to implement its objectives. Yet in spite of its policy advancements, over a decade later women still do not participate equally in peace and security initiatives that impact on the sustainability of peace. This article aims to explore the context of this framework through considerations of the gender mainstreaming provision in the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) process in Liberia. Using interviews with women associated with fighting forces (WAFFs)/ex-combatants the article argues that although there was a specific targeted focus showing some gender responsive design and coordination, WAFFs’/ex-combatants’ unique needs, especially those of a social and psychological nature, were poorly addressed. In addition, the commentary shows that the focus did not attend to structural inequality issues such as sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). Journal: International Interactions Pages: 535-557 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805129 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805129 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:535-557 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Elin Bjarnegård Author-X-Name-First: Elin Author-X-Name-Last: Bjarnegård Author-Name: Erik Melander Author-X-Name-First: Erik Author-X-Name-Last: Melander Title: Revisiting Representation: Communism, Women in Politics, and the Decline of Armed Conflict in East Asia Abstract: This research note evaluates one of the commonly used measurements for political gender equality: representation of women in parliaments. It demonstrates that caution is called for when interpreting results where this variable is used, because parliamentary representation implies different things in different settings. Societies with more women in parliament tend to have fewer intrastate armed conflicts. We investigate this statistical association with a particular focus on East Asia. This region has seen a shift from extremely intense warfare to low levels of battle deaths at roughly the same time as great strides have been made in the representation of women in parliaments. This research note shows, however, that this statistical association is driven by authoritarian communist regimes promoting gender equality as a part of communist ideology, and these countries’ representative chambers have little influence over politics. Using statistical tests and empirical illustrations from East Asia, the note concludes that the political representation of women is an invalid indicator of political gender equality in East Asia. There is thus a need for nuance in assessing the picture painted in earlier research. In addition, the suggestion that more women in parliament will lead to fewer armed conflicts runs the risk of being forwarded as an oversimplified solution to a complex problem, and we briefly discuss the instrumentalization of gender equality in peace and security studies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 558-574 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805132 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805132 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:558-574 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Anita Schjølset Author-X-Name-First: Anita Author-X-Name-Last: Schjølset Title: Data on Women's Participation in NATO Forces and Operations Journal: International Interactions Pages: 575-587 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805326 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805326 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:575-587 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Louise Olsson Author-X-Name-First: Louise Author-X-Name-Last: Olsson Author-Name: Frida Möller Author-X-Name-First: Frida Author-X-Name-Last: Möller Title: Data on Women's Participation in UN, EU, and OSCE Field Missions: Trends, Possibilities, and Problems Journal: International Interactions Pages: 587-600 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805325 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805325 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:587-600 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Theodora-Ismene Gizelis Author-X-Name-First: Theodora-Ismene Author-X-Name-Last: Gizelis Author-Name: Nana Afua Pierre Author-X-Name-First: Nana Afua Author-X-Name-Last: Pierre Title: Gender Equality and Postconflict Reconstruction: What Do We Need to Know in Order to Make Gender Mainstreaming Work? Journal: International Interactions Pages: 601-611 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805324 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805324 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:601-611 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat Author-X-Name-First: Chantal Author-X-Name-Last: de Jonge Oudraat Title: UNSCR 1325—Conundrums and Opportunities Journal: International Interactions Pages: 612-619 Issue: 4 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.805328 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.805328 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:4:p:612-619 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Milton Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Author-X-Name-Last: Milton Author-Name: Megan Spencer Author-X-Name-First: Megan Author-X-Name-Last: Spencer Author-Name: Michael Findley Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Findley Title: Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee Flows and Transnational Terrorism Abstract: We examine whether refugee flows increase transnational terrorism in states to which refugees flee. Recent studies find that refugee flows contribute to the spread of interstate and civil war, but to a far lesser extent have studies examined how refugee flows could lead to other forms of political violence. We discuss two ways in which refugee flows can lead to transnational terrorism: how conditions in camps contribute to the radicalization of refugees; and how poorly host states treat refugees. We then conduct empirical tests using data on worldwide international refugee flows and transnational terrorism. Specifically, we model the effect of refugee flows on transnational terror attacks within a directed dyad framework to account for characteristics of origin and host states. Using a rare-events logit model, along with count models to check robustness, we find that refugee flows significantly increase the likelihood and counts of transnational terrorist attacks that occur in the host country, even when controlling for other variables. Given the prominence of refugee flows and populations worldwide, the results suggest that states with significant refugee populations and the international community at large should take measures to address the conditions in refugee camps, as well as the treatment of refugees by host states in order to prevent transnational terrorism. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 621-645 Issue: 5 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834256 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.834256 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:5:p:621-645 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sam R. Bell Author-X-Name-First: Sam R. Author-X-Name-Last: Bell Author-Name: Richard Frank Author-X-Name-First: Richard Author-X-Name-Last: Frank Author-Name: Paul Macharia Author-X-Name-First: Paul Author-X-Name-Last: Macharia Title: Passenger or Driver? A Cross-National Examination of Media Coverage and Civil War Interventions Abstract: Existing research on civil war interventions provides contradicting evidence about the role that the media plays in affecting the likelihood of intervention. To date, studies often focus on specific cases (frequently by the United States) leaving it unclear whether the media's influence extends more broadly. In this article we examine this question cross-nationally and argue that we need to account for the possibility that interventions also lead to increases in media coverage. We test our hypotheses using cross-national data on civil war interventions and media coverage. These data include a new measure of media coverage of 73 countries experiencing civil wars between 1982 and 1999. These data allow us to determine whether media coverage is more likely to drive leaders’ decisions or follow them. Toward this end we employ a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood model to control for potential endogeneity between media attention and interventions. The results suggest a reciprocal positive relationship between media attention and civil conflict interventions. Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in media coverage raises the probability of intervention 68%. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 646-671 Issue: 5 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834257 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.834257 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:5:p:646-671 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert A. Galantucci Author-X-Name-First: Robert A. Author-X-Name-Last: Galantucci Title: Who Promotes Protection? Economic and Electoral Influences on Trade-Related Position Taking in the Senate Abstract: Existing studies of Congressional behavior devote little attention to understanding legislators' trade-related positions outside the context of roll call votes. Using a new dataset on bill sponsorship that spans 15 Congresses, the author explores the factors that affect a senator's propensity to introduce protectionist trade bills, including state-level manufacturing characteristics, economic cycles, and electoral vulnerability. The results provide support for a number of the prominent economic-based explanations for trade policy preferences, including the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models, and also draw attention to several additional economic and political influences on policy outcomes. Beyond trade politics, these findings have implications for the expanding body of research on bill sponsorship as well as the literature on the role of Congress in U.S. foreign policymaking. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 672-697 Issue: 5 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834260 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.834260 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:5:p:672-697 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Isak Svensson Author-X-Name-First: Isak Author-X-Name-Last: Svensson Author-Name: Mathilda Lindgren Author-X-Name-First: Mathilda Author-X-Name-Last: Lindgren Title: Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role of the Insider-Partial Mediator Abstract: Previous quantitative research on mediation in intrastate and interstate conflicts has highlighted the role of external mediators. This study represents the first effort to systematically explore the role of internal—insider-partial—mediators. We suggest that the insider-partial mediators bring important indigenous resources to a peace process and that they can complement external mediators by mitigating the bargaining problem of information failure. Exploring new data on the occurrence and effect of mediation in unarmed insurrections from 1970--2006, we find that the insider-partial mediators significantly increase the likelihood of negotiated agreements. This applies even after controlling for so-called selection effects, where external mediators are selected, or self-selected, into the most difficult conflict situations, whereas insider-partial mediators are utilized in conflict situations that are less severe; and where insider-partial mediators have a substantially higher frequency of activity in unarmed as compared to armed insurrections. We therefore conclude that the insider-partial mediators play an important and positive role in peacemaking that merits further exploration. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 698-722 Issue: 5 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834261 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.834261 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:5:p:698-722 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erica Owen Author-X-Name-First: Erica Author-X-Name-Last: Owen Title: Unionization and Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment Abstract: Although inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has many benefits for a country as a whole, like trade, it is a source of competition for producers in the host country, with concomitant effects on labor markets. The entrance of foreign multinationals increases demand for skilled labor at the expense of unskilled labor, and also increases the elasticity of demand for labor because multinationals are able to shift production across borders. This raises the question of whether or not labor has an impact on policy toward inward FDI. I suggest that organized labor is a key determinant of the influence of labor on inward FDI restrictions. Not only do unions mitigate the collective action problem facing labor, but unionized workers, regardless of skill level, have incentives to support restrictions on inward FDI because rising elasticity of demand restricts bargaining power. I expect that higher levels of unionization will lead to greater restrictions on inward FDI. I find support for this hypothesis in an analysis of U.S. industry-level formal restrictions on inward FDI between 1981 and 2000. Industry skill intensity, a proxy for the distributional consequences of FDI for labor, does not explain variation in barriers to inward FDI, suggesting that the confluence of interests and influence is necessary for labor to influence policy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 723-747 Issue: 5 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834258 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.834258 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:5:p:723-747 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ryan D. Griffiths Author-X-Name-First: Ryan D. Author-X-Name-Last: Griffiths Author-Name: Charles R. Butcher Author-X-Name-First: Charles R. Author-X-Name-Last: Butcher Title: Introducing the International System(s) Dataset (ISD), 1816--2011 Abstract: We argue that the Correlates of War dataset on sovereign state membership has two weaknesses: a requirement that states maintain diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and a size inconsistency that disqualifies many mid-sized states in the pre-1920 period. As a consequence, entire state systems are excluded from the data, and the total number of states during the nineteenth century is undercounted. After reviewing two other approaches to identifying states, we offer an alternative set of criteria that identifies 100 completely new cases, and a total of 363 states between 1816 and 2011. These modifications reveal several previously overlooked patterns. Most importantly, the global trend in the number of states over time is concave. From a high of 134 in 1816, states declined precipitously in the mid-nineteenth century through the processes of accession, conquest, and unification. This pattern of state consolidation bottomed out in 1912, and states have proliferated since 1945. However, the pattern of state death and state birth varied by region in the nineteenth century. Whereas the state systems of South Asia and Southeast Asia experienced a steady reduction in the number of states, Africa underwent a more dynamic process of state formation, consolidation, and death. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 748-768 Issue: 5 Volume: 39 Year: 2013 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834259 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.834259 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:5:p:748-768 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sarah E. Croco Author-X-Name-First: Sarah E. Author-X-Name-Last: Croco Author-Name: Scott Sigmund Gartner Author-X-Name-First: Scott Sigmund Author-X-Name-Last: Gartner Title: Flip-Flops and High Heels: An Experimental Analysis of Elite Position Change and Gender on Wartime Public Support Abstract: We address whether politicians’ flip-flopping on support for a war is damaging to their electoral fortunes, and if the gender of the politician has a conditioning effect on this relationship. A series of survey experiments, conducted in 2010 and designed specifically for this project, allows us to examine the causal power of these two cues. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom: respondents do not fault leaders who change their minds about a conflict, and importantly, this effect holds irrespective of the gender of the politician. Instead, individuals react to the policy position the politician currently holds on a war regardless of the politician's consistency and gender. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-24 Issue: 1 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.863195 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.863195 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:1:p:1-24 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: A. Cooper Drury Author-X-Name-First: A. Cooper Author-X-Name-Last: Drury Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Author-Name: Dursun Peksen Author-X-Name-First: Dursun Author-X-Name-Last: Peksen Title: Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy: The Complex Case of Economic Sanctions Abstract: Although voluminous research connects the neo-Kantian triad—democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organization membership—to amelioration of conflict processes, comparatively little is known about how these factors relate to economic coercion. We advance the relevant literature on neo-Kantianism and the determinants of sanction decisions by (1) analyzing the impact of all three neo-Kantian factors on economic coercion and (2) assessing the effects of these factors across both the onset of threat and imposition of sanctions. Results from the time-series, cross-national data analyses indicate a significant but complex connection between the neo-Kantian variables and sanctions. Specifically, we find that although democratic regimes are less likely to threaten each other with sanctions, once a threat is made, democracies are more likely to impose sanctions against each other. Economic interdependence and common IGO membership are likely to increase the probability of sanction threats. Yet, the results also suggest that common IGO membership decreases the probability of sanction imposition while economic interdependence has no statistically significant effect on the decision to impose sanctions. Overall, these results highlight the importance of a more nuanced study of sanction decisions for a better understanding of the factors that lead to sanction use. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 25-51 Issue: 1 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.863194 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.863194 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:1:p:25-51 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Paul Gill Author-X-Name-First: Paul Author-X-Name-Last: Gill Author-Name: Jeongyoon Lee Author-X-Name-First: Jeongyoon Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Karl R. Rethemeyer Author-X-Name-First: Karl R. Author-X-Name-Last: Rethemeyer Author-Name: John Horgan Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Horgan Author-Name: Victor Asal Author-X-Name-First: Victor Author-X-Name-Last: Asal Title: Lethal Connections: The Determinants of Network Connections in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1970--1998 Abstract: Using stochastic methods we illustrate that the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) network is clustered along three primary dimensions: (a) brigade affiliation, (b) whether the member participated in violent activities, and (c) task/role within PIRA. While most brigades tended to foster connections within the brigade (that is, “closure”), the tendency to do so varied across the organization. Members who engaged with violent activities were far more likely to connect with each other; in later periods there is polarization into those who engage in violent activities and those who do not. Across brigades, those who engage in a particular task and role (improvised explosive device [IED] constructor, IED planter, gunman, robber/kidnapper/drug smuggler/hijacker) are more likely to connect with others who do the same task or play the same role than with other members who fulfill other roles. Standard forms of homophily (that is, the tendency to make connections with people who are similar in terms of demography or status) play a very weak role in explaining which members interact with one another. Finally, our analysis illustrates clear patterns of relational change that correspond to changes in the formal structures that PIRA's leadership promoted. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 52-78 Issue: 1 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.863190 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.863190 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:1:p:52-78 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Amanda Murdie Author-X-Name-First: Amanda Author-X-Name-Last: Murdie Author-Name: Craig S. Stapley Author-X-Name-First: Craig S. Author-X-Name-Last: Stapley Title: Why Target the “Good Guys”? The Determinants of Terrorism Against NGOs Abstract: Why would a terrorist group target nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? We theorize that certain types of NGOs, namely those using mainly nonviolent pressure to advocate for changes in government human rights practices, influence the behaviors of potential terrorist group supporters in ways not liked by terrorist organizations. These advocacy-based human rights NGOs make terrorism attacks against the whole NGO sector more likely by changing the dynamics of terrorist-domestic audience relations in ways that threaten to limit audience support of terrorist groups. Other types of NGOs, especially those that do not have an advocacy focus, are less likely to directly challenge the terrorist organization or the state and can provide resources utilized by terrorist groups and potential sympathizers. Thus, their presence would not increase the likelihood of any NGO-targeted terrorist attacks. A global test of these dynamics supports our basic hypotheses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 79-102 Issue: 1 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.863192 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.863192 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:1:p:79-102 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Author-Name: Cameron G. Thies Author-X-Name-First: Cameron G. Author-X-Name-Last: Thies Title: The Demand for Protectionism: Democracy, Import Elasticity, and Trade Barriers Abstract: Numerous studies suggest that democracies employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. In this article, we examine the conditioning role that the elasticity of import demand at the commodity level plays on the relationship between democracy and import barriers. Beginning with the assumption that democracies are more responsive than nondemocracies to the preferences of mass publics, we demonstrate that the value of free trade as a public good depends on the elasticity of import demand. When import demand for a given commodity is inelastic, trade barriers are more harmful to consumers; as such, democracies will employ lower trade barriers than nondemocracies. However, as import demand becomes more elastic, publics find it easier to adjust to higher prices; as a result, the difference in imposed trade barriers by regime type decreases. We find support for this argument in statistical analyses of crosssectional data covering 4,656 commodities imported by 73 countries Furthermore, we find that democracies raise higher trade barriers than nondemocracies on commodities for which import demand is very elastic. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 103-126 Issue: 1 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.863191 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.863191 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:1:p:103-126 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Philip Arena Author-X-Name-First: Philip Author-X-Name-Last: Arena Author-Name: Brian Hardt Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Hardt Title: Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War Abstract: To fully understand the effects of factors that encourage rebellion, we must differentiate between the way such factors influence mass decisions to join an ongoing rebellion and the way they influence the level of concessions offered by the government. We analyze a three-player bargaining model that allows us to do so. Our results indicate that governments tolerate a greater risk of conflict with their chosen concessions when any conflict that does occur is likely to take the form of a limited, rather than popular, rebellion. We demonstrate that rebellions are more likely to be popular when the general populace is relatively dissatisfied with the status quo and when the government is relatively incapable of putting down rebellions. Widespread poverty and low state capacity might therefore be associated with a lower likelihood of conflict, but a greater probability that the general populace will participate in any conflict that does occur. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 127-141 Issue: 1 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.863193 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2013.863193 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:1:p:127-141 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erika Forsberg Author-X-Name-First: Erika Author-X-Name-Last: Forsberg Title: Transnational Transmitters: Ethnic Kinship Ties and Conflict Contagion 1946--2009 Abstract: Previous research has proposed that ethnic conflict may spread across borders. Although the importance of transnational ethnic groups is often emphasized, the processes through which contagion may take place remain unspecified. The present study presents a context for more precise analysis of contagion. Further, it identifies distinct processes through which contagion is likely to occur within this context. It is argued that when an ethnic group engages in violent conflict in one state, kin in a nearby state may be inspired to rebel because the outbreak of conflict renders ethnic bonds and similar conditions salient. These bonds and similarities become even more salient when the kin group has opportunities and willingness to mobilize for rebellion. Statistical analysis employing unique global data covering 1946--2009 supports this argument. These results indicate that kinship ties matter for contagion and identify some of the conditions which amplify the effects such ties have for contagion. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 143-165 Issue: 2 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880702 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.880702 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:2:p:143-165 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Author-Name: Andrew J. Enterline Author-X-Name-First: Andrew J. Author-X-Name-Last: Enterline Title: The Durability of Imposed Democracy Abstract: Why do imposed democracies endure and how do policy choices by imposing states affect durability? To study these questions, we formulate expectations linking durability to structural domestic conditions, the level of domestic security in the state into which a polity is imposed, the policies of imposing states, and the regional environment within which an imposed democracy is nested. We use event history to test our expectations on a sample of democracies imposed during the twentieth century. We find that relatively immutable, structural conditions, such as ethnic cleavages, economic development, and prior democratic experience strongly influence the durability of imposed democracies. While some policy choices made by imposing states can impact the survival of imposed democracy, they do so only modestly relative to the environment in which a democracy is imposed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 166-190 Issue: 2 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880701 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.880701 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:2:p:166-190 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ulrich Petersohn Author-X-Name-First: Ulrich Author-X-Name-Last: Petersohn Title: The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002 Abstract: Research has long abandoned the view that only states wage war. On the contrary, civil war research has produced an impressive body of literature on violent non-state actors. Still, a particular group of actors—mercenaries—has been widely neglected so far, although they have participated in numerous conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether their presence aggravated or improved the situation is a matter of dispute. Some believe that the additional military capabilities provided by mercenaries help to end civil wars quickly without increased bloodshed, while others deem mercenaries greedy and bloodthirsty combatants who contribute to making civil wars more brutal, while a third opinion differentiates between different types of mercenaries. This article tests the impact of mercenaries on civil war severity. The evidence indicates that the presence of both mercenaries and private military and security contractors increases its severity. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 191-215 Issue: 2 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880699 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.880699 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:2:p:191-215 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Xun Cao Author-X-Name-First: Xun Author-X-Name-Last: Cao Author-Name: Michael D. Ward Author-X-Name-First: Michael D. Author-X-Name-Last: Ward Title: Do Democracies Attract Portfolio Investment? Transnational Portfolio Investments Modeled as Dynamic Network Abstract: For many, transnational capital is an important driving force of economic globalization. However, we know little about the political determinants for cross-border portfolio investments. Recent economic literature focuses upon information asymmetries. We move beyond this and introduce an explicitly political element into the study of international asset flows. Democratic institutions attract portfolio investments because they reduce the chances of government predatory practices. Applying a dynamic latent space model on the bilateral portfolio investment data from 2001 to 2005, we empirically examine the effects of important country-level characteristics of both exporters and importers of portfolio investments. The empirical findings suggest that democracies are often associated with higher levels of inward portfolio investments. Interestingly, we also find that portfolio investments are associated with business communities’ subjective estimate of property rights protection, but not with more comprehensive, index-based aggregate measures from international think tanks. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 216-245 Issue: 2 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880697 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.880697 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:2:p:216-245 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian Benjamin Crisher Author-X-Name-First: Brian Benjamin Author-X-Name-Last: Crisher Title: Inequality Amid Equality: Military Capabilities and Conflict Behavior in Balanced Dyads Abstract: Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty—in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict—determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent’s capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state’s willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory’s implications. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 246-269 Issue: 2 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880700 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.880700 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:2:p:246-269 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Susan G. Sample Author-X-Name-First: Susan G. Author-X-Name-Last: Sample Title: From Territorial Claim to War: Timing, Causation, and the Steps-to-War Abstract: The steps-to-war thesis has become one of the dominant frameworks for explaining war in the discipline. Substantial testing has supported the empirical claims of the argument, but key theoretical questions remain. These primarily have to do with the question of endogeneity. While the steps-to-war thesis argues that each step increases the probability of war, others have argued that you might find the same empirical relationships in cases where war was anticipated, or that rivalry is the underlying causal factor for both the different variables and war itself. This study addresses these critical challenges by examining the historic timing of the steps to war in territorial claims from 1919--1995 to determine whether their sequencing supports the causal argument of the steps-to-war thesis or the various challenges to it. The results indicate that there are clear categorical differences in territorial claims that result in war, and discusses the relevant theoretical implications. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 270-285 Issue: 2 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.880698 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.880698 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:2:p:270-285 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nathan M. Jensen Author-X-Name-First: Nathan M. Author-X-Name-Last: Jensen Author-Name: Bumba Mukherjee Author-X-Name-First: Bumba Author-X-Name-Last: Mukherjee Author-Name: William T. Bernhard Author-X-Name-First: William T. Author-X-Name-Last: Bernhard Title: Introduction: Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy Abstract: Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims and predictions. Yet the reasons for the rapid growth in survey and experimental methods in IPE are more multifaceted. We therefore seek to answer the following three pertinent questions in the introduction. First, what are the main substantive puzzles and issue-areas that IPE scholars analyze via survey and experimental methods in their research? Second, what are the main methodological advantages and drawbacks from using survey and experimental methods in IPE? Third, what are the key substantive theoretical and empirical insights that scholars have learned from recent research in IPE that employs either survey or experimental methods (or both)? In addition to answering these questions here, we also provide a summary of each article included in the special issue. The introduction concludes with a road map for future studies on survey and experimental research in IPE. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 287-304 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899222 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899222 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:287-304 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nathan M. Jensen Author-X-Name-First: Nathan M. Author-X-Name-Last: Jensen Author-Name: Mi Jeong Shin Author-X-Name-First: Mi Jeong Author-X-Name-Last: Shin Title: Globalization and Domestic Trade Policy Preferences: Foreign Frames and Mass Support for Agriculture Subsidies Abstract: Reforming agriculture trade policy is key to breaking the deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations. While existing studies have focused on institutions and interest group barriers to agriculture trade reform in developed countries, most have failed to recognize the broad support for agriculture protection among developed countries. In this article we examine one of the drivers of this support: the ability of politicians to frame their own agriculture policies as less generous relative to those of other countries. Drawing on existing literature on heuristics, we argue that voters are malleable to politicians’ comparative framing of agriculture policies. Using an original survey experiment in the United States, we find that framing US agriculture as less generous than other countries generates an additional 12% of respondents supporting increased farm payments to US farmers. These results speak to the difficulty in reforming agriculture and more broadly about the lack of public support for unilateral trade liberalization. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 305-324 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899228 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899228 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:305-324 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Julia Gray Author-X-Name-First: Julia Author-X-Name-Last: Gray Author-Name: Raymond P. Hicks Author-X-Name-First: Raymond P. Author-X-Name-Last: Hicks Title: Reputations, Perceptions, and International Economic Agreements Abstract: How do countries’ actions on the international stage affect their reputations? We propose that, particularly when evaluating countries about whom individuals may have few prior beliefs, international agreements may hold particular sway in establishing countries’ reputations. Specifically, if a relatively unknown country joins an organization with a country that has a good reputation, individuals will judge that original state to be less risky; if the better-known countries are generally perceived to have a bad reputation, the less-known state will also look more risky. This article presents evidence from a survey experiment in which individuals are asked about the weight of various factors in their perceptions of countries’ reputations. Subjects would randomly receive a prompt about a country’s domestic policy reform or its ties to other countries via economic or cultural agreements. The results show that states’ international ties play a role in assessments about country reputations. We also examine possible mechanisms underlying this finding. Lower risk associated with agreements with good countries is largely a function of anticipated economic benefits. However, the higher risk associated with agreements with bad countries seems to be more a function of anticipated political closeness between countries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 325-349 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899227 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899227 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:325-349 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Benjamin E. Bagozzi Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin E. Author-X-Name-Last: Bagozzi Author-Name: Thomas Brawner Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Brawner Author-Name: Bumba Mukherjee Author-X-Name-First: Bumba Author-X-Name-Last: Mukherjee Author-Name: Vineeta Yadav Author-X-Name-First: Vineeta Author-X-Name-Last: Yadav Title: Regional International Organizations and Individual Immigration Attitudes: Results from Finite Mixture Models Abstract: When are individuals more likely to support immigration? We suggest here that regional international organizations (IOs; for example, the European Union) publicly release reports about the scale and benefits of immigration to member states in the region in which these IOs operate. We argue that unlike individuals who are uninformed about immigration, informed individuals who have more knowledge of the main regional IO in which their country participates will be more likely to employ immigration reports released by their regional IO to construct their immigration attitudes. They will also perceive that these reports are credible. The credibility of these reports helps individuals with more knowledge about their region’s main IO to view immigrants favorably, which translates to support for immigration. We test our prediction by developing a finite mixture model that statistically accounts for the econometric challenges that emerge when uninformed individuals “save face” by disproportionately opting for the middle “status quo” category in ordinal survey response variables of immigration support. Results from the finite mixture model corroborate our prediction and are more reliable than estimates from a standard ordered probit model. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 350-375 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899226 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899226 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:350-375 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Judith L. Goldstein Author-X-Name-First: Judith L. Author-X-Name-Last: Goldstein Author-Name: Margaret E. Peters Author-X-Name-First: Margaret E. Author-X-Name-Last: Peters Title: Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession Abstract: To better evaluate the weight of economic versus cultural factors in determining individual attitudes toward open borders, this article reports on a survey experiment conducted over the course of the Great Recession. Over the course of the recession, we measured changes in attitudes on both immigration and trade policies, controlling for economic circumstance. Based on the data provided by respondents on both their current salaries as well as a subjective assessment of their economic well-being, we illustrate how both objective and subjective perceptions of the economy interact with cultural factors and influence attitudes on open borders. The panel provides a unique picture of the “stickiness” of policy attitudes in hard economic times, and by extension, the level of commitment in the United States to globalization. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 376-401 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899219 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899219 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:376-401 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: K. Amber Curtis Author-X-Name-First: K. Amber Author-X-Name-Last: Curtis Title: In Times of Crisis: The Conditions of Pocketbook Effects Abstract: When and how will personal financial (aka “pocketbook”) concerns drive citizens’ political decisions? Scholars remain puzzled by the mismatch between the expectation that pocketbook voting should occur and the reality that, according to most findings, it usually does not. Using original survey data collected immediately after Iceland’s second “Icesave” referendum (2011), I first report the results of an embedded experiment that successfully evokes greater pocketbook concern. Next, I analyze the determinants of retrospective pocketbook evaluations, showing that priming effects are conditioned by political sophistication such that high sophisticates are among the most likely to report negative economic assessments. I then turn to the consequences of these egocentric views for government approval. Mediation analysis confirms a significant indirect effect, suggesting that subjective pocketbook evaluations exert a strong influence on political attitudes that has been hidden in prior work. Results illuminate the contextual, cognitive, and causal circumstances under which pocketbook effects transpire and suggest new ways in which self-interest might matter for attitudes toward international political economy issues. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 402-430 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.902816 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.902816 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:402-430 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas B. Pepinsky Author-X-Name-First: Thomas B. Author-X-Name-Last: Pepinsky Title: Surveys, Experiments, and the Landscape of International Political Economy Abstract: The contributions to this issue show that surveys and experiments offer exciting new tools for doing empirical research in international political economy (IPE). This essay cautions that the utility of these tools is not self-evident: Neither appeals to microfoundations nor to methodological individualism in constructing explanations for social phenomena themselves recommend an embrace of surveys or experiments. The field of IPE should worry that the focus on surveys and experiments will constrain not just methodological choice but also theoretical breadth, limiting the field’s ability to conceive of what theories are admissible in learning about the global political economy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 431-442 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899223 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899223 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:431-442 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dustin Tingley Author-X-Name-First: Dustin Author-X-Name-Last: Tingley Title: Survey Research in International Political Economy: Motivations, Designs, Methods Abstract: The use of surveys and survey experiments by international political economy scholars is increasing, adding to the ability to study a broad array of topics. In doing so, many scholars in international political economy draw on—and are contributing to—insights and arguments from American politics and comparative politics (Milner 1998), substantive fields with a history of using surveys and survey experiments. In this article, I review motivations for using surveys and survey experiments, the research designs, and analysis strategies in light of this issue’s contributions. I contrast these motivations and their accompanying designs and discuss the pros and cons of ways to approach the data generated by these research designs. The goal of this commentary is to situate surveys and survey experiments—especially those within the special issue—within a larger discussion about research motivations, design, and analysis techniques. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 443-451 Issue: 3 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.900614 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.900614 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:3:p:443-451 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Justin Conrad Author-X-Name-First: Justin Author-X-Name-Last: Conrad Author-Name: James Igoe Walsh Author-X-Name-First: James Igoe Author-X-Name-Last: Walsh Title: International Cooperation, Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism Abstract: Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: nonstate groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and noncooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 453-476 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.892873 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.892873 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:453-476 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alexandra Hennessy Author-X-Name-First: Alexandra Author-X-Name-Last: Hennessy Author-Name: Martin C. Steinwand Author-X-Name-First: Martin C. Author-X-Name-Last: Steinwand Title: The Sources of Pension Reforms in Western Europe: Domestic Factors, Policy Diffusion, or Common Shock? Abstract: Existing research has linked the adoption of pension reforms to demographic pressures, party ideology, and the diffusion of social policy ideas. We argue that pension policy change in Western Europe is also related to the “shock” of European Monetary Union (EMU). We use a Spatial Autoregressive Probit model with event-history features to test whether the decision to reform can be best explained by domestic factors, diffusion dynamics, or similar exposure to a common shock. We find that EMU made pension reform more likely for low and moderately indebted countries in the early 1990s but delayed reform in the late 1990s. Demographic pressures and policy diffusion also mattered for reform adoption, but not more than the EMU shock. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 477-505 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.892874 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.892874 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:477-505 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott Wolford Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Wolford Title: Threats at Home, Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions Abstract: I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 506-532 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.891996 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.891996 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:506-532 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew W. Bausch Author-X-Name-First: Andrew W. Author-X-Name-Last: Bausch Title: An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory Abstract: This article uses a laboratory experiment to test one of the main predictions of selectorate theory, that is, that democratic leaders invest more resources in public goods than autocratic leaders. The results of the experiment confirm this prediction and further show citizens are better off on average under democratic institutions than autocratic institutions. Meanwhile, autocratic leaders receive higher payoffs than democratic leaders. Additionally, this article attempts to bring domestic politics into international relations experimentation with a focus on how communication may allow democracies to organize more efficiently for war than autocracies. A game theoretical model shows democracies have the potential to organize optimally and use their citizens’ skills to their full advantage while autocracies do not. The results of the experiment reveal some evidence that democracies organize more efficiently than autocracies, but that this increased efficiency did not produce a higher percentage of conflict wins. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 533-553 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.891997 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.891997 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:533-553 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Martha Crenshaw Author-X-Name-First: Martha Author-X-Name-Last: Crenshaw Title: Terrorism Research: The Record Abstract: Looking back at the beginnings of academic research on terrorism just over 40 years ago, it is extraordinary to see that what was once a marginal subject for social science has developed into a full-fledged program of “terrorism studies.” In fact, recently a sociologist considered the subject of sufficient importance to write a doctoral dissertation and then a book on the “social construction” of the field (Stampnitzky 2013). This essay highlights some examples of the contributions scholars from different disciplines have made to understanding terrorism. There is no consensus on any general theoretical laws of terrorism (there is no equivalent of a democratic peace theory, for example), but researchers have defined key concepts and deepened explanations of cause, effect, and process.What follows identifies four interrelated areas of explanatory inquiry into terrorism that have emerged over years of research: the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of opposition, the determinants and consequences of counterterrorism policies, how campaigns or waves of terrorism end, and how analysis of terrorism can be situated in a broader theoretical framework rather than treated as a phenomenon sui generis. Particular emphasis is placed on studies that are comparative and/or that situate the specific case of terrorism in a general theoretical perspective. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 556-567 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.902817 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.902817 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:556-567 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Navin A. Bapat Author-X-Name-First: Navin A. Author-X-Name-Last: Bapat Title: The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict Abstract: Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight terrorist groups? This essay proposes an explanation to address this question using current theoretical and empirical research on terrorism and interstate violence. Recent work indicates that while terrorists appear weak compared to states, terrorists can wield significant coercive power in smaller geographic areas. I argue that if these areas are strategically crucial to the government, such as areas with oil wells or mineral deposits, terrorist activity may precipitously weaken states relative to their rivals. I therefore argue that even if groups are only capable of killing at low levels, terrorism may lead to macrolevel power shifts, which may contribute to interstate violence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 568-578 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.902818 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.902818 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:568-578 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas Plümper Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Plümper Author-Name: Eric Neumayer Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Neumayer Title: Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Integrated Approach and Future Research Agenda Abstract: In this commentary, we make the case that the analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism must be based on an integrated theory that links both issues together. Terrorist groups’ ultimate goals must be distinguished from their strategic goals and the strategic logic by which they employ terror and select targets to further their ultimate goals. The strategic logic of terrorism is thus key to understanding patterns of terrorism and the counter-reaction by governments against it. We make the case for a unified approach and suggest major areas for future research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 579-589 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.901316 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.901316 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:579-589 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca Author-X-Name-First: Ignacio Author-X-Name-Last: Sánchez-Cuenca Title: Why Do We Know So Little About Terrorism? Abstract: We have less substantive knowledge about terrorism than about civil war, interstate war, genocide, or ethnic violence. I argue that this is due to the ambiguity of the concept of “terrorism.” This ambiguity hinders empirical research, making the selection of cases for empirical research a contentious issue. Today, most scholars avoid the issue by relying on the existing datasets, without questioning the coding rules. But a close look at these rules reveals that they do not escape from the intrinsic ambiguity of the concept. I argue for a better integration between thick description and statistical analysis of terrorism as a way of overcoming the disagreements on the nature of terrorist violence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 590-601 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899224 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899224 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:590-601 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian Benjamin Crisher Author-X-Name-First: Brian Benjamin Author-X-Name-Last: Crisher Author-Name: Mark Souva Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Souva Title: Power at Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865--2011 Abstract: Naval power is a crucial element of state power, yet existing naval data sets are limited to a small number of states and ship types. Here we present 147 years of naval data on all the world’s navies from 1865 to 2011. This country-year data set focuses on warships with ship-based weapons capable of using kinetic force to inflict damage on other structures or peoples. After identifying a country’s active naval forces, we create a measure of naval power based on the aggregate tonnage of the active ships. Additionally, we create count variables for ship types such as aircraft carriers or battleships. This article introduces the country-year data, describes variables of interests for use in country-year, dyadic, or systemic studies, and suggests potential questions of interest scholars could explore using the naval power data set. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 602-629 Issue: 4 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.918039 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.918039 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:602-629 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Eunyoung Ha Author-X-Name-First: Eunyoung Author-X-Name-Last: Ha Author-Name: Dong-Wook Lee Author-X-Name-First: Dong-Wook Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Puspa Amri Author-X-Name-First: Puspa Author-X-Name-Last: Amri Title: Trade and Welfare Compensation: The Missing Links Abstract: This study uses theory from embedded liberalism to reorient the debate over efficiency versus compensation in the trade and welfare literature. We detail the causal mechanisms and provide empirical results that show how welfare spending can be a necessary condition to further trade liberalization. We argue that increases in welfare compensation lead to stronger public support for trade, which allows states to further advance along the path toward trade liberalization. Based on the 1995 and 2003 ISSP (International Social Survey Program) for 10 OECD countries, our multilevel statistical analyses (individual and country level) show that (1) workers in import-exposed sectors tend to strongly oppose trade, but this effect is substantially diminished when they receive unemployment compensation, and (2) public support for free trade is significantly associated with higher levels of trade openness. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 631-656 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.896799 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.896799 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:631-656 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Yuichi Kono Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Yuichi Author-X-Name-Last: Kono Author-Name: Stephanie J. Rickard Author-X-Name-First: Stephanie J. Author-X-Name-Last: Rickard Title: Buying National: Democracy, Public Procurement, and International Trade Abstract: Many studies show that democracy promotes freer trade. However, because they typically focus on “at-the-border” barriers such as tariffs, we know little about democracy’s effects on “behind-the-border” barriers such as discrimination in government procurement. We address this question by asking how democracy affects governments’ incentives to discriminate against foreigners when buying goods and services. We argue that “buy national” policies have unclear costs and are harder to attack than policies that visibly interfere with consumers’ ability to buy foreign goods. This makes such provisions more attractive than tariffs to democratic leaders seeking reelection. We thus hypothesize that democracy leads to lower tariffs but to greater discrimination in public procurement. We support this hypothesis with an analysis of procurement and imports in 138 countries from 1990 to 2008. Our results imply that a full understanding of the democracy--trade policy relationship requires attention to increasingly prominent behind-the-border barriers to trade. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 657-682 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899220 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899220 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:657-682 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hoon Lee Author-X-Name-First: Hoon Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Glen Biglaiser Author-X-Name-First: Glen Author-X-Name-Last: Biglaiser Author-Name: Joseph L. Staats Author-X-Name-First: Joseph L. Author-X-Name-Last: Staats Title: The Effects of Political Risk on Different Entry Modes of Foreign Direct Investment Abstract: Although numerous studies document the effect of political institutions on foreign direct investment (FDI), few works in the political economy literature have investigated the link between political institutions and the mode of entry chosen by investors, be it mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, or greenfield investments. Using panel data for 111 developing countries covering 1980--2006, we find that countries with political institutions that uphold good governance tend to attract higher levels of mergers and acquisitions, as opposed to joint ventures and greenfield investments, because such institutions help to mitigate the special risks faced by merger and acquisition investors. Our findings provide a nuance for understanding the different effects of political institutions based on the particular mode of entry. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 683-710 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899225 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.899225 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:683-710 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen C. Nemeth Author-X-Name-First: Stephen C. Author-X-Name-Last: Nemeth Author-Name: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Sara McLaughlin Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Author-Name: Elizabeth A. Nyman Author-X-Name-First: Elizabeth A. Author-X-Name-Last: Nyman Author-Name: Paul R. Hensel Author-X-Name-First: Paul R. Author-X-Name-Last: Hensel Title: Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime Conflicts through UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones Abstract: Two primary mechanisms for managing competitive interstate claims to maritime areas are evaluated: the creation of private ownership of maritime zones in the form of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the creation of a global institution, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to establish standards for maritime claims and dispute resolution procedures. Analyses of maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001 show that declared EEZs help states reach agreements over maritime conflicts in bilateral negotiations, while membership in UNCLOS prevents the outbreak of new maritime claims and promotes third-party management efforts of maritime conflicts. Neither mechanism influences the probability of militarized conflicts over maritime areas. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 711-736 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.897233 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.897233 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:711-736 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hanne Fjelde Author-X-Name-First: Hanne Author-X-Name-Last: Fjelde Author-Name: Gudrun Østby Author-X-Name-First: Gudrun Author-X-Name-Last: Østby Title: Socioeconomic Inequality and Communal Conflict: A Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990--2008 Abstract: This article examines the role of economic inequality in influencing the risk of armed conflict between communal groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that socioeconomic inequality can generate intergroup grievances, which, due to the exclusionary legitimacy of the African state and elite incentives to engage in competitive mobilization of communal groups, precipitate violent communal conflict. To examine this argument, we rely on a series of household surveys to construct subnational inequality measures. For each region, we calculate measures of inequality in terms of household welfare and education between individuals (vertical inequality) and between ethnic groups (horizontal inequality). Combining the inequality data with new georeferenced data on communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1990--2008, we find that regions with strong socioeconomic inequalities—both vertical and horizontal—are significantly more exposed to violent communal conflicts. More specifically, regions in which the largest ethnic group is severely disadvantaged compared to other groups are particularly prone to experience communal conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 737-762 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.917373 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.917373 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:737-762 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Peter F. Trumbore Author-X-Name-First: Peter F. Author-X-Name-Last: Trumbore Author-Name: Byungwon Woo Author-X-Name-First: Byungwon Author-X-Name-Last: Woo Title: Smuggler’s Blues: Examining Why Countries Become Narcotics Transit States Using the New International Narcotics Production and Transit (INAPT) Data Set Abstract: We examine the global determinants of the illicit international narcotics trade and the specific roles that states play in it, a topic understudied by international relations scholars. We develop the first comprehensive global data set of state involvement in international narcotics trafficking and then use the data set to empirically test hypotheses concerning the likelihood of countries to serve as transit states for the transshipment of illicit drugs. We find that more-globalized countries are more likely to act as transit states and that the size of the economy, as well as state corruption and a weak rule of law, are positively related to the probability of acting as a transit state. States with a more stable political environment are also more likely to be transit states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 763-787 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.917297 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.917297 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:763-787 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Adrian Florea Author-X-Name-First: Adrian Author-X-Name-Last: Florea Title: De Facto States in International Politics (1945--2011): A New Data Set Abstract: Sovereign states remain the primary units of analysis in conflict research. Yet, the empirical record suggests that the international system includes a wider range of actors whose behavior is relevant for conflict outcomes. This article introduces De Facto States in International Politics (1945--2011), a new data set dedicated to understanding the behavior of de facto states—separatist statelike entities such as Abkhazia. I begin by explaining why de facto states deserve attention. Further, I provide a definition of the de facto state that separates it from cognate phenomena. Thereafter, I offer an overview of the data set and illustrate its utility by demonstrating how it contributes to the literatures on war and state making, civil war, and rebel governance. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 788-811 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.915543 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.915543 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:788-811 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Neil J. Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Neil J. Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Author-Name: Sabine C. Carey Author-X-Name-First: Sabine C. Author-X-Name-Last: Carey Author-Name: Christopher K. Butler Author-X-Name-First: Christopher K. Author-X-Name-Last: Butler Title: The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations Abstract: New data show that between 1982 and 2007, in over 60 countries governments were linked to and cooperated with informal armed groups within their own borders. Given the prevalence of these linkages, we ask how such links between governments and informal armed groups influence the risk of repression. We draw on principal-agent arguments to explore how issues of monitoring and control help understanding of the impact of militias on human rights violations. We argue that such informal agents increase accountability problems for the governments, which is likely to worsen human rights conditions for two reasons. First, it is more difficult for governments to control and to train these militias, and they may have private interests in the use of violence. Second, informal armed groups allow governments to shift responsibility and use repression for strategic benefits while evading accountability. Using a global dataset from 1982 to 2007, we show that pro-government militias increase the risk of repression and that the presence of militias also affects the type of violations that we observe. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 812-836 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932783 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.932783 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:812-836 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: G. Dale Thomas Author-X-Name-First: G. Dale Author-X-Name-Last: Thomas Title: Minimizing the Effects of Temporal Aggregation on Event Data Analysis Abstract: Event data remains one of the best means for evaluating reciprocity and triangularity in international politics. One difficulty with using this type of data has been its susceptibility to the statistical effects of temporal aggregation. This article examines the concept of the natural interval in event data analysis, specifies how a user-selected aggregation interval affects measured stimulus--response behavior, and proposes a method for calculating a minimum threshold for the natural interval. The article then examines how such a minimum threshold reduces the impact of misspecification on perceived relationships for the Amazon River Basin and the Jordan River Basin. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 837-852 Issue: 5 Volume: 40 Year: 2014 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.907161 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.907161 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:5:p:837-852 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Johannes Kleibl Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Kleibl Title: Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation Abstract: Securities laws, overseen by independent regulatory agencies, have spread around the world. This article argues that coercion has played a more critical role in the spread of regulatory models than previously acknowledged. In particular, I argue that globally integrated markets can provide powerful regulators and governments with strong incentives to actively promote the export of their regulatory models. Case study evidence and the analysis of a global data set on the establishment of US-style securities regulatory regimes between 1973 and 2007 lend support to the crucial role of the US government and the US Securities and Exchange Commission in spreading the US securities regulatory model around the world. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-25 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932785 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.932785 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:1-25 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jacob Ausderan Author-X-Name-First: Jacob Author-X-Name-Last: Ausderan Title: Following an Experienced Shepherd: How a Leader’s Tenure Affects the Outcome of International Crises Abstract: Previous research has shown that a leader’s preconflict tenure affects the likelihood of conflict occurrence, while conflict outcomes affect a leader’s postconflict tenure. I argue that a leader’s preconflict tenure should affect not only conflict occurrence but conflict outcomes as well, specifically by increasing a leader’s professional competence and increasing the likelihood that the state will emerge victorious from international crises. This effect should weaken as the constraints upon leaders’ behaviors increase and their competence becomes less important for policy outcomes. Using a bivariate probit model with selection and a dyadic data set on international crises experienced by 195 countries between 1950 and 2000, I find moderate-to-strong support for the hypotheses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 26-45 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.964401 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.964401 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:26-45 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephanie J. Rickard Author-X-Name-First: Stephanie J. Author-X-Name-Last: Rickard Title: Compensating the Losers: An Examination of Congressional Votes on Trade Adjustment Assistance Abstract: Globalization intensifies political conflict between citizens whose circumstances improve from foreign trade and those whose lives deteriorate as a result of trade. To pacify these rival interests, governments may assist citizens who become unemployed due to trade. When and under what conditions will legislators fund such assistance programs? The current study addresses this question by examining Congressional roll call votes in the United States during a period of rapid economic integration (1980--2004). The analysis reveals that protrade legislators who represent relatively more exporters are more likely to vote for increased spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs. Exporters and their elected representatives arguably support such expenditures to broaden the protrade coalition. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 46-60 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.954697 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.954697 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:46-60 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Author-Name: Peter Rudloff Author-X-Name-First: Peter Author-X-Name-Last: Rudloff Title: Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Expectations Theory Abstract: Studies find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict. An expectation of continuing amicable trade relations is among the factors linking PTAs to peace. However, this role of PTAs is difficult to test due to the problem of observational equivalence; PTAs correlate with trade levels and liberalization, factors also linked to peace. In this article, we isolate the impact of PTAs on trade expectations by distinguishing between signed agreements and those in force. A focus on signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs allows us to assess the correlation between agreements and peace before other pacifying, and therefore potentially confounding, elements emerge. Statistical tests spanning 1957 to 2000 demonstrate that signed PTAs are pacifying, while in-force agreements have no statistically significant impact when controlling for other factors linked to peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 61-83 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.948153 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.948153 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:61-83 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy W. Taylor Author-X-Name-First: Timothy W. Author-X-Name-Last: Taylor Title: The Electoral Salience of Trade Policy: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Welfare and Complexity Abstract: Why do some trade policies become electorally salient while others do not? While much of the literature argues that citizens act as a domestic constraint in the formation of trade policy, a general consensus has emerged that trade is most often a nonsalient issue among voters. This poses a paradox. On the one hand, trade models hinge upon voters’ rational self-interest and preferences for varying levels of protectionism to keep their governments accountable. On the other hand, the conditions by which trade becomes salient to these very voters in the first place are both undertheorized and untested. Using experimental evidence, I argue that two dimensions of a trade policy affect the likelihood of that issue becoming electorally salient. First, policies with large welfare effects should be more salient. Second, more complex issues should be less salient because such agreements are more likely to obfuscate an individual’s ability to discern its effects. I find support for my hypotheses that a trade policy’s salience tends to increase with the magnitude of its welfare effects and decrease with its complexity. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 84-109 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.945582 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.945582 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:84-109 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew D. Fails Author-X-Name-First: Matthew D. Author-X-Name-Last: Fails Author-Name: Byungwon Woo Author-X-Name-First: Byungwon Author-X-Name-Last: Woo Title: Unpacking Autocracy: Political Regimes and IMF Program Participation Abstract: Why do some countries participate in IMF programs while others refuse to do so? We suggest an answer to the question by unpacking one side of the typical democracy--autocracy dichotomy. Specifically, we utilize the growing literature on the varieties of authoritarianism to develop an argument linking the different incentives and constraints that leaders in party-based, personalist, and military regimes face when considering whether to sign agreements with the IMF. Empirically, we demonstrate that distinguishing among autocracies uncovers important variations in the sensitivity of such regimes to the political costs incurred by IMF participation. Party-based autocracies, for instance, respond to both sovereignty costs and the benefits of program participation during severe economic crises. Personalist regimes, however, are not sensitive to the sovereignty costs incurred with IMF participation and thus only participate when doing so provides needed revenue during economic crises. The unique features of military juntas, by contrast, suggests that such regimes are not sensitive to either of these political costs and thus do not respond to economic crises in the same way as their autocratic counterparts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 110-132 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.969370 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.969370 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:110-132 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stacy Bondanella Taninchev Author-X-Name-First: Stacy Bondanella Author-X-Name-Last: Taninchev Title: Intergovernmental Organizations, Interaction, and Member State Interest Convergence Abstract: This article presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they define their states’ interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization defined as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence and test them using an original IGO data set. The findings are supportive of my general theory but provide some interesting support for existing theory that runs counter to one of the hypotheses presented here. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 133-157 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932784 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.932784 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:133-157 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tobias Böhmelt Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Böhmelt Author-Name: Ulrich Pilster Author-X-Name-First: Ulrich Author-X-Name-Last: Pilster Title: The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes Abstract: Coup-proofing pertains to political leaders’ strategies that will prevent groups inside or outside the state apparatus from seizing power via a coup d’état. One particular form of these strategies divides a country’s military into rivaling organizations, thereby creating an artificial balance between and structural obstacles for the armed forces. Despite the general claim that this institutional coup-proofing is indeed effective, a recent empirical study does not obtain evidence for a negative impact on the risk of coup attempts or coup outcomes. The authors take this finding as a motivation for their re-evaluation of the effect of institutional coup-proofing on coup risk and outcomes. By developing an argument that rests on the concepts of collective action and polarization, it is contended that institutional coup-proofing and coups are characterized by a U-shaped relationship: Institutional coup-proofing is likely to lower the likelihood of coup onsets and successful outcomes, yet only until a tipping point of about two equally strong military organizations. After this turning point, the risk of coup onset as well as coup success may increase again. Using time-series cross-section data for 1975--1999, the authors find strong and robust support for their claims in terms of coup onset, but not coup outcomes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 158-182 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.906411 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.906411 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:158-182 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen L. Quackenbush Author-X-Name-First: Stephen L. Author-X-Name-Last: Quackenbush Author-Name: Amanda Murdie Author-X-Name-First: Amanda Author-X-Name-Last: Murdie Title: We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes Abstract: Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 183-200 Issue: 1 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.921784 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.921784 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:1:p:183-200 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ryan C. Briggs Author-X-Name-First: Ryan C. Author-X-Name-Last: Briggs Title: The Influence of Aid Changes on African Election Outcomes Abstract: Many African democracies experience highly variable aid flows. This article examines the influence of aid changes on presidential incumbent advantage in Africa. Aid changes influence the odds of incumbents winning reelection, with aid increases helping incumbents, but this effect is only present when the aid change occurs in the year before an election. Aid changes in earlier or later time periods have no influence. Case studies of elections in Ghana and Malawi reveal causal mechanisms linking aid changes to incumbent advantage and support the finding that aid changes have a limited window of influence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 201-225 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.948155 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.948155 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:201-225 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian Burgoon Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Burgoon Author-Name: Andrea Ruggeri Author-X-Name-First: Andrea Author-X-Name-Last: Ruggeri Author-Name: Willem Schudel Author-X-Name-First: Willem Author-X-Name-Last: Schudel Author-Name: Ram Manikkalingam Author-X-Name-First: Ram Author-X-Name-Last: Manikkalingam Title: From Media Attention to Negotiated Peace: Human Rights Reporting and Civil War Duration Abstract: Violations of human rights in the context of a conflict have in recent years received an increasing amount of attention from the international media. Yet how such media attention influences conflict remains understudied and, a priori, uncertain. On the one hand, media coverage of human rights abuses may constitute “naming and shaming” that might temper hostilities. On the other hand, such coverage might spark intransigence and complicate negotiations among conflicting parties, thereby hindering rather than hastening peace. This article tries to adjudicate among these and other possibilities by exploring how media reporting on human rights abuses influences the development of conflicts. The analysis reveals that such reporting is associated with shorter conflicts and negotiated agreements between fighting parties. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 226-255 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.942898 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.942898 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:226-255 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Wonjae Hwang Author-X-Name-First: Wonjae Author-X-Name-Last: Hwang Author-Name: Amanda G. Sanford Author-X-Name-First: Amanda G. Author-X-Name-Last: Sanford Author-Name: Junhan Lee Author-X-Name-First: Junhan Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly? Abstract: Recent studies report that temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, the World Bank, or in US foreign aid in exchange for their political support for permanent members. Nevertheless, few studies have examined whether this favorable treatment and these benefits have actually made any significant changes in the member states’ voting behavior in the United Nations. To explore this question, we investigate whether membership on the UN Security Council influences a state’s voting in the UN General Assembly. In the analysis of panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1946 to 2008, the empirical results show that elected members of the UN Security Council tend to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the IMF and the World Bank increases. Also, US foreign aid significantly increases temporary members’ vote coincidence with the United States and other permanent members. In this regard, this article contributes to our understanding of state voting behavior and power politics in international organizations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 256-278 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.982114 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.982114 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:256-278 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tongfi Kim Author-X-Name-First: Tongfi Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba Author-X-Name-First: Jennifer Dabbs Author-X-Name-Last: Sciubba Title: The Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of Military Alliances Abstract: Scholars of alliance politics have ignored a potentially important factor that shapes foreign policy: the age structure of a state. In this article, we argue that an alliance member is more likely to terminate the alliance in violation of the terms when the state’s youth ratio is high. The demographic pressure of a high youth ratio raises potential for political instability domestically, which in turn increases the risk of radical foreign policy changes. We demonstrate the effects of a state’s age structure on its alliance policy by examining alliance termination by violation from 1950 to 2000. Through quantitative analysis, we find that youth ratio is a strong and significant predictor of alliance abrogation. A brief examination of several examples illustrates two paths by which the pressure created by a high youth ratio contributes to political instability and results in alliance abrogation—leadership change that brings about a new foreign policy and appeasement of the population through abrogation of an unpopular alliance. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 279-308 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.948156 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.948156 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:279-308 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jesse C. Johnson Author-X-Name-First: Jesse C. Author-X-Name-Last: Johnson Author-Name: Brett Ashley Leeds Author-X-Name-First: Brett Ashley Author-X-Name-Last: Leeds Author-Name: Ahra Wu Author-X-Name-First: Ahra Author-X-Name-Last: Wu Title: Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence Abstract: Deterrence theory suggests that extended general deterrent threats are likely to be more effective when a potential challenger views them as capable and credible. When states sign formal defense pacts, they are making explicit extended general deterrent threats. Thus, the population of defense pacts allows us an opportunity to judge the efficacy of extended deterrent threats with different characteristics. We find that defense pacts with more capability and more credibility reduce the probability that a member state will be a target of a militarized dispute. We also find that states can affect the capability and credibility of their extended deterrent threats through alliance design. Members of defense pacts that include higher levels of peacetime military coordination are less likely to be attacked. This analysis provides support for deterrence theory in the context of extended general deterrence. It also provides evidence that should aid policymakers in designing security structures to meet their goals. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 309-336 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.982115 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.982115 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:309-336 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Breen Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Breen Author-Name: Robert Gillanders Author-X-Name-First: Robert Author-X-Name-Last: Gillanders Title: Political Trust, Corruption, and Ratings of the IMF and the World Bank Abstract: There are only a handful of studies that examine public support for the IMF and World Bank. Public opinion data on attitudes to the economy feature prominently in these studies. Utilizing data from the Afrobarometer survey, we find that evaluations of the economy, ideology, and a range of sociodemographic factors including age, gender, employment status, health, education, and living conditions are not significantly related to ratings of effectiveness. Rather, we find that political trust and corruption—two very important concepts in the wider literature on individual-level attitudes toward international relations and foreign policy issues—are strongly associated with ratings of effectiveness. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 337-364 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.948154 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.948154 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:337-364 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gary Uzonyi Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Uzonyi Title: Civil War Victory and the Onset of Genocide and Politicide Abstract: Why do some governments engage in genocide and/or politicide? A common explanation for such government-sponsored mass killing is that civil war provides governments both the incentive and opportunity to eradicate their enemies during the fighting. However, many episodes of genocide and politicide begin once the fighting has ended. I argue that when the civil war ends with a clear victor the winning party is more likely to engage in mass killing than if the conflict ends through negotiated settlement or other inconclusive manners, since the victorious party does not fear armed resistance while they eliminate dissidents throughout the country. Moreover, I posit that the government will be more likely to engage in politicide rather than genocide, as politicide eradicates the leader’s political enemies across cross-cutting segments of the population, whereas genocide only destroys certain communal groups. Statistical examination of all post-civil war periods between 1955 and 2009 supports my argument. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 365-391 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932786 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2014.932786 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:365-391 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cullen S. Hendrix Author-X-Name-First: Cullen S. Author-X-Name-Last: Hendrix Author-Name: Idean Salehyan Author-X-Name-First: Idean Author-X-Name-Last: Salehyan Title: No News Is Good News: Mark and Recapture for Event Data When Reporting Probabilities Are Less Than One Abstract: We discuss a common, but often ignored, problem in event data: underreporting bias. When collecting data, it is often not the case that source materials capture all events of interest, leading to an undercount of the true number of events. To address this issue, we propose a common method first used to estimate the size of animal populations when a complete census is not feasible: mark and recapture. By taking multiple sources into consideration, one can estimate the rate of missing data across sources and come up with an estimate of the true number of events. To demonstrate the utility of the approach, we compare Associated Press and Agence France Press reports on conflict events, as contained in the Social Conflict in Africa Database. We show that these sources capture approximately 76% of all events in Africa but that the nondetection rate declines dramatically when considering more significant events. We also show through regression analysis that deadly events, events of a larger magnitude, and events with government repression, among others, are significant predictors of overlapping reporting. Ultimately, the approach can be used to correct for undercounting in event data and to assess the quality of sources used. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 392-406 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.982117 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.982117 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:392-406 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John A. Doces Author-X-Name-First: John A. Author-X-Name-Last: Doces Author-Name: Christopher S. P. Magee Author-X-Name-First: Christopher S. P. Author-X-Name-Last: Magee Title: Trade and Democracy: A Factor-Based Approach Abstract: We study the relationship between trade openness and democracy using a data set with capital-labor ratios, trade flows, and regime type for 142 countries between 1960 and 2007. We are among the first to test a prediction that emerges from the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): Relative factor endowments determine whether trade promotes democracy or not. The statistical results from two-stage least squares estimation indicate that trade is positively associated with democracy among labor-abundant countries but that trade has a negative effect on democracy in capital-abundant countries. The results are not robust, however, and thus we conclude that the evidence in support of their argument is relatively weak. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 407-425 Issue: 2 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.984065 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.984065 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:407-425 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Taehee Whang Author-X-Name-First: Taehee Author-X-Name-Last: Whang Author-Name: Hannah June Kim Author-X-Name-First: Hannah June Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: International Signaling and Economic Sanctions Abstract: Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 427-452 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1024242 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1024242 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:427-452 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Vincenzo Bove Author-X-Name-First: Vincenzo Author-X-Name-Last: Bove Author-Name: Mauricio Rivera Author-X-Name-First: Mauricio Author-X-Name-Last: Rivera Title: Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies Abstract: This article provides an explanation for the significant variation in coups in autocracies. The existing theoretical literature focuses on the strategies that leaders use to thwart mass mobilization and survive in power. However, most autocratic leaders lose power through a coup, indicating that the main threats to political survival in autocracies emerge from insiders and not from outside the incumbent coalition. This article focuses on leaders’ strategies to mitigate elite threats and argues that autocrats’ strategies of co-optation and repression within the ruling elite and the armed forces affect the risk of coups in opposite ways. Elected authoritarian legislatures are instruments that leaders employ to co-opt members of the incumbent coalition and are expected to decrease the likelihood of coups. In contrast, purges of insider actors constitute a repressive strategy that depletes bases of support and increases the risk of coups. We find empirical support for these hypotheses from a sample of all authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 2004. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 453-479 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1006727 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1006727 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:453-479 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Xiaoting Li Author-X-Name-First: Xiaoting Author-X-Name-Last: Li Title: Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China’s Strategic Competition with America? Abstract: Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America? This study indicates that the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to reach an accommodation with the hegemon and to expand its own stature and influence against the hegemonic dominance. The ambivalence of its intentions is structurally induced and reflects its uncertain stake in the hegemonic order. Consequently, a strategy of engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarily eliminate the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’s reaction to American preeminence has long been marked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitive propensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic association with the developing world. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 480-508 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1006728 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1006728 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:480-508 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Süveyda Karakaya Author-X-Name-First: Süveyda Author-X-Name-Last: Karakaya Title: Religion and Conflict: Explaining the Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence” Abstract: Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, there is little systematic empirical research that explores the intrastate conflict proneness of Muslim countries, and existing studies provide mixed results. This article examines the causal factors that explain the prevalence of intrastate conflict in Muslim-plurality states and the conditions under which Islam may influence civil war onset. Further, following Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke’s (2010) suggestion, the effects of Islam and other socioeconomic and political factors in actually predicting civil wars are examined by utilizing ROC curves and cross-validation exercises. Utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s data for the 1981--2009 period, the findings indicate that Muslim-plurality countries are indeed disproportionately involved in intrastate conflicts, but these countries are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with intrastate conflict onset. The significance of Islam disappears when controls for such factors are included in the statistical model. The variable of Islam does not make any significant contribution to either the in-sample or out-of-sample predictive power of models. Among the factors that increase the risk of intrastate conflict, the presence of a youth bulge has the greatest impact in Muslim-plurality countries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 509-538 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1016158 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1016158 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:509-538 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Carla Martinez Machain Author-X-Name-First: Carla Author-X-Name-Last: Martinez Machain Title: Air Campaign Duration and the Interaction of Air and Ground Forces Abstract: This article explores the role that ground troops play in aerial campaigns. Specifically, it intends to explain how ground troops affect the duration of aerial bombing campaigns. It distinguishes between the effect of ground troops on the duration of aerial campaigns that are selective and on those that are more general and less discriminate (using newly coded data on aerial strategies). The effect of ground troops may vary depending on how air power is being used. Ground troops may increase the duration of aerial campaigns in cases in which selective strategies are used during the aerial bombing campaign. In these cases, states lose the possibility of quick, “clean” victories once ground troops are introduced. In the cases of the less-discriminate bombing campaigns, the effect of ground troops is the opposite: They shorten the duration of the bombing campaign, possibly through the increased effectiveness of a combined arms approach. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 539-564 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1018414 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1018414 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:539-564 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Tikuisis Author-X-Name-First: Peter Author-X-Name-Last: Tikuisis Author-Name: David Carment Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Carment Author-Name: Yiagadeesen Samy Author-X-Name-First: Yiagadeesen Author-X-Name-Last: Samy Author-Name: Joseph Landry Author-X-Name-First: Joseph Author-X-Name-Last: Landry Title: Typology of State Types: Persistence and Transition Abstract: Research on state fragility has seldom examined questions of persistence and transition of states. We develop a sixfold typology of states to examine how key structural features of states evolve and contribute to successful exits from fragility in some cases and persistence in others. Particularly worrisome is the lack of positive transition among the weakest states. Our findings are derived from a minimalist construct of a refined time series data set involving state indicators of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. Case studies of some of the more turbulent examples support our state trajectories. Additionally, changes in legitimacy most often led state transitions into or out of fragility. Implications of intervention policy for transitioning states out of fragility are addressed, and these are given particular focus since fragile states experience at least twice the intensity/incidence of internal armed conflict compared to other states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 565-582 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.982116 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.982116 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:565-582 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christopher Linebarger Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Linebarger Title: Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960--2001 Abstract: In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 583-600 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.984809 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.984809 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:583-600 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Madhav Joshi Author-X-Name-First: Madhav Author-X-Name-Last: Joshi Author-Name: Subodh Raj Pyakurel Author-X-Name-First: Subodh Raj Author-X-Name-Last: Pyakurel Title: Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996--2006: A New Data Set Abstract: This article introduces individual-level microdata on victims of violence in Nepal’s civil war (1996--2006). The data being presented in this study are unique in that they are a census—not a sample—of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of analysis is the individual victim, and the data provide information on: whether the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where they were targeted; their permanent home addresses; the circumstances of the attack (combat, extrajudicial, etc.); socioeconomic information; whether they had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist informant. After describing the data, an application of the data is performed and some preliminary findings are discussed on the differences in targeting behavior between the government and the Maoist rebels. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 601-619 Issue: 3 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.987345 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.987345 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:3:p:601-619 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ricardo Real P. Sousa Author-X-Name-First: Ricardo Author-X-Name-Last: Real P. Sousa Title: External Interventions in Post-Cold War Africa, 1989--2010 Abstract: The study of external interventions in conflict management is critical and has implications for international relations and conflict theory. Quantitative studies of the relationship between external interventions and civil war have been prone to some conceptual limitations (understudied lower-intensity periods) and data limitations (unavailability of event battle death data). This article presents a new external interventions data set covering the period between 1989 and 2010 for Africa, building on the Regan et al. (2009) data set, which covers the period between 1945 and 1999. Novel features of this new data set are: the recoding of the overlap period; a broader range of categories of intervention, including UN and non-UN missions; and wider temporal scope, by extending the period of analysis to 2010, by lowering the civil war threshold to 25 battle deaths, and by starting the conflict period from the date of the first battle death in each civil war (based on UCDP GED version-1.5-2011). The advantages of the data set are illustrated with an analysis of the different effects interventions have on high- and low-intensity conflict periods. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 621-647 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1028626 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1028626 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:621-647 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jan Teorell Author-X-Name-First: Jan Author-X-Name-Last: Teorell Title: A Quality of Government Peace? Explaining the Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1985--2001 Abstract: That democracies do not wage wars against each other is one of the most widely accepted claims within the study of international relations, although challenged lately by the capitalist peace argument. In addition to confirming both the democratic and capitalist peace effects, this article finds that the impact of quality of government—that is, having an impartial, nonpoliticized, and noncorrupt bureaucracy—on the risk of interstate conflict is at least on par with the influence of democracy. This result draws on dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data in 1985--2001 and holds even under control for incomplete democratization and economic development, as well as for fatal MIDs, the Cold War era, and within politically relevant dyads. I argue that the causal mechanism underlying this finding is that quality of government reduces information uncertainty among potentially warring parties and improves their ability to credibly commit to keeping their promises. Both democratic and capitalist peace theory needs to be complemented by theories “bringing the state back in” to the study of interstate armed conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 648-673 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1023434 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1023434 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:648-673 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ross A. Miller Author-X-Name-First: Ross A. Author-X-Name-Last: Miller Title: You’ve Got to Know When to Fold ‘Em: International and Domestic Consequences of Capitulation, 1919--1999 Abstract: This article explores the effect of acquiescing to compellent threats on the probability that a leader loses office and on the probability that he or she is targeted in a subsequent international crisis. Using a leader-specific punishment (LSP) model that corrects for the endogeneity between domestic and international politics, an analysis of over 9,000 observations during the period 1919--1999 suggests that backing down generally increases both the risk of becoming a target and the probability of losing office. Leaders who back down to coercive threats without a fight are almost twice as likely to become targets in subsequent crises and much more likely to lose office than those who do not. Democratic leaders are more at risk than their autocratic counterparts for loss of office and becoming targets if they acquiesce to coercive threats. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 674-698 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1023435 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1023435 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:674-698 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ursula E. Daxecker Author-X-Name-First: Ursula E. Author-X-Name-Last: Daxecker Author-Name: Brandon C. Prins Author-X-Name-First: Brandon C. Author-X-Name-Last: Prins Title: Searching for Sanctuary: Government Power and the Location of Maritime Piracy Abstract: Recent systematic work on the incidence of maritime piracy shows the importance of various political, economic, and geographic correlates at the country level. Yet these correlates tell us little about the determinants of piracy location off states’ coasts, despite the fact that piracy is well known to cluster locally. Conceptualizing pirates as strategic actors who consider the risk of detection and capture, this article argues that states’ ability to project power over distance affects pirates’ decisions on where to organize and operate. As state capacity increases, piracy will locate farther away from government power centers, whereas piracy can flourish closer to state capitals in weak states that struggle to extend control over space. Using geocoded data from the International Maritime Bureau for the 1996--2013 period, results show that increases in state capacity are associated with greater median capital--piracy distances. These findings are robust to several changes in model specification. Our results have important implications for the study of piracy and crime. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 699-717 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1016159 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1016159 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:699-717 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cali Mortenson Ellis Author-X-Name-First: Cali Mortenson Author-X-Name-Last: Ellis Author-Name: Michael C. Horowitz Author-X-Name-First: Michael C. Author-X-Name-Last: Horowitz Author-Name: Allan C. Stam Author-X-Name-First: Allan C. Author-X-Name-Last: Stam Title: Introducing the LEAD Data Set Abstract: The Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) data set provides a rich source of new information about the personal lives and experiences of over 2,000 state leaders from 1875--2004. For the first time, we can combine insights from psychology and human development with large-N data on interstate conflict for a new theory of leadership and interstate relations. The data set provides details about military experiences, childhood, education, personal and family life, and occupational history before leaders assumed power. The data are available in leader-year format and are compatible with existing tools for analysis such as EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000). This research note discusses the motivation for the creation of the LEAD data set and discusses the coding decisions for most of the key variables. We provide a series of descriptive statistical illustrations of the data and illustrate the depth of the available information with cases from Latin American leaders, showing the durability of these personal experiences across space and time. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 718-741 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1016157 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1016157 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:718-741 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: T. Clifton Morgan Author-X-Name-First: T. Clifton Author-X-Name-Last: Morgan Title: Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence Abstract: Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, some unpublished, that are hard to reconcile with existing theory, and I argue that there is enough consistency in these results to suggest which way to turn. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 744-754 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1037710 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1037710 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:744-754 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel W. Drezner Author-X-Name-First: Daniel W. Author-X-Name-Last: Drezner Title: Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance Abstract: This is the golden age of economic statecraft—and the study of economic statecraft. This is in large part due to the evolution of economic coercion from trade embargoes to targeted financial sanctions. Targeted financial sanctions are attractive because they can generate economic costs similar to those of more comprehensive sanctions, with fewer negative externalities. Over time, however, the intersection of economic sanctions with globalized capital markets will provoke three interesting research questions. First, do financial sanctions spare a target country’s population from negative humanitarian and human rights outcomes? Second, to what extent are financial sanctions an exercise in learning by both targets and senders? Third, will the United States’ use of financial sanctions trigger blowback against US primacy in the international financial system? These last two questions offer the prospect to linking research on economic statecraft with larger questions of international security and global political economy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 755-764 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:755-764 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nikolay Marinov Author-X-Name-First: Nikolay Author-X-Name-Last: Marinov Author-Name: Shmuel Nili Author-X-Name-First: Shmuel Author-X-Name-Last: Nili Title: Sanctions and Democracy Abstract: How do economic sanctions affect democratization, and should the former be used to promote the latter? Imposing economic pain on large swaths of an already vulnerable population in order to nudge democratic change poses thorny issues. Does it work, in terms of securing democratic outcomes? Even if it did, is this way of achieving change justifiable? We explore the connections between the normative and positive sides of the argument for sanctions in light of theoretical and normative progress in two decades of post-Cold War research on democracy. We argue that some sanctions policies used under specific conditions are more justifiable, but there are other sanctions policies that are less justifiable. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 765-778 Issue: 4 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1036723 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1036723 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:765-778 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jennifer L. Miller Author-X-Name-First: Jennifer L. Author-X-Name-Last: Miller Author-Name: Jacob Cramer Author-X-Name-First: Jacob Author-X-Name-Last: Cramer Author-Name: Thomas J. Volgy Author-X-Name-First: Thomas J. Author-X-Name-Last: Volgy Author-Name: Paul Bezerra Author-X-Name-First: Paul Author-X-Name-Last: Bezerra Author-Name: Megan Hauser Author-X-Name-First: Megan Author-X-Name-Last: Hauser Author-Name: Christina Sciabarra Author-X-Name-First: Christina Author-X-Name-Last: Sciabarra Title: Norms, Behavioral Compliance, and Status Attribution in International Politics Abstract: Extant work on status attribution has largely focused on major powers or state capabilities as key explanatory factors driving these social processes and suggests that status considerations increase conflicts between states. We argue for a more comprehensive approach to status attribution that considers international norms as another major factor that is weighed in the attribution process. We contend that states (policymakers) evaluate one another not only on the basis of economic and military capabilities but also on the extent to which there is behavioral conformance with normative expectations and reward one another dependent upon whether these expectations are met. However, this attribution of status is dependent upon the level of contestation pertaining to that norm. Using a data set that assesses consistency with six different norms (resource transference, multilateralism, economic liberalism, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and peaceful dispute resolution), we find that status attribution is associated with norm-consistent behavior but only when these norms are uncontested at the global level. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 779-804 Issue: 5 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1037709 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1037709 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:5:p:779-804 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bryce W. Reeder Author-X-Name-First: Bryce W. Author-X-Name-Last: Reeder Title: Rebel Behavior in the Context of Interstate Competition: Exploring Day-to-Day Patterns of Political Violence in Africa Abstract: This study develops a day-to-day theory of political violence that predicts that rebels respond strategically to the onset of interstate conflict that is directly related to a civil war. Government-initiated interstate conflict is theorized to incentivize rebels to signal their resolve, willingness to bear costs, and vulnerability of government forces. In addition, this form of interstate conflict is predicted to decrease violence against civilian populations, as it makes it more likely that rebels will need to rely on civilians for resources in the future. This is contrary to interstate conflict initiated by an external state, as this signal of third-party support makes civilian support more dispensable from the perspective of a rebel movement. Using a country-day data set constructed from event data, evidence is presented that is consistent with this theoretical logic. Interstate conflict, therefore, is shown to play a significant role in explaining the variation of violent events that occur on a day-to-day basis during a civil conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 805-831 Issue: 5 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1052139 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1052139 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:5:p:805-831 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: William Spaniel Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Spaniel Title: Arms Negotiation, War Exhaustion, and the Credibility of Preventive War Abstract: Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 832-856 Issue: 5 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1051225 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1051225 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:5:p:832-856 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Johannes Vüllers Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Vüllers Author-Name: Birte Pfeiffer Author-X-Name-First: Birte Author-X-Name-Last: Pfeiffer Author-Name: Matthias Basedau Author-X-Name-First: Matthias Author-X-Name-Last: Basedau Title: Measuring the Ambivalence of Religion: Introducing the Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) Dataset Abstract: Despite ample anecdotal evidence, previous research on violent conflict has found little evidence that religion is an important factor in organized violence. Quantitative work in this area has been largely confined to the interreligious character of conflict and measures of religious diversity, and has strongly neglected the peace aspect of religion. The Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) dataset helps to fill this gap with innovative and fine-grained data for 130 developing countries between 1990 and 2010. RCDC includes four types of religious violence (assaults on religious targets, attacks by religious actors, clashes between religious communities, and clashes with the state). In addition, RCDC contains data on interreligious networks and peace initiatives. This article demonstrates the usefulness of RCDC by applying our data to a preliminary analysis. The results indicate that interreligious networks are a reaction to identity overlaps and previous interreligious conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 857-881 Issue: 5 Volume: 41 Year: 2015 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1048855 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1048855 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:5:p:857-881 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cameron S. Brown Author-X-Name-First: Cameron S. Author-X-Name-Last: Brown Author-Name: Christopher J. Fariss Author-X-Name-First: Christopher J. Author-X-Name-Last: Fariss Author-Name: R. Blake McMahon Author-X-Name-First: R. Blake Author-X-Name-Last: McMahon Title: Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution Abstract: ABSTRACTIn order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their militaries undertake several substitution policies in order to offset their military weakness when faced with external threats. These policies include pursuing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and forging alliances. We find support for these theoretical predictions in quantitative tests on data with global coverage between 1970 and 2001. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-30 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:1-30 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tim Wegenast Author-X-Name-First: Tim Author-X-Name-Last: Wegenast Title: Oil, Natural Gas, and Intrastate Conflict: Does Ownership Matter? Abstract: ABSTRACTThe impact of natural resources on intrastate violence has been increasingly analyzed in the peace and conflict literature. Surprisingly, little quantitative evidence has been gathered on the effects of the resource-ownership structure on internal violence. This article uses a novel data set on oil and natural gas property rights, covering 40 countries during the period 1989--2010. The results of regression analyses employing logit models reveal that the curvilinear effect between hydrocarbon production and civil conflict onset—often found in previous studies—only applies to countries in which oil and gas is extracted by state-owned companies. The findings suggest that only state-controlled hydrocarbon production might entail peace-buying mechanisms such as specific clientelistic practices, patronage networks, welfare policies, and/or coercion. At the same time, it seems that greed and grievance are more pronounced whenever resources lie in the hands of the state. Exploring the within-country variation, further analyses reveal that divergent welfare spending patterns are likely to be one causal channel driving the relationship between resource ownership and internal violence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 31-55 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1046599 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1046599 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:31-55 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sambuddha Ghatak Author-X-Name-First: Sambuddha Author-X-Name-Last: Ghatak Title: Challenging the State: Effect of Minority Discrimination, Economic Globalization, and Political Openness on Domestic Terrorism Abstract: ABSTRACTDiscrimination against minority groups is a robust predictor of domestic terrorism. However, economic and political openness might further facilitate mobilization of such aggrieved sections of a larger population. This study relates economic and political openness to minority discrimination in explaining vulnerability to domestic terrorism. Terrorism is a rational choice when a minority’s deprivation of public good provisions increases, while global economic integration and limited political openness facilitate rebel mobilization. Using data on 172 countries, I find strong support that countries discriminating against minority groups are more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks when their economic and political systems open up. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 56-80 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1048857 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1048857 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:56-80 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nicole Detraz Author-X-Name-First: Nicole Author-X-Name-Last: Detraz Author-Name: Dursun Peksen Author-X-Name-First: Dursun Author-X-Name-Last: Peksen Title: The Effect of IMF Programs on Women’s Economic and Political Rights Abstract: ABSTRACTThough much research has been devoted to the socioeconomic and political consequences of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for recipient countries, little is known about the impacts of these programs on the level of respect for women’s rights. We postulate that IMF-induced policy reforms of privatization and public spending cuts, and the growing political repression and instability following the implementation of IMF programs, undermine the government’s ability and willingness to protect women’s economic and political rights. To substantiate the theoretical claims, we combine data on women’s political and economic rights with data on IMF programs for the years 1981--2004. Our findings suggest that IMF involvement is likely to deteriorate the level of respect for women’s economic rights while having no discernible effect on women’s political rights. The results further indicate that the effect of these programs is not conditioned by political regime type and economic wealth of recipient countries. One major policy implication of our findings is that the IMF should start to recognize that the conditions attached to lending programs might be implemented at the expense of women’s economic rights and that more explicit protections of women’s rights need to be included in program negotiations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 81-105 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1056343 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1056343 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:81-105 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Siri A. Rustad Author-X-Name-First: Siri A. Author-X-Name-Last: Rustad Title: Socioeconomic Inequalities and Attitudes toward Violence: A Test with New Survey Data in the Niger Delta Abstract: ABSTRACTAlthough socioeconomic inequalities are assumed to increase the risk of conflict, the mechanisms behind how inequalities affect attitudes toward violence are poorly understood. The differences between individual (vertical) and group (horizontal) inequalities, and the role that perception of inequality plays, have not been investigated to any great extent due to limited data availability. This study aims at providing a better understanding of the effects of different kinds of inequality by testing new survey data collected in the Niger Delta. Using attitudes of acceptance of the use of violence as the dependent variable, the study compares the effects of horizontal and vertical inequalities and actual versus perceived inequalities. The effect of access to oil resources is also tested for horizontal inequalities (actual and perceived). The results show that both vertical and horizontal inequalities matter for the acceptance of violence. While relatively deprived individuals are more likely to support violence, among groups it is the relatively privileged. However, in oil regions, the more deprived groups are more likely to support violence. In general, perceived inequalities appear to be more important than actual inequalities. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 106-139 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1048856 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1048856 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:106-139 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ida Bastiaens Author-X-Name-First: Ida Author-X-Name-Last: Bastiaens Title: The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes Abstract: ABSTRACTWhile political scientists find that democracy reduces political risk, little scholarship analyzes how authoritarian regimes attract foreign direct investment (FDI). This article argues that while authoritarian countries are generally risky, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both “above” and “below.” Signing international investment treaties are critical for authoritarian countries to signal a commitment to FDI-friendly policies. However, only authoritarian signatories that allow some degree of public deliberation in their policymaking are then constrained from deviating from the policies of the international investment treaties. Panel statistical regressions and a case analysis support the hypothesis. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 140-171 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1065699 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1065699 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:140-171 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott Sigmund Gartner Author-X-Name-First: Scott Sigmund Author-X-Name-Last: Gartner Author-Name: Christopher F. Gelpi Author-X-Name-First: Christopher F. Author-X-Name-Last: Gelpi Title: The Affect and Effect of Images of War on Individual Opinion and Emotions Abstract: ABSTRACTWe explore the conditions under which individuals are attentive to positive and negative battlefield information when forming beliefs about a conflict’s success or failure. We use three experiments to explore the impact of visual and textual battlefield cues on individuals’ emotional states and attitudes toward the war in Afghanistan. We find that both visual and textual information convey information about failure that influences public attitudes and emotions toward war. In keeping with rational expectations theory, but contrary to widespread beliefs within the journalistic and policymaking communities, textual cues and images of battlefield failure have similar effects on emotions and attitudes. The consistency of multiple war cues, however, greatly affects peoples’ reactions. Simply put, in war the content of information matters, not its delivery style. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 172-188 Issue: 1 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1051620 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1051620 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:1:p:172-188 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Neil Narang Author-X-Name-First: Neil Author-X-Name-Last: Narang Title: Forgotten Conflicts: Need versus Political Priority in the Allocation of Humanitarian Aid across Conflict Areas Abstract: ABSTRACTDespite a principled commitment to assist people in need equally, the allocation of humanitarian assistance across conflict and post-conflict states shows remarkable variation that is not easily explained by differences in the level of recipient-need. This paper attempts to explain these “forgotten conflicts“ by analyzing the determinants of humanitarian aid to civil war and post-civil war states. Using cross-national panel data on humanitarian aid provisions, I show that the most important determinants of international humanitarian assistance are not always demand-side factors measuring humanitarian need -- as the principals of humanitarian action would dictate -- but often strategic factors that reflect donors’ political interests in providing humanitarian assistance. Although humanitarian aid to ongoing civil wars appears to be substantially more humanitarian than strategic in its allocation, humanitarian aid provided to post-conflict states in the aftermath of civil war tends to go to conflicts where donors perceive important strategic and political interests. These results suggest that one important explanation for why some conflicts are essentially ignored or gradually neglected over time is that strategic interests of donors can dominate humanitarian concerns over time. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 189-216 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1080697 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1080697 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:189-216 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bryan R. Early Author-X-Name-First: Bryan R. Author-X-Name-Last: Early Author-Name: Amira Jadoon Author-X-Name-First: Amira Author-X-Name-Last: Jadoon Title: Do Sanctions Always Stigmatize? The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Foreign Aid Abstract: ABSTRACTA prevalent view among both scholars and policymakers is that economic sanctions stigmatize and isolate their targets. According to this perspective, the stigma associated with economic sanctions should signal to foreign aid donors that they should be more cautious and restrained in providing assistance to sanctioned states. We test this signaling-based theory via a large-n analysis of the impact that sanctions imposed by the United States and those supported by the United Nations (UN) had on the aid flows of 133 recipient states from 1960--2000. Contrary to expectations, our results indicate that being subject to sanctions supported by the UN does not have a negative effect on target states’ aid flows, and being sanctioned by the United States actually has a positive effect on them. We explore two potential explanations for our puzzling findings based upon donor self-interest and donor altruism via a scoping analysis of eight sanctions cases in which target states received greater than expected aid flows. Our findings suggest that theories based upon donor self-interest represent the most promising explanation for why individual donors may increase their aid to sanctioned states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 217-243 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1093477 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1093477 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:217-243 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Colin M. Barry Author-X-Name-First: Colin M. Author-X-Name-Last: Barry Title: Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment Abstract: ABSTRACTThe industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 244-270 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1065698 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1065698 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:244-270 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Touchton Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Touchton Title: Campaigning for Capital: Fair Elections and Foreign Investment in Comparative Perspective Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article makes several contributions to the literature on political risk and the determinants of capital inflows. First, I clarify the relationship between capital flows and democracy’s constituent parts in a way that takes arguments beyond aggregate democracy indicators and static political institutional structures. Specifically, I argue that fair elections signal government respect for democracy and the rule of law in a highly visible manner investors can access. I show how investors therefore use the fairness of elections as a way to assess political risk and to inform their investment strategies. However, the type of investment and the kinds of evidence of electoral misbehavior condition elections’ influence on capital flows. I also disaggregate capital flows into foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. I argue that the logic of investing is different in the short term (portfolio) versus the long term (FDI). When it comes to political risk, I provide evidence that portfolio investment is much more sensitive to risk factors than FDI because of the relative ease with which portfolio investors can extricate themselves from an increasingly risky market and seek safer returns elsewhere compared to direct investors. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 271-294 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1093475 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1093475 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:271-294 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gerald L. McCallister Author-X-Name-First: Gerald L. Author-X-Name-Last: McCallister Title: Beyond Dyads: Regional Democratic Strength’s Influence on Dyadic Conflict Abstract: ABSTRACTOver the history of modern international relations research, we have moved from systemic and regional studies to empirical explorations of dyadic interactions. However, our statistical models have put the details of dyadic interactions under a microscope at the expense of ignoring the relevant regional context that these dyads interact in. This development has been in part due to computational limitations, but do we really believe that decision makers interact with one another while ignoring the regional power balance and the wishes of regional powers? In this article, I take a look at the well-researched relationship between democracy and peace by using a multilevel approach to dyadic interactions and the regions they are embedded in. The findings suggest that when the regional power balance favors democracies, it influences conflict between dyads, especially mixed dyads, by increasing the costs of aggression by autocracies and establishing regional norms of cooperation and compromise. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 295-321 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1069292 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1069292 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:295-321 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joshua Eastin Author-X-Name-First: Joshua Author-X-Name-Last: Eastin Title: Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict Abstract: ABSTRACTDo natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 322-349 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1115402 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1115402 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:322-349 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Philipp M. Lutscher Author-X-Name-First: Philipp M. Author-X-Name-Last: Lutscher Title: The More Fragmented the Better?—The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings Abstract: ABSTRACTAuthoritarian regimes frequently employ fragmentation to safeguard themselves against coups and reduce the power of the military apparatus. This article investigates the impact of structural coup-proofing in the setting of a nonviolent popular uprising that threatens the regime and its survival. It is argued that in such settings fragmentation can have unintentional consequences with respect to the question whether the army fulfills orders of repression or defects. If the security apparatus is highly divided, some armed organizations will seize the opportunity to defect and side with the protesters because the efficiency of counterbalancing decreases if more effective armed organizations are involved. This can be mainly explained through collective action problems that the security apparatus faces in such a setting. This article compiles data of nonviolent uprisings from 1975 to 2006 and data on armed forces structure for conducting a multivariate probit regression on the probability of defection. The findings indeed show a U-shaped relationship between armed forces fragmentation and the likelihood of defection during nonviolent mass uprisings. While security apparatuses with around two effective armed organizations display only a low probability of defection, minimally and highly fragmented forces indicate higher chances of defection from the ruling regime. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 350-375 Issue: 2 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1093476 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1093476 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:2:p:350-375 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Di Wang Author-X-Name-First: Di Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Author-Name: Quan Li Author-X-Name-First: Quan Author-X-Name-Last: Li Title: Democracy, Veto Player, and Institutionalization of Sovereign Wealth Funds Abstract: ABSTRACTSovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have become important and controversial in global economy. We analyze why some SWFs have more encompassing and clearly specified governance rules than others. We argue that SWF institutionalization is structurally rooted in a country’s regime type and number of veto players in public policymaking. Democracy promotes SWF institutionalization by its need for strong rule of law, voters trying to constrain opportunistic behaviors of politicians, and the free flow of information. In contrast, the number of veto players has a curvilinear effect. When the number of veto players is very small, institutionalization is too rigid, constraining, and not preferred; when the number of veto players is moderate, it is optimal for veto players to manage their conflict over SWF governance in a more routine and institutionalized fashion; and when the number of veto players grows above a threshold, it becomes too costly to coordinate and produce mutually agreeable institutional rules. Our empirical analysis of 46 SWFs in 30 countries from 2007 to 2009 provides robust confirming evidence. SWF governance is more institutionalized and transparent in democracies and in countries with four veto players. Our research has important theoretical and policy implications for the ongoing debate over SWF. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 377-400 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1130313 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1130313 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:377-400 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick E. Shea Author-X-Name-First: Patrick E. Author-X-Name-Last: Shea Title: Borrowing Trouble: Sovereign Credit, Military Regimes, and Conflict Abstract: ABSTRACTChanges in relative military power in the international system are seen as an impediment to peace. This article will focus on one particular avenue for states to increase their relative military power: sovereign borrowing. States’ ability to borrow inexpensive credit can undermine credible commitments in international relations, but only for those states that habitually use credit for military purposes. I argue that military regimes are more likely to use fiscal resources such as sovereign credit toward military spending, which leads to sudden increases in military power. As a result, adversarial states have incentives to use preventive action against military regimes before these regimes use credit for military purposes. To test this argument, I examine target behavior in militarized disputes as a function of expected borrowing costs credit and regime type. The empirical analysis demonstrates that military regimes, expected to have improved borrowing costs, are more likely to be the target of militarized disputes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 401-428 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1100611 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1100611 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:401-428 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chia-yi Lee Author-X-Name-First: Chia-yi Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Noel P. Johnston Author-X-Name-First: Noel P. Author-X-Name-Last: Johnston Title: Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Accountability Abstract: ABSTRACTThe literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid an increasing interest to international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but whether BITs help attract FDI is an unsettled question. Building on the existing literature, this article argues that BITs can change investors’ perceptions and the corresponding investment they make because signing BITs signals the involvement of another powerful country that is able to compel the host government to comply. This implies that the effect of BITs is not constant across signatory countries: BITs are more effective when they are signed with rich and influential countries. Using monadic and dyadic FDI data, this article finds that BITs signed with powerful countries (defined as the top six largest economies) lead to an increase in FDI inflows (both from these signatory countries and from other countries). BITs signed with other countries, despite in a larger quantity, have little influence on FDI inflows. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 429-451 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1128429 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1128429 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:429-451 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sarah Bauerle Danzman Author-X-Name-First: Sarah Author-X-Name-Last: Bauerle Danzman Title: Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI Abstract: ABSTRACTUnder what conditions can governments use international commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Although numerous studies have attempted to answer this question, none considers how investment treaties may have heterogeneous affects across industry. I argue BIT effect is strongest when the obsolescing bargaining problem between firms and governments is most protracted, namely, when FDI relies on strong contracts between firms and states. Using a time series cross-sectional data set of 114 developing countries from 1985 to 2011, I find BITs are associated with increases in infrastructure investment, an industry particularly reliant on the sanctity of government contracts, but not with total FDI inflows. Moreover, BITs with strong arbitration provisions display the strongest statistical effect on infrastructure investment, while BITs that do not provide investors with such protections are not associated with increased investment. My results have implications for both scholarship on the relationship between governments and multinational firms as well as for the study of international institutions more broadly. To properly ascertain the effects of international treaties and institutions, scholars should consider not just whether institutions constrain or inform—or matter at all—but also the extent to which the targets of institutions have heterogeneous responses to them. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 452-478 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1121451 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1121451 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:452-478 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yu Wang Author-X-Name-First: Yu Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Title: The Effect of Bargaining on US Economic Aid Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article is designed to explore the effect of bargaining power on the distribution of US economic aid. Conceptualizing US foreign assistance as the outcome of aid-for-policy transactions between the donor and its recipients, it shows why the bargaining issue is an integral part of US economic aid. A two-tiered stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is then developed to integrate the bargaining effect into our empirical analysis. Applying the model to US economic aid for the period of 1976--2011, I show empirical results that strongly support the bargaining approach. The results show that the bargaining effect explains a fundamental part of the cross-recipient difference in the level of US economic aid. On average, the donor US enjoys more bargaining power. However, a huge variation in bargaining capability on the recipient side is equally noteworthy. As for the contributors to the difference, the statistical results reveal that bargaining efficiency increases with higher per capita income, ongoing civil war, violations of personal integrity rights, and a more democratic regime, on the one hand. Importing heavily from and having an active defense pact with the US, on the other hand, affect bargaining efficiency negatively. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 479-502 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1112189 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1112189 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:479-502 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Frank Häge Author-X-Name-First: Frank Author-X-Name-Last: Häge Author-Name: Simon Hug Author-X-Name-First: Simon Author-X-Name-Last: Hug Title: Consensus Decisions and Similarity Measures in International Organizations Abstract: ABSTRACTVoting behavior in international organizations, most notably in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), is often used to infer the similarity of foreign policy preferences of member states. Most of these measures ignore, however, that particular covoting patterns may appear simply by chance (Häge 2011) and that these patterns of agreement (or the absence thereof) are only observable if decisions are reached through roll-call votes. As the relative frequency of roll-call votes changes considerably over time in most international organizations, currently used similarity and affinity measures offer a misleading picture. Based on a complete data set of UNGA resolution decisions, we demonstrate how taking different forms of chance agreement and the relative prevalence of consensus decisions into account affects conclusions about the effect of the similarity of member states’ foreign policy positions on foreign aid allocation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 503-529 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1138107 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1138107 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:503-529 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Eleonora Mattiacci Author-X-Name-First: Eleonora Author-X-Name-Last: Mattiacci Author-Name: Benjamin T. Jones Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin T. Author-X-Name-Last: Jones Title: (Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals? Abstract: ABSTRACTWhat explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 530-558 Issue: 3 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1115760 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1115760 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:3:p:530-558 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Carmela Lutmar Author-X-Name-First: Carmela Author-X-Name-Last: Lutmar Author-Name: Cristiane L. Carneiro Author-X-Name-First: Cristiane L. Author-X-Name-Last: Carneiro Author-Name: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Sara McLaughlin Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Title: Formal Commitments and States’ Interests: Compliance in International Relations Journal: International Interactions Pages: 559-564 Issue: 4 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1187144 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1187144 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:4:p:559-564 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cristiane Lucena Carneiro Author-X-Name-First: Cristiane Author-X-Name-Last: Lucena Carneiro Author-Name: Laerte Apolinário Author-X-Name-First: Laerte Author-X-Name-Last: Apolinário Title: Targeted Versus Conventional Economic Sanctions: What Is at Stake for Human Rights? Abstract: ABSTRACTThe adverse impact of economic sanctions on human rights is well documented in the literature (Peksen 2009; Wood 2008) and so are the consequences of sanctions for democracy (Peksen and Drury 2009, 2010) and for the survival of leaders (Escribà-Folch & Wright 2010; Marinov 2005). Using data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho, and Hudákóva 2013), we analyze whether sanctions that target segmented groups within the leadership fare any better with respect to human rights protection. The analysis focuses on the universe of targeted sanctions against African countries, between 1992 and 2008, and finds that the adverse impact of this coercive instrument—though unintended—is not statistically distinguishable from the adverse consequences already identified by the literature with respect to conventional sanctions. All else equal, the protection of rights to physical integrity (the right to life and the prohibition of torture) in the targeted country is 1.74 times more likely to worsen under an episode of targeted sanction when compared to a situation where there is no sanction. We propose a signaling model wherein a targeted leader is perceived by the opposition as weakened by the sanctions, which leads to more protest and repression. Higher levels of human rights violations follow. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 565-589 Issue: 4 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1036989 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2015.1036989 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:4:p:565-589 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Simon Hug Author-X-Name-First: Simon Author-X-Name-Last: Hug Author-Name: Simone Wegmann Author-X-Name-First: Simone Author-X-Name-Last: Wegmann Title: Complying with Human Rights Abstract: ABSTRACTThe empirical assessment of how signatories of human rights conventions comply with their obligations has, so far, yielded conflicting results, especially regarding the compliance mechanisms that are the most promising to ensure improving human rights records. We argue that this is due to the fact that differences in compliance systems have been neglected and that different compliance mechanisms have been assessed in isolation, without considering possible interactions. To analyze this argument, we propose a novel way to assess the effect of these mechanisms by relying on a Markov-transition model. Our results show that human rights violations are time dependent and that the effect of independent variables is conditional on previous human rights violations as well as on the strength of human rights compliance systems. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 590-615 Issue: 4 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1185712 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185712 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:4:p:590-615 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Courtney Hillebrecht Author-X-Name-First: Courtney Author-X-Name-Last: Hillebrecht Title: The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya Abstract: ABSTRACTThe International Criminal Court (ICC) was designed to try the worst war criminals for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other instances of mass human suffering. By providing a permanent, international mechanism to hold perpetrators of mass human rights abuse accountable, the ICC is also meant to be a deterrent—to prevent potential genocidaires from committing systematic human rights abuses in the first place. But what if the effect is actually quite the opposite? While advocates of international justice have made conjectures about the effect of the ICC on stopping human rights abuses, the existing scholarship does not empirically test assumptions about the relationship between international criminal justice and violence. This article outlines the causal mechanisms by which the ICC could affect ongoing violence and tests these assumptions using event count models of the relationship between the ICC and the level of violence against civilians in Libya during the 2011 crisis. These analyses suggest that the ICC’s involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of mass atrocities committed. The results also call for a broad and sustained research agenda on the effect of international accountability efforts on ongoing violence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 616-643 Issue: 4 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1185713 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185713 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:4:p:616-643 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christopher C. Anderson Author-X-Name-First: Christopher C. Author-X-Name-Last: Anderson Author-Name: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Sara McLaughlin Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Author-Name: Emily U. Schilling Author-X-Name-First: Emily U. Author-X-Name-Last: Schilling Title: Kantian Dynamics Revisited: Time-Varying Analyses of Dyadic IGO-Conflict Relationships Abstract: ABSTRACTThe literature on international organizations (IGOs) and interstate conflict in world politics produces a series of contradictory theoretical arguments and empirical findings about how IGOs help to prevent conflict and promote peace between member states. Empirical studies find a range of inconsistent results, ranging from pacifying effects of shared IGO memberships on dyadic militarized disputes to conflict-inducing effects of shared IGO memberships to null relationships. Theoretically, we consider how IGOs promote the rule of peace preservation through the mechanisms of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy, and we describe how these mechanisms help explain the time-varying relationships between shared IGOs memberships and militarized conflict since WWII. Analyses of time-varying parameter models of dyad-year data from 1948 to 2000 suggest that shared IGO memberships reduce the likelihood of militarized conflict in some historical periods (Cold War) but increase the chances for dyadic conflict in other periods (post-Cold War). The design of IGOs is relevant as well, with security-based, highly institutionalized IGOs best suited to prevent militarized conflict between member states. The results suggest that evolutionary dynamics in the Kantian peace vary across legs of the Kantian tripod and that we cannot understand the Kantian peace without considering dynamic relationships over time. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 644-676 Issue: 4 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 8 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1185714 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185714 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:4:p:644-676 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Muhammet A. Bas Author-X-Name-First: Muhammet A. Author-X-Name-Last: Bas Author-Name: Elena V. McLean Author-X-Name-First: Elena V. Author-X-Name-Last: McLean Title: Natural Disasters and the Size of Nations Abstract: ABSTRACTWhat is the relationship between natural disasters and country size? Is an increasing likelihood of environmental shocks linked to political integration or secessionism? We argue that natural disasters are associated with a decline in country size. This relationship arises because costs generated by disasters are higher for citizens located farther away from the political center of a country, and costs are amplified as disasters affect a larger area in a country, which in turn makes it less desirable for citizens in remote regions to remain part of a larger country. Our empirical results show that greater risks of environmental shocks are indeed associated with smaller countries, as well as smaller administrative units. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 677-702 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1140652 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1140652 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:677-702 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Konstantin Ash Author-X-Name-First: Konstantin Author-X-Name-Last: Ash Title: Threats to Leaders’ Political Survival and Pro-Government Militia Formation Abstract: ABSTRACTIt is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers, or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from foreign actors make leaders particularly more likely to form linkages with ethnic or religious PGMs. The findings strongly suggest that PGM linkage formation is driven by leader-level desire for political survival, rather than a host of state-level explanations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 703-728 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1138108 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1138108 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:703-728 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: R. Urbatsch Author-X-Name-First: R. Author-X-Name-Last: Urbatsch Title: Protectionist Executives Abstract: ABSTRACTThe trade policy literature long presumed that legislatures favor relatively more protectionist policies than executives do, but more recent studies have found little evidence to support the idea. This article clarifies these mixed results with a simple formal model. It finds that legislative protectionism requires very specific circumstances involving the combination of universalistic legislative norms and a particular economic geography, with trade policy interests large relative to legislative districts but small compared to countries. Empirical evidence on this latter point suggests that the necessary spatial patterning is likely to have diminished in many countries since the 1930s, when the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act focused attention on institutional differences. The assumption of legislative protectionism based on theories and measures of that era thus may not hold today, and widespread presumptions about institutional preferences may accordingly be uncomfortably fragile. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 729-749 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1140452 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1140452 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:729-749 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sam R. Bell Author-X-Name-First: Sam R. Author-X-Name-Last: Bell Author-Name: Andrew G. Long Author-X-Name-First: Andrew G. Author-X-Name-Last: Long Title: Trade Interdependence and the Use of Force: Do Issues Matter? Abstract: ABSTRACTIn this project, we investigate the relationship between the use of military force and trade interdependence, suggesting that the influence of trade on militarized conflict varies based on the issue under dispute. For some issues, trade is likely to attenuate the chances that states escalate a dispute to the use of military force, while for others trade can intensify disputes so that military conflict is more likely. Specifically, we hypothesize that greater trade interdependence decreases the probability of military conflict over realpolitik issues like territory. On the other hand, greater trade interdependence increases the probability that states use military force when the issue under dispute concerns the regime, policies, and conditions in the target. To test our hypotheses, we employ new data on dyadic uses of force from the International Military Intervention data set that records the initiator’s reason(s) for using force against the target. The statistical tests support our hypotheses; trade decreases the use of force against a target for territorial and military/diplomatic reasons, which is consistent with arguments from the liberal paradigm. However, trade interdependence increases the use of force for humanitarian and economic reasons as well as to affect the regime or policy of the target. Thus, our study improves upon current research about the relationship between economic interdependence and foreign policy by specifying a conditional relationship based on the issues under contention. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 750-773 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1145119 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1145119 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:750-773 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Uk Heo Author-X-Name-First: Uk Author-X-Name-Last: Heo Author-Name: Min Ye Author-X-Name-First: Min Author-X-Name-Last: Ye Title: Defense Spending and Economic Growth around the Globe: The Direct and Indirect Link Abstract: ABSTRACTIn this study, we combine both demand- and supply-side models to investigate the direct and indirect link between defense spending and economic growth. With data from 161 states for 1990--2012, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the defense-growth nexus in the post-Cold War world. Our findings suggest that at the global level, military spending significantly dampens private investment but somewhat reduces unemployment. However, the direct economic effects of defense spending on growth are minimal at best. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 774-796 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1149067 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1149067 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:774-796 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daehee Bak Author-X-Name-First: Daehee Author-X-Name-Last: Bak Title: Political Investment Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies Abstract: ABSTRACTExtant research has shown considerable interest in whether host countries’ political uncertainty impedes foreign direct investment (FDI). Building upon the scholarly consensus on the adverse impact of political uncertainty on FDI, this article demonstrates that the extent to which investment climates are unpredictable varies cyclically, on the basis of election timing in democracies and leadership turnover in autocracies. The empirical results show that in presidential democracies, FDI tends to slowly increase after an executive election and then decline as the next executive election nears. However, I find that an electoral investment cycle is not found in parliamentary democracies where election timing is irregular, less predictable, and endogenous to domestic economic conditions. I also find that a similar political investment cycle exists in autocracies not through electoral cycle but through leadership tenure cycle. The level of FDI inflows tends to be relatively low early in autocrats’ tenure when political uncertainty is high and rise as autocratic leadership tenure increases over time but eventually wane again as autocratic leadership is destabilized in the late period of power transition. The findings indicate the existence of heterogeneous political investment cycles, depending on regime type. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 797-819 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1173547 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1173547 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:797-819 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ka Zeng Author-X-Name-First: Ka Author-X-Name-Last: Zeng Author-Name: Yue Lu Author-X-Name-First: Yue Author-X-Name-Last: Lu Title: Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997--2011 Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article examines the differentisal effects of specific provisions included in China’s bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in inducing foreign direct investment (FDI). Empirical analysis yields some evidence suggesting that while the signing of a BIT does not necessarily boost FDI, the entry into force of a BIT does exert a strong effect on investment flows. More importantly, we find substantial evidence that BITs with stronger investment protection provisions such as absolute and relative standards of treatment and dispute settlement procedures are more likely to induce greater FDI flows. These results suggest that the variation in the institutional design of bilateral investment treaties strongly influences FDI flows by shaping foreign investors’ expectations of their asset security and the overall stability of the host country investment environment. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 820-848 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:820-848 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ana Carolina Garriga Author-X-Name-First: Ana Carolina Author-X-Name-Last: Garriga Title: Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure central bank independence (CBI), including yearly data from 182 countries between 1970 and 2012. The dataset identifies statutory reforms affecting CBI, their direction, and the attributes necessary to build the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty index. Previous datasets focused on developed countries, and included non-representative samples of developing countries. This dataset’s substantially broader coverage has important implications. First, it challenges the conventional wisdom about central bank reforms in the world, revealing CBI increases and restrictions in decades and regions previously considered barely affected by reforms. Second, the inclusion of almost 100 countries usually overlooked in previous studies suggests that the sample selection may have substantially affected results. Simple analyses show that the associations between CBI and inflation, unemployment or growth are very sensitive to sample selection. Finally, the dataset identifies numerous CBI decreases (restrictions), whereas previous datasets mostly look at CBI increases. These data’s coverage not only allows researchers to test competing explanations of the determinants and effects of CBI in a global sample, but it also provides a useful instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields, such as liberalization, diffusion, political institutions, democratization, or responses to financial crises. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 849-868 Issue: 5 Volume: 42 Year: 2016 Month: 10 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:42:y:2016:i:5:p:849-868 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Charles Roger Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Roger Author-Name: Thomas Hale Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Hale Author-Name: Liliana Andonova Author-X-Name-First: Liliana Author-X-Name-Last: Andonova Title: The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance Abstract: ABSTRACTWe live in an era of remarkable transformations in how governance is supplied at the global level, as traditional means of intergovernmental institutions are being joined by a growing diversity of transnational arrangements. Yet, at present, we still have only a superficial understanding of what causes actors to adhere to transnational rules, norms, and initiatives once they appear, and especially what role domestic political, economic and social variables play in their decision making. Focusing on climate change as an issue exemplifying the tendency for complex governance interplay, this special issue provides a comparative political economy perspective on the increasing but uneven uptake of transnational climate governance (TCG). This article articulates a conceptual framework for the analysis, highlighting the interplay between transnational and domestic politics and how such interactions shape the incentives, opportunities, and modalities of participation in transnational initiatives. An original data set of participation in transnational governance initiatives is introduced to capture the significance of the phenomenon and to provide a common basis to systematically address, for the first time, questions about the cross-national patterns of involvement we find across different arenas and types of TCG, be they networks of sub- or nonstate actors, private rules, or hybrid arrangements. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-25 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1252248 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1252248 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:1-25 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nives Dolšak Author-X-Name-First: Nives Author-X-Name-Last: Dolšak Author-Name: Aseem Prakash Author-X-Name-First: Aseem Author-X-Name-Last: Prakash Title: Join the Club: How the Domestic NGO Sector Induces Participation in the Covenant of Mayors Program Abstract: ABSTRACTHow does strength of domestic NGOs influence participation in the Covenants of Mayors program? Launched by the European Commission in 2008, this program invites local and regional authorities to voluntarily commit to implementing EU climate change and energy policies. We focus on the transitional countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia to examine whether the strength of their domestic NGOs correlates with cities’ decisions to participate in this transnational program. To operationalize NGO strength, we suggest thinking of it as a stock variable that cumulates over time, instead of a single-year, flow variable. With country year as the unit of analysis, we examine the percentage of urban population covered by the Covenant across a panel of 26 transitional economies for the period 2008--2014. We find that the key variable of interest, cumulative NGO strength, is a statistically significant predictor of program participation, even after controlling for domestic and international factors, including the salience of international NGOs and the years since the country began the formal process to join the European Union. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 26-47 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1226668 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1226668 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:26-47 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lily Hsueh Author-X-Name-First: Lily Author-X-Name-Last: Hsueh Title: Transnational Climate Governance and the Global 500: Examining Private Actor Participation by Firm-Level Factors and Dynamics Abstract: ABSTRACTThis article focuses on the Global 500, which are the world’s largest companies by revenue, to examine the factors and dynamics internal to companies that motivate some corporations, but not others, to engage in transnational climate governance. Empirical results based on multilevel mixed-effects analyses, which separately identify the relative weight of firm and country-level factors, suggest that the likelihood that a firm participates in transnational climate governance (TCG) is higher when there exists a “policy supporter” who champions sustainability policies and when a company adopts explicit sustainability practices, such as the incorporation of ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) principles. Voluntary climate action and carbon disclosure are more likely to take place when a company has a large asset base and certifies with the ISO 14001 environmental management standard. Moreover, the level of civil liberties that corporations enjoy in their respective country of origin is associated with participation in TCG. A decomposition of the variance indicates that firm-level factors account for a majority of the variance in TCG participation. This study has implications for climate change governance and policies, which have increasingly focused on concrete climate solutions and innovations by nonstate and substate actors. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 48-75 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1223929 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1223929 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:48-75 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Xun Cao Author-X-Name-First: Xun Author-X-Name-Last: Cao Author-Name: Hugh Ward Author-X-Name-First: Hugh Author-X-Name-Last: Ward Title: Transnational Climate Governance Networks and Domestic Regulatory Action Abstract: ABSTRACTTransnational climate governance (TCG) creates networks between countries as governments and other organizations enter joint arrangements to further their interests. We argue that actors build TCG, rather than focusing on promoting change at the domestic level, when this is a more efficient way of using their limited resources than lobbying to increase the level of domestic regulation. Based on standard microeconomic theory, we show that actors will respond to higher existing levels of domestic regulation by participating more in TCG because the existence of such domestic legislation frees up resources for them to use in other ways, including activities at the transnational level. We carry out an empirical test based on the strength of the network ties between countries formed by TCG. Results support our main hypothesis on the positive relationship between a country’s level of domestic policy output and its participation in TCGs, suggesting that national policies and TCGs are more complements than substitutes as instruments to address global climate change. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 76-102 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1220162 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1220162 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:76-102 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jessica F. Green Author-X-Name-First: Jessica F. Author-X-Name-Last: Green Title: Blurred Lines: Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations Abstract: ABSTRACTCarbon markets are flourishing around the globe, created both by governments and by nonstate actors. In this article, I investigate when and why governments choose to interact with and use private rules about carbon offsets in public regulatory arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that there is “blurring” between public and private authority, insofar that there are a multiple interactions between the two spheres. However, a closer look reveals that most of these are of a relatively weak nature, since private standards are used for voluntary rather than compliance purposes. To explain this trend, I use qualitative and quantitative analysis and find that NGOs are the main catalysts for the interaction between public and private rules. States are most likely to interact with private regulations when they have large numbers of NGOs active within their borders. In short, private authority is largely a complement to public regulatory arrangements. While previous work that suggests that private authority arises when there are gaps in public rules, the analysis here demonstrates that at the domestic level, this logic does not hold. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 103-128 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1210943 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1210943 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:103-128 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Katharina Michaelowa Author-X-Name-First: Katharina Author-X-Name-Last: Michaelowa Author-Name: Axel Michaelowa Author-X-Name-First: Axel Author-X-Name-Last: Michaelowa Title: Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives: Designed for Effective Climate Change Mitigation? Abstract: ABSTRACTThe Paris Agreement of December 2015 set a highly ambitious target for global climate change mitigation, but it remains unclear how it will be reached, and the individual countries’ pledges do not add up to the overall target. Can transnational climate governance initiatives be expected to fill the gap? We assess 109 such initiatives based on four design criteria: existence of mitigation targets; incentives for mitigation; definition of a baseline; and existence of a monitoring, reporting, and verification procedure. About half of the initiatives do not meet any of these criteria, and not even 15% satisfy three or more. Many initiatives were created only for the purpose of networking. Orchestration by national governments and international organizations increases the number of criteria met. On average, the mitigation focus of new initiatives was highest during the “heyday” of the international climate policy regime between 2005 and 2010. While mitigation-oriented entrepreneurial initiatives are generally started only in response to existing regulation, subnational governments and NGOs show some attempts to go beyond that and compensate for insufficient regulation at the national and international level. Yet, given the low overall quality assessment, transnational climate governance initiatives cannot be expected to fill the “mitigation gap.” Journal: International Interactions Pages: 129-155 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1256110 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1256110 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:129-155 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Miles Kahler Author-X-Name-First: Miles Author-X-Name-Last: Kahler Title: Domestic Sources of Transnational Climate Governance Abstract: ABSTRACTTransnational climate governance (TCG) is an example of complex governance in which national governments no longer serve as reliable gatekeepers between nonstate and subnational actors and global governance. The articles in this special issue demonstrate that TCG and complex governance do not eliminate the importance of domestic political institutions and actors in explaining national variation in engagement with TCG. Rich democracies provide the most favorable political setting for participation in TCG. National policies that favor climate change mitigation produce greater engagement with TCG on the part of nonstate and subnational actors. The same political ecology that produces favorable national policies supports TCG participation: NGO presence and activism, affluent consumers that encourage corporations to engage with TCG, subnational governments with political incentives and fiscal space to undertake cross-border activism. Although direct effects by TCG on greenhouse gas emissions may be limited, TCG may have longer-run and second-order effects that are larger, particularly if commitments are more precise and binding. Overall, TCG illustrates a complementary rather than competitive relationship between national governments and complex governance, a relationship that should be investigated in other issue areas. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 156-174 Issue: 1 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1251687 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1251687 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:1:p:156-174 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Marc Simon Author-X-Name-First: Marc Author-X-Name-Last: Simon Title: When sanctions can work: Economic sanctions and the theory of moves Abstract: The paradox of economic sanctions is that though they are used with increasing frequency in the post‐cold war world, policy makers and scholars still largely conclude that they do not work to produce political change in targeted countries. This paper uses Steven Brams’ revision of standard game theory, the “theory of moves,” to derive conditions for successful sanctions, failed sanctions, and stalemated sanctions disputes. Then, applying the theory of moves to the cases of U.S. sanctions against Vietnam and Haiti, it illustrates how Brams’ theory can explain the dynamics and outcome of sanctions disputes. The paper shows that even if the recipient state has a dominant strategy of noncompliance with the sanctioning state, sanctions can succeed—even when they are costly to the sanctioning state. Further, it demonstrates that the theory of moves provides a better conceptual account of the dynamics of sanctions disputes over time than traditional game theory. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 203-228 Issue: 3 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434866 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434866 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:203-228 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alastair Smith Author-X-Name-First: Alastair Author-X-Name-Last: Smith Title: The success and use of economic sanctions Abstract: This paper explains the use and the success of economic sanctions. In the model, a sender, nation A, uses sanctions to force a target, nation B, to alter its current policy. I use a continuous time, one sided incomplete information game to show that the decision of the sender to sanction is related to the decision of the target to resist I characterize the conditions under which sanctions occur, the conditions under which the sender threatens sanctions and the conditions under which sanctions are successful. The analysis reveals that the success of sanctions affects whether a nation chooses to sanction. I discuss how the implications of this result relates to the cases of sanctions that we empirically observe. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 229-245 Issue: 3 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434867 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434867 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:229-245 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: T. Clifton Morgan Author-X-Name-First: T. Clifton Author-X-Name-Last: Morgan Author-Name: Valerie Schwebach Author-X-Name-First: Valerie Author-X-Name-Last: Schwebach Title: Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics Abstract: Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may be examples of two‐level games in which the domestic game within both parties affects the international game and vice‐versa. Here, we take a first cut of applying this approach to the analysis of sanctions effectiveness. We extend the spatial model to focus on how sanctions affect the internal political bargaining within the target state. From this, we determine how state policy should change (or not) as a result of the sanctions. We use the basic model to identify general hypotheses regarding the nature of sanctions and their effectiveness and we evaluate some of these hypotheses using cases in which the United States imposed sanctions on Latin American countries for human rights violations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 247-263 Issue: 3 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434868 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434868 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:247-263 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Majeski Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Majeski Title: Generating and maintaining cooperation in international relations: A model of repeated interaction among groups in complex and uncertain situations Abstract: One important change in the Post Cold War international landscape is the emergence of a number of reconstituted nation‐states. Because of significant and continuing domestic political change, economic volatility, “newness” of bureaucratic institutions, factional divisions, and unstable leadership, the behavior of reconstituted nation‐states is volatile, uncertain, and difficult to predict. This creates a more complex and difficult decision environment for both established and reconstituted nation‐states and makes the task of generating and maintaining cooperative security regimes more problematic. Can established nation‐states develop stable cooperative relationships with reconstituted nation‐states? Can they maintain established cooperative security regimes? To address these questions, the relations between established and reconstituted nation‐states are modeled as a repeated coordination problem (a mutual fate control game) where nation‐states are represented as groups that employ adaptive decision rules; tit for tat for established nation‐states and trial and error for reconstituted nation‐states. An analysis of the model reveals that groups can achieve stable cooperative relationships with relative ease. However, cooperative outcomes hinge on the ability of groups to maintain cohesiveness; a difficult task for reconstituted nation‐states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 265-289 Issue: 3 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434869 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434869 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:265-289 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gary Goertz Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Goertz Author-Name: Paul Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry: The rivalry approach to war and peace Abstract: Enduring rivalries form the most conflict‐prone dyads in the international system, but they are only the extreme case of rivalry; rivalries can be short‐lived as well as enduring. Rivalries are not merely a new topic of research—an extension of the logic behind studying “dangerous dyads"—nor are they merely a useful research tool and case selection device. Part of what has hindered a clear understanding of the wide‐ranging ramifications of the rivalry concept comes from the focus on enduring rivalries. We show that much can be gained by taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalries—resulting in what we term the “rivalry approach” to war and peace. There are three general ways in which the rivalry approach focuses attention on issues normally beyond the horizon of the traditional international conflict literature, or what might generically be labeled the causes of war approach: changing the unit of analysis from war to rivalry, adopting a longitudinal and dynamic approach, and putting rivalry context as part of theory rather than merely as a case selection device. We explore these three aspects of the rivalry approach, illustrating our points primarily by reference to scholarly work on deterrence, but also drawing on other examples from neorealism, expected utility, liberalism, arms races, power transitions, diffusion, and long cycles in order to illustrate the broader applicability of the framework. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 291-308 Issue: 3 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434870 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434870 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:3:p:291-308 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Konstantin Ash Author-X-Name-First: Konstantin Author-X-Name-Last: Ash Title: “The War Will Come to Your Street”: Explaining Geographic Variation in Terrorism by Rebel Groups Abstract: Geographic variation in rebels’ use of terrorism is not well understood. This article explains the use of terrorism in civil conflict through examining geographic variation in terrorist attacks across first–level administrative regions. Two explanations are tested using data on 47 groups in 21 countries: that terrorism is intended to punish supporters of counterinsurgency efforts or to destabilize regions of the country that are both outside of rebels’ military reach and have substantial grievances against the regime. Results show that terrorism is most prevalent in national capitals and regions that are more deprived. The findings suggest that rebel groups face multiple incentives for violence beyond zones of direct military confrontation with the government, using both highly visible attacks against the center of power and attacks intended to geographically expand the rebellion. The findings imply maximizing public service provision and minimizing economic inequality may reduce the breadth of rebels’ potential expansion. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 411-436 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1367294 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1367294 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:411-436 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Carlo Koos Author-X-Name-First: Carlo Author-X-Name-Last: Koos Title: Which Grievances Make People Support Violence against the State? Survey Evidence from the Niger Delta Abstract: Previous research has established a link between oil production and armed conflict in low- and middle-income countries. Oil-related grievances are viewed as a key variable driving resentment and antistate attitudes. However, the off-the-shelf measures of existing studies (oil exports, oil revenues per capita, etc.) measure dependence and richness, not grievances among the population. This article contributes to filling this gap. Relying on an original opinion poll from the conflict-ridden Niger Delta, the analysis shows that both rebel-pursued, collective grievances (unfair oil revenue distribution) and individual grievances (livelihood destruction due to oil production) make people support antistate violence. These results lend micro-level evidence to the grievance mechanism linking oil and (support for) rebellion. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 437-462 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1369411 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1369411 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:437-462 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yesola Kweon Author-X-Name-First: Yesola Author-X-Name-Last: Kweon Title: Economic Competitiveness and Social Policy in Open Economies Abstract: While many studies have shown that greater trade openness affects the overall size of social spending, this study emphasizes that it also affects types of social policies that a government prioritizes. When faced with deepening trade competition, governments tend to use different policy measures to address the opportunities and challenges stemming from their economic competitiveness in the international market. Policy makers in countries with high relative labor costs are likely to privilege social insurances and income transfer. This is because as high labor costs make their workers more vulnerable in the trade competition, governments seek to protect skilled labor in order to maintain their economic advantage in advanced industries. In contrast, when relative labor costs are low, human capital investment programs are likely to be emphasized to enhance productivity and the quality of labor to capitalize the cost competitiveness of a country’s workers. The findings from empirical analyzes of 26 OECD economies from 1991 to 2012 support these arguments. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 537-558 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1382489 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1382489 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:537-558 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Shawn L. Ramirez Author-X-Name-First: Shawn L. Author-X-Name-Last: Ramirez Author-Name: Arianna J. Robbins Author-X-Name-First: Arianna J. Author-X-Name-Last: Robbins Title: Targets and Tactics: Testing for a Duality within Al Qaeda’s Network Abstract: One prevailing view treats Al Qaeda as a monolithic entity with a global network of affiliates. Yet, certain affiliates appear more committed to local political and territorial goals – parochial, not global, terrorists. We construct a classification scheme to differentiate affiliates conceptually and empirically, and then track their types over time. We sort Al Qaeda’s network of affiliates using a principal components analysis of terrorist attacks from 1988 to 2012. We show that this aids in identifying latent affiliate types, and interpreting shifts in behavior. We find that despite Al Qaeda’s anti-western rhetoric, there exists a global-parochial divide in which most affiliates are parochial – with anti-Western groups pursuing local political goals even when Western targets remain. By providing an empirical strategy to identify which affiliates are more or less aligned with global terrorism, this research holds implications for the literatures on terrorism and civil war, terrorism and democracy, and the effects of counterterrorism. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 559-581 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1383907 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1383907 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:559-581 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Clayton Webb Author-X-Name-First: Clayton Author-X-Name-Last: Webb Title: Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval Abstract: How do economic sanctions affect presidential approval? Competing claims have been made about the domestic political consequences of economic sanctions. One claim is that sanctions are unpopular because they have negative economic consequences; another claim is that sanctions are popular because they project an image of strength; and another claim is that sanctions are neither popular nor unpopular because the public is uninformed about international affairs. These arguments imply competing identification restrictions. I test these competing models using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. The results show that sanctions have a moderate negative effect on presidential approval. I use these findings as a basis for a broader set of auxiliary analyses. Despite received wisdom, sanctions imposed for different reasons against different target states do not produce disparate effects on public opinion. These analyses resolve an important empirical dilemma that weighs on a range of theoretical perspectives in the sanctions literature and highlights fruitful avenues for future research. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 491-509 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1388234 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1388234 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:491-509 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Johannes Karreth Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Karreth Title: The Economic Leverage of International Organizations in Interstate Disputes Abstract: Addressing a long-standing debate in international relations scholarship, this study shows that international governmental organizations (IGOs) with high economic leverage over their member states, such as some development banks, substantially lower the risk that political disputes experience the use of military force. Empirical tests covering cases of disputatious claims and international crises since 1946 make use of a new classification of IGOs that have economic leverage and use it toward increasing states’ cost of using force in disputes. When pairs of states are subject to the economic leverage of IGOs, they are substantially less likely to use force. For the understanding and practice of interstate dispute resolution and international conflict more generally, the study suggests a specific linkage between institutionalized economic interdependence and conflict escalation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 463-490 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1389728 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1389728 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:463-490 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gabriele Spilker Author-X-Name-First: Gabriele Author-X-Name-Last: Spilker Author-Name: Thomas Bernauer Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Bernauer Author-Name: Víctor Umaña Author-X-Name-First: Víctor Author-X-Name-Last: Umaña Title: What Kinds of Trade Liberalization Agreements Do People in Developing Countries Want? Abstract: One of the most striking developments in the global economy in the past decades is the rapid proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), with many of them concluded among or with participation of developing countries. On the presumption that current popular debates on trade policy are not so much about whether citizens want free trade but rather what kinds of trade liberalization they want, we examine individual trade policy preferences with regard to PTAs that can vary in content along several dimensions. To that end we carried out conjoint choice experiments embedded in representative surveys in three developing countries that differ strongly in income levels, political system, and trade liberalization history: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. We conceptualize trade policy preferences as preferences over the scale and scope of trade liberalization, environmental and labor standards, and labor market access (migration). Two main findings emerge. First, non-economic considerations, such as sympathy/antipathy toward particular countries and environmental and labor rights concerns influence citizens’ preferences at least as much as factors based on standard economic logic. Second, preferences over particular facets (attributes) of trade liberalization, that is PTA content, are surprisingly consistent across countries, despite strong differences in macro-economic and political context. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 510-536 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1436316 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1436316 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:510-536 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tyson Roberts Author-X-Name-First: Tyson Author-X-Name-Last: Roberts Title: Economic Policy, Political Constraints, and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries Abstract: As foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly important in the world economy, a large body of literature has emerged regarding the determinants of FDI flows. Some scholars argue that democracy attracts FDI through the mechanism of political constraints, which reduce the risk of negative policy changes. However, the value of policy stability should be conditional on the attractiveness of contemporary FDI-relevant policies. I therefore propose a theoretically more comprehensive argument: political constraints are attractive to investors when the host country policy environment is FDI-friendly, because these political constraints reduce the probability of negative policy changes in the future. When the policy environment is hostile to FDI, on the other hand, political constraints will have little positive effect, and, to the extent they indicate that FDI-relevant policies are unlikely to improve, may even deter FDI. This argument helps explain why the positive relationship between democracy and FDI seems to emerge after a global shift toward FDI-friendly polices. I find robust empirical support for the argument in tests covering more than 100 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, indicating significant effects using a variety of policy and political constraint measures. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 582-602 Issue: 3 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1448806 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1448806 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:3:p:582-602 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Abigail S. Post Author-X-Name-First: Abigail S. Author-X-Name-Last: Post Author-Name: Paromita Sen Author-X-Name-First: Paromita Author-X-Name-Last: Sen Title: Why can’t a woman be more like a man? Female leaders in crisis bargaining Abstract: What is the impact of gender on international affairs? In this paper, we argue that existing theories of international relations often miss the crucial role of gendered perceptions in politics. We draw on research in experimental psychology and the comparative politics of gendered leadership to understand how gender influences reactions to female foreign policy. We argue that female leaders in particular face gender stereotypes that cause dispute opponents to underestimate their resolve during bargaining. Using data on the gender of leaders in militarized disputes, we find evidence of gender biases in bargaining interactions: Female-led states are more likely to have their disputes reciprocated and are consequently more likely to forcefully escalate a dispute than male-led governments. These findings point to the importance of stereotypes and cognitive biases when studying how the increasing heterogeneity of policymakers—and especially world leaders—impacts foreign policy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-27 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1683008 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1683008 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:1-27 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Heather Elko McKibben Author-X-Name-First: Heather Elko Author-X-Name-Last: McKibben Author-Name: Timothy W. Taylor Author-X-Name-First: Timothy W. Author-X-Name-Last: Taylor Title: Trade balance and policy complexity: explaining political elites’ focus on international trade at the domestic level Abstract: The attention international trade receives at the domestic level varies widely across countries as well as among political elites within the same country. When and why are political elites likely to dedicate attention to this issue, and what is the policy position on which they are likely to focus when doing so? We argue that political elites are more likely to focus domestic attention on international trade when their country’s economy is more dependent upon trade. The balance of trade is likely to influence the degree to which trade liberalization or protectionism is the main focus of elites at the domestic level, and the complexity of their country’s trade policies is likely to mediate this relationship between the trade balance and the trade-policy positions that dominate the domestic agenda. We test this argument by analyzing how political elites chose to focus on international trade in their party platforms in the lead-up to national elections across fifty-three countries from 1960 through 2014. The results show that these characteristics of countries’ trade policies are related in important ways to political elites’ strategic choice regarding when and how to focus domestic attention on international trade. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 28-50 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1685989 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1685989 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:28-50 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Adam Dean Author-X-Name-First: Adam Author-X-Name-Last: Dean Author-Name: Jonathan Obert Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan Author-X-Name-Last: Obert Title: Shocked into Service: Free Trade and the American South’s Military Burden Abstract: Free trade has gradually shifted the burden of military service onto the American South. While trade shocks generally lead to local increases in US Army enlistment, there are two different regional dynamics that concentrate this effect in the South. First, trade-related job losses are disproportionately concentrated in this region, where manufacturing jobs gradually migrated during the second half of the twentieth century. Second, the South’s “military tradition,” a relatively youthful population, and weak labor unions, combine to translate trade shocks into larger spikes in Army enlistment than the rest of the country. This paper uses county-level data from 1996–2010 to demonstrate the importance of meso-level, regional factors for understanding the location of trade shocks, as well as how communities adjust to such economic dislocations. We find that trade-related job losses account for roughly 7% of the South’s over-representation in the Army during our period of study. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 51-81 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1674298 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1674298 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:51-81 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Anna O. Pechenkina Author-X-Name-First: Anna O. Author-X-Name-Last: Pechenkina Title: Third-party pressure for peace Abstract: Third-party pressure for peace is any threat issued or any penalty applied toward one or both sides of the warring dyad with an intention to halt hostilities. Some studies find that pressure shortens peace, while others conclude that it has no effect. This paper advances our understanding of how outside pressure affects peace by differentiating the levels of costs associated with various instances of pressure. I argue that outside pressure to halt hostilities leaves at least one belligerent in the dyad unhappy with the political settlement, because reputational or other costs force belligerents to accept settlements that do not fully reflect a potential military outcome. Disagreeing with political settlement provides incentives to revise it. More crippling types of pressure raise the cost of another war, making formal renegotiation off the battlefield more attractive even in the presence of bargaining failures. Cheaper methods of pressure do not. I test this intuition, using original data on all cases of outside pressure for peace in a sample of ceasefires initiated in 1914–2001. The results show that diplomatic pressure is associated with ceasefire breakdown, while economic pressure has no effect in the long run (most instances of economic pressure coincide with diplomatic sanctions), and military pressure is associated with longer peace. To circumvent the empirical challenge of outside actors selecting themselves into certain types of wars, I also match ceasefires, so that the most similar cases with and without pressure are compared; all results hold. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 82-110 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1694018 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1694018 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:82-110 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison Author-X-Name-First: Hayoun Jessie Author-X-Name-Last: Ryou-Ellison Author-Name: Aaron Gold Author-X-Name-First: Aaron Author-X-Name-Last: Gold Title: Moral hazard at sea: how alliances actually increase low-level maritime provocations between allies Abstract: The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict (mainly shows of force, or what we call maritime provocations) and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states’ participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to undermine the position of defending states by using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional security umbrella to maintain its organization’s strength and continuity. High levels of commitment to defensive alliances provide a challenger state with the opportunity to behave provocatively without risking an escalation of the conflict or severely damaging its reputation within the alliance. We test our theory using data on all maritime claims and their associated militarization attempts in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001 from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 111-132 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1688804 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1688804 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:111-132 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Idean Salehyan Author-X-Name-First: Idean Author-X-Name-Last: Salehyan Author-Name: Ayal Feinberg Author-X-Name-First: Ayal Author-X-Name-Last: Feinberg Title: Merging actors with events: introducing the social conflict analysis dataset – organizational properties (SCAD-OPs) Abstract: Events data have been instrumental in the study of contentious politics. Yet such data often focus on the attributes of the events themselves – such as the number of participants, fatalities, and location – while providing scant information on those involved. To address this shortcoming, we introduce the Social Conflict Analysis Database – Organizational Properties (SCAD-OPs). This dataset categorizes the organizations and identity groups involved in the original SCAD, which allows analysts to answer important questions about who is involved in social conflict. Named entities are assigned to seventeen domains, or primary functional areas, including government, labor, criminal, activist, and so on. Individuals and groups that have a coherent identity – enabling researchers to track their activities over time – are assigned unique organizational codes, and factions within organizations are also identified. Presenting data from seven countries, we provide descriptive statistics on the types of entities most likely to be principal SCAD actors and targets across countries, as well as a preliminary analysis, linking participants with event types. We assess which domains are most likely to engage in peaceful protests, violent riots, strikes, and armed attacks. Finally, we discuss potential questions that can be addressed using this data. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 133-149 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1687466 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1687466 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:133-149 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kevin T. Greene Author-X-Name-First: Kevin T. Author-X-Name-Last: Greene Author-Name: Caleb Lucas Author-X-Name-First: Caleb Author-X-Name-Last: Lucas Title: Once more, with feeling: using sentiment analysis to improve models of relationships between non-state actors Abstract: We collect an original corpus of official documents released by Hezbollah and use text analysis to create a measure of their relationships with other non-state groups. Despite recent research that demonstrates these types of relationships affect the length and severity of conflict, data limitations hinder efforts by researchers to capture important variation in them over time. Our approach uses fine-grained text data to capture dynamic trends in these relationships. We demonstrate its effectiveness by showing our model is able to reproduce qualitative accounts of Hezbollah’s known alliances and rivalries with other non-state actors with greater accuracy and precision than existing measures. We also compare the approach with event data and demonstrate its ability to provide more granular and complementary information. With further exploration, this technique could assist researchers in improving and developing measures of intrastate cooperation and competition for use in empirical analyses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 150-162 Issue: 1 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1684913 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1684913 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:1:p:150-162 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: William Christiansen Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Christiansen Author-Name: Tobias Heinrich Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Heinrich Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Title: Foreign policy begins at home: the local origin of support for US democracy promotion Abstract: Citizens hold opinions about what kinds of foreign policy their government should pursue. Because foreign policy often has geographically specific domestic consequences, we expect opinions to vary with the locality of its impact. In this article, we examine whether individual support for US foreign policy to promote democracy abroad depends on exactly where the policy’s domestic impact will occur. We expect individuals to favor policies that bestow local benefits while opposing those that impose local costs. Accordingly, we argue that support for proposed democracy aid grants will be higher when such aid benefits local firms and organizations. Conversely, we expect that opposition to proposed economic sanctions in the form of development aid cuts will be higher when the associated domestic costs stemming from lost jobs fall locally. Using the results from an original survey experiment, we find evidence that a positive local impact of aid increases support for and reduces opposition to democracy promotion, while a negative local impact of sanctions reduces indifference and increases opposition to punitive policy in the case of democratic backsliding. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 595-616 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1610748 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1610748 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:595-616 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Fabio Wasserfallen Author-X-Name-First: Fabio Author-X-Name-Last: Wasserfallen Title: Global diffusion, policy flexibility, and inflation targeting Abstract: A diverse group of over 30 countries located all over the world—such as the UK, Colombia, and Ghana—introduced inflation targeting, which is a monetary policy that seeks to control inflation through a pre-announced target. Fully institutionalized democracies adopted the policy first because the core features of inflation targeting are consistent with the principles of a liberal democracy. But why was inflation targeting also introduced by less-democratic countries? This article develops the argument that decision makers of less-democratic countries became more likely to adopt inflation targeting when they observed that nearby countries increased the flexibility of the policy. The statistical analysis of data from 76 countries between 1989 and 2013 supports this hypothesis. The finding that the change of a policy toward a more flexible framework drives its global spread addresses a blind spot in the more recent policy diffusion literature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 617-637 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1614573 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1614573 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:617-637 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jori Breslawski Author-X-Name-First: Jori Author-X-Name-Last: Breslawski Author-Name: David E. Cunningham Author-X-Name-First: David E. Author-X-Name-Last: Cunningham Title: International Influences on Nonviolent and Violent Contention Abstract: How do international actors influence dissidents’ decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that the presence of important actors affects dissident decisions to engage in violent or nonviolent contention by affecting whether dissidents expect that governments will repress or concede to dissident demands in response to this contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors – powerful states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national-level elections in Africa from 2000–2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 638-665 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1638375 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1638375 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:638-665 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sebastian Schutte Author-X-Name-First: Sebastian Author-X-Name-Last: Schutte Title: Politics or prejudice? Explaining individual-level hostilities in India’s Hindu–Muslim conflict Abstract: Multiple explanations have been proposed for what drives India’s Hindu–Muslim conflict. Harnessing novel approaches to data acquisition and analysis, this paper uses insights from an electronic survey with 1,414 respondents to test three prominent theories of why individuals promote conflict with out-groups. The results show that security concerns for the future are strong predictors for a hostile stance and approval of violence. Experiences of violence in the past do not seem to systematically perpetuate hostility. Personal experiences with out-groups strongly correlate with hostile sentiments. These results hold across model specifications, post-stratified estimation based on census data, and a benchmark relying on Finite Mixture Models. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 666-692 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1620743 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1620743 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:666-692 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brandon Ives Author-X-Name-First: Brandon Author-X-Name-Last: Ives Title: Religious Institutionalism: A Domestic Explanation for External Support of Rebel Groups Abstract: What motivates state support for rebel groups? The literature on state support for rebel groups has made critical developments. In particular, scholarship has shed light on the impact of religious identity links. Less work, however, examines the level of religious institutionalism in external states. I argue that the impact of religious links is conditional on the extent to which religion is institutionalized in the external state. Religiously institutionalized states allow domestic religious forces more space in the political arena, which increases pressure on state leaders to support co-religious rebel groups. Using statistical analysis, I find that the interaction of religious institutionalism and religious links affects the likelihood of support. When an external state and rebel group have religious links, and the external state has a high level of religious institutionalism, the likelihood of support is high. In contrast, without a high level of religious institutionalism in the external state, religious links do not increase the likelihood of support. The relationship is driven by cases where the external and target states do not share a religion. This article contributes to existing literature by moving beyond transnational religious links and focuses on how religious institutionalism increases domestic pressure to support co-religious rebel groups. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 693-719 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1621309 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1621309 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:693-719 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Zhanna Terechshenko Author-X-Name-First: Zhanna Author-X-Name-Last: Terechshenko Author-Name: Charles Crabtree Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Crabtree Author-Name: Kristine Eck Author-X-Name-First: Kristine Author-X-Name-Last: Eck Author-Name: Christopher J. Fariss Author-X-Name-First: Christopher J. Author-X-Name-Last: Fariss Title: Evaluating the influence of international norms and shaming on state respect for rights: an audit experiment with foreign embassies Abstract: How do international norms affect respect for human rights? We report the results of an audit experiment with foreign missions that investigates the extent to which state agents observe international norms and react to the potential of international shaming. Our experiment involved emailing 669 foreign diplomatic missions in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom with requests to contact domestic prisoners. According to the United Nations, prisoners have the right for individuals to contact them. We randomly varied (1) whether we reminded embassies about the existence of an international norm permitting prisoner contact and (2) whether the putative email sender is associated with a fictitious human rights organization and, thereby, has the capacity to shame missions through naming and shaming for violating this norm. We find strong evidence for the positive effect of international norms on state respect for human rights. Contra to our expectations, though, we find that the potential of international shaming does not increase the probability of state compliance. The positive effect of the norms cue disappears when it is coupled with the shaming cue, suggesting that shaming might have a ‘backfire’ effect. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 720-735 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1622543 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1622543 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:720-735 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Eitan Y. Alimi Author-X-Name-First: Eitan Y. Author-X-Name-Last: Alimi Author-Name: Gregory M. Maney Author-X-Name-First: Gregory M. Author-X-Name-Last: Maney Author-Name: Alon Burstein Author-X-Name-First: Alon Author-X-Name-Last: Burstein Title: Beyond the media’s radar: Introducing the Intifada Non-Media-Based Dataset Abstract: This article presents the Intifada Non-Media-Based Dataset (INMBD). Drawing primarily on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) daily field reports, the INMBD contains day-level observations of wide-ranging types, modes, and forms of contentious events involving multitudes of parties and actors in the Israeli-Palestinian cycle of contention, known as the First Intifada (1987–1993). Each event – defined as a collective action, claim, message, or decision that pertain explicitly and directly to systems of authority that institutionally structure ethno-nationalist relations – comes with a date, short description, type, location, actors involved, and whether the events result in injury, fatality, and damage to property. After making a case for a new dataset, presenting the particularities of the dataset’s sources, structure, inclusion and coding rules, and discussing its limitations, we offer a descriptive illustration of the dataset’s potential uses, specifically an elaboration of the association between state repression and insurgent violence. The richness and distinctness of information INMBD contains facilitate the identification of the multifaceted, contingent, polyadic, and context-sensitive dynamics of cycles of conflict and contention. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 736-756 Issue: 4 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1614572 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1614572 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:4:p:736-756 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Yuichi Kono Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Yuichi Author-X-Name-Last: Kono Title: Tariffs and Carbon Emissions Abstract: International trade and the environment are uneasy partners. Both environmentalists and free traders worry that the pursuit of one goal may obstruct the other. Nowhere is this tension more evident than in the area of climate change. Does trade liberalization increase carbon emissions? Do efforts to reduce carbon emissions lead to protectionist pressures? This paper addresses these questions by examining the relationship between CO2 emissions and tariffs in 109 to 153 countries from 1988 to 2013. Using instrumental-variable regressions to address reciprocal causation, I find that emissions reductions led to higher tariffs on manufactured goods. This suggests that carbon-intensive industries responded to carbon restrictions by lobbying against trade liberalization. In contrast, emissions did not affect tariffs on less carbon-intensive primary products, and neither type of tariff affected CO2 emissions. My results imply that efforts to combat climate change may obstruct trade liberalization, but the latter should not hinder climate change mitigation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 895-919 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1311257 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1311257 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:895-919 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mark S. Manger Author-X-Name-First: Mark S. Author-X-Name-Last: Manger Author-Name: Clint Peinhardt Author-X-Name-First: Clint Author-X-Name-Last: Peinhardt Title: Learning and the Precision of International Investment Agreements Abstract: The international regime for the promotion and protection of foreign investment consists of a multitude of close to 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and related international investment agreements (IIAs). Yet, despite a growing body of research on IIAs, scholars in political economy have paid little attention to the legal language in the treaties themselves. In this research note, we draw on the conceptual apparatus of the legalization literature and focus on legal precision in BITs. We use a new data set created through quantitative text analysis to develop an index measuring legal precision. We then investigate the causes of the pronounced increase in precision in BITs and the considerable variation across treaties. We argue that capital-exporting countries are the primary drivers of change, and that they are motivated because they learn the implications of existing legal language from two sources: First, from the growing number of arbitration proceedings, and second, when they themselves are targeted by such claims. We provide statistical tests of our hypotheses and find ample support. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 920-940 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1311258 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1311258 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:920-940 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Bernhard Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Bernhard Author-Name: Ömer Faruk Örsün Author-X-Name-First: Ömer Faruk Author-X-Name-Last: Örsün Author-Name: Reşat Bayer Author-X-Name-First: Reşat Author-X-Name-Last: Bayer Title: Democratization in Conflict Research: How Conceptualization Affects Operationalization and Testing Outcomes Abstract: Using the debate over democratization and conflict, we demonstrate how the connection between conceptualization and operationalization can play a decisive role in testing falsifiable hypotheses. We discuss seven different operationalizations of regime change based on three different conceptualizations of democracy. Although we find high correlations between different measures of democracy, when they are used to capture regime change, the correlations drop precipitously. In multivariate estimations of the effect of regime change on a range of conflict variables, we generate widely disparate results, providing no consistent support that democratization affects conflict. We thus demonstrate that decisions about conceptualization and subsequent operationalization have decisive impact on the inference we produce. In contrast, our controls for the effect of institutionalized democracy consistently show a negative relationship between joint democracy and conflict. Finally, autocratic regime change seems to be more robustly correlated with a range of conflict behaviors than heretofore recognized in this literature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 941-966 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1257489 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1257489 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:941-966 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: T. David Mason Author-X-Name-First: T. David Author-X-Name-Last: Mason Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Title: State Capacity, Regime Type, and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War Abstract: About half of the nations that experience civil war eventually relapse into renewed conflict within a few years after the original war ends. This observation has motivated a stream of research into the factors that affect the risk of peace failure in the aftermath of civil war. While the outcome of the previous civil war—for example, military victory versus peace agreement—structures the post-war environment in ways that affect the risk of peace failure, the capacity of the post-war state to enact and implement policies that affect the incentives for and capacity of groups to undertake armed violence as a means of advancing their interests should also affect the risks of peace failure. Using Geddes’ categories of nondemocratic regime types, we will present a theory of how different regime types have varying capacities to repress and/or implement accommodative policies that affect the risk of peace failure. We test propositions derived from this theory with a series of event history models. Our findings suggest that while peace agreements significantly increase the duration of post-civil war peace, peace agreements involving some types of nondemocratic regimes actually increase the risk of post-civil war peace failure. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 967-993 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1260012 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1260012 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:967-993 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Madhav Joshi Author-X-Name-First: Madhav Author-X-Name-Last: Joshi Author-Name: SungYong Lee Author-X-Name-First: SungYong Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Roger Mac Ginty Author-X-Name-First: Roger Author-X-Name-Last: Mac Ginty Title: Built-in Safeguards and the Implementation of Civil War Peace Accords Abstract: This article contributes to analyses of peace agreement implementation by focusing on the role of built-in safeguards as procedural mechanisms within peace agreements. Recent empirical studies suggest that negotiated peace agreements are a frequent mode of armed conflict termination and implementation of those agreements to be the primary predictor of enduring peace and the quality of that peace. However, in many instances implementation takes years or even decades and is subject to breakdown before achieving the key implementation objectives. In this article, we identify and theorize three key safeguards in peace accords: transitional power-sharing, dispute resolution, and verification mechanisms. We argue that these safeguards lead to higher implementation of provisions negotiated in peace agreements by addressing mutual suspicion and by facilitating more constructive working relationships among former rivals. To test our arguments, we analyze implementation of comprehensive peace agreements negotiated between 1989 and 2012 from the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Data (PAM_ID). We find that the built-in safeguards that we have identified significantly explain variations in levels of peace agreement implementation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 994-1018 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1257491 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1257491 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:994-1018 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kathryn McNabb Cochran Author-X-Name-First: Kathryn Author-X-Name-Last: McNabb Cochran Author-Name: Stephen B. Long Author-X-Name-First: Stephen B. Author-X-Name-Last: Long Title: Measuring Military Effectiveness: Calculating Casualty Loss-Exchange Ratios for Multilateral Wars, 1816–1990 Abstract: In this article, we introduce and utilize a new dataset that provides battle- and war- level Loss Exchange Ratios (LERs) for combatant states involved in multilateral wars between 1816 and 1990.The battle-level data provide an alternative to the widely used, but problematic, HERO/CDB-90 data set on battle outcomes. To demonstrate the utility of the new data, we weigh in on the debate over democratic military effectiveness arguments by replicating models by Reiter and Stam (2002, 2009) and Downes (2009), finding that, when effectiveness is measured using LERs, democracies do not have an edge over their non-democratic counterparts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1019-1040 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1273914 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1273914 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:1019-1040 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: The Editors Title: Editorial Board EOV Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1041-1041 Issue: 6 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1397864 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1397864 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:6:p:1041-1041 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Kinsella Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Kinsella Title: Nested rivalries: Superpower competition, arms transfers, and regional conflict, 1950–1990 Abstract: Interstate rivalries in the Third World cannot be fully understood apart from the global context in which they evolve and endure. This study examines the link between the superpowers’ Cold War competition and regional rivalry by focusing specifically on arms‐transfer relationships. Poisson regression analysis highlights the interrelationships between superpower competition, arms transfers, and regional rivalry in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Horn of Africa from 1950 to 1990. Many of the observed patterns are consistent with a realist explanation of interstate alignment and conflict, but a more holistic theory is required to detail the mechanisms by which Third World rivalries are nested in great power competition. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 109-125 Issue: 2 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434862 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434862 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:2:p:109-125 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Marina Arbetman Author-X-Name-First: Marina Author-X-Name-Last: Arbetman Title: The impact of politics on exchange rate fluctuations: The untold story Abstract: Exchange rate fluctuations send the wrong message to economic agents, affect the credibility of the government and result in loss of welfare for the whole society. Therefore, the optimal economic and political scenario revolves around stable equilibrium exchange rates. This paper is concerned with long term trends and builds up on balance of payment explanations of exchange rates fluctuations but adds a political perspective. It contends that effective governments will provide trust in their capacity of managing and implementing the necessary policies to avoid misalignments, especially recurrent devaluations. Using cross‐pooled time series analysis for 90 countries during 1960–1985, I find that while the economic explanation is straight forward, politics provides a nonlinear interpretation. Higher level of reserves provides governments with flexibility to intervene in the foreign exchange market; high levels of indebtedness are counterproductive to maintain a strong domestic currency but, the current account balance is not a significant predictor. Somewhat counter intuitively, I find that strong governments are at the mercy of economic forces; while weak governments, that could effectively use political tools to avoid devaluations, are prevented from doing so by their very weakness. Thus, political interventions are most effective when applied by weak governments who can seldom muster the capacity to do so, and least effective when applied by capable governments who act in hopes of altering their economic environment. The policy implications are important because political interventions could be very successful when accompanied by marginal increases in the political capacity of weak governments. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 127-153 Issue: 2 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434863 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434863 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:2:p:127-153 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Raymond Dacey Author-X-Name-First: Raymond Author-X-Name-Last: Dacey Title: A general model of international interactions and peace economics Abstract: This paper arises from some recent discussions of Peace Economics (Dacey, 1994a; Isard, 1994; Polachek, 1994; and Tinbergen, 1994). The purpose of the paper is to provide a model that integrates the seemingly disparate disciplines of international relations, domestic politics, and international business, and thereby provide a unified model of international interactions and peace economics. I present a model of international interactions based on a three‐part system of games—political games played between nations by governments, business games played between nations by firms, and pressure games played within and between nations by governments and firms: The games in the first component of this system are generally referred to as international relations games and those in the second as international business games. The games in the third component do not have a familiar name; I will call them pressure games. Here I outline the three components of this system, sketch the structure of the overall system, delineate some of the particular games, and try to establish the interconnections between and among these games. I conclude with some comments about the analytical tools that remain to be developed as Peace Economics, in particular, and International Political Economy, in general, advance. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 155-180 Issue: 2 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434864 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434864 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:2:p:155-180 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Ward Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Ward Author-Name: Mohan Penubarti Author-X-Name-First: Mohan Author-X-Name-Last: Penubarti Author-Name: Jordin Cohen Author-X-Name-First: Jordin Author-X-Name-Last: Cohen Author-Name: Corey Lofdahl Author-X-Name-First: Corey Author-X-Name-Last: Lofdahl Title: Guns and growth around the globe Abstract: A model of direct and indirect linkages between defense outlays and economic output is developed and applied to approximately 100 countries. We illustrate that there is a positive linkage between military spending programs and economic productivity in most countries of the world. In addition, we find generally positive externalities from the military sector into the civilian sectors of the economy. Importantly, we find that the opportunity costs associated with military spending are considerable and that civilian investments generally produce greater economic benefits than military ones. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 181-201 Issue: 2 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434865 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434865 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:2:p:181-201 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Yoo Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Author-X-Name-Last: Yoo Title: Capital Account Liberalization, Financial Structure, and Access to Credit in Latin America Abstract: This article revisits the question of whether capital account liberalization improves access to credit by advancing and testing a theory of how the structure of the financial sector shapes the willingness and ability of banks and governments to repress the domestic financial sector. In a highly concentrated financial sector, banks and governments are more willing to reap the benefits of financial openness by suppressing liberalizing reforms to domestic financial policies, and they can also better coordinate with one another to stifle these reforms compared to when the financial sector is diffuse. Using a panel dataset of Latin American and Caribbean countries, I find that capital account liberalization leads to a decrease in loans to private firms and households and an increase in loans to governments and state-owned enterprises when the financial sector is highly concentrated. Only when the financial sector is diffuse does capital account liberalization lead to reforms in entry barriers, directed credit programs, and banking sector supervision, which extends to improved access to credit for private firms and households. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 385-410 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1311330 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1311330 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:385-410 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Author-Name: James M. Scott Author-X-Name-First: James M. Author-X-Name-Last: Scott Title: The Democracy Aid Calculus: Regimes, Political Opponents, and the Allocation of US Democracy Assistance, 1981–2009 Abstract: To encourage the spread of democracy throughout the developing world, the United States provides targeted aid to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations. This study examines the calculations behind the allocation of democracy assistance, with special attention to the role of regime conditions and policy compatibility in the provision of aid. We argue that both concerns—the opportunity for successful democratization and critical goals related to containing and countering political opponents—are central to democracy aid allocations. We theorize how these two concerns determine the amount of aid allocated, operationalizing these concepts using measures of the original democracy level, change in the democracy level, and policy compatibility. We find support for our argument in tests of US democracy aid allocations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1981–2009. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 268-293 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1339701 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1339701 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:268-293 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Amy Pond Author-X-Name-First: Amy Author-X-Name-Last: Pond Title: Worker Influence on Capital Account Policy: Inflow Liberalization and Outflow Restrictions Abstract: How do workers impact openness to international investment flows? This article distinguishes between two types of openness: openness to inflows and openness to outflows of investment. Workers benefit from inflow openness due to increases in wages, productivity, and efficiency and due to reductions in borrowing costs, which are associated with investment inflows. Workers are hurt by outflow openness, as investors gain investment options, and therefore bargaining power, when outflows are permitted. Labor rights help workers overcome collective action problems, and democratic institutions increase policymakers’ responsiveness to labor organizations and make their commitment to labor rights credible. The theory thus predicts that, particularly under democratic institutions, labor rights are positively correlated with inflow openness and negatively correlated with outflow openness. Evidence from time-series, cross-sectional data is consistent with the theoretical expectations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 244-267 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1344125 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1344125 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:244-267 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Leah Windsor Author-X-Name-First: Leah Author-X-Name-Last: Windsor Author-Name: Nia Dowell Author-X-Name-First: Nia Author-X-Name-Last: Dowell Author-Name: Alistair Windsor Author-X-Name-First: Alistair Author-X-Name-Last: Windsor Author-Name: John Kaltner Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Kaltner Title: Leader Language and Political Survival Strategies Abstract: Authoritarian leaders’ language provides clues to their survival strategies for remaining in office. This line of inquiry fits within an emerging literature that refocuses attention from state-level features to the dynamic role that individual heads of state and government play in international relations, especially in authoritarian regimes. The burgeoning text-as-data field can be used to deepen our understanding of the nuances of leader survival and political choices; for example, language can serve as a leading indicator of leader approval, which itself is a good predictor of leader survival. In this paper, we apply computational linguistics tools to an authoritarian leader corpus consisting of 102 speeches from nine leaders of countries across the Middle East and North Africa between 2009 and 2012. We find systematic differences in the language of these leaders, which help advance a more broadly applicable theory of authoritarian leader language and tenure. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 321-336 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1345737 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1345737 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:321-336 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Skyler J. Cranmer Author-X-Name-First: Skyler J. Author-X-Name-Last: Cranmer Author-Name: Elizabeth J. Menninga Author-X-Name-First: Elizabeth J. Author-X-Name-Last: Menninga Title: Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes1 Abstract: Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Yet what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed is poorly understood. We argue that the quality of multinational military coalitions—in terms of the coalition’s skill, coordination, and legitimacy—can provide better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing conflict aims. Empirical testing reveals that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success: a history of success, both alone and with the same coalition partners, predicts military success. Moreover, increasing a coalition’s legitimacy via more diverse members has a weak effect, indicating that diversity comes at the expense of coordination and cooperation challenges. Last, we find that elements of coalition quality affect initiating and defending coalitions differently. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 217-243 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1369410 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1369410 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:217-243 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Efe Tokdemir Author-X-Name-First: Efe Author-X-Name-Last: Tokdemir Author-Name: Brendan Skip Mark Author-X-Name-First: Brendan Skip Author-X-Name-Last: Mark Title: When Killers Become Victims: Diversionary War, Human Rights, and Strategic Target Selection Abstract: The diversionary theory largely focuses on the incentives leaders have to use force. However, little attention has been given to the characteristics that make for a good target. We argue that US presidents choose targets that repress human rights since they are the easiest to sell to international and domestic audiences. By targeting repressive states US presidents can justify their use of force by cloaking their motivation in the language of human rights, responding to calls for intervention, pointing to the failure of international actors and institutions to resolve these problems, and building upon emerging norms that allow for intervention in repressive states. Updating US Use of Force data, we empirically test and find support for our hypothesis that presidents target human rights abusers when they face trouble at home. This paper contributes to target selection process by offering a complete theory of diversionary conflict accounting for cost/benefit calculation of presidents. Moreover, we believe that our findings reveal human rights practices’ role in international conflict, as well. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 337-360 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1369412 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1369412 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:337-360 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Leonardo Baccini Author-X-Name-First: Leonardo Author-X-Name-Last: Baccini Author-Name: Wilfred M. Chow Author-X-Name-First: Wilfred M. Author-X-Name-Last: Chow Title: The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries Abstract: While autocracies constitute a third of all signatories of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), very little research has explained why some autocrats join PTAs while others do not. We argue that this variation reflects the leader’s degree of vulnerability to elite-led coups during leadership change–whether a leader enters power legally or extralegally. New extralegal leaders are more vulnerable than new legal leaders, which encourages extralegal leaders to use PTAs to both build support from exporters and pressure disloyal importers. We test our hypotheses using a dyadic data set of 120 autocracies from 1960 to 2014. Our results show that extralegal leaders sign more and deeper PTAs than legal leaders. Moreover, we find that extralegal leaders with a high risk of coups are more likely to form deep PTAs than extralegal leaders with a low risk of coups. In line with our argument, we also provide evidence that extralegal leaders sign trade agreements that are likely to be enforced. Our article has implications for the political economy of trade and for development studies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 189-216 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1373352 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1373352 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:189-216 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick E. Shea Author-X-Name-First: Patrick E. Author-X-Name-Last: Shea Author-Name: Jonathan A. Solis Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan A. Author-X-Name-Last: Solis Title: Leaders, Tenure, and the Politics of Sovereign Credit Abstract: Sovereign creditworthiness is as much a function of politics as economic fundamentals. Previous research has focused on the relationship between creditworthiness and political factors such as regime type, regional effects, and international organization membership. These factors, while important, often change slowly and do not always capture the more dynamic political determinants of creditworthiness. As an alternative, this study focuses on the role of leaders. We argue that leaders’ tenure reduces uncertainty in the sovereign credit market. Time in power allows leaders to better manage expectations related to sovereign credit policy of both domestic supporters and market actors. As a result, we expect that creditworthiness improves as a leader’s tenure increases. We find supporting evidence for our argument using two distinct empirical approaches: panel data analysis and a natural experiment. Our findings provide a better understanding of the relationship between leaders, politics, and sovereign credit. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 294-320 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1406932 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1406932 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:294-320 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tristin Beckman Author-X-Name-First: Tristin Author-X-Name-Last: Beckman Title: Reversing Course: Fiscal Policy and Economic Interdependence Abstract: In response to the 2008 financial crisis, countries throughout the developed world widely embraced fiscal stimulus policies. But about one year later, with their economies still weak, a majority of these countries reversed course and adopted austerity measures, despite having the ability to maintain fiscal expansions. With little variation in domestic interests, institutions, or political ideologies over this short time period, theories of budgetary politics struggle to explain this policy shift. This shortcoming may be the result of the literature generally ignoring the international effects of fiscal policy. I argue that policymakers strategically consider their trade partners’ likely fiscal policies before setting domestic fiscal policy. If incumbents expect their major trade partners to enact fiscal expansions, they are more likely to pass expansionary policies of their own. But when incumbents expect their counterparts to enact contractionary policies, they are less likely to fund expansionary policies, as these policies may boost foreign economies with suppressed effects at home. I test this argument using spatial econometrics and a data set of OECD countries from 1998 to 2015. The evidence suggests that shifting expectations of fiscal policies abroad explains much of the move from stimulus to austerity over the short time span. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 361-384 Issue: 2 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1434169 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1434169 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:2:p:361-384 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Anup Phayal Author-X-Name-First: Anup Author-X-Name-Last: Phayal Title: UN Troop Deployment and Preventing Violence Against Civilians in Darfur Abstract: Does the presence of UN peacekeeping force lower civilian fatalities at the local level? If it does, is it because of their coercive military capacity or for other reasons such as their roles in monitoring and reporting violent atrocities? To explore these questions, I study the deployment of peacekeeping units in Darfur and its impact on violence against civilians. Using original geocoded data of UN deployments before and after the intervention, I examine what aspects of such deployments impact one-sided civilian killings by government and rebel groups. Results indicate that deploying UN peacekeepers in an area restrains belligerent from targeting civilians. However, the military capacity of peacekeepers is not a significant predictor of violence against civilians. While their ability to defend themselves is extremely important for peacekeepers, these findings caution against the militarization trend in UN peacekeeping and seek to reshift focus on other substantive aspects of peacekeeping. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 757-780 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1593161 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1593161 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:757-780 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mi Jeong Shin Author-X-Name-First: Mi Jeong Author-X-Name-Last: Shin Author-Name: Chia-yi Lee Author-X-Name-First: Chia-yi Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: Labor Market Institutions and Outward Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries Abstract: Concern among voters in the United States and elsewhere about jobs moving overseas has spurred significant research into outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), which can depress employment and economic growth. Recent research shows that labor market institutions play a prominent role in influencing inward foreign direct investment in developed economies, but little is known about how such institutions influence OFDI. We argue that increasing labor union density or centralized wage bargaining threatens firms’ profitability and thus leads to higher OFDI flows. Yet union density and coordination of wage setting moderate each other’s effect on OFDI since firms can expect wage moderation, fewer strikes, and labor skill protection that offset labor costs. Our tests using data on 27 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries between 1971 and 2013 suggest this is the case. The findings indicate that a highly stable and institutionalized labor market can lead firms to stay and to return if they have left. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 781-803 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1642885 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1642885 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:781-803 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joonbum Bae Author-X-Name-First: Joonbum Author-X-Name-Last: Bae Title: International conflict, military rule, and violent authoritarian breakdown Abstract: Why do some transitions of power from military rule occur violently while others do not? What effect, if any, does the international security environment have on how violent breakdowns of authoritarian rule are? I argue a conflict-prone security environment ameliorates the commitment problem by ensuring an influential role for the military out of power. Therefore, when facing a domestic crisis in a threatening security environment, military leaders are more likely to peacefully cede power rather than wield violent measures to stay in office. Perhaps counter-intuitively, international conflicts thus lead to transitions of power from military rule that minimize violence and human costs. International conflicts do not have this moderating effect on other types of authoritarian rule. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 804-837 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1647837 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1647837 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:804-837 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Su-Mi Lee Author-X-Name-First: Su-Mi Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Title: The Conditional Effectiveness of Directive Mediation Abstract: This research re-examines the effectiveness of directive mediation in interstate rivalries. To do so, highlighting the importance of disputants’ willingness for successful directive mediation, this study identifies four conditions that affect the levels of disputants’ willingness to engage in mediation talks and proposes that the presence of such conditions improves or worsens the efficacy of directive strategies. We expect heavy-handed mediators will be less effective in a dispute involving highly interdependent or power-imbalanced rivalries while directive mediation performs poorly when it is led by unbiased mediators or when it is employed for long-running rivals. Our empirical findings, based on two existing rivalry datasets, suggest that directive mediation fares well when mediators are biased, when rivals are power-balanced, and when rivalries are protracted, and that the efficacy of directive mediation improves in disputes involving highly interdependent strategic rivals but decreases in the cases between highly interdependent general rivals. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 838-864 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1614923 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1614923 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:838-864 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yasutaka Tominaga Author-X-Name-First: Yasutaka Author-X-Name-Last: Tominaga Title: Evaluating the impact of repeated leadership targeting on militant group durability Abstract: The effects of repeated leadership targeting on militant organizations have been little discussed and quantitatively assessed. This research undertakes to assess the policy’s effectiveness by account for targeting policies’ repeated nature. Analysis of 207 militant organizations between 1970 and 2008 finds that repeated targeting can hasten a group’s demise, but quadratically. While initial targeting interventions actually increase a group’s resilience, a series of successive attacks significantly reduces their survivability. This effect is particularly significant for young organizations. The findings suggest that for targeting to be effective, patience and repeated interventions are required; it is erroneous to conclude its effectiveness based on a single intervention result. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 865-892 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1647836 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1647836 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:865-892 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Levke Aduda Author-X-Name-First: Levke Author-X-Name-Last: Aduda Title: Failed agreements and their impact on subsequent mediation onset and success in intrastate conflicts Abstract: What impact do failed mediated agreements have on subsequent mediation onset and success? The question of mediation onset and success is undoubtedly important, given that mediation is one of the international community’s preferred conflict management tools, but its voluntary nature leaves room for the conflict parties to (dis)agree to talks and possible settlements. Existing research suggests that previous mediation outcomes can affect subsequent mediation efforts positively or negatively – depending on the outcome in focus. This article argues that failed agreements – an outcome of mediation that has not been accounted for in existing literature – underscore the persistence of the commitment problem, and therefore the hazards of sharing private information. Consequently, the conflict parties question the utility of mediation, and the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset decreases. If subsequent talks take place despite the failed agreement, the conflict parties refrain from sharing private information, and reaching an agreement becomes thus less likely. Drawing on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Managing Intrastate Conflict in Africa data set and the UCDP Peace Agreement data set, the results strongly underline the negative impact failed agreements have on subsequent mediation onset, and thereby show that agreement longevity is crucial not only for peace duration but also for leaving the door open to subsequent talks. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 893-916 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1642201 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1642201 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:893-916 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sung Eun Kim Author-X-Name-First: Sung Eun Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: Johannes Urpelainen Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Urpelainen Author-Name: Joonseok Yang Author-X-Name-First: Joonseok Author-X-Name-Last: Yang Title: Environmental effects of GATT/WTO membership: an empirical evaluation Abstract: One of the great questions for scholars of international relations and economics concerns the relationship between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the natural environment. Does membership in the multilateral trade regime constrain environmental regulation and increase the environmental burden of national economies? Do countries pay a heavy environmental price for trade liberalization? Although this question has been debated extensively, there is little statistical evidence to contribute the debate. We provide a comprehensive statistical analysis of the environmental effects of joining the multilateral trade regime. We collected data on a variety of environmental policies, institutions, and outcomes that should be influenced by the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO membership if the predictions of environmental pessimists or optimists are valid. A wide range of statistical models designed to identify the causal effect of the GATT/WTO on the environmental indicators shows that joining the GATT/WTO does not have negative effects on environmental quality. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 917-932 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1632305 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1632305 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:917-932 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joshua Tschantret Author-X-Name-First: Joshua Author-X-Name-Last: Tschantret Title: The old terrorism: a dataset, 1860 – 1969 Abstract: Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, research on terrorism has grown exponentially. Data limitations, however, have made temporal generalization difficult. Most terrorism datasets extend back only to the 1970s, which inhibits the ability to quantitatively examine earlier waves of terrorism. To address this limitation, this article presents a dataset of over 250 terrorist organizations formed between 1860 and 1969. These data, which have global coverage, include country-year information on group formation, allowing scholars to examine the relationship between various country-year factors and the emergence of terrorist organizations. To illustrate their usefulness, these data are used to examine the relationship between democracy and terrorist group formation. Following several recent studies, the empirical analysis reveals a curvilinear or inverted u-shaped relationship between terrorism and democracy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 933-948 Issue: 5 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1649259 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1649259 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:5:p:933-948 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Charles Kegley Author-X-Name-First: Charles Author-X-Name-Last: Kegley Author-Name: Margaret Hermann Author-X-Name-First: Margaret Author-X-Name-Last: Hermann Title: Military intervention and the democratic peace Abstract: The finding generated by numerous empirical investigations that democracies do not wage war against one another has inspired hope that the democratic “pacific union” envisioned by Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson might be created in the late 1990s as democracy spreads worldwide. This paper examines democracies' use of overt military intervention, exploring if the democratic peace applies to small‐scale as well as large‐scale war. The research uncovers 15 instances in which free democratic states have moved their regular troops into the territory of other free states and 32 instances of free states intervening into partly free states between 1974 and 1988. Focusing on these anomalous cases, the paper assesses the extent to which this interventionist activity comprises a potential “danger zone in the democratic peace,” and a concludes with a discussion of the role that interventionism is likely to play in a democratic twentieth‐century peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-21 Issue: 1 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434857 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434857 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:1:p:1-21 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas Lemke Author-X-Name-First: Douglas Author-X-Name-Last: Lemke Title: The tyranny of distance: Redefining relevant dyads Abstract: Investigation of the causes of war requires analysis of the characteristics and behavior of only those dyads of countries that are potential belligerents. Several scholars have offered rules for delineating such “relevant dyads”. One common element of such rules is contiguity. A second common element is major power status. Any dyad involving either contiguous states or a major power is defined as relevant. Such definitions of relevant dyads are simple and useful. Nevertheless, I contend that some contiguous dyads are not relevant to study of the causes of war, while some non‐contiguous dyads are relevant. For example, Israel and Iraq are neither contiguous, nor major powers. With existing definitions this dyad is not deemed relevant. I offer an operational definition of relevant dyads that delineates which dyads are proximate enough in terms of distance and terrain to be potential war fighters, regardless of major or minor power status. Adapting existing work on the loss‐of‐strength gradient, I argue that each member of the international system has an area of the globe within which it can act militarily. This area is the relevant neighborhood of that country. Relevant‐dyads are found where relevant neighborhoods overlap. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 23-38 Issue: 1 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434858 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434858 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:1:p:23-38 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dan Reiter Author-X-Name-First: Dan Author-X-Name-Last: Reiter Title: Political structure and foreign policy learning: Are democracies more likely to act on the lessons of history? Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of domestic political structure on whether a state's foreign policy will reflect the lessons of history. The paper focuses on one theory of learning in foreign policy, the formative events model. Drawing on social psychology and public opinion literatures, two arguments are made as to why the foreign policies of democracies may be more likely to reflect the lessons of formative events than those of non‐democracies. Another argument, based on a bureaucratic learning model, is made as to why the foreign policies of non‐democracies may be more likely than those of democracies to reflect the lessons of formative events. These hypotheses are then tested on behavior in three areas, alliances, crisis bargaining, and extended deterrence. The results indicate limited support for the hypothesis that the foreign policies of democracies are more likely to reflect the lessons of formative events than those of non‐democracies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 39-62 Issue: 1 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434859 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434859 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:1:p:39-62 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sherry Quiñones Author-X-Name-First: Sherry Author-X-Name-Last: Quiñones Author-Name: Scott Gates Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Gates Title: Economic risk and the politics of protectionism Abstract: Numerous scholars continue to search for explanations to account for the rise of protectionist trade practices by some nation‐states. Recent work has sought to formally link the notion of economic risk with the rise in barriers to free trade. This class of models examine what trade policies are optimal under different conditions arising from changes in the world economy. Generally speaking, unexpected fluctuations in the world economy place some nation‐state's domestic economies at risk. Specifically, risk has the potential to affect the economic well being of various domestic groups who subsequently demand protection. These demands, if met, are usually mitigated by the manipulation of trade policies that prove to be suboptimal for international free trade. Existing research has several notable shortcomings. First, most studies tend to focus on normative questions concerned with determining the type of trade strategies nation‐states should pursue when they confront risk. However, this research neglects the political dimension of risk. Policy options available to mitigate the effects of risk, which are optimal in economic terms, may not be optimal politically. We suggest that the decision process involved in determining what type of policy to pursue is inherently political. This research begins to uncover the political dimensions of this process by developing an explanation for governmental responsiveness to risk conditions. Secondly, most studies do not empirically verify their assertions. With the exception of Bates et al. (1991), few empirical studies exist on this topic. This paper seeks to address these theoretical and empirical deficits by (1) delineating the political dimension of risk in order to derive a theoretical explanation that accounts for risk and explains why nation‐states may find it in their best interest to pursue protectionist trade policy strategies and (2) provide an empirical test of the relationship between risk and trade among a small sample of countries. Building upon previous research by Bates et al. (1991), we operationalize economic risk to reflect the instability of a nation‐state's terms‐of‐trade in the international economy. We then seek to determine what nation‐states are most vulnerable to economic risk. Subsequently, we test whether countries most vulnerable to risk have a higher propensity to impose barriers to free trade. Lastly, we test to see what effect the availability of governmental resources have on a nation‐state's propensity to adopt a free trade policy orientation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 63-83 Issue: 1 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434860 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434860 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:1:p:63-83 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Author-Name: Glenn Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Glenn Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Title: Targets of covert pressure: The hidden victims of the democratic peace Abstract: The expanding literature on the relationship between democracy and international conflict continues to focus on two questions: Are democracies inherently more peaceful than other forms of government? Why do democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another? The first question now appears settled. The empirical record is clear. Democracies are not inherently more peaceful than other forms of government. Although the second question is still subject to a wide‐ranging debate, there is a growing consensus that democracies almost never use force against each other. Presently, that is where agreement ends. Explanation of the relative lack of war among democratic nations is where the debate now rages. We suggest that, while violence among democratic states is scarce, these states do fight one another—just in ways that are more concealed. We use a modified version of the crisis subgame from Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) to demonstrate that relatively weak democracies that seek changes in structural dependency and are vulnerable to outside efforts at destabilization are likely to be the victims of covert attack by more powerful democratic states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 85-107 Issue: 1 Volume: 21 Year: 1995 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434861 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629508434861 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:1:p:85-107 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cassy Dorff Author-X-Name-First: Cassy Author-X-Name-Last: Dorff Author-Name: Shahryar Minhas Author-X-Name-First: Shahryar Author-X-Name-Last: Minhas Title: When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance Abstract: In this article we address the long-debated question of when and why states comply with sanctions. While the literature remains indeterminate as to whether the key mechanisms driving sanction compliance are tied to interstate relations, intrastate constraints, or a dynamic combination of the two, our theoretical framework and methodological approach provide a novel perspective that incorporates insights drawn from network theory to explain the time until countries comply. Specifically, we argue that reciprocity, a concept with deep roots in both network theory and international relations, has largely been overlooked in the study of sanction compliance. Though often ignored, this concept captures an essential aspect of how cooperation is fostered in the international system and allows us to better analyze the strategic environment underlying sanctioning behavior. Given the theoretical importance of reciprocity in understanding interstate relations, we provide an approach that integrates estimations of this type of network interdependency into extant frameworks for modeling the time until countries comply with sanctions. Our results highlight that reciprocity not only has a substantive effect in explaining the duration of sanctions but that models excluding this concept from their specifications do notably worse in terms of their predictive performance. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 563-588 Issue: 4 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1221679 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1221679 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:4:p:563-588 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Justin Esarey Author-X-Name-First: Justin Author-X-Name-Last: Esarey Author-Name: Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt Author-X-Name-First: Jacqueline H. R. Author-X-Name-Last: DeMeritt Title: Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse Abstract: Does being named and shamed for human rights abuse influence the amount of foreign aid received by the shamed state? Recent research suggests that the impact of public censure may depend on the political relationship between donor and recipient. We argue that donors deriving a direct political benefit from the aid relationship (such as a military advantage or the satisfaction of a domestic political audience) will ignore or work against condemnation, but donors with little political interest in the recipient (who give aid for symbolic or humanitarian reasons) will punish condemned states. We also argue that the size of prior aid packages can be used as a holistic measure of the donor’s political interest in the aid relationship because mutually beneficial aid packages are subject to a bargaining process that favors recipients with more to offer. We find that condemnation for human rights abuse by the United Nations is associated with lower bilateral aid levels among states that previously received small aid package, and with equal or higher bilateral aid to states already receiving a great deal of aid. The source of shaming also matters: We find that public shaming by human rights NGOs is not associated with decreased aggregate bilateral aid. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 589-618 Issue: 4 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1223656 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1223656 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:4:p:589-618 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Julia Gray Author-X-Name-First: Julia Author-X-Name-Last: Gray Author-Name: René Lindstädt Author-X-Name-First: René Author-X-Name-Last: Lindstädt Author-Name: Jonathan B. Slapin Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan B. Author-X-Name-Last: Slapin Title: The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations Abstract: Most international organizations (IOs) expand their membership over the course of their lifespan. Although these enlargements tend to be heralded as normatively positive — for the IOs themselves, for the new members, and for cooperative outcomes more generally — expansions can also lead to conflicts in the organization. What conditions lead to enlargement rounds that reshape an organization in unexpected ways? We argue that, depending upon the diversity of the initial group of countries, members may vote to admit new entrants that can tilt organizational decision-making in unexpected directions. We anticipate fewer enlargements with lesser impact on the character of the organization among organizations that have either a smaller range of founding members or a relatively even initial dispersion. We develop an agent-based model that accounts for the complex decision-making environment and social dynamics that typify IO accession processes. The model helps us explain how the nature of decision-making in organizations can shift following enlargement, likely changing the organization’s output and goals. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 619-642 Issue: 4 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1228039 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1228039 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:4:p:619-642 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christian Arnold Author-X-Name-First: Christian Author-X-Name-Last: Arnold Title: Empty Promises and Nonincorporation in Mercosur Abstract: Why do the member states of the world’s fourth-largest trading block incorporate only about two-thirds of all policies they adopt? This article argues that empty promises are an important reason for Mercosur’s incorporation problems and that Mercosur’s institutional design furthers such a defective behavior. Member governments easily sign agreements whenever they are rewarded for the mere act of doing so. However, if they expect high costs from implementing these policies, they try to avoid incorporation. Since only the last state to incorporate a policy triggers its overall legal validity, Mercosur’s members can easily veto any agreement ex post. In addition to empty promises, mismanaged drafting and incorporation and the abuse of negotiation power also pose important obstacles to incorporation. Free riding, however, does not play a role. Due to the incorporation rules, there can be no externalities that incentivize unilateral defection. The article substantiates the arguments empirically with the multivariate analysis of the complete incorporation record of 1,033 policies adopted between 1994 and 2008. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 643-667 Issue: 4 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1206391 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1206391 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:4:p:643-667 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nikola Mirilovic Author-X-Name-First: Nikola Author-X-Name-Last: Mirilovic Author-Name: David S. Siroky Author-X-Name-First: David S. Author-X-Name-Last: Siroky Title: International Recognition and Religion: A Quantitative Analysis of Kosovo’s Contested Status Abstract: Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming a fully fledged member state of the international system. Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized, the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries but not others extend recognition. However, research on what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty. It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level through religious institutions and one at the international level through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide strong support for these two pathways through which religion shapes state decisions regarding international recognition. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 668-687 Issue: 4 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1227805 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1227805 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:4:p:668-687 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Qiang Zhou Author-X-Name-First: Qiang Author-X-Name-Last: Zhou Title: Endogenizing Labor Mobility: A Partisan Politics Explanation Abstract: Much of the existing literature shows that factor mobility across industries has important political economic implications but that it is exogenous to the political process. This article argues that labor’s mobility across industries can be endogenous to changes of power relations due to partisan reasons. Based on a general equilibrium model, the prediction is that, when unions are decentralized, governments led by left-wing parties seek and obtain higher labor mobility than do governments led by rightist parties. However, as unions become more centralized, this distinction becomes less clear-cut. Time series cross-sectional analyses of OECD countries from 1960 to 1999 support this prediction and the endogenous labor mobility hypothesis. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 688-715 Issue: 4 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1222712 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1222712 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:4:p:688-715 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ammar Shamaileh Author-X-Name-First: Ammar Author-X-Name-Last: Shamaileh Title: Never out of Now: Preference Falsification, Social Capital and the Arab Spring Abstract: Could the Arab Spring have led to a rise in support for authoritarian governments in some states? Discussions of revolutionary diffusion during the Arab Spring focused on whether expressions of discontent spread to different states. Such discussions, however, neglect the potential for there to be a decrease in expressions of discontent in the wake of spreading revolutionary sentiment in certain contexts. The spread of revolutionary fervor in states with similar characteristics decreases perceptions that individuals will free ride in a revolution, and, thus, increases the perception that a revolution can succeed. This perceived increase in the probability of a revolution succeeding, however, can decrease expressions of discontent with the regime where the threat of an unfavorable alternative replacing the status quo is high. The empirical analysis of data collected before and after the Arab Spring provides evidence that the Arab Spring decreased criticism of the regime in some authoritarian contexts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 949-975 Issue: 6 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1650744 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1650744 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:6:p:949-975 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Joshua C. Fjelstul Author-X-Name-First: Joshua C. Author-X-Name-Last: Fjelstul Author-Name: Dan Reiter Author-X-Name-First: Dan Author-X-Name-Last: Reiter Title: Explaining incompleteness and conditionality in alliance agreements Abstract: What explains the form of international alliances? Conventional wisdom forecasts that audience cost-averse states like democracies demand that their alliances include conditions, such as limitations to specific regions, to reduce the likelihood of paying the audience costs of treaty violation. This paper builds on the conventional wisdom by proposing that democracies are especially likely to demand that an alliance include conditions that make the treaty more incomplete, that is, make the compliance requirements more ambiguous, in comparison to including conditions that do not make the treaty more incomplete. Treaty incompleteness gives leaders another tool to reduce domestic political audience cost risks. Incompleteness makes it easier for a leader to argue to a domestic political audience that a wider array of actions, including actions such as nonintervention on behalf of an embattled ally that other signatories might view as noncompliant, is actually compliant, reducing domestic audience costs for these actions. Examining all international alliances since 1816 using seemingly unrelated regression, the paper finds empirical support for the theory: alliances with democracies are more likely to have conditions making the treaty more incomplete, but not more likely to have conditions that do not make the treaty more incomplete. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 976-1002 Issue: 6 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1647838 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1647838 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:6:p:976-1002 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Christoph V. Steinert Author-X-Name-First: Christoph V. Author-X-Name-Last: Steinert Title: Trial fairness before impact: Tracing the link between post-conflict trials and peace stability Abstract: In this study, I investigate the impact of post-conflict trials on peace stability in post-conflict countries. I contend that empirical effects of post-conflict trials are contingent upon the partiality of the proceedings. While impartial trials promote accountability and confidence in the rule of law, partisan trials marginalize opposition forces and provide selective amnesties for government allies. To create comparable insights on partiality levels of post-conflict trials, I conduct an expert survey evaluating all major post-conflict trials between 1946 and 2005 (53 trials in total). The findings reveal that most trials were partisan while few represented genuine instances of accountability-seeking. Building on these insights, a quantitative analysis disentangles the impacts of partisan and impartial trials on peace stability using a global sample of post-conflict episodes (N = 265). The results demonstrate that positive effects of post-conflict trials on peace stability are primarily driven by partisan trials. Hence, the correlation between post-conflict trials and peace stability is mainly a product of power consolidation operating through coercive victor’s justice. While impartial post-conflict trials likewise tend to stabilize peace, their incidence is too small to trace a generalizable effect in a quantitative analysis. In light of these findings, this study calls for restraint when making consequentialist arguments about choices of post-conflict justice instruments. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1003-1031 Issue: 6 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1657114 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1657114 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:6:p:1003-1031 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thorsten Gromes Author-X-Name-First: Thorsten Author-X-Name-Last: Gromes Author-Name: Matthias Dembinski Author-X-Name-First: Matthias Author-X-Name-Last: Dembinski Title: Practices and outcomes of humanitarian military interventions: a new data set Abstract: Despite abundant debates on humanitarian military interventions, there is yet little empirical knowledge about these operations and their effects due to a lack of systematized data. To stimulate the necessary comparative research, this article introduces a new data set on all humanitarian military interventions between 1946 and 2015. The data set outlines the interveners’ proclaimed aims, mandates, and activities. Documentation of events in the target countries prior to, during, and after the interventions facilitates their evaluation. The data set consists of data matrices and structured case descriptions that document all coding decisions. A review of the spatial and temporal distribution of interveners and interventions refutes the prevalent view that the vast majority of humanitarian military interventions are conducted by Western states and that such missions subsided after the interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. The data set enables a wide range of quantitative and qualitative research. Despite its limited number of cases, it can reveal whether humanitarian military interventions generally decrease the duration and intensity of violence. Among other applications, it can help identify the conditions under which such interventions lead to an escalation or de-escalation of deadly violence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1032-1048 Issue: 6 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1638374 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1638374 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:6:p:1032-1048 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Javier Osorio Author-X-Name-First: Javier Author-X-Name-Last: Osorio Author-Name: Viveca Pavon Author-X-Name-First: Viveca Author-X-Name-Last: Pavon Author-Name: Sayeed Salam Author-X-Name-First: Sayeed Author-X-Name-Last: Salam Author-Name: Jennifer Holmes Author-X-Name-First: Jennifer Author-X-Name-Last: Holmes Author-Name: Patrick T. Brandt Author-X-Name-First: Patrick T. Author-X-Name-Last: Brandt Author-Name: Latifur Khan Author-X-Name-First: Latifur Author-X-Name-Last: Khan Title: Translating CAMEO verbs for automated coding of event data Abstract: The Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) framework is the industry standard for computerized event coding that produces massive data on political conflict at a global scale. However, despite their focus on conflict in foreign locations, most coding efforts have the limitation of exclusively relying on text written in English. This paper advances the frontier of computerized event coding by presenting the CAMEO Verb Translation Application (VTA), a new technology to enable the translation of CAMEO verb dictionaries into non-English languages. CAMEO VTA integrates automated translation with human-in-the-loop features to increase the validity of the translation task. This development opens the possibility of expanding the leverage of CAMEO in a systematic and efficient manner. The first application of this tool focuses on translating CAMEO into Spanish. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1049-1064 Issue: 6 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1632304 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1632304 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:6:p:1049-1064 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew W. Bausch Author-X-Name-First: Andrew W. Author-X-Name-Last: Bausch Title: Coup-Proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment Abstract: Coup-proofing occurs when a leader arranges his military to prevent military leaders from overthrowing him. However, coup-proofing often has the additional effect of lowering the military’s effectiveness in conflict. This article discusses coup-proofing in the context of the Nouri al-Maliki’s regime in Iraq before presenting two formal models. The first model shows when coups are possible, leaders select military commanders with lower ability but higher loyalty. The second model shows that when coups are possible, leaders rotate their military commanders to prevent any one commander from becoming too powerful. The article then presents experimental tests of the models. The results of these laboratory experiments show that leaders are more likely to select loyal commanders or rotate their commanders under the coup treatment relative to groups with no leadership turnover or with leadership turnover according to elections. Thus, when faced with the possibility of a coup, leaders intentionally lower their military effectiveness. This article captures the dynamics behind a fundamental inefficiency introduced into groups when leadership is valuable, delegation is necessary, and powerful subordinates can remove the leader from office. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-32 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1289938 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1289938 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:1-32 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Eric Keels Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Keels Title: Electoral Reforms and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements Abstract: One of the most common features found within peace agreements is provisions that call for post-civil war elections. Unfortunately, the initial post-war elections often increase the risk of civil war recurrence. While past research has consistently confirmed this finding, it focuses only on one element of the democracy. Rather than focusing solely on elections, this article examines the laws surrounding the electoral process. Specifically, I examine how changes in electoral laws that are called for in peace agreements impacts the risk of renewed civil war. Building on research that examines the context of post-civil war elections, I argue that reforms to electoral laws that precede the initial post-war election substantially reduce the risks associated with that election. This proposition is supported with evidence from survival models of peace failures following the establishment of comprehensive peace agreements from 1989 to 2010, demonstrating that electoral reforms reduce the risk of civil war recurrence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 33-58 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1296834 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1296834 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:33-58 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Danielle L. Lupton Author-X-Name-First: Danielle L. Author-X-Name-Last: Lupton Title: Signaling Resolve: Leaders, Reputations, and the Importance of Early Interactions Abstract: How do leaders develop reputations for resolve across repeated interactions? While scholars find that leaders can acquire individual reputations for resolve, we know relatively little about how these leader-specific reputations form to begin with. This article examines how leaders develop reputations for resolve from the very beginning of their tenures and present three key hypotheses regarding these leader-specific reputations. First, statements are more influential to reputational assessments during initial interactions. Second, statements create expectations of future behavior, which interact with a leader’s subsequent actions to influence reputation development. Third, initial perceptions of resolve significantly condition later assessments. Through a process tracing survey experiment, I find evidence that resolute statements are more substantively influential during early interactions. I also find early perceptions of resolve do significantly influence later perceptions. Furthermore, statements create expectations of future behavior, and it is by meeting or defying these expectations that a leader’s reputation for resolve is improved or injured within the experiment. These results remain robust even when controlling for contextual factors, including state characteristics. The implications of these findings for both scholars and policy makers are discussed, and this study illustrates how individual leaders develop these reputations for resolve across interactions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 59-87 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1316268 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1316268 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:59-87 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Indra de Soysa Author-X-Name-First: Indra Author-X-Name-Last: de Soysa Author-Name: Ann Kristin de Soysa Author-X-Name-First: Ann Kristin Author-X-Name-Last: de Soysa Title: Do Globalization and Free Markets Drive Obesity among Children and Youth? An Empirical Analysis, 1990–2013 Abstract: Scholars of public health identify globalization as a major cause of obesity. Free markets are blamed for spreading high calorie, nutrient-poor diets, and sedentary lifestyles across the globe. Global trade and investment agreements apparently curtail government action in the interest of public health. Globalization is also blamed for raising income inequality and social insecurities, which contribute to “obesogenic” environments. Contrary to recent empirical studies, this study demonstrates that globalization and several component parts, such as trade openness, FDI flows, and an index of economic freedom, reduce weight gain and obesity among children and youth, the most likely age cohort to be affected by the past three decades of globalization and attendant lifestyle changes. The results suggest strongly that local-level factors possibly matter much more than do global-level factors for explaining why some people remain thin and others put on weight. The proposition that globalization is homogenizing cultures across the globe in terms of diets and lifestyles is possibly exaggerated. The results support the proposition that globalized countries prioritize health because of the importance of labor productivity and human capital due to heightened market competition, ceteris paribus, even if rising incomes might drive high consumption. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 88-106 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1311259 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1311259 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:88-106 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daehee Bak Author-X-Name-First: Daehee Author-X-Name-Last: Bak Title: Alliance Proximity and Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence Abstract: This article examines whether geographical proximity between defensive allies and a protégé increases the likelihood of successful extended general deterrence. I argue that proximate allies are better at making a credible deterrent threat because proximate allies are more willing and able to help alliance partners in times of crisis than distant ones. This claim is theorized by examining how geographical distance influences the international and domestic costs of alliance commitments. The empirical tests reveal that a potential aggressor is less likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a target with proximate defensive allies. Furthermore, I find that the power of proximate defensive allies is a more significant determinant of successful extended general deterrence than that of distance allies. Interestingly, I also find that the constraining effects of geographical distance on the effectiveness of extended general deterrence have been alleviated by advancements in military technologies throughout history. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 107-131 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1320995 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1320995 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:107-131 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thorin M. Wright Author-X-Name-First: Thorin M. Author-X-Name-Last: Wright Author-Name: Shweta Moorthy Author-X-Name-First: Shweta Author-X-Name-Last: Moorthy Title: Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression* Abstract: Does hosting refugees affect state repression? While there have been numerous studies that examine the link between refugees and the spread of civil and international conflict, an examination of the systematic links between refugees and repression is lacking. We contend that researchers are missing a crucial link, as the dissent-repression nexus is crucial to understanding the development of armed conflict. Drawing upon logics of the relationship between refugees and the spread of conflict as well as economic capacity, we argue that increased numbers of refugees lead to increased repression. We contend that willingness to increase repression when hosting refugees is in part conditional on a host state’s economic capacity. We argue that, on the whole, the greater the population of refugees in a host state, repression becomes more likely. That said, we argue that increased economic capacity will moderate this relationship. We find empirical support for both predictions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 132-155 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1273915 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1273915 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:132-155 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew Wilson Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: Wilson Author-Name: Carla Martinez Machain Author-X-Name-First: Carla Author-X-Name-Last: Martinez Machain Title: Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity Abstract: This research note examines how domestic institutions can moderate the relationship between domestic and interstate conflict involvement. Previous work has found that military dictatorships are more likely to become involved in either domestic or international conflicts, compared to party-based autocracies. We argue that the same institutional explanations for why military autocracies are more conflict-prone also make them less capable of successfully carrying out multiple conflicts at the same time. Analyzing interstate and domestic conflict involvement on a sample of dictatorships over the period 1947–2004, we show that military autocracies dealing with internal armed conflict are less likely than their nonmilitary counterparts to become involved in an international conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 156-172 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1257492 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1257492 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:156-172 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott Wolford Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Wolford Title: Wars of Succession Abstract: I analyze a model of bargaining, war, and endogenous leadership turnover in which (1) leader attributes affect war outcomes and (2) war can insulate settlements from renegotiation. Shifts in bargaining power caused by leadership turnover are endogenous and discontinuous, but sufficiently decisive war outcomes can solve the associated commitment problem. In contrast to other models where the shadow cast by a hawkish successor encourages moderation toward a dovish incumbent, the foreign state attacks instead—despite a dovish incumbent’s known preference for peace—using war to lock in a settlement that would otherwise be lost to future leadership turnover. I discuss the theory’s implications for widening the empirical scope of the commitment problem explanation for war to limited wars over relatively lower stakes and for integrating the politics of leadership turnover with the study of strategic rivalries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 173-187 Issue: 1 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1257493 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1257493 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:1:p:173-187 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Florian Justwan Author-X-Name-First: Florian Author-X-Name-Last: Justwan Author-Name: Sarah K. Fisher Author-X-Name-First: Sarah K. Author-X-Name-Last: Fisher Title: Generalized Social Trust and International Dispute Settlement Abstract: What determines the success of a peaceful settlement attempt of a border dispute? In order to fully understand why decision makers choose to put an end to an ongoing conflict, it is necessary to consider the social trust levels of the general populations in both states. International conflict settlement requires public support at the domestic level. If a state’s general population perceives the potential dangers of a settlement as too severe, the conclusion of a peace agreement will be difficult. We argue that high levels of social trust allow citizens (1) to favor more conciliatory foreign policies and (2) to be more optimistic about the future behavior of other states. In democratic settings, these public attitudes serve as powerful constraints for decision makers. As a result, high aggregate levels of social trust should be directly related to concession-granting behavior by democracies as well as effective dispute settlement among jointly democratic dyads. We test these expectations with a new aggregate-level measure of social trust and find mixed support for our hypotheses: While trust does not influence the behavior of challenger states, it does have strong effects on democratic target states and jointly democratic dyads. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 717-743 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1257490 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1257490 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:717-743 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael E. Flynn Author-X-Name-First: Michael E. Author-X-Name-Last: Flynn Author-Name: Benjamin O. Fordham Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin O. Author-X-Name-Last: Fordham Title: Economic Interests and Threat Assessment in the US Congress, 1890–1914 Abstract: Why do some domestic actors see the international environment as a threatening place populated by untrustworthy powers, when others find opportunities for peaceful cooperation in the same conditions? Because these actors confront the same international environment, the reasons for their divergent evaluations must rest on differences in their own beliefs and interests. In this article, we consider the impact of societal interests in trade and trade protection on elite assessments of the international environment. We examine evaluations of the international environment in speeches given in the US Congress during naval appropriations debates between 1890 and 1914. The manufacturing sector’s interest in trade protection led political leaders who represented manufacturing regions to offer more negative assessments of the international environment, while those representing export-oriented agricultural areas of the country gave more positive evaluations. These effects were roughly comparable to those associated with party, as well as individual-level characteristics, such as having served as a military officer. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 744-770 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1236925 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1236925 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:744-770 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Shawna K. Metzger Author-X-Name-First: Shawna K. Author-X-Name-Last: Metzger Title: The Chicken or the Egg?: A Coevolutionary Approach to Disputed Issues and Militarized Conflict Abstract: Is state behavior influenced by the context in which it occurs, or does context arise because of the way in which states behave? I investigate these questions in the context of international disputes over issues and states’ militarized behavior. The prevalent assumption in interstate conflict research is that disputed issues are exogenous to militarization patterns. I question the validity of this assumption, arguing there are reasons to suspect certain states self-select into disputes. I use a coevolution modeling strategy to allow the existence of disputes and states’ behavior to mutually affect one another. I find disputes are not exogenous to states’ militarized behavior. States that resort to militarized behavior are more likely to dispute an issue than peaceful states. I also find evidence of behavioral contagion among states engaged in disputes: Militarized behavior begets militarized behavior. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 771-796 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1237944 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1237944 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:771-796 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brad L. LeVeck Author-X-Name-First: Brad L. Author-X-Name-Last: LeVeck Author-Name: Neil Narang Author-X-Name-First: Neil Author-X-Name-Last: Narang Title: How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context Abstract: We investigate the role of international reputation in alliance politics by developing a signaling theory linking past alliance violations with the formation of future alliance commitments. In our theory, past violations Are useful signals of future alliance reliability conditional on whether they effectively separate reliable from unreliable alliance partners. It follows that states evaluating potential alliance partners will interpret past violations in their context when deciding to enter a new alliance, attaching less weight to violations in “harder times,” when many states are defaulting on their alliance commitments together, and more weight to violations in “easier times,” when fewer states are defaulting on their alliances. We test our theory and find that states are empirically more likely to form new alliances with states that violated in harder times compared to states that violated in easier times. The results have important implications for how scholars understand and estimate the impact of international reputation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 797-821 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1237818 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1237818 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:797-821 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sabrina Karim Author-X-Name-First: Sabrina Author-X-Name-Last: Karim Title: Reevaluating Peacekeeping Effectiveness: Does Gender Neutrality Inhibit Progress? Abstract: Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, more female peacekeepers are participating in peacekeeping missions than ever before. Nevertheless, the current literature on peacekeeping effectiveness is largely gender neutral, discounting the unique role female peacekeepers may play in peacekeeping operations. This article addresses this missing piece in the literature by assessing how female peacekeepers and locals view the role of women in peacekeeping operations. Using interviews and focus groups conducted with peacekeepers in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and original surveys conducted in Liberian communities, it finds that there is an “access gap” that prevents female peacekeepers from fully contributing to the mission’s operations and therefore prevents the peacekeeping mission from reaching its full potential. The findings have broader implications for how to improve peacekeeping missions’ effectiveness moving forward. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 822-847 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1231113 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1231113 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:822-847 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Clionadh Raleigh Author-X-Name-First: Clionadh Author-X-Name-Last: Raleigh Author-Name: Hyun Jin Choi Author-X-Name-First: Hyun Jin Author-X-Name-Last: Choi Title: Conflict Dynamics and Feedback: Explaining Change in Violence against Civilians within Conflicts Abstract: Conflicts are complex, dynamic processes wherein the frequency and intensity of violence changes throughout the contest. In this article, we explore the temporal dynamics of two long-term civil wars—DR-Congo and Sudan—to identify systematic and random conditions that lead to changes in civilian targeting. Violence committed by rival political actors, territorial exchange, and the number and addition of violent agents strongly shape the likelihood that civilian targeting events and casualties increase or decrease over time. General and country differences emerge from vector autoregression analysis to suggest that (1) three types of violent agents—rebels, militias, and the government—are locked in spirals of violence where violence against civilians by one actor leads to subsequent violence by another actor; (2) rebels and government forces respond to the other side’s acquisition of contested territory by increasing counterattacks on civilians, specifically in DR-Congo; and (3) increasing numbers of active nonstate agents lead to higher violence rates in the following months. Among these, civilian targeting by rival actors triggers the most follow-on violent events against civilians. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 848-878 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1235271 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1235271 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:848-878 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Peter A. G. Van Bergeijk Author-X-Name-First: Peter A. G. Author-X-Name-Last: Van Bergeijk Author-Name: Muhammad S. H. Siddiquee Author-X-Name-First: Muhammad S. H. Author-X-Name-Last: Siddiquee Title: Biased Sanctions? Methodological Change in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered and Its Implications Abstract: We investigate the influence of case selection and (re)coding for two vintages of a key resource for research on economic sanctions: the Peterson Institute database reported in Hufbauer et al. (second edition in 1990 and third edition in 2007, often identified by their abbreviations HSE and HSEO). The Peterson Institute has not transparently reported about these changes. These changes make it more likely to find sanction success. A multivariate probit analysis establishes upward bias related to modest policy change, duration, and cost to target and downward bias for regime change, military impairment, companion policies, and cost to the sender. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 879-893 Issue: 5 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1242584 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1242584 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:5:p:879-893 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tijen Demirel-Pegg Author-X-Name-First: Tijen Author-X-Name-Last: Demirel-Pegg Title: The Dynamics of the Demobilization of the Protest Campaign in Assam Abstract: This study highlights the role that critical events play in the demobilization of protest campaigns. Social movement scholars suggest that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of polarization within the campaign or the cooptation of the campaign leaders. I offer critical events as an alternative causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns in ethnically divided societies are particularly combustible, as they have the potential to trigger unintended or unorchestrated communal violence. When such violence occurs, elite strategies change, mass support declines, and the campaign demobilizes. An empirical investigation of the dynamics of the demobilization phase of the anti-foreigner protest campaign in Assam, India, between 1979 and 1985 confirms this argument. A single group analysis is conducted to compare the dynamics of the campaign before and after the communal violence by using time series event data collected from The Indian Express, a national newspaper. The study has wider implications for the literature on collective action, as it illuminates the dynamic and complex nature of protest campaigns. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 175-216 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1128430 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1128430 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:175-216 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sambuddha Ghatak Author-X-Name-First: Sambuddha Author-X-Name-Last: Ghatak Author-Name: Brandon C. Prins Author-X-Name-First: Brandon C. Author-X-Name-Last: Prins Title: The Homegrown Threat: State Strength, Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism Abstract: Scholars maintain that, similar to insurgency, terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism, while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for antistate violence, as nonstate actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time that measures to improve state capacity are enacted. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 217-247 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1128431 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1128431 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:217-247 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jun Xiang Author-X-Name-First: Jun Author-X-Name-Last: Xiang Title: Dyadic Effects, Relevance, and the Empirical Assessment of the Kantian Peace Abstract: Dyadic effects to a large extent account for the difficulty of explaining and predicting international conflict. In this study, I derive a statistical model to estimate unobserved dyadic effects in the dyadic analysis of conflict. The proposed model employs a hierarchical modeling approach to estimate dyadic effects, thereby avoiding the problems caused by the use of fixed effects models. Furthermore, it simultaneously addresses the important sample selection issue of identifying relevant dyads. I show that the estimation of dyadic effects significantly improves the model fit and generates several interesting findings. Substantively, this study makes an important contribution to the empirical evaluation of the Kantian peace. It argues that international organizations increase the likelihood of conflict of interest between member states but reduce the probability of militarized conflict. I demonstrate that the positive coefficient of international organizations in Oneal and Russett (1999) is biased in the positive direction. When the proposed statistical model is used, international organizations, together with trade and democracy, reduce the probability of conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 248-271 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1156542 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1156542 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:248-271 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gary Uzonyi Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Uzonyi Author-Name: Toby Rider Author-X-Name-First: Toby Author-X-Name-Last: Rider Title: Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability Abstract: Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 272-299 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1171763 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1171763 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:272-299 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yong Kyun Kim Author-X-Name-First: Yong Kyun Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: States Sued: Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Abstract: Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases have increased dramatically in recent decades, and the institutions of investment arbitration to resolve investor-state disputes constitute the core of the modern investment regime. In this article, we seek to explain the variation in the host governments’ risk of being challenged by foreign investors before international arbitration tribunals. We argue that such risk is greatest at the intermediate level of democracy where some democratic elements such as elections are strong, but the system of rule of law remains weak. In those regimes, “regulatory risk” runs higher than in autocratic regimes as the host governments are under greater pressure for regulating matters of broad public concern. At the same time, more traditional political risk of arbitrary, discriminate, and abusive acts remains considerable at that level of democracy due to weak rule of law, exacerbating the former risk. Empirical analysis provides a good deal of support for the argument. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 300-325 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1173546 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1173546 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:300-325 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Author-Name: Thomas Lassi Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Lassi Title: Centers of Gravity: Regional Powers, Democracy, and Trade Abstract: Classic studies on hegemonic stability and power transition suggest that concentration of capabilities favoring a single state can promote economic cooperation and discourage militarized conflict. However, tests of these arguments have been primarily limited to examining temporal variation in global capability distributions and corresponding levels of system-wide cooperation; few have examined the impact of capability concentration at the region level. In this article, we contend that concentration of regional military capabilities corresponds to lower trade costs for states throughout a region and to an incentive for weaker states to de-prioritize expenditure on the military, freeing resources that can be used to promote trade. As a result, this condition promotes higher levels of trade, particularly within the region. We also argue that democratic regional powers are better able to foster confidence in the sustainability of cooperation; thus, the trade-enhancing impact of concentrated regional capabilities is stronger when the predominant state is more democratic. We find evidence in support of our expectations in statistical models examining state trade between 1960 and 2007. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 326-348 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1184661 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1184661 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:326-348 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael C. Grillo Author-X-Name-First: Michael C. Author-X-Name-Last: Grillo Author-Name: Juris Pupcenoks Author-X-Name-First: Juris Author-X-Name-Last: Pupcenoks Title: Let’s Intervene! But Only If They’re Like Us: The Effects of Group Dynamics and Emotion on the Willingness to Support Humanitarian Intervention Abstract: International relations (IR) studies on humanitarian intervention have debated both the nature and strength of intervention norms. This article contributes to this debate by exploring under what conditions individuals are willing to support military humanitarian intervention (MHI) and the psychological factors that influence whether, and the degree to which individuals support MHI. Taking a psychological approach, we hypothesized that individuals’ decision to support MHI is influenced by in-group favoritism and emotional responses to in-group suffering. We tested our theory with two experiments, each of which recruited roughly 200 American participants. Both experiments centered on the ongoing Syrian civil war and assessed Americans’ willingness to support intervention to protect different civilian groups. The results suggested that support for intervention was widespread, but not a majority view in most cases. The findings also suggested that participants exhibited slightly higher rates of support for intervention when those suffering were Christian, as opposed to Muslim. Furthermore, we found that the dynamics of support for intervention changed when chemical weapons were introduced into the scenario, which reframed the the crisis as a national security issue. Overall, our results suggest that individuals’ decisions to act upon norms can be influenced by the context of a crisis and individual level psychological factors, which have been under explored in IR scholarship on norms. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 349-374 Issue: 2 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1185420 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185420 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:2:p:349-374 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mi Hwa Hong Author-X-Name-First: Mi Hwa Author-X-Name-Last: Hong Author-Name: Gary Uzonyi Author-X-Name-First: Gary Author-X-Name-Last: Uzonyi Title: Deeper Commitment to Human Rights Treaties: Signaling and Investment Risk Perception Abstract: Why do some leaders make deeper commitments to human rights treaties (HRAs) by consenting to receive extra monitoring of complaints or communications from individual citizens? Extant theory suggests leaders join HRAs for tangible benefits. However, empirical support for this argument is mixed. To address this mismatch, we approach this question from a different angle. We argue that by ratifying HRAs, leaders send a signal that they are reliable partners who value future returns. Accepting optional articles and protocols that increase monitoring of the state’s human rights behavior, without changing the state’s substantive obligations, helps better signal that the regime does not fear instability nor sees the need to resort to the proscribed abuses in the future. This, in turn, serves as an important middle step to recognizing tangible benefits, such as foreign direct investment, by improving investors’ risk perception of ratified countries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1040-1064 Issue: 6 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1492385 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492385 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:6:p:1040-1064 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jana Krause Author-X-Name-First: Jana Author-X-Name-Last: Krause Author-Name: Werner Krause Author-X-Name-First: Werner Author-X-Name-Last: Krause Author-Name: Piia Bränfors Author-X-Name-First: Piia Author-X-Name-Last: Bränfors Title: Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace Abstract: There is an emerging consensus that women’s participation in peace negotiations contributes to the quality and durability of peace after civil war. However, to date, this proposition has remained empirically untested. Moreover, how women’s participation may contribute to durable peace has not been systematically explored. This article uses a mixed method design to examine this proposition. Our statistical analysis demonstrates a robust correlation between peace agreements signed by female delegates and durable peace. We further find that agreements signed by women show a significantly higher number of peace agreement provisions aimed at political reform, and higher implementation rates for provisions. We argue that linkages between women signatories and women civil society groups explain the observed positive impact of women’s direct participation in peace negotiations. Collaboration and knowledge building among diverse women groups contributes to better content of peace agreements and higher implementation rates of agreement provisions. We substantiate this argument with qualitative case study evidence and demonstrate how collaboration between female delegates and women civil society groups positively impacts peace processes. Our findings support the assumption that women’s participation in peace negotiations increases the durability and the quality of peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 985-1016 Issue: 6 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:6:p:985-1016 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Vito D’Orazio Author-X-Name-First: Vito Author-X-Name-Last: D’Orazio Author-Name: Idean Salehyan Author-X-Name-First: Idean Author-X-Name-Last: Salehyan Title: Who is a Terrorist? Ethnicity, Group Affiliation, and Understandings of Political Violence Abstract: What does the American public label as “terrorism?” How do people think about the factors motivating violence, and in turn, the policies that are favored? Using ingroup and outgroup dynamics, we argue that the terrorist label is more readily applied to Arab-Americans than Whites, and to members of militant groups. Moreover, people attribute different motives to violence committed by Arabs versus Whites, and favor different policies in response. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned one of six stories about a failed armed attack, each with a different combination of ethnicity and group affiliation. We find that an Arab ethnicity and Islamist group affiliation increase the likelihood of labeling an act as terrorism. Attacks by Whites and members of a White supremacist group are less likely to be labeled terrorism. Rather, Whites are more likely to be called “mass shooters.” Despite never discussing motive, Arab-American attackers are more likely to be ascribed political or religious motives, while White suspects are more likely to be seen as mentally ill. Lastly, an Arab ethnicity increases support for counterterrorism policies and decreases support for mental health care. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1017-1039 Issue: 6 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1500911 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1500911 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:6:p:1017-1039 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: R. Urbatsch Author-X-Name-First: R. Author-X-Name-Last: Urbatsch Title: Immigrant Out-Groups and Voting against Free Trade Abstract: Resistance to trade and demands for protectionist policy can derive from social as well as economic factors. A sense of cultural threat surrounding immigrants, especially immigrants visibly from groups that are widely stigmatized among the local population, may potentially stimulate such recoiling from exposure to the world. Voting patterns in the 1889 election in New South Wales, Australia, confirm this hypothesis: in a contest between the Protectionist and Free Trade Parties amidst reaction against the Chinese-Australian population, larger shares of voters preferred the protectionist, trade-restricting side in areas with proportionately larger ethnically Chinese populations than in otherwise similar areas elsewhere. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1065-1080 Issue: 6 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1504780 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1504780 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:6:p:1065-1080 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: The Editors Title: EOV Editorial Board Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1081-1081 Issue: 6 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1518830 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1518830 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:6:p:1081-1081 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Seiki Tanaka Author-X-Name-First: Seiki Author-X-Name-Last: Tanaka Author-Name: Atsushi Tago Author-X-Name-First: Atsushi Author-X-Name-Last: Tago Author-Name: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch Author-X-Name-First: Kristian Skrede Author-X-Name-Last: Gleditsch Title: Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict Abstract: Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 375-396 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1200572 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1200572 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:375-396 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael A. Allen Author-X-Name-First: Michael A. Author-X-Name-Last: Allen Author-Name: Michael E. Flynn Author-X-Name-First: Michael E. Author-X-Name-Last: Flynn Author-Name: Julie VanDusky-Allen Author-X-Name-First: Julie Author-X-Name-Last: VanDusky-Allen Title: Regions of Hierarchy and Security: US Troop Deployments, Spatial Relations, and Defense Burdens Abstract: Recent work has begun exploring the effects of foreign military deployments on host-state foreign policies. However, research mostly focuses on dyadic relationships between major powers and host-states, ignoring the broader regional security environment of host-states. We develop a theory of spatial hierarchies to understand how security relationships throughout the region surrounding the host-state affect host-state foreign policy. Using data on US military deployments from 1950–2005, we show that regional security considerations condition how host-states respond to the deployment of military forces to their territory. Consequently, regional analyses are fundamental in understanding monadic and dyadic decisions about security, alliance behavior, and conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 397-423 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1191482 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1191482 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:397-423 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Vincent Arel-Bundock Author-X-Name-First: Vincent Author-X-Name-Last: Arel-Bundock Title: The Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Firm-Level Analysis Abstract: Many large-N cross-national studies claim to show that political institutions and phenomena determine where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In this article, I argue that these studies tend to overemphasize statistical significance and often neglect to assess the explanatory or predictive power of their theories. To illustrate the problem, I estimate variations of a statistical model published in an influential article on “Political Risk, Institutions, and FDI.” I find that none of the political variables that the authors consider accounts for much of the variation in aggregate FDI inflows. To ensure that this underwhelming result is not driven by misspecification or measurement error, I leverage a large firm-level data set on the investment location decisions of thousands of multinational firms. Using nonparametric machine-learning techniques and out-of-sample tests, I show that gravity variables can help us develop very accurate expectations about firm behavior but that none of the 31 “political determinants” of FDI that I consider can do much to improve our expectations. These findings have important implications because they suggest that governments retain some room to move in the face of economic globalization. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 424-452 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1185011 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185011 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:424-452 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Roseanne W. McManus Author-X-Name-First: Roseanne W. Author-X-Name-Last: McManus Title: The Impact of Context on the Ability of Leaders to Signal Resolve Abstract: This article explores the impact of context on the ability of leaders to signal resolve in international disputes. Leaders make statements of resolve in various contexts, and the context in which a leader speaks affects the size and composition of the audience as well as how adversaries are likely to interpret the statements. I focus on comparing five main contexts in which leaders commonly make resolved statements: speeches to the nation, both scripted and unscripted interactions with the press, remarks to narrow audiences, and campaign events. I offer hypotheses regarding how the effectiveness of statements at conveying resolve will vary among these contexts and test them using a data set that codes resolved statements made by US presidents. I find that resolved statements made in national speeches and scripted remarks to the press have the most significant impact on dispute outcomes, suggesting greater effectiveness at conveying resolve. However, statements made in other contexts also appear to matter, and inconsistency among contexts can reduce the effectiveness of statements. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 453-479 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1171764 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1171764 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:453-479 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jeff D. Colgan Author-X-Name-First: Jeff D. Author-X-Name-Last: Colgan Author-Name: Edward R. Lucas Author-X-Name-First: Edward R. Author-X-Name-Last: Lucas Title: Revolutionary Pathways: Leaders and the International Impacts of Domestic Revolutions Abstract: How much and in what ways do individual leaders matter for international politics? This article sheds new light on these questions by considering the consequences of domestic revolutions in international relations. We argue that revolutions have international effects due to two separate pathways, one associated with the event and one associated with the new leader’s administration. In the first pathway, a revolutionary event disrupts established relationships and perceptions, creating uncertainty both within the state and abroad. In the second pathway, revolutions put individuals into office who are more willing to challenge the status quo and who have publicly committed to a sustained shift in policies during their administration. These two distinct pathways suggest that the important question about revolutions is not whether leaders or events matter most but rather the conditions under which they matter. Consequently, we studied these pathways on three phenomena: international economic sanctions, domestic economic growth, and interstate alliances. We find that revolutionary events have a short-term negative effect on domestic economic growth, while revolutionary leaders have a long-term effect on the probability that a revolutionary state is targeted for sanctions. Both the revolutionary leader and the revolution’s immediate events alter the state’s international alliances. Our findings suggest that no single level of analysis completely dominates, and the answer depends on the outcome of interest. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 480-506 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1203788 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1203788 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:480-506 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Patrick J. W. Egan Author-X-Name-First: Patrick J. W. Author-X-Name-Last: Egan Title: The Political Economy of Exchange Rates in an Era of Global Production Chains Abstract: Scholars have long recognized that exchange-rate movements affect different actors within societies in different ways. However, increasingly complex global production chains add complications to longstanding theoretic models of exchange-rate politics. I argue that imported intermediate inputs condition firm preferences regarding the level and stability of exchange-rates and directly test these arguments using firm survey responses in a variety of countries. I employ multilevel models to evaluate how imported input profiles of firms interact with real effective exchange-rate movements to influence firm assessments of macroeconomic constraints. Higher dependence on imported inputs is linked to increased dissatisfaction with depreciating currencies, contingent on various firm and country characteristics. The results highlight the multiple channels through which exchange-rate movements can now affect exporters, nonexporters, and nontradables. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 507-536 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1195565 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1195565 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:507-536 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Cristina Bodea Author-X-Name-First: Cristina Author-X-Name-Last: Bodea Author-Name: Ibrahim Elbadawi Author-X-Name-First: Ibrahim Author-X-Name-Last: Elbadawi Author-Name: Christian Houle Author-X-Name-First: Christian Author-X-Name-Last: Houle Title: Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants? Abstract: The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes like civil wars and coups. We suggest that this approach overlooks lower levels of instability and that isolating outcomes understates the likelihood that they are manifestations of similar structural determinants. We extend the notion of instability to encompass jointly but distinctly civil wars, coups, and riots. Our explanation focuses on the role of political institutions and the related ethnopolitical strife over state power. Using data from 1950 to 2007, we find that the three outcomes share some determinants such as a factional partial democracy and the exclusion from power of a large proportion of the population; the inverted U-shaped effect of political institutions is driven by a subset of semidemocracies; and there is a substitution relationship between civil wars and coups emerging from the composition of governing coalitions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 537-561 Issue: 3 Volume: 43 Year: 2017 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1188093 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188093 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:537-561 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rebecca Cordell Author-X-Name-First: Rebecca Author-X-Name-Last: Cordell Title: Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition Abstract: Following the launch of the WoT, the United States established a global rendition network that saw the transfer of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world. Conventional accounts of foreign complicity show that 54 diverse countries were involved, including many established democracies. What determined more than a quarter of the world’s countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I argue that the United States screened countries according to their preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the United States on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that cooperation is more likely between countries with similar preferences as both actors are better off when the partnership increases. I test this hypothesis on global data using UNGA voting data as a proxy for common interest and develop a spatial variable that models a country’s logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee based on its distance to a central rendition transit corridor between the United States and Afghanistan. The analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 369-400 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1522307 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522307 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:369-400 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Crystal Shelton Author-X-Name-First: Crystal Author-X-Name-Last: Shelton Author-Name: Erik Cleven Author-X-Name-First: Erik Author-X-Name-Last: Cleven Author-Name: Aaron M. Hoffman Author-X-Name-First: Aaron M. Author-X-Name-Last: Hoffman Title: Deadly foreign terrorism and the rank-ordered tournament for foreign press attention: implications for counterterrorism Abstract: Limiting the attention countries receive from the foreign press is thought to reduce the incidence of deadly foreign attacks, but by how much? We show that the incidence of deadly foreign terrorism increases as a nonlinear function of the level of foreign press attention states receive. As a result, the benefits of reducing foreign press attention to prevent deadly foreign terrorist attacks are uneven: some states stand to benefit more than others. Nevertheless, we also show that reducing press attention produces, at best, only minor reductions in the number of deadly foreign terrorist attacks states experience. These results suggest that reducing foreign press attention may not provide as much security as governments expect. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 344-368 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1529668 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1529668 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:344-368 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Thomas Oatley Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Oatley Author-Name: Robert Galantucci Author-X-Name-First: Robert Author-X-Name-Last: Galantucci Title: The dollar and the demand for protection Abstract: Postwar trade politics in the USA have exhibited intermittent periods of rising industry demands for protection from imports. At present, however, we do not fully understand why industry demands for protection rise and fall overtime. We argue that intermittent protectionism in postwar USA has been driven by changes in the real exchange rate. To do so, we incorporate the real exchange rate into a basic model of sectoral trade policy preferences to show how the number of sectors that expect to benefit from protection grows as the real exchange rate appreciates. We test two hypotheses generated from this model: first that the number of antidumping and escape clause petitions rises as the dollar strengthens and falls as the dollar weakens. Second that competitive sectors are more sensitive to exchange rate movements than comparatively disadvantaged and comparatively advantaged sectors. We evaluate these expectations with a Bayesian statistical analysis of data on antidumping and escape clause petitions in the USA between 1974 and 2012. The empirical models provide robust support for the study’s principal hypotheses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 267-288 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1551006 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1551006 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:267-288 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew DiGiuseppe Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: DiGiuseppe Author-Name: Katja B. Kleinberg Author-X-Name-First: Katja B. Author-X-Name-Last: Kleinberg Title: Economics, security, and individual-level preferences for trade agreements Abstract: Empirical research on the determinants of individual-level support for trade liberalization has focused almost entirely on the economic effects of trade. Yet, international relations scholarship has long recognized that commerce also has a variety of security implications. This paper explores if and when security considerations influence individual attitudes toward trade. In this study, we ask two questions: First, to what extent do expectations about the security implications of trade affect individual-level attitudes toward trade agreements? Second, does the introduction of security concerns into the discussion of trade agreements influence how heavily individuals weigh their economic costs and benefits? We employ an original experiment embedded in a conjoint survey to investigate the relative impact of a variety of economic and security considerations on respondents’ support for trade. Our findings suggest that security information matters and undermines the appeal of some, though not all, economic arguments for trade liberalization among our respondents. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 289-315 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1551007 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1551007 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:289-315 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chelsea Estancona Author-X-Name-First: Chelsea Author-X-Name-Last: Estancona Author-Name: Lucia Bird Author-X-Name-First: Lucia Author-X-Name-Last: Bird Author-Name: Kaisa Hinkkainen Author-X-Name-First: Kaisa Author-X-Name-Last: Hinkkainen Author-Name: Navin Bapat Author-X-Name-First: Navin Author-X-Name-Last: Bapat Title: Civilian self-defense militias in civil war Abstract: To mitigate the costs associated with suppressing rebellion, states may rely on civilian self-defense militias to protect their territory from rebel groups. However, this decision is also costly, given that these self-defense groups may undermine control of its territory. This raises the question: why do governments cultivate self-defense militias when doing so risks that these militias will undermine their territorial control? Using a game theoretic model, we argue that states take this risk in order to prevent rebels from co-opting local populations, which in turn may shift power away from the government and toward the rebels. Governments strategically use civilian militias to raise the price rebels must pay for civilian cooperation, prevent rebels from harnessing a territory’s resources, and/or to deter rebels from challenging government control in key areas. Empirically, the model suggests states are likely to support the formation of self-defense militias in territory that may moderately improve the power of rebel groups, but not in areas that are either less valuable or areas that are critical to the government’s survival. These hypotheses are tested using data from the Colombian civil war from 1996 to 2008. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 215-266 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1554570 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554570 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:215-266 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Oguzhan Turkoglu Author-X-Name-First: Oguzhan Author-X-Name-Last: Turkoglu Author-Name: Thomas Chadefaux Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Chadefaux Title: Nowhere to go? Why do some civil wars generate more refugees than others? Abstract: Civil wars greatly vary in the number of refugees they generate, ranging from zero to over six millions in a given conflict. Work on this variation has largely focused on “push” factors – deleterious attributes of the home country that lead to refugee flows, such as violence and repression. Yet, few have studied the importance of “pull” factors – attractive features of the potential host countries. Here we show in particular the importance of the expected quality of life in possible destinations. Using data on civil wars from 1951 to 2008, we find that the proximity of democratic and wealthy potential hosts accounts for much of the variation in the number of refugees. Out-of-sample validation methods show that these “pull” factors account for nearly as much predictive power as all the main variables previously identified in the literature combined. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 401-420 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1554571 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554571 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:401-420 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian J. Phillips Author-X-Name-First: Brian J. Author-X-Name-Last: Phillips Title: Foreign Terrorist Organization designation, international cooperation, and terrorism Abstract: How does branding militant groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) affect them? Beyond its obvious policy importance, this question speaks to debates about counterterrorism, terrorism financing, and organizational dynamics of subnational violence. This article analyzes FTO designation, a key policy used by the U.S. government since 1997 to impose costs on foreign terrorist groups and those who might support them. Contrary to arguments that sanctions are ineffective and that terrorism is too “cheap” to be affected, it is argued that designation should weaken terrorist groups, reducing their attacks over time. However, the effect is probably conditional. FTO designation should be especially effective against groups operating in U.S.-aligned countries, given the importance of international cooperation in counterterrorism. Global quantitative analyses suggest that FTOs operating in U.S.-aligned countries carry out fewer attacks over time than other groups, taking many other factors into consideration. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 316-343 Issue: 2 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1556158 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1556158 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:2:p:316-343 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hakan Gunaydin Author-X-Name-First: Hakan Author-X-Name-Last: Gunaydin Title: Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality, Partisanship, and Labor Unions Abstract: Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do borrowing governments benefit from IMF programs to overcome domestic opposition to reform by organized interests? Utilizing a unique new data set on IMF conditionality, I show that partisan and electoral concerns and domestic alliances strongly affect the implementation of labor market reforms, even when the IMF imposes them. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than center/right-wing governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international commitments during election years when labor groups are militant. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions and the IMF’s conditional role in removing domestic political opposition to reform. Counter-intuitively, right-wing governments still struggle to reform the labor market, even during economic crises and under IMF programs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 888-918 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1448807 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1448807 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:888-918 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nam Kyu Kim Author-X-Name-First: Nam Kyu Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: International Conflict, International Security Environment, and Military Coups Abstract: Why do some countries repeatedly experience military coups while others seem immune? Are countries more prone to military coups when faced with external threats? The answers to these questions still remain contested: While several scholars hold that countries facing external threats are more vulnerable to coups, others argue that such countries are actually more secure from coups. I argue that by failing to distinguish between immediate and acute threats, caused by wars and militarized conflicts, and chronic threats from a state’s international security environment, the existing literature ignores the possibility that these two types of external threats differently affect the likelihood of coups. I propose that wars and militarized conflicts, infrequent and often short lived, decrease coup propensity, while a threatening security environment increases coup risk. I find strong supporting evidence that the presence of chronic international threats increases the likelihood of coups while acute international conflicts lower that likelihood. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 936-952 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1466288 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1466288 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:936-952 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bryan Rooney Author-X-Name-First: Bryan Author-X-Name-Last: Rooney Title: Sources of Leader Support and Interstate Rivalry Abstract: Since segments of the selectorate differently experience costs and benefits from rivalry, the foreign policy choices of leaders reflect these domestic preferences. As a result, shifts in the composition of the domestic coalition of support backing the leader provide a fundamental determinant of rivalry termination. While previous research sought to explore the relationship between domestic political turnover and rivalry termination using regime transitions as a proxy for turnover of the state’s domestic ruling group, in practice this measure exhibits significant disconnection with the quantity of interest. Further, there are alternative pathways through which regime transitions may lead to rivalry termination. I test the relationship using new data from the CHISOLS project, finding that when rivals undergo a change in the source of support that maintains the leader in office, the probability of rivalry termination rises dramatically. I further find that regime transitions have an effect on the probability of rivalry termination that is independent of the effect of ruling coalition turnover. This study thus both asserts the relationship between domestic political turnover and rivalry termination and clarifies the mechanism by which the relationship operates. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 969-983 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1466289 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1466289 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:969-983 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Matthew S. Wells Author-X-Name-First: Matthew S. Author-X-Name-Last: Wells Author-Name: Timothy J. Ryan Author-X-Name-First: Timothy J. Author-X-Name-Last: Ryan Title: Following the Party in Time of War? The Implications of Elite Consensus Abstract: Prominent perspectives in the study of conflict point to two factors that exert substantial influence on public opinion about foreign intervention: (1) news about casualties and (2) signals from partisan elites. Past work is limited, however, in what it can say about how these two factors interact. We present an experiment designed to understand the surprisingly common scenario where elites send competing messages about whether the public should support war or oppose it—and these messages do not coincide with party divisions. We find that partisans are generally insensitive to news about casualties, but they become noticeably more sensitive when they perceive within-party disputes over support for the war. Independents, however, respond to news of casualties irrespective of what messages elites send. These findings shed light on when and how the public responds to competing and unclear cues and speak to the role of public opinion in determining conflict outcomes and democratic foreign policy-making more broadly. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 919-935 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1492383 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492383 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:919-935 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Shahryar Minhas Author-X-Name-First: Shahryar Author-X-Name-Last: Minhas Author-Name: Karen L. Remmer Author-X-Name-First: Karen L. Author-X-Name-Last: Remmer Title: The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes Abstract: To what extent do alleged violations of international commitments damage state reputation? This article explore this question with specific reference to investor-state disputes arising under the protection of international investment agreements. Its main contributions are threefold. First, building on the political institutions literature, the study places the theoretical importance of information about the rules of the game, and the actions of the participants at the center of analysis. Second, in contrast to prior empirical research, the study systematically analyzes the costs of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration by examining all known disputes. Third, the study addresses the impact of investment disputes on both foreign investment flows and state reputational rankings. We show that the consequences of investment disputes vary with the transparency of the investor-state dispute settlement process. The central implication of these findings for the broader body of literature on international institutions is that reputational mechanisms for effective treaty enforcement cannot be taken as given but instead need to be explored on the basis of a nuanced approach that addresses the pivotal issues of institutional design and information costs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 862-887 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1492384 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492384 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:862-887 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nina von Uexkull Author-X-Name-First: Nina Author-X-Name-Last: von Uexkull Author-Name: Therese Pettersson Author-X-Name-First: Therese Author-X-Name-Last: Pettersson Title: Issues and Actors in African Nonstate Conflicts: A New Data Set Abstract: Armed nonstate conflict without the direct involvement of the state government is a common phenomenon. Violence between armed gangs, rebel groups, or communal militias is an important source of instability and has gained increasing scholarly attention. In this article, we introduce a data collection on conflict issues and key actor characteristics in armed nonstate conflicts that provides new opportunities for investigating the causes, dynamics, and consequences of this form of organized violence. The data builds on and extends the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Non-State Conflict data set by introducing additional information on what the actors in the conflict are fighting over, alongside actor characteristics. It covers Africa during the time period 1989–2011. The data set distinguishes between two main categories of issues, territory and authority, in addition to a residual category of other issues. Furthermore, we specify sub-issues within these categories, such as agricultural land/water as sub-issue for territory and religious issues for other issues. As actor characteristics, the data set notes whether warring parties received military support by external actors and whether religion and the mode of livelihood were salient in the mobilization of the armed group. The article presents coding processes, key features of the data set, and point to avenues for new research based on these data. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 953-968 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1493478 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1493478 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:953-968 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lisa Lechner Author-X-Name-First: Lisa Author-X-Name-Last: Lechner Author-Name: Simon Wüthrich Author-X-Name-First: Simon Author-X-Name-Last: Wüthrich Title: Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions, Institutional Design, and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations Abstract: Multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization have stalled. This has contributed to a steep rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). At the same time, negotiations for PTAs have not always proven quick and painless: While some treaties are sealed within a few months or days only, other agreements are preceded by protracted bargaining processes in trade and trade-related issue areas. In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical variation. More specifically, we argue that PTA negotiations take longer the greater the distance between the prospective partners’ initial bargaining positions. Moreover, we contend that negotiation processes become more protracted the higher the relative ambition of the prospective PTA. Due to the limited links to the domestic political arena in autocracies, we expect this latter effect to play out for groups of democratic bargaining partners only. We test these two hypotheses for 198 preferential trade negotiations using novel measures for bargaining templates and the ambition of PTA clauses. In our two-stage survival models, we find support for our argument. In line with qualitative evidence from recent preferential trade initiatives, our models indicate that services, investment and intellectual property rights are particularly sticky agenda items for democratic leaders at the international bargaining table. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 833-861 Issue: 5 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1500367 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1500367 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:5:p:833-861 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Elise Must Author-X-Name-First: Elise Author-X-Name-Last: Must Author-Name: Siri Aas Rustad Author-X-Name-First: Siri Aas Author-X-Name-Last: Rustad Title: “Mtwara will be the New Dubai”: dashed expectations, grievances, and civil unrest in Tanzania Abstract: When does inequality lead to conflict? Despite recent studies highlighting the effects of group exclusion, this question has not been fully answered. We argue that objective group inequality is not sufficient to fuel unrest. Structural inequalities need to be perceived as unfair, and become grievances, in order to spark mobilization. While most conflict scholars recognize this on a theoretical level, statistical tests of the effect of inequality on conflict almost exclusively rely on objective data. This limits their ability to distinguish when inequality is politically relevant and when it is not. Southern Tanzania is a case in point. Despite decades of marginalization, the population remained peaceful until natural gas was discovered, and the government was perceived to break their promises of local development. Demonstrating that objective regional inequalities have remained relatively constant, while group grievances seems to have increased, we argue that direct measures of grievances are needed to pinpoint when inequality becomes politically salient. Using novel survey data, we find that people who think that the region is treated unfairly have the highest likelihood of supporting and participating in civil unrest. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 500-531 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1554569 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554569 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:500-531 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kyle Haynes Author-X-Name-First: Kyle Author-X-Name-Last: Haynes Title: Useful ignorance: The benefits of uncertainty during power shifts Abstract: This paper develops a formal model exploring how declining states allocate scarce military resources across multiple commitments under uncertainty. The model reveals that under certain conditions, states might actually benefit from their own uncertainty. In the model, a declining state’s uncertainty creates incentives for a revisionist rising power to misrepresent its intentions. But importantly, this misrepresentation requires the rising state to act cooperatively, implementing policies that immediately benefit the declining state. The model reveals how declining states can exploit these incentives in order to maximize the short-term benefits of their counterpart’s cooperation. Under some conditions, the benefits of this deceptive cooperation can outweigh the long-term costs of being deceived. These dynamics do not operate when the declining state is certain of the rising state’s type. I illustrate this logic through a case study of Great Britain’s pre-WWI naval withdrawal from East Asia. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 421-446 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1554572 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554572 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:421-446 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sarah Kreps Author-X-Name-First: Sarah Author-X-Name-Last: Kreps Author-Name: Stephen Roblin Author-X-Name-First: Stephen Author-X-Name-Last: Roblin Title: Treatment format and external validity in international relations experiments Abstract: Political scientists use short vignettes or mock news stories to embed treatments in experimental survey designs. We investigate whether the choice of format entails a trade off between internal and external validity. On the one hand, short vignettes may improve internal validity by isolating key variables without overloading respondents with information, thereby mitigating satisficing and improving data quality. On the other hand, mock news stories may improve external validity by approximating the circumstances under which individuals consume political information, which may enhance the credibility of the information. We find no evidence, however, that short vignettes mitigate satisficing more than mock news stories. Nor do we find that mock news stories enhance individual perceptions of the credibility of the information. Instead, we find that short vignettes are susceptible to confounding, which mock news story mitigate. These findings have important implications for debates about the use of survey experiments in political science. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 576-594 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1569002 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1569002 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:576-594 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Breen Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Breen Author-Name: Patrick J. W. Egan Author-X-Name-First: Patrick J. W. Author-X-Name-Last: Egan Title: The Catalytic Effect of IMF Lending: Evidence from Sectoral FDI Data Abstract: Our study contributes to the search for the elusive catalytic effect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending on inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Recent scholarship has found that the catalytic effect is conditional on political regime and program stringency. We contribute to this literature by developing and testing a theory which describes how the catalytic effect also varies by economic sector. This is a departure from existing studies, which have tended to focus on aggregate FDI flows after crises. Our findings corroborate previous research, which finds that in general IMF lending has a substantial and negative effect on FDI. However, we find that the negative effect is concentrated in sectors that are highly dependent on external capital and have low sunk costs in the host country. Our findings are robust to several alternative explanations common in IMF literature, namely the importance of IMF program design and the ability of governments to make credible commitments to reform. Substantively, our findings suggest that investors are more likely to use IMF lending as an escape hatch in countries where FDI is dependent on external capital and has low sunk costs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 447-473 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1582530 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1582530 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:447-473 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bernhard Reinsberg Author-X-Name-First: Bernhard Author-X-Name-Last: Reinsberg Author-Name: Thomas Stubbs Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Stubbs Author-Name: Alexander Kentikelenis Author-X-Name-First: Alexander Author-X-Name-Last: Kentikelenis Author-Name: Lawrence King Author-X-Name-First: Lawrence Author-X-Name-Last: King Title: The political economy of labor market deregulation during IMF interventions Abstract: This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel data sets with unprecedented country-year coverage – leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF conditionality – our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and collective labor rights. Once we control for the effect of labor market policy measures, however, we find that collective labor rights increase in the wake of IMF programs. We argue that this result is explained by the impact of union pressure on governments which, in such a context, are imbued with the policy space to respond to domestic interest groups. The study has broader theoretical implications as to when international organizations are effective in constraining governments’ choices. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 532-559 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1582531 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1582531 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:532-559 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daina Chiba Author-X-Name-First: Daina Author-X-Name-Last: Chiba Author-Name: Tobias Heinrich Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Heinrich Title: Colonial Legacy and Foreign Aid: Decomposing the Colonial Bias Abstract: It is well-known that donors give considerably more foreign aid to former colonies than to countries lacking past colonial ties. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about why this is the case. For one, there is almost never a theoretical justification for the inclusion of colonial history in statistical models. For the other, the only explicitly made rationale by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) actually predicts an interpretational problem: colonial history not only increases a former colony’s saliency to the donor, but also has left deep marks on recipients’ social and political institutions today. Both aspects shape how much aid a donor transfers to the recipient. This leaves ambiguous the meaning of the routinely found positive, sizable, and significant coefficient of colonial history on aid flows. We solve the inferential quandary by using a decomposition approach from labor econometrics. Our results show that about 75–100% of the colony effect on foreign aid stems from the greater saliency that donors give to policy concessions from former colonies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 474-499 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1593834 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1593834 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:474-499 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Juan Tellez Author-X-Name-First: Juan Author-X-Name-Last: Tellez Author-Name: Jordan Roberts Author-X-Name-First: Jordan Author-X-Name-Last: Roberts Title: The Rise of the Islamic State and Changing Patterns of Cooperation in the Middle East Abstract: Interstate relations are highly interdependent: a change in relations between a pair of states can impact the relationship each of those states has with third parties, as well as relations among those third party states. This is particularly salient in cases where emerging security threats have the potential to destabilize existing patterns of interstate behavior. While the interdependent nature of states’ strategic responses to varied security challenges is often discussed and theorized in the international relations (IR) literature, it is less frequently modeled empirically. We present an approach for analyzing state relations that takes into account higher-order dependencies in the position of states within a network. We apply the approach to a unique context: diplomatic relations between Middle East and North African (MENA) states during a period in which the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) becomes a significant destabilizing force in the region. We find that the emergence of ISIL dramatically reshaped the region’s politics, improving relations among the region’s major powers while worsening relations for the states facing territorial threats from the group. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 560-575 Issue: 3 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1604520 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1604520 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:3:p:560-575 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Babak RezaeeDaryakenari Author-X-Name-First: Babak Author-X-Name-Last: RezaeeDaryakenari Author-Name: Cameron G. Thies Author-X-Name-First: Cameron G. Author-X-Name-Last: Thies Title: Secrecy and Self-Interest: When Mediators Act Deceitfully Abstract: 3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 603-630 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1406931 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1406931 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:603-630 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timm Betz Author-X-Name-First: Timm Author-X-Name-Last: Betz Title: Domestic Institutions, Trade Disputes, and the Monitoring and Enforcement of International Law Abstract: Why do some governments participate more actively in the enforcement of international law than others? In the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO), I argue that domestic institutions – and, specifically, the electoral rule – can account for these differences. Interest groups are frequently harmed when foreign governments violate international law and have compliance information, but they lack access to formal enforcement mechanisms, such as dispute settlement bodies. I identify two complementary effects of domestic institutions. Where domestic institutions increase the government’s responsiveness to interest groups, the government is more likely to enforce international law on their behalf. In turn, because they expect that rule violations are more likely to be enforced, interest groups are more willing to contribute to the monitoring of international law. Hence, interest groups are more likely to provide the information necessary for enforcement, and governments are more likely to be aware of rule violations and to provide enforcement. Empirical evidence from the GATT/WTO is consistent with these propositions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 631-660 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1407319 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1407319 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:631-660 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Evangeline Reynolds Author-X-Name-First: Evangeline Author-X-Name-Last: Reynolds Author-Name: Amâncio Jorge Silva Nunes De Oliveira Author-X-Name-First: Amâncio Jorge Silva Nunes Author-X-Name-Last: De Oliveira Author-Name: Janina Onuki Author-X-Name-First: Janina Author-X-Name-Last: Onuki Author-Name: Matthew S. Winters Author-X-Name-First: Matthew S. Author-X-Name-Last: Winters Title: Attitudes toward Consent-Based and Non-Consent-Based International Law in a Regional Power Context Abstract: International legal scholars have identified and argued for and against new forms of non-consent-based international law. We study variation in Brazilian public opinion about adherence to international law created in three different ways: through a consent-based multilateral treaty, by the U.N. Security Council with the participation of Brazil, and by the U.N. Security Council without the participation of Brazil. Information that Brazil has participated in creating the international legal obligation through a multilateral treaty or membership on the Security Council yields levels of support for adherence to the legal obligation that are similar to those found when the origins of the legal obligation are generic. Information that the international legal obligation was created without Brazil’s participation, on the other hand, results in reduced support for compliance. This difference, which is particularly concentrated among highly educated respondents, is not driven by reduced concerns about reputational consequences or sanctions. Our results suggest that the increased use of non-consent-based forms of international law might be challenged by a lack of public support for compliance. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 661-680 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1408012 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1408012 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:661-680 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Muhammet A. Bas Author-X-Name-First: Muhammet A. Author-X-Name-Last: Bas Author-Name: Omer F. Orsun Author-X-Name-First: Omer F. Author-X-Name-Last: Orsun Author-Name: Robert J. Schub Author-X-Name-First: Robert J. Author-X-Name-Last: Schub Title: Accounting for Extra-Dyadic Sources of International Outcomes Abstract: Leaders consider the broader international landscape when making foreign policy choices. This landscape could encompass a single external actor, the local region, or even the whole international system. Quantitative analyses of international outcomes, however, frequently do not account for this broader context. This study suggests a corrective, illustrating the value of incorporating extra-dyadic variables into analyses with dyadic and monadic outcomes. The challenge is to parsimoniously capture theoretically salient elements of the multilateral environment. We contend that a measure that links distributions of power within any k-set of relevant states to uncertainty over conflict outcomes is a promising option for two reasons. First, the measure builds from and accords with canonical theories of international politics. Second, it offers scholars a simple and flexible means to define and account for the set of states that constitute the relevant multilateral landscape. Illustrative applications linking power distributions and outcome uncertainty to alliance formation and pursuit of nuclear weapons demonstrate that extra-dyadic factors consistently influence foreign policy outcomes. This study thus shows that situating such outcomes within their broader context is both feasible and substantively important. Moreover, it contributes to recent efforts to address shortcomings of monadic and dyadic studies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 777-800 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1414810 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1414810 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:777-800 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jeremy M. Berkowitz Author-X-Name-First: Jeremy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Berkowitz Title: Delegating Terror: Principal–Agent Based Decision Making in State Sponsorship of Terrorism Abstract: State sponsorship of terrorism, where a government deliberately provides resources and material support to a terrorist organization, is common in the international system. Sponsorship can provide significant strategic and political benefits for a state, but there are inherent international and domestic risks associated with delegating foreign policy to these actors. Using principal–agent analysis, I develop a model that evaluates the impact of potential costs and benefits on a state’s decision to sponsor terrorism. I test my model by using a novel dataset on sponsorship behaviors that ranges from 1970 to 2008. The results of my analysis support the validity of the principal–agent model in explaining sponsorship, as states will be more likely to engage in sponsorship when the strategic benefits of weakening the targeted state are high and the risks of international reputation loss and domestic dissatisfaction are low. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 709-748 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1414811 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1414811 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:709-748 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Milos Popovic Author-X-Name-First: Milos Author-X-Name-Last: Popovic Title: Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors Abstract: From the Patriotic Front struggle against the minority rule in Rhodesia to the seven-party mujaheddin alliance in Afghanistan, inter-rebel alliances make the armed opposition more resilient and successful in the face of government repression. Why then do some rebel groups cooperate with each other while others do not? Drawing on the principal-agent theory, I argue that the presence of foreign sponsors is likely to encourage alliance formation in civil wars especially when two rebel outfits share a state sponsor. Shared sponsors may demand cooperation between their agents and credibly threaten to punish them for non-compliance. They may also insist on the establishment of umbrella institutions to improve their monitoring and sanctioning capacity, and to increase the legitimacy of their agents. I test this argument using the UCDP Actor dataset with new data on alliances between rebel groups. I find strong evidence that shared sponsors increase the probability of inter-rebel alliance. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 749-776 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1414812 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2017.1414812 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:749-776 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dursun Peksen Author-X-Name-First: Dursun Author-X-Name-Last: Peksen Author-Name: Byungwon Woo Author-X-Name-First: Byungwon Author-X-Name-Last: Woo Title: Economic Sanctions and the Politics of IMF Lending Abstract: What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 681-708 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1429427 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1429427 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:681-708 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Yehuda Magid Author-X-Name-First: Yehuda Author-X-Name-Last: Magid Author-Name: Justin Schon Author-X-Name-First: Justin Author-X-Name-Last: Schon Title: Introducing the African Relational Pro-Government Militia Dataset (RPGMD) Abstract: This paper introduces the African Relational Pro-Government Militia Dataset (RPGMD). Recent research has improved our understandings of how pro-government forces form, under what conditions they are most likely to act, and how they affect the risk of internal conflict, repression, and state fragility. In this paper, we give an overview of our dataset that identifies African pro-government militias (PGMs) from 1997 to 2014. The data set shows the wide proliferation and diffusion of these groups on the African continent. We identify 149 active PGMs, 104 of which are unique to our dataset. In addition to descriptive information about these PGMs, we contribute measures of PGM alliance relationships, ethnic relationships, and context. We use these variables to examine the determinants of the presence and level of abusive behavior perpetrated by individual PGMs. Results highlight the need to consider nuances in PGM–government relationships in addition to PGM characteristics. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 801-832 Issue: 4 Volume: 44 Year: 2018 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1458724 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1458724 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:44:y:2018:i:4:p:801-832 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Erin Baggott Carter Author-X-Name-First: Erin Baggott Author-X-Name-Last: Carter Title: Diversionary cheap talk: economic conditions and US foreign policy rhetoric, 1945-2010 Abstract: This study explains how the economy affects the foreign policy rhetoric used by American presidents. When economic conditions deteriorate, presidents criticize foreign nations to boost their approval ratings. Presidents use this “diversionary cheap talk” in response to the misery index of unemployment plus inflation, which poses a unique threat to their popularity. They target historical rivals, which make intergroup distinctions most salient. Diversionary cheap talk is most influential for and most frequently used by Democratic presidents, whose non-core constituents prefer hawkish foreign policy but already expect it from Republican presidents. I test the observable implications of the theory with the American Diplomacy Dataset, an original record of 50,000 American foreign policy events between 1851 and 2010 drawn from a corpus of 1.3 million New York Times articles. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 163-198 Issue: 2 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1688319 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1688319 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:163-198 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Holley E. Hansen Author-X-Name-First: Holley E. Author-X-Name-Last: Hansen Author-Name: Stephen C. Nemeth Author-X-Name-First: Stephen C. Author-X-Name-Last: Nemeth Author-Name: Jacob A. Mauslein Author-X-Name-First: Jacob A. Author-X-Name-Last: Mauslein Title: United Nations peacekeeping and terrorism: short-term risks and long-term benefits Abstract: Does the introduction of UN forces impact terrorism? We argue that at least initially, UN peacekeeping missions may significantly shift the local conflict bargaining process, creating incentives for terrorist and insurgent groups to increase their attacks against civilians. UN missions create a symbolic endpoint to initial negotiations, alter the balance of power between combatants, and may change the relationship between local combatants and the civilian population they rely on for support. We test this argument using monthly data from 12 African countries, analyzing the risk of terrorism at the local level. We find that the introduction of UN forces in an area significantly increases the short-term risk of terrorism, but longer missions in the country reduce this risk. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 199-226 Issue: 2 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1725500 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1725500 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:199-226 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dennis M. Foster Author-X-Name-First: Dennis M. Author-X-Name-Last: Foster Author-Name: Jonathan W. Keller Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan W. Author-X-Name-Last: Keller Title: Single-party government, Prime Minister psychology, and the diversionary use of force: theory and evidence from the British case Abstract: This paper develops expectations about the likelihood of diversionary conflict initiation by parliamentary democracies with single-party majoritarian (SPM) governments. While most of the literature on diversion and governmental arrangement claims that SPMs have little incentive and/or limited capacity to execute diversionary gambits, we contend that the structural and environmental impetuses for diversion in such states are in fact largely indeterminate. We posit that the psychological attributes of prime ministers under SPM – in particular, their level of distrust – is the most important predictor of how they view structural and environmental constraints, and thus of whether they will militarily divert from poor economic conditions. Distrustful prime ministers are predisposed to the use of force, will dwell on the costs of economic problems, and fear that co-partisan MPs (especially in the cabinet) have designs on their office. Thus, despite having a legislative majority, these leaders will choose diversionary conflict over economic policy fixes. We conduct a partial test of this hypothesis in the British case from 1945 to 2007, and our analyses provide robust support. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 227-250 Issue: 2 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1708741 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1708741 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:227-250 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ludovico Alcorta Author-X-Name-First: Ludovico Author-X-Name-Last: Alcorta Author-Name: Haley J. Swedlund Author-X-Name-First: Haley J. Author-X-Name-Last: Swedlund Author-Name: Jeroen Smits Author-X-Name-First: Jeroen Author-X-Name-Last: Smits Title: Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa Abstract: The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated against. We posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. We further posit that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities and the share of elites. Using dyadic data for 155 ethnic groups in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that among politically-excluded groups it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Additionally, we find that discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 251-273 Issue: 2 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1716748 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1716748 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:251-273 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Steven Ward Author-X-Name-First: Steven Author-X-Name-Last: Ward Title: Status from fighting? Reassessing the relationship between conflict involvement and diplomatic rank Abstract: Recent research has provided evidence that conflict improves a belligerent’s status. I argue that this finding is based on a specification error. The relationship between the CINC index, which is used to control for material capabilities as a potential confounder, and change in diplomatic rank is not linear. Accounting for this non-linearity eliminates the apparent positive effect of MID initiation on change in diplomatic rank, and also reduces the effect of MID victory. The analysis has significant implications for foreign policy, for ongoing debates over the most useful way to model the link between status dissatisfaction and belligerence, and, more broadly, for analyses that use CINC to control for material capabilities. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 274-290 Issue: 2 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1708350 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1708350 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:274-290 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Charles R. Butcher Author-X-Name-First: Charles R. Author-X-Name-Last: Butcher Author-Name: Ryan D. Griffiths Author-X-Name-First: Ryan D. Author-X-Name-Last: Griffiths Title: States and their international relations since 1816: introducing version 2 of the International System(s) Dataset (ISD) Abstract: We introduce version 2 of the International System(s) Dataset (ISD), a register of sovereign states across the 1816–2016 period that include numerous states that are missed in commonly used datasets like the Correlates of War (COW) Project. Whereas ISD version 1 identified 363 states between 1816 and 2011, version 2 identifies 482. This version also records valuable information on a range of corollary variables, including start dates, end dates, estimated population sizes, diplomatic relations with Europe, conflict episodes, the existence of borders, and the location of capital cities. This dataset makes an important contribution to the study of international relations. It provides a more accurate understanding of the development of the international system over the last two centuries, it moves beyond the Eurocentric bias that sits at the heart of existing quantitative IR scholarship, and it will enable scholars to pursue a range of research topics such as the historical importance of state borders and boundaries, the practices surrounding recognition, and the frequency and intensity of conflict across regions. In this article, we discuss the existing state system membership lists and show how the ISD addresses their shortcomings. We outline the key concept and operationalization of statehood that the ISD adopts. We detail the variables included in this version of the ISD, discuss the data collection process, and show temporal and spatial distributions that illustrate the uniqueness of the ISD. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of bringing the ISD into one of many potential research topics: the study of conflict. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 291-308 Issue: 2 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1707199 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1707199 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:2:p:291-308 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Akisato Suzuki Author-X-Name-First: Akisato Author-X-Name-Last: Suzuki Title: Ethnicity, political survival, and the exchange of nationalist foreign policy Abstract: How does leadership’s desire for political survival in ethnically heterogeneous democracies affect the probability of states exchanging nationalist foreign policy? I define nationalist foreign policy as foreign policy that aims to fulfill national self-governance using a civic or ethnic frame. I argue that civic-nationalist policy disputing the territoriality of one’s own state is more likely, while ethno-nationalist policy favoring the leadership’s foreign co-ethnics is less likely, when the size of the leadership’s ethnic group is small and the level of democracy is relatively high. This is because the leadership, under such domestic conditions, has to mobilize support from other ethnic groups in order to stay in power. Civic-nationalist policy allows the leadership to increase domestic solidarity across ethnic lines and mobilize support from other ethnic groups, whereas ethno-nationalist policy would risk other ethnic groups criticizing the leadership of being ethno-centrist. These hypotheses are supported by quantitative analysis using an original dataset. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 54-79 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1508463 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2018.1508463 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:54-79 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gina Lei Miller Author-X-Name-First: Gina Lei Author-X-Name-Last: Miller Author-Name: Ryan M. Welch Author-X-Name-First: Ryan M. Author-X-Name-Last: Welch Author-Name: Andrew J. Vonasch Author-X-Name-First: Andrew J. Author-X-Name-Last: Vonasch Title: The psychological effects of state socialization: IGO membership loss and respect for human rights Abstract: We present an interdisciplinary theory that considers how loss of membership in international organizations affects states’ human rights practices. Drawing mostly from social psychology and international relations research, we argue that states are socialized into the international community through a process of social influence, whereby they are incentivized to comply with group norms by the promise (threat) of social rewards (punishments). Social influence occurs when states form social bonds through interactions with other states. When social bonds are severed, fewer opportunities for social influence occur due to lower information to both the remaining states and the state that lost those social bonds. Thus, we hypothesize that the loss of membership from IGOs reduces incentives to comply with group norms and adversely affects human rights practices at home. A combination of propensity score matching/regression and autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models on a global cross-section across the years 1978–2012 supports the theory. Specifically, losing at least one IGO membership leads to a long-run drop in human rights respect of about one quarter to one half standard deviation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 113-143 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1522308 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522308 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:113-143 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Eric Keels Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Keels Author-Name: Justin Kinney Author-X-Name-First: Justin Author-X-Name-Last: Kinney Title: “Any press is good press?” Rebel political wings, media freedom, and terrorism in civil wars Abstract: As part of a recent effort to bridge the studies of terrorism and civil war, new research has begun to emerge on the use of terrorism by rebel groups as a strategy of war. Building on these findings, we examine the role of affiliated political wings in shaping the use of terrorism by rebel groups during civil wars. We contend that the presence of an affiliated political wing during the civil war should increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only in countries where there are relatively few restrictions on the freedom of the press. As political wings are often designed to engage with the civilian population through the dissemination of information, these apparatuses are in a key position to frame the use of terrorism as part of the rebel’s broader war effort. To test this proposition, we examine the use of terrorism by all rebel groups from 1970 to 2011. The results from the analysis provide strong support for our argument that political wings increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only when the press is allowed to independently cover terrorist attacks. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 144-169 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1522309 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522309 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:144-169 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hannes Weber Author-X-Name-First: Hannes Author-X-Name-Last: Weber Title: Age structure and political violence: a re-assessment of the “youth bulge” hypothesis Abstract: A popular hypothesis in international studies states that a “youth bulge”––an age pyramid dominated by large cohorts between 15 and 29 years of age––increases the risk of political violence. However, empirical evidence on this link remains inconclusive to date. In this article, we systematically assess the youth effect using new data from 183 countries between 1996 and 2015. We find that within countries, a decrease in the youth ratio is generally associated with a decrease in the number of violent deaths from terrorism or other internal conflicts, and vice versa. This is also confirmed in out-of-sample predictions. However, the association is not evident in all constellations and sensitive to modeling issues. In particular, large cohorts of young males can become a disruptive power in countries that increase enrollment in post-primary education. Although this is usually followed by fertility decline, youth bulges often remain at record levels for quite some time due to high birth rates in the past. Strong labor markets can in general suppress the detrimental consequences of youth bulges. However, the combination of growing youth cohorts and educational expansion often leads to increased political violence even in the presence of low youth unemployment. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 80-112 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1522310 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522310 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:80-112 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ore Koren Author-X-Name-First: Ore Author-X-Name-Last: Koren Title: Food, state power, and rebellion: The case of maize Abstract: Why do rebellions occur and persist in some countries but not in others? Evidence shows that natural resources affect the fighting capacity of rebel groups; yet, by focusing on lucrative resources that are rare in most rebellion-afflicted countries, such as oil and diamonds, scholars neglected one necessary input for rebellion: staple crops. Focusing on maize, the world’s most prevalent staple, this study argues that, as one of the most important resources for rebel groups, maize can have a destabilizing effect on the state’s ability to thwart rebellion. These claims are corroborated statistically on a new time-varying, high-resolution global dataset of staple crop productivity, and then qualitatively through an analysis of archival records on the Mau Mau rebellion. In identifying an overlooked, global linkage between agricultural abundance, state capacity, and intrastate violence, this study explains strong geographical and temporal variations in rebellions at both the subnational and global levels. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 170-197 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1522311 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522311 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:170-197 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David H. Bearce Author-X-Name-First: David H. Author-X-Name-Last: Bearce Author-Name: Andrew F. Hart Author-X-Name-First: Andrew F. Author-X-Name-Last: Hart Title: Labor migration numbers and rights: do they trade off or advance together? Abstract: This article reconsiders the argument that as labor immigration policy opens, it must also become more restrictive in terms of immigrant rights. After discussing this tradeoff logic, positing a negative relationship between external (numbers) and internal (rights) labor migration policy, it then extends the underlying political model to show that when accounting for the lobbying pressure of firms seeking high skill labor, a very different expectation emerges. This political accommodation argument predicts a positive relationship between external and internal migration policy, or that policy related to labor immigration openness and immigrant rights should advance together, although not necessarily quickly or at the same rate. It then tests these competing propositions using a new dataset that sorts labor migration policy changes among 38 advanced industrial democracies from 1995 to 2016 into these two dimensions, finding a significant positive relationship between them. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 28-53 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1525137 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1525137 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:28-53 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Tyson Chatagnier Author-X-Name-First: J. Tyson Author-X-Name-Last: Chatagnier Title: Civil war mediation and integration into global value chains Abstract: How does the globalization of production affect interstate behavior? While scholars have paid significant attention to the effect of global value chains on trade and political economy, there has been substantially less focus on the interaction between globalized production and conflict behavior. However, the changing economic landscape has the potential to alter the decision calculus of leaders on a variety of issues, including conflict mediation. In this research note, I argue that when deciding how to allocate scarce mediation resources, major powers pay attention to the position of potential beneficiaries in the global production network. In particular, among states involved in intrastate conflicts, those that are more heavily involved in the production and sale of intermediate inputs are more likely to receive mediation from major powers. I test this argument using data on intermediate trade and civil war mediation between 1991 and 2011. The results of the analysis are consistent with the theory, suggesting that major powers are more likely to provide mediation for producers of intermediate goods, but not for consumers. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 198-214 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1538047 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1538047 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:198-214 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Barbara F. Walter Author-X-Name-First: Barbara F. Author-X-Name-Last: Walter Title: Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars Abstract: Why do multiple rebel groups form in some civil wars but not others? Since 1946, only half of all civil wars were fought by a single rebel group; the rest were fought by multiple groups. This article argues that this variation is determined by the incentives political entrepreneurs have to enter a war. The higher the demand for political change and the lower the costs of fighting, the more incentives entrepreneurs have to form their own group. Analyzing UCDP data for all civil wars between 1946 and 2015 I find that the two measures of demand – the number of identifiable ethnic or religious groups in a country and the size of the disgruntled population – have the most consistent effects, but that key measures of costs such as the size of the government military also matter. A detailed analysis of the Ethiopian case further reveals the influence of external intervention on the formation of rebel groups. These results suggest that rebel groups emerge in civil wars in rational, predictable ways related to the ease by which rebel elites can mobilize separate groups for fighting. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-27 Issue: 1 Volume: 45 Year: 2019 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1554573 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2019.1554573 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:1-27 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Benjamin Tkach Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin Author-X-Name-Last: Tkach Title: Private military and security companies, corporate structure, and levels of violence in Iraq Abstract: This article analyzes the effect of private military and security companies (PMSCs) on levels of civilian casualties in Iraqi governorates from 2004 to 2007. Within a principal-agent framework, we argue that the capacity to monitor and evaluate PMSC performance is conditioned by the availability of performance-related information. Crucially, PMSC corporate structure impacts the information available to the employer. Differences in PMSCs’ corporate structure (e.g., whether a firm is publicly traded or closed ownership) influences the disclosure of different levels of information about a firm’s performance. A closed ownership PMSC is opaque, obstructing access to information. Publicly traded PMSCs, by contrast, have legal obligations to release information on corporate performance, policies, and contracts. Closed ownership PMSCs are correlated with increases in the likelihood of civilian casualties while publicly traded PMSCs have no effect on civilian casualties. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 499-525 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1758082 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1758082 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:499-525 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Glen Biglaiser Author-X-Name-First: Glen Author-X-Name-Last: Biglaiser Author-Name: David Lektzian Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Lektzian Title: The effects of economic sanctions on targeted countries’ stock markets Abstract: Although much previous research has investigated the impact of sanctions on trade and global capital, few academic studies have explored the effect of sanctions on stock markets in targeted countries. The lack of research is surprising as a frequent goal of sanctions is to inflict pain on financial markets in targeted countries to promote policy change. Using monthly market data for 66 countries from 1990 to 2005, we find that the introduction of import sanctions by countries with developed economies, such as those with membership in the G20, has a significantly negative impact on stock market valuation in targeted countries. However, this effect only occurs when targeted states are not already subject to multiple sanctions. Our study suggests that sanctions can have a negative effect on stock market value in targeted countries, but that their effectiveness is relatively limited in practice due to the overuse of sanctions. This finding is supported by the marginal decrease in the negative effect on the target’s stock market as the number of sanctions increases. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 526-550 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1765774 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1765774 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:526-550 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jillienne Haglund Author-X-Name-First: Jillienne Author-X-Name-Last: Haglund Title: Domestic Politics and the Effectiveness of Regional Human Rights Courts Abstract: Under what conditions are regional human rights courts effective? I argue that in order for regional human rights courts to be effective, they should deter future human rights abuses and this is more likely when the executive adopts and implements rights-respecting policy in response to adverse regional court decisions. When the executive expects the domestic judiciary to implement regional human rights court orders, the executive also expects to face domestic pressure for failing to make policy changes despite domestic judicial implementation of regional court orders. However, the domestic judiciary does not implement regional court orders with equal probability. Domestic judicial power (independence and effectiveness) increases the ability and willingness of the domestic judiciary to implement regional court orders, and subsequently increases the likelihood that the executive adopts and implements comprehensive human rights policy. Using data on adverse judgments from the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, I find that regional human rights courts are more likely to be effective in the presence of a strong domestic judiciary. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 551-578 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1751624 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1751624 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:551-578 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: William Spaniel Author-X-Name-First: William Author-X-Name-Last: Spaniel Author-Name: Michael Poznansky Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Poznansky Title: Bad-faith cooperation Abstract: In many political contexts, antagonistic actors face a tradeoff. Broadly, they profit from noncooperative actions. But taking those actions signals unfriendly preferences to their targets, who may then take proactive countermeasures to mitigate the damage of later defections. We develop a model to investigate how actors can manipulate the signaling incentives. We show that the target best avoids initial defections when the cost and effectiveness of countermeasures fall in a middle region. Although antagonists find misrepresentation profitable, the initial cooperation that uncertainty induces gives impatient targets a greater overall payoff than with complete information. As a result, impatient targets may want to pre-commit to less attractive countermeasures to enjoy the benefits of initial cooperation. We illustrate the mechanism with a case study of the Soviet and American policy toward Central-Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 579-605 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1751152 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1751152 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:579-605 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Seung-Whan Choi Author-X-Name-First: Seung-Whan Author-X-Name-Last: Choi Author-Name: Youngwan Kim Author-X-Name-First: Youngwan Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: David Ebner Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Ebner Author-Name: Patrick James Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: James Title: Human rights institutionalization and US humanitarian military intervention Abstract: Are human rights a core value of US foreign policy? If so, how does the United States enforce human rights standards? Extant studies maintain that mass media, public opinion, and/or political concerns drive US decisions to engage in humanitarian military interventions. In this study, we explore the extent to which “human rights institutionalization” through the State Department’s human rights reporting affects the likelihood of US humanitarian interventions. We find that human rights institutionalization is a viable, and perhaps even the best, explanation for the robust connection between human rights violations and deployment of the US military. These findings suggest that the United States is willing to undertake costly action to enforce international standards of human rights, but with some important caveats. Overall, we provide large-N, quantitative support for the broader shifts in US humanitarian intervention described by qualitative scholars and experts in US strategy and security policy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 606-635 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1758694 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1758694 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:606-635 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ross A. Miller Author-X-Name-First: Ross A. Author-X-Name-Last: Miller Title: Welcome to the Jungle: a research note on leader entry, combat experience, and dispute targeting Abstract: A relatively large body of research emphasizes the vital role of the tenure of leaders in explaining conflict behavior. In some accounts, new leaders are more likely to be attacked than their more seasoned counterparts. But are all new leaders equally susceptible to challenge? This research note argues that a key characteristic of leaders – whether or not they have combat experience prior to assuming office – influences their exposure to attacks from abroad. Analyses of dyadic interactions, 1900–2001, reveal that new leaders with combat experience are almost three times more likely to be targeted than leaders without a history of combat. Moreover, while time in office tends to increase the likelihood of conflict involvement generally, for leaders with combat experience, the risk of conflict declines across their tenure. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 636-651 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1758693 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1758693 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:636-651 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brandon Yoder Author-X-Name-First: Brandon Author-X-Name-Last: Yoder Author-Name: Kyle Haynes Author-X-Name-First: Kyle Author-X-Name-Last: Haynes Title: Mutual uncertainty and credible reassurance: experimental evidence Abstract: Recent theoretical work has suggested that mutual uncertainty of a particular kind can promote credible reassurance and cooperation among states with compatible preferences. Specifically, on issues where cooperation is subjective, such that states are uncertain what types of actions the other will view as cooperative, credible reassurance under mutual uncertainty is straightforward. This finding, if correct, has profound implications for the scope and severity of the security dilemma, suggesting that misplaced suspicion due to uncertainty can be readily overcome under a range of realistic conditions. We present the results of a laboratory experiment testing this important theoretical claim, and find broad support for it. When cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty induces senders to signal their true preferences and allows receivers to form more accurate beliefs about the sender’s type. Importantly, however, mutual uncertainty did not increase receivers’ confidence in their assessments of the sender’s type. Thus, receivers responded appropriately as signals became more credible, but failed to recognize that their beliefs had become more accurate. This distinction between the accuracy and confidence of beliefs has broad implications for international relations theory and social science methodology. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 652-668 Issue: 4 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1753725 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1753725 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:4:p:652-668 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Milton Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Author-X-Name-Last: Milton Author-Name: Bryan Price Author-X-Name-First: Bryan Author-X-Name-Last: Price Title: Too central to fail? Terror networks and leadership decapitation Abstract: Leadership decapitation, as a means of hindering the operations and hastening the demise of terrorist organizations, has been the subject of a growing body of research. However, these studies have not examined how an organization’s position in a broader network impacts its ability to weather decapitation. We argue that highly networked organizations possess characteristics that make decapitation less effective. To test this argument, we combine data on leadership decapitation with network data on terrorist organizations and find that well-networked organizations are resilience to leadership decapitation. Our study has implications for our understanding of how terrorist organizations respond to counterterrorism efforts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 309-333 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1719406 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1719406 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:309-333 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nils W. Metternich Author-X-Name-First: Nils W. Author-X-Name-Last: Metternich Author-Name: Julian Wucherpfennig Author-X-Name-First: Julian Author-X-Name-Last: Wucherpfennig Title: Strategic rebels: a spatial econometric approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars Abstract: Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebel organizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebel organizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the core theoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach to explicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. We argue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized until the end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil, power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategic complements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts. Based on a network game-theoretic model, we derive a spatial econometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategic interdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence is positive but partially offset in secessionist conflicts where the public goods nature of the incompatibility also induces strategic substitution effects. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 334-371 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1737800 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1737800 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:334-371 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Mamone Author-X-Name-First: Ignacio Author-X-Name-Last: Mamone Title: Time for a haircut: political regimes and sovereign debt restructurings Abstract: Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to full debt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countries take a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions from investors. This article argues that these differences are largely explained by the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previous research examines whether democracies make more credible commitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining with foreign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with their institutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, and public deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentives to pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set of viable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset of debt restructurings with private creditors in the period 1975–2017. The event history analysis indicates that democracies experience longer restructurings and the double-hurdle regression analysis shows that democracies obtain larger creditor losses. Further, there is interesting variation among democracies and autocracies. Our findings suggest that political regimes are crucial to explaining why cooperation fails in international debt markets. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 372-401 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1742119 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1742119 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:372-401 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alexandra Haines Author-X-Name-First: Alexandra Author-X-Name-Last: Haines Author-Name: Michele Leiby Author-X-Name-First: Michele Author-X-Name-Last: Leiby Author-Name: Matthew Krain Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: Krain Author-Name: Amanda Murdie Author-X-Name-First: Amanda Author-X-Name-Last: Murdie Title: Two sides of the same coin: can campaigns generate support for both human rights and retributive violence? Abstract: Do framing strategies that are effective at encouraging pro-social behavior, such as participation in human rights campaigns, also mobilize support for violence within the same subjects? We use an experimental research design to examine individuals’ reactions to personal, humanizing narratives about past victimization. Participants are randomly assigned to one of eight treatment groups, which variously highlighted the humanity of the subject, the intensity of the past violence, and/or an evocative photograph of the subject that underscores her loss and vulnerability. We expect narratives that emphasize the subject’s humanity will encourage the audience to see the subject as innocent and as a victim, but also to feel angry about her experience. As a result, individuals will be more likely to defend the subject’s human rights, and to condone her use of retributive violence. We find that humanizing narratives lead respondents to simultaneously support a human rights appeal on the subject’s behalf and her use of retributive violence. Perceiving the subject in the narrative as innocent or as a victim mediates these effects, but anger often does not. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 402-430 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1743990 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1743990 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:402-430 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: James A. Piazza Author-X-Name-First: James A. Author-X-Name-Last: Piazza Title: Politician hate speech and domestic terrorism Abstract: Does hate speech – rhetoric that targets, vilifies or is intended to intimidate minorities and other groups in society – fuel domestic terrorism? This question is, unfortunately, relevant given the convergence of the use of hate speech by political figures and domestic terrorist incidents in a variety of countries, including the United States. In this study I theorize that hate speech by politicians deepens political polarization and that this, in turn, produces conditions under which domestic terrorism increases. I test this proposition using terrorism and hate speech data for 135 to 163 countries for the period 2000 to 2017. I produce two findings. First, hate speech by political figures boosts domestic terrorism. Second, the impact of political hate speech on domestic terrorism is mediated through increased political polarization. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 431-453 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1739033 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1739033 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:431-453 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Louis-Alexandre Berg Author-X-Name-First: Louis-Alexandre Author-X-Name-Last: Berg Author-Name: Naomi Levy Author-X-Name-First: Naomi Author-X-Name-Last: Levy Title: When aid builds states: party dominance and the effects of foreign aid on tax collection after civil war Abstract: Does foreign aid strengthen or weaken post-conflict states? We examine the effects of aid on tax collection after civil war, an important dimension of state effectiveness. While the literature emphasizes aid’s perverse effects, the relationship between aid dependence and the growth of tax collection is unclear. We argue that the impact of aid reflects its political utility for ruling elites in consolidating their authority after civil war. While dominant parties subvert tax strengthening reforms to solidify their political base, elites in more fractionalized settings rely on external political backing to manage internal challenges to their authority, and are more likely to comply with donor conditions. We test this argument through a Latent Curve Analysis of tax collection rate growth in post-civil war countries from 1978 to 2012. We find that aid is associated with slower growth in tax collection in dominant party settings, and more rapid tax growth in politically fractionalized settings. The findings highlight the need for attention to internal political dynamics to explain aid effectiveness after civil war, and point to opportunities to strengthen institutions in some post-conflict countries. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 454-480 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1735383 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1735383 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:454-480 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Martin Mosler Author-X-Name-First: Martin Author-X-Name-Last: Mosler Author-Name: Niklas Potrafke Author-X-Name-First: Niklas Author-X-Name-Last: Potrafke Title: International political alignment during the Trump presidency: voting at the UN general assembly Abstract: We examine voting behavior of Western allied countries in line with the United States over the period 1949 until 2019. Descriptive statistics show that voting in line with the United States on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was on average 7.2 percentage points lower under Donald Trump than under the preceding United States presidents. The policy shift is especially pronounced for resolutions dealing with the Middle East. The decline in common UNGA voting behavior is statistically significant for the resolution agreement rate and the absolute difference of ideal points. The results do not suggest that the alienation of Western allies is driven by ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology scale. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 481-497 Issue: 3 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1719405 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1719405 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:3:p:481-497 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael J. Soules Author-X-Name-First: Michael J. Author-X-Name-Last: Soules Title: Women in uniform: the opening of combat roles in state militaries Abstract: Women have historically been excluded from combat roles in state militaries. However, in recent years, women’s growing involvement in combat roles has sparked public debate. Currently, only a small minority of countries allow women into their ground combat forces. Given the policy relevance, it is important to examine the conditions under which militaries will allow women into combat roles. Using data from 1970–2016, I empirically examine how a variety of aspects of women’s participation in social, political, and economic activities and institutions affects the probability that combat roles will be opened to them. The results provide robust evidence that women’s participation in politics, civil society, and economic activities are associated with a higher probability that these exclusionary policies are lifted from combat roles. However, I do not find evidence of an association between expectations pertaining to women’s familial roles and the probability of combat positions being opened to them. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 847-871 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814766 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814766 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:847-871 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Katherine Sawyer Author-X-Name-First: Katherine Author-X-Name-Last: Sawyer Author-Name: Talbot M. Andrews Author-X-Name-First: Talbot M. Author-X-Name-Last: Andrews Title: Rebel recruitment and retention in civil conflict Abstract: While the conflict literature has examined the use of forced recruitment in conflict, the question remains why groups would choose to do so when forced recruits require expensive coercion and time intensive socialization processes. The prevailing wisdom in the literature is that forced recruitment is a tactic of the weak; yet empirically, we often observe relatively strong rebel groups employing forced recruitment. In this paper, we argue that credible threats of punishment for desertion are a prerequisite to successful coercive recruitment. Thus, stronger rebels, those that are able to credibly threaten punishment, are more likely to engage in forced recruitment than are weaker rebels. Forced recruitment is not a tactic of last resort but a human rights abuse frequently exploited by already advantaged rebel groups. We find strong support for our argument quantitatively and qualitatively using cross-national data on rebel recruitment practices and case illustrations of the contras in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. The results speak to the growing literature emphasizing the importance of integrating individual and group level processes both theoretically and empirically. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 872-892 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814765 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814765 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:872-892 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Elizabeth J. Menninga Author-X-Name-First: Elizabeth J. Author-X-Name-Last: Menninga Title: Complementary mediation: Exploring mediator composition in civil wars Abstract: Mediators improve the chances disputants in civil wars sign a peace agreement by exerting pressure or influence, referred to as leverage. This paper explores how sources of mediator leverage complement one another and draws attention to an under-explored form of influence: credible staying power. I argue that softer forms of leverage (i.e. relationships with the disputants and credible staying power) complement material strength, providing the highest chance of reaching a peace agreement when used together. As multiple sources of leverage mean multiple mediators, this paper also explores the number of and coordination among mediators, acknowledging the tension between multiple mediators increasing available leverage while complicating negotiations by adding more voices to the negotiating table. I argue that more mediators, all else equal, will decrease the probability of success; this effect can be offset, however, by coordination among the mediators. Empirical analysis of 312 mediation efforts in civil wars from 1989 to 2006 find that softer forms of leverage do reinforce material power, producing the greatest probability of reaching a signed agreement when used together. Moreover, coordination substantially mitigates the negative effect of additional mediators. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 893-921 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814759 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814759 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:893-921 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rong Wang Author-X-Name-First: Rong Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Author-Name: Aimei Yang Author-X-Name-First: Aimei Author-X-Name-Last: Yang Title: The Structure and Evolution of the International Human Rights Network:Unpacking the Influences of Countries’ Contextual Factors and Network Configurations Abstract: Guided by the multi-theoretical, multilevel (MTML) framework, this study draws from the World Polity Theory and World System Theory to examine factors shaping the structure and evolution of an international human rights network which included INGOs, IGOs, and countries as key players. Using a longitudinal research design and network modeling, this study collected data from 197 countries and revealed a consistent increase of their participation in the networks over a period of 10 years and also the tendency to stabilize. Nonetheless, structural inequality has persisted over time, which was reinforced by endogenous network configurations such as centrality and transitivity at the country level. Exogenous variables such as a country’s economic development, press freedom, and human rights performance-based reputation all contributed to the evolution of this international alliance network. Theoretical and practical implications on how communication and collaboration between countries may play a role in influencing a country’s human right performance are discussed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 922-952 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814769 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814769 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:922-952 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Efe Tokdemir Author-X-Name-First: Efe Author-X-Name-Last: Tokdemir Author-Name: Seden Akcinaroglu Author-X-Name-First: Seden Author-X-Name-Last: Akcinaroglu Author-Name: H. Ege Ozen Author-X-Name-First: H. Ege Author-X-Name-Last: Ozen Author-Name: Ekrem Karakoc Author-X-Name-First: Ekrem Author-X-Name-Last: Karakoc Title: ‘Wars of Others’: National Cleavages and Attitudes towards External Conflicts Abstract: Why do individuals sympathize with others’ wars, an antecedent of the decision to become a foreign fighter? By collecting original public opinion data from Lebanon, in 2015, and Turkey in 2017, about the actors of conflict in Syria, we test the argument that an ethno-religious cleavage at home shapes the proclivity of individuals to support others’ wars. Individuals may perceive a war abroad as endangering political and social balance of power at home – and hence own survival. Therefore, when transnational identities map onto a national cleavage, as in the Sunni–Shia cleavage in Lebanon, and Turk – Kurd cleavage in Turkey, individuals are more disposed to show sympathy for others’ wars both to help their kin and to protect the balance of power at home. Our findings imply that efforts to end the trend toward citizens becoming foreign fighters must start at home by mending the relations between ethnic and religious groups. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 953-986 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1792898 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1792898 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:953-986 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Doron Ella Author-X-Name-First: Doron Author-X-Name-Last: Ella Title: Categorization in international organizations Abstract: This paper explores why certain IOs officially categorize their member-states while others do not. It also examines the specific problems that categorization mechanisms are intended to solve. Building on theories of rational design, I argue that categorization is intended to provide a solution to cooperation problems in IOs and assist in preventing possible defections of participating member-states. I hypothesize that categorization is more likely to be incorporated and employed in IOs with heterogeneous membership in terms of capabilities and/or preferences; in IOs that deal with issues characterized by high levels of uncertainty about the state of the world; and in IOs that require deep cooperation and therefore are highly institutionalized. To test these hypotheses, I created a new dataset on categorization, encompassing information on 156 IOs established between 1868 and 2015 and ranging across 12 issue-areas. A multivariate logistic regression with robust standard errors is used to estimate the empirical relationships between the variables. This study finds that IOs may consider categorization as a proper alternative to other solutions, such as exclusion, for problems that stem from divergent power distributions; it assists in lowering states’ uncertainties about the consequences of cooperation, as it clarifies current and future distribution of possible costs and benefits; and, it assists in minimizing the compliance costs of less powerful participant-states. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 987-1015 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814760 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814760 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:987-1015 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Eyal Rubinson Author-X-Name-First: Eyal Author-X-Name-Last: Rubinson Author-Name: Tal Sadeh Author-X-Name-First: Tal Author-X-Name-Last: Sadeh Title: Perceived to slack: secondary securitization and multilateral treaty ratification in Israel Abstract: This study emphasizes the place that cognitive processes rather than objective concerns have in ratification of multilateral treaties. We argue that secondary securitization by non-security experts hinders treaty ratification. When security is at stake, the potential costs of undesired action by the treaty’s IO are deemed higher, risk-aversion increases, and asymmetry among the member states’ policy perceptions is greater. Thus, our secondary securitization model improves over existing explanations of multilateral treaty ratification by assuming that national selfishness drives treaty (non)ratification, but not necessarily in a rational way. We support our argument with survival analysis regarding the ratification process in Israel of 243 treaties, based on documents retrieved from official archives, and controlling for a variety of competing explanations. We break securitization into objective and subjective components and correct for the possibility of undocumented acts of securitization. Our results are robust to all this. We follow with discourse and content analysis of official discussions of three human rights treaties (ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW). We innovate theoretically by distinguishing secondary from primary securitization, and by combining Securitization and Principal-Agent theories. We believe our results travel well for other countries in which security concerns overshadow aspect of civilian life, and IOs are regarded with suspicion. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1016-1042 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1797715 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1797715 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:1016-1042 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nick Dietrich Author-X-Name-First: Nick Author-X-Name-Last: Dietrich Author-Name: Kristine Eck Author-X-Name-First: Kristine Author-X-Name-Last: Eck Title: Known unknowns: media bias in the reporting of political violence Abstract: How does sourcing affect which events are included in international relations datasets? The increasing number of machine-coded datasets offers the promise of coding a larger corpus of documents more quickly, but existing automated processes rely exclusively on databases of news reports for coverage. We exploit source variation in the UCDP GED dataset, which includes events from media reports and non-media sources, to explore the bias introduced by including only media reports in international relations datasets. Unlike previous studies, our approach allows us to compare subnational and cross-national determinants of bias. We find that media sources severely underreport events in African countries, and coverage is also associated with country-level factors like international trade and subnational factors like access to communication technology. Non-media sources cover a significant number of events not included in media sources; their inclusion can expand coverage and reduce bias in datasets. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1043-1060 Issue: 6 Volume: 46 Year: 2020 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814758 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814758 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:46:y:2020:i:6:p:1043-1060 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew P. Owsiak Author-X-Name-First: Andrew P. Author-X-Name-Last: Owsiak Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Making trains from boxcars: studying conflict and conflict management interdependencies Abstract: Research on international conflict management remains largely siloed, with studies omitting conflict events and focusing on disparate conflict management strategies (e.g., mediation, or peacekeeping); yet we know that strategies regularly interact with conflict events and one another (e.g., within the same conflict). If one imagines conflict events and conflict management strategies as train boxcars, and begins from the observation that boxcars travel in trains (i.e., collections of boxcars linked together in a purposefully constructed, meaningful way), a key question emerges: how do we build trains from conflict management strategy boxcars? How do we move from the impulse to isolate these strategies artificially and study them discretely, to theorizing about and examining the interdependence between them directly. The contributors to this special issue address that broad question. In this introductory article, we first explain the challenge at hand, outline the forms conflict management interdependence can theoretically take, and define the conflict management strategies that feature throughout the issue. We then conduct a multidimensional scaling exercise to ascertain the most promising dimensions along which to theorize conflict management interdependence. This analysis shows that the myriad conflict management strategies organize along two prominent dimensions: whether the strategy pursues a more integrative or distributive outcome, and how costly the strategy is for its user to employ. The analysis, far from being the last word, serves as an opening salvo for further research on conflict management interdependence. Finally, we discuss the various articles in this special issue, highlighting their contributions and tying them together into a few main themes.Les recherches sur la gestion internationale des conflits restent majoritairement en silo, des études omettant des événements de conflit pour se concentrer sur des stratégies disparates de gestion des conflits (p. ex. médiation ou maintien de la paix) ; cependant, nous savons que les stratégies interagissent régulièrement avec les événements de conflit et entre elles (p. ex. dans le même conflit). Si nous imaginons les événements de conflit et les stratégies de gestion des conflits comme étant des wagons, et que nous commençons par observer que les wagons se déplacent en tant que trains (c-à-d, que les wagons sont reliés ensemble d’une manière constructive, qui a un sens, dans un but très précis), une question clé émerge : comment construisons-nous des trains à partir de wagons de stratégie de gestion des conflits ? Et comment passons-nous de la pulsion d’isoler ces stratégies artificiellement et de les étudier de manière distincte à celle de théoriser et d’examiner directement l’interdépendance entre elles ? Les contributeurs à ce numéro spécial abordent ces vastes questions. Dans cet article d’introduction, nous commençons par expliquer le défi qui nous attend, par présenter les formes que l’interdépendance de la gestion des conflits peut théoriquement prendre, et par définir les stratégies de gestion des conflits qui seront abordées tout au long de ce numéro. Nous procédons ensuite à un exercice de mise à l’échelle multidimensionnelle afin de déterminer les dimensions les plus prometteuses pour théoriser l’interdépendance de la gestion des conflits. Cette analyse montre que la myriade de stratégies de gestion des conflits s’organise autour de deux dimensions principales : la stratégie poursuit-elle un objectif plus intégratif ou distributif, et quel est son coût pour celui qui l’emploie. Loin de constituer le dernier mot, cette analyse est la première salve pour des recherches ultérieures sur l’interdépendance de la gestion des conflits. Enfin, nous abordons les divers articles de ce numéro spécial en mettant en évidence leurs contributions et en les associant en quelques thèmes principaux. Las investigaciones sobre el manejo de conflictos internacionales continúan en gran parte aisladas, con estudios que omiten eventos de conflicto y se enfocan en estrategias dispares de manejo de conflictos (p. ej., mediación o mantenimiento de la paz); sin embargo, sabemos que las estrategias interactúan regularmente con eventos de conflicto y entre sí (p. ej., dentro del mismo conflicto). Si uno imagina los eventos de conflicto y las estrategias de manejo de conflictos como vagones de tren, y comienza con la observación de que los vagones viajan en trenes (es decir, conjuntos de vagones enlazados entre sí a propósito y con un determinado sentido), surge una pregunta clave: ¿cómo construimos trenes con los vagones de estrategias para el manejo de conflictos? ¿Cómo pasamos del impulso de aislar artificialmente estas estrategias y estudiarlas por separado, a teorizar y examinar directamente la interdependencia entre ellas? Los colaboradores de esta especial problemática abordan esa amplia cuestión. En este artículo introductorio, primero explicamos el desafío inmediato, delineamos las formas que puede tomar teóricamente la interdependencia en el manejo de conflictos y definimos las estrategias de manejo de conflictos que aparecen en toda la problemática. Luego, llevamos a cabo un ejercicio de escalamiento multidimensional para determinar las dimensiones más prometedoras en las cuales hay que teorizar la interdependencia en el manejo de conflictos. Este análisis muestra que la infinidad de estrategias para el manejo de conflictos se organizan en dos dimensiones destacadas: si la estrategia persigue un resultado más integrador o distributivo, y cuán costoso es emplear la estrategia para el usuario. El análisis, lejos de ser la última palabra, sirve como salva inicial para futuras investigaciones sobre la interdependencia en el manejo de conflictos. Finalmente, analizamos los diversos artículos sobre esta problemática especial, destacando sus contribuciones y vinculándolos con algunos temas principales. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-22 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1848827 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1848827 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:1-22 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew P. Owsiak Author-X-Name-First: Andrew P. Author-X-Name-Last: Owsiak Title: Conflict management trajectories: theory and evidence Abstract: When multiple attempts to manage a given conflict occur, are these attempts interdependent – and if so, how? Policymakers and practitioners regularly report that such interdependence exists; and yet, explicit theorizing about it remains underdeveloped. The need for theorizing motivates the current study. Using the concept of a conflict management trajectory as a foundation, I develop four models that potentially link successive conflict management efforts together: a cost model, a limited cost model, a learning model, and a baseline model. I then test these models’ predictions empirically with data on diplomatic interventions during the period 1946–2000 (i.e., verbal pleas, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, humanitarian and other administrative tasks, and peace operations). The analysis shows that the limited cost model best explains interdependence among conflict management attempts. In that model, states balance their desire to do something with their incentive to minimize costs. This creates an intervention ‘threshold’ beyond which third parties less frequently travel – particularly if that threshold has not yet been crossed in a given dispute. Third-party intervention overwhelmingly resides on the less costly end of the spectrum, exceeding the costs associated with mediation rarely. If a third party crosses that threshold, the probability of further intervention on the high-cost side of the threshold rises, but third parties still prefer to return to low-cost conflict management strategies. It seems, therefore, that rational considerations dominate, as third parties work to achieve the benefits of peace for the lowest possible price. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 23-55 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814767 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814767 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:23-55 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Zorzeta Bakaki Author-X-Name-First: Zorzeta Author-X-Name-Last: Bakaki Author-Name: Marius Mehrl Author-X-Name-First: Marius Author-X-Name-Last: Mehrl Title: Examining conflict management technique sequences in international claims Abstract: This study groups third-party conflict management techniques (CMTs) into binding and non-binding approaches to examine whether and how their sequence and, in more detail, changes therein explain the outcome of international issue claims. Third parties can intervene in disputes by providing good offices or mediation; they also engage with more binding approaches such as arbitration and adjudication. While the literature has established a solid understanding of any of these third-party techniques in issue claims, it has mostly treated them in isolation from each other, thereby ignoring the persistent interdependencies that may establish a sequence of CMTs. We address this shortcoming by developing a theoretical argument for and empirically testing the impact of changes in CMT sequences on the outcome of interstate conflicts. Our results indicate that sequences involving a change in CMTs (from binding to non-binding approaches or vice versa) result in more effective outcomes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 56-78 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814762 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814762 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:56-78 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: J. Michael Greig Author-X-Name-First: J. Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Greig Title: Helping without hurting: ameliorating the negative effects of humanitarian assistance on civil wars through mediation Abstract: A growing body of literature has suggested that, in the long-run, humanitarian aid, while well-intentioned, might be counter-productive to civil war conflict management because aid provides resources that help belligerents sustain their conflict, increasing the intensity of civil wars and lengthening their duration. This unintended consequence of humanitarian aid creates a paradox for policymakers. Those civil wars that are most resistant to settlement efforts generate the greatest need for humanitarian aid to limit the deadly effects of conflict on civilians. Yet, if humanitarian aid adds fuel to the fire of these same conflicts, making them more resistant to settlement and increasing the pain they impose upon civilians, policymakers might choose to avoid providing humanitarian assistance altogether in the hopes of hastening the end of the conflict. In this paper, I argue that while humanitarian aid can bring these unintended consequences, scholars have tended to overlook the way in which the combined effects of humanitarian aid and mediation can increase the likelihood of civil wars ending. I find that the combined effects of repeated mediation and high levels of humanitarian aid increase the likelihood both that conflicts will end and that they will terminate with peace agreements and cease-fires. This effect is especially strong for conflicts mediated by international organizations and major powers. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 79-106 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814763 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814763 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:79-106 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Molly M. Melin Author-X-Name-First: Molly M. Author-X-Name-Last: Melin Title: The business of peace: understanding corporate contributions to conflict management Abstract: Do private firms act beyond “business as usual” and proactively build peace? Firms are largely absent from the conflict management literature, despite studies suggesting their importance. What conditions encourage firms to actively prevent or resolve violent conflict? Are such actions interdependent with ongoing international conflict prevention and management efforts? I argue international efforts encourage corporate conflict management-related activities since conflict management interdependencies can decrease the costs of conflict management, while increasing the benefits and success of their efforts. In addition, firms respond to gaps in governance and instability, especially when they are norm entrepreneurs or their reputation is threatened. I test these arguments on original cross-national data of conflict management-related efforts by large, domestic firms in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa from 1999–2013. The findings bring large-N empirical analysis to a topic dominated by case studies and emphasize the need for conflict management scholars to account for the role of the private sector in our studies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 107-134 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1723581 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1723581 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:107-134 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rebecca Cordell Author-X-Name-First: Rebecca Author-X-Name-Last: Cordell Author-Name: Thorin Wright Author-X-Name-First: Thorin Author-X-Name-Last: Wright Author-Name: Paul F. Diehl Author-X-Name-First: Paul F. Author-X-Name-Last: Diehl Title: Extant commitment, risk, and UN peacekeeping authorization Abstract: Do aspects of current UN peacekeeping operations affect the willingness of that body to authorize new operations? Our theoretical arguments center on the capacity and costs of the organization – specifically the committed resources and risks associated with ongoing operations – with the assumption that greater existing commitments and perceived risks lessen the likelihood that the UN will create new operations. Related to the concern with risk, does successful diplomacy that produces a peace agreement in the conflict at hand lessen expected costs and therefore make authorizing new peacekeeping operations more attractive? To answer these questions, we examine UN peacekeeping authorization decisions over the period 1989–2016. Our results demonstrate that UN decisions to authorize new peacekeeping missions are connected to two forms of conflict management. First, successful attempts at peacemaking (evidence by peace agreements) increased the likelihood that a UN peacekeeping operation would be sent to that conflict in the aftermath of the agreement. We also demonstrate that the number of ongoing UN peacekeeping efforts are a strong negative predictor of whether or not the UN authorizes new missions. Theoretically, the concepts of perceived carrying capacity and risk, derived from other conflict management efforts, provided the explanatory bases for these effects. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 135-160 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814764 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814764 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:135-160 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Govinda Clayton Author-X-Name-First: Govinda Author-X-Name-Last: Clayton Author-Name: Han Dorussen Author-X-Name-First: Han Author-X-Name-Last: Dorussen Author-Name: Tobias Böhmelt Author-X-Name-First: Tobias Author-X-Name-Last: Böhmelt Title: United Nations peace initiatives 1946-2015: introducing a new dataset Abstract: The United Nations (UN) has developed a complex and interconnected system of committees, representatives, and missions in support of its peace and security mandate. This article introduces the United Nations Peace Initiatives (UNPI) data set, which provides information on 469 UN initiatives aimed at conflict prevention and crisis management, mediation, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The data encompass all initiatives mandated by the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, as well as Secretary General between 1946 and 2015. This includes diplomatic, technocratic, political-development, and peacekeeping missions. UNPI data provide an empirical basis to assess the relative contributions of various UN subsidiary bodies to prevent, manage, and suppress the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. This article discusses the underlying rationale of the data collection, the coding rules, and procedures, and shows how UNPI can be combined with conflict data. Initial analyses show the increased use of different types of UN peace initiatives over time. The UN regularly deploys multiple peace initiatives to a dispute, often with significant periods of overlap. Ongoing hostilities and economic development are found to be key determinants of mission choice. In line with the theme of the Special Issue, the UNPI data set underscores the importance of, and provides a tool through which to examine the, interdependencies between various conflict management efforts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 161-180 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1772254 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1772254 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:161-180 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Druckman Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Author-X-Name-Last: Druckman Author-Name: Susan Allen Author-X-Name-First: Susan Author-X-Name-Last: Allen Title: Interactions among conflict management techniques: extending the breadth and depth of the framework Journal: International Interactions Pages: 181-189 Issue: 1 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1848826 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1848826 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:1:p:181-189 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Kerstin Fisk Author-X-Name-First: Kerstin Author-X-Name-Last: Fisk Title: Plausible deniability? An investigation of government and government-outsourced violence in refugee hosting areas Abstract: This paper examines the propensity for host governments and the groups they sponsor to engage in violence in areas that host refugee populations. Drawing on arguments that governments strategically delegate violence to affiliated groups for “plausible deniability” purposes, it argues that, due to concerns over self-settled refugees’ welfare burden as well as the concern that these refugees will choose to live in border areas that are more vulnerable to (or useful for) militant activity, host governments, and their proxies are likely to target violence in areas with more substantial refugee self-settlement. At the same time, it anticipates that host governments will “outsource” this violence to surrogate groups where sizable camp-settled populations are present, due to a heightened risk of suffering international audience costs. Findings from a large-N sample of countries in Africa provide some evidence of the hypothesized outsourcing effect. While the presence of sizable camps alongside large self-settled populations is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of violence by host governments, it significantly increases the likelihood of violence committed by host-aligned proxies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 191-220 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1848824 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1848824 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:191-220 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Alex Braithwaite Author-X-Name-First: Alex Author-X-Name-Last: Braithwaite Author-Name: Joseph M. Cox Author-X-Name-First: Joseph M. Author-X-Name-Last: Cox Author-Name: Faten Ghosn Author-X-Name-First: Faten Author-X-Name-Last: Ghosn Title: Should I stay or should I go? The decision to flee or stay home during civil war Abstract: The literature on forced migration reveals a linkage between conflict-related violence and displacement. However, it often neglects the potential that variable forms of violence have differential impacts on the decision to flee violence. Moreover, there is a mobility bias in the empirical literature, whereby analyses often focus upon individuals that leave their homes, neglecting to assess factors influencing decisions to remain at home during conflict. To address these dynamics, we focus upon Lebanon, which experienced a civil war between 1975 and 1990. We leverage a survey of 2,400 Lebanese residents who lived through the civil war. Our analyses suggest different forms of violence play distinct roles in the decisions taken by individuals who remained at home, those that fled internally, and those that fled abroad as refugees. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 221-236 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1835890 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1835890 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:221-236 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Nazli Avdan Author-X-Name-First: Nazli Author-X-Name-Last: Avdan Author-Name: Naji Bsisu Author-X-Name-First: Naji Author-X-Name-Last: Bsisu Author-Name: Amanda Murdie Author-X-Name-First: Amanda Author-X-Name-Last: Murdie Title: Abuse by association: migration from terror-prone countries and human rights abuses Abstract: A burgeoning body of work examines the connection between migration and security. Studies link migration to an increased volume of terrorism in destination states. More recent work examines the humanitarian consequences for political migrants and shows that refugees confront repression by state agents in recipient states. We argue that these consequences can generalize to society writ large and may point to a broader erosion of human rights. We build on and expand this line of work by examining the effects of migration on the abuse of physical integrity rights in destination states. Using a cross-national longitudinal sample from 1980 to 2010, we show that while overall migration has no pernicious effects, migration flows from terror-prone states are associated with reduced physical integrity rights provision in destination states. Contrary to intuition, we find that migration from culturally dissimilar origin states has no negative consequences. These results refine our understanding of the migration-security nexus by showing that fears over terrorism drive the deleterious consequences of migration. Our paper also contributes to the human rights literature by demonstrating that the link between migrants and terrorism affects the rights not just of foreigners but also those of destination citizens. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 237-265 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1824997 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1824997 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:237-265 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Timothy M. Peterson Author-X-Name-First: Timothy M. Author-X-Name-Last: Peterson Author-Name: Yuleng Zeng Author-X-Name-First: Yuleng Author-X-Name-Last: Zeng Title: Conflict and cooperation with trade partners Abstract: Escalating political conflict between major trade partners such as the US and China appears puzzling given theories linking trade to pacific international relations. We reconsider theories on bilateral trade, exposure to the global economy, and politics in order to explain contemporary events. Our approach departs from previous work in three key ways: we examine a broader range of conflictual and cooperative interactions together; we assume leaders are responsive to interests opposed to trade as well as to those who benefit; and we reconceptualize what it means to be a “major trade partner,” presenting a new definition that varies with the dispersion of a state’s trade across partners rather than merely dollar value or GDP composition of trade. We demonstrate that states generally initiate more conflict and more cooperation with major trade partners; and while higher exposure to the global economy reduces conflict initiation against major trade partners, it also reduces cooperation. Simultaneously, higher exposure to the global economy is associated with more initiation of cooperation with non-major trade partners. Using events data spanning 1995–2012, we find empirical support for our expectations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 266-290 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1835892 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1835892 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:266-290 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Lindsey Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Lindsey Title: Willful ignorance in international coercion Abstract: Intelligence gathering presents a dilemma when states attempt military coercion. New information may bolster the case for war and the credibility of threats to fight. But it may also undermine the case for war, thereby preventing states from achieving their aims through coercive threats. I argue that this incentivizes leaders to decline to gather available information about the state of the world when they hold threats to fight that are initially credible. Leaders who engage in such willful ignorance may blunder into war, but they can also achieve “coercion through ignorance,” forcing their opponents to make otherwise unavailable concessions. When conditions appear favorable initially, this tradeoff favors ignorance. I apply the model to the US invasion of Iraq, arguing that the Bush administration deliberately declined to gather relevant information as part of a strategy of coercion aimed at Saddam Hussein’s removal from power short of war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 291-317 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1824996 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1824996 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:291-317 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Minnie M. Joo Author-X-Name-First: Minnie M. Author-X-Name-Last: Joo Author-Name: Bumba Mukherjee Author-X-Name-First: Bumba Author-X-Name-Last: Mukherjee Title: Rebel command and control, time, and rebel group splits Abstract: Fractious splits of rebel groups debilitate the military capacity of these organizations which increases their vulnerability to anti-rebel operations. Despite the risks of disunity and the battlefield advantages of remaining cohesive, our new global sample of rebel groups (1980–2014) reveals that two-fifths of these (but not the remaining) groups have split into distinct, competing factions. Why and when do some rebel groups split, while other groups remain cohesive? Unlike previous research on rebel fragmentation, we argue that the extent of centralization of the rebel groups command-and-control structure together with the group’s “age” influences the propensity of rebel group splits. The organizational features of rebel groups with high command-and-control centralization lead to internal blame-game politics when these groups age, which encourages the supreme leader to amass power and curtail the other leaders’ decision-making authority. This induces the alienated leaders to split the parent rebel organization to form a new rebel group. In contrast, the organizational structure of moderate and weakly centralized rebel groups promotes mutual interdependence among leaders as well as between these leaders and sub-commanders over time. This reduces the likelihood of splits of these groups. Results from our new rebel-group-year data provide robust statistical support for these predictions.Les scissions anarchiques des groupes rebelles affaiblissent leur capacité militaire et accroissent leur vulnérabilité aux opérations anti-rebelles. En dépit des risques de la perte d’unité et des avantages de rester soudés sur le champ de bataille, notre nouvel échantillon mondial de groupes rebelles (1980-2014) révèle que deux cinquièmes de ces groupes (mais pas le reste) se sont scindés en factions distinctes qui sont en concurrence. Pourquoi et à quel moment certains groupes rebelles se séparent-ils alors que d’autres restent soudés ? Contrairement aux recherche précédentes sur la fragmentation des rebelles, nous soutenons que la mesure dans laquelle la structure de commandement et de contrôle du groupe rebelle est centralisée ainsi que « l’anciennenté » du groupe influencent sa propension à se séparer. Les caractéristiques organisationnelles des groupes rebelles dont le commandement et le contrôle sont très centralisés conduisent à une politique interne de rejet des fautes lorsque ces groupes vieillissent, ce qui encourage le chef suprême à accroître son pouvoir et à réduire l’autorité décisionnelle des autres chefs. Cela incite les chefs ainsi mis de côté à se séparer de l’organisation rebelle dont ils sont issus pour former un nouveau groupe rebelle. À l’inverse, la structure organisationnelle des groupes rebelles peu ou moyennement centralisés favorise l’interdépendance entre les chefs ainsi qu’entre ces chefs et les sous-chefs au fil du temps. Cela réduit la probabilité de scission de ces groupes. Les résultats issus de nos nouvelles données annuelles sur les groupes rebelles par an étayent ces prévisions par de solides statistiques.Las escisiones fraccionadas de los grupos rebeldes debilitan la capacidad militar de estas organizaciones, lo que aumenta su vulnerabilidad a las operaciones contra los rebeldes. A pesar de los riesgos de desunión y de las ventajas en el campo de batalla de permanecer cohesionados, nuestra nueva muestra global de grupos rebeldes (1980-2014) revela que dos quintas partes de estos grupos (pero no los restantes) se han dividido en distintas facciones contrapuestas. ¿Por qué y cuándo algunos grupos rebeldes se separan, mientras que otros grupos permanecen unidos? A diferencia de investigaciones anteriores sobre la fragmentación de los rebeldes, argumentamos que el grado de centralización de la estructura de mando y control del grupo rebelde junto con la “edad” del grupo influye en la tendencia a las escisiones de grupos rebeldes. Las características organizativas de los grupos rebeldes con una alta centralización de mando y control conducen a una política interna de atribución de culpas cuando estos grupos envejecen, lo que motiva al líder supremo a acumular poder y restringir la autoridad de toma de decisiones de los otros líderes. Esto induce a los líderes alienados a dividir la organización matriz de rebeldes para formar un nuevo grupo rebelde. En contraste, la estructura organizacional de los grupos rebeldes moderados y débilmente centralizados promueve la interdependencia mutua entre los líderes, así como entre dichos líderes y subcomandantes a lo largo del tiempo. Esto reduce la probabilidad de escisiones de estos grupos. Los resultados de nuestros nuevos datos anuales sobre grupos rebeldes proporcionan un sólido respaldo estadístico para estas predicciones. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 318-345 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1848823 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1848823 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:318-345 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lamis Abdelaaty Author-X-Name-First: Lamis Author-X-Name-Last: Abdelaaty Title: Rivalry, ethnicity, and asylum admissions worldwide Abstract: Why do countries welcome some refugees and treat others poorly? Existing explanations suggest that the assistance refugees receive is a reflection of countries’ wealth or compassion. However, statistical analysis of a global dataset on asylum admissions shows that states’ approaches to refugees are shaped by foreign policy and ethnic politics. States admit refugees from adversaries in order to weaken those regimes, but they are reluctant to accept refugees from friendly states. At the same time, policymakers favor refugee groups who share their ethnic identity. Aside from addressing a puzzling real-world phenomenon, this article adds insights to the literature on the politics of migration and asylum. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 346-373 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814768 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814768 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:346-373 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michal Smetana Author-X-Name-First: Michal Author-X-Name-Last: Smetana Author-Name: Marek Vranka Author-X-Name-First: Marek Author-X-Name-Last: Vranka Title: How moral foundations shape public approval of nuclear, chemical, and conventional strikes: new evidence from experimental surveys Abstract: In this article, we present the results of two survey experiments on public support for nuclear, chemical, and conventional strikes. We examined how moral values of individuals interact with the approval of different kinds of strikes and with the effects of information about the ingroup and out-group fatalities. Our results show that while the public is more averse to the employment of chemical weapons than to the conduct of nuclear or conventional strikes, the overall relationship between strike approval and the individuals’ moral values does not differ across the three experimental treatments. In addition, we found that individuals’ scores in so-called “binding” moral values affect the sensitivity of the public for in-group fatalities. Findings of our paper contribute to the broader debates in the field about the strength and nature of the norms against the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and about the role of morality in the public attitudes to the use of military force. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 374-390 Issue: 2 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 03 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1848825 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1848825 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:2:p:374-390 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dawid Walentek Author-X-Name-First: Dawid Author-X-Name-Last: Walentek Author-Name: Joris Broere Author-X-Name-First: Joris Author-X-Name-Last: Broere Author-Name: Matteo Cinelli Author-X-Name-First: Matteo Author-X-Name-Last: Cinelli Author-Name: Mark M. Dekker Author-X-Name-First: Mark M. Author-X-Name-Last: Dekker Author-Name: Jonas M. B. Haslbeck Author-X-Name-First: Jonas M. B. Author-X-Name-Last: Haslbeck Title: Success of economic sanctions threats: coercion, information and commitment Abstract: This study examines when and why threats of economic sanctions lead to the successful extraction of policy concessions. Scholars identified three (not mutually exclusive) hypotheses that explain the success of sanction threats: (a) the coercive, (b) the informational and (c) the public commitment hypothesis. The underpinning mechanisms for the hypotheses are, respectively, the economic cost of sanctions, uncertainty about the resolve of the sender and domestic audience cost for issuing empty threats. In this study, we offer an empirical test of the three hypotheses on threats effectiveness. In addition, we assess how variation in the three mechanisms affects the effectiveness of threats relative to imposed sanctions. For the expected economic cost, we use the TIES data. To measure uncertainty, we generate a network of diplomatic relations, based on Formal Alliance data, utilizing methods from complex network theory. To assess public commitment, we use the democracy score based on the POLITY IV data. Our results show that the effectiveness of threats strongly increases in an economic cost to the target; however, threats become increasingly effective relative to imposed sanctions for lower uncertainty and higher domestic audience cost. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 417-448 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1860034 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1860034 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:417-448 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Dov H. Levin Author-X-Name-First: Dov H. Author-X-Name-Last: Levin Title: Will you still love me tomorrow? Partisan electoral interventions, foreign policy compliance, and voting in the UN Abstract: What are the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the target’s subsequent cooperation with the intervener? Attempts by the great powers to affect the election results in other countries have been quite common with electoral interventions occurring in one of every nine elections between 1946 and 2000 as well as in the 2016 US presidential election. One important reason for such interventions has been the interveners desire to change or maintain the target’s foreign policies in a manner favorable to its interests. Nevertheless, there has been little research on whether electoral interventions usually have such effects in practice. This study begins to investigate this question utilizing a common measure of foreign policy preferences and a new dataset of electoral interventions. I find that while successful American electoral interventions do temporarily increase the target’s voting similarity with the US while the assisted leader is in power, and overt American interventions are more effective in this regard. I also find preliminary evidence that Russian/Soviet electoral interventions have no significant effects. These results indicate that such meddling can be for some great powers an effective tool for gaining increased foreign policy compliance out of targets with relatively competitive elections. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 449-476 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1865946 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1865946 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:449-476 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jonathan A. Chu Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan A. Author-X-Name-Last: Chu Author-Name: Jiyoung Ko Author-X-Name-First: Jiyoung Author-X-Name-Last: Ko Author-Name: Adam Liu Author-X-Name-First: Adam Author-X-Name-Last: Liu Title: Commanding Support: Values and Interests in the Rhetoric of Alliance Politics Abstract: How can democratic governments convince their citizens to support a costly military alliance? We theorize about two rhetorical tools that foreign policy leaders have historically used to achieve this goal: instrumental cues emphasizing national interests and ideational cues highlighting shared values. We then assess the effects of these appeals in various forms and contexts by analyzing two original survey experiments fielded in the United States. Our analysis shows that alliance rhetoric – whether positive or negative – can sway public support for alliances. Positive appeals to both interests and values raise citizen approval for maintaining a costly alliance in times of peace and during an active crisis, though their effects are slightly muted in a crisis. We also find that negative rhetoric erodes public support for alliances, but only under limited conditions: negative rhetoric affects public support for peace-time alliance policies but not for defending an ally during a crisis, and its effect disappears in the presence of positive rhetoric. The findings contribute to literatures on the domestic politics of international institutions and the role of political communication in foreign policy. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 477-503 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898955 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898955 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:477-503 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Quynh Nguyen Author-X-Name-First: Quynh Author-X-Name-Last: Nguyen Author-Name: Gabriele Spilker Author-X-Name-First: Gabriele Author-X-Name-Last: Spilker Author-Name: Thomas Bernauer Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Bernauer Title: The (still) mysterious case of agricultural protectionism Abstract: Existing research demonstrates why farmers demand subsidies, but remains ambiguous as to why consumers/taxpayers support or rather do not oppose such subsidies. We approach this puzzle from two angles: how sensitive are citizens to cost implications of agricultural subsidies, and what is their “value function” with respect to agricultural policy? We argue that farm subsidies, besides benefiting farmers, promise to generate an array of non-market goods that serve various interests in society and thus receive strong support overall. To test our argument, we conducted conjoint survey experiments in two countries: Switzerland and the United States. Our results show that while cost implications only marginally reduce support for subsidies, support is positively affected by the allocation of subsidies to various policy goals, such as guaranteeing food security and enhancing animal welfare. These findings suggest that individual-level support for agricultural subsidies does not result from a lack of information, but reflect genuine appreciation of the perceived multi-functionality of agricultural subsidies. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 391-416 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898957 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898957 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:391-416 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Aysegul Aydin Author-X-Name-First: Aysegul Author-X-Name-Last: Aydin Author-Name: Cem Emrence Author-X-Name-First: Cem Author-X-Name-Last: Emrence Title: Counterinsurgency as an institution: Evidence from Turkey Abstract: Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put 13 provinces under emergency rule (1987–2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using the first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro-insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) the legal-institutional framework of counterinsurgency affects civilians’ political perceptions in fundamental ways, and (2) it can lead to failure when its repressive arm target activism. Overall, the paper presents an institutionalist account of civilian perceptions during wartime. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 530-558 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898953 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898953 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:530-558 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Richard J. Saunders Author-X-Name-First: Richard J. Author-X-Name-Last: Saunders Title: Only Friends Can Betray You: International Rivalry and Domestic Politics Abstract: This article argues that dramatic political change in State A poses a threat to the interests that other states B share with it. The more salient those interests are to State B, the greater the threat posed by domestic political change within State A. Thus major changes in one state place the leaders of formerly friendly states into a domain of losses, motivating risk-seeking behavior in hopes of reversing these losses. Conversely, the new leaders of the state undergoing domestic political change initiate similarly risk-seeking behavior to defend their new endowments. The conflicts that result sow the seeds of long-lasting enmity (rivalry) between former partners. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry onset during the period 1950–2005 and find evidence that in the wake of dramatic political change in State A, rivalries are most likely to form between A and its close partners. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 504-529 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1824995 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1824995 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:504-529 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel Finke Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Author-X-Name-Last: Finke Title: Regime type and co-sponsorship in the UN General Assembly Abstract: The years immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union were characterized by high hopes for an expansion of the liberal world order and for lasting peace. In the meantime, discord between western democracies, led by the US, and non-democratic states has been increasing. In the present article, I ask in how far these tensions have reached the working level of international cooperation in the United Nations (UN). Specifically, I present the first large-N study of co-sponsorship that includes all UN resolutions drafted between 1994 and 2017. First, my results reveal that regime type became increasingly relevant for co-sponsorship of UN resolutions starting at the turn of the millennium. Second, I find that cooperation among non-democratic states increased during the first years of the millennium, but I find a restoration of democratic cooperation since 2006. Third, I find that these trends are especially relevant with regard to cooperation over national security. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 559-578 Issue: 3 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 05 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1865947 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1865947 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:3:p:559-578 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu Author-X-Name-First: Sema Hande Author-X-Name-Last: Ogutcu-Fu Title: State intervention, external spoilers, and the durability of peace agreements Abstract: How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement status quo, and in instances of multiple interventions, b) whether state interveners converge or diverge in their level of satisfaction. I trace state interveners’ level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period. I examine the durability of intra-state peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence between each state intervener’s economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states’ satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant of durable peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 633-661 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1910822 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1910822 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:633-661 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Benjamin Denison Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin Author-X-Name-Last: Denison Author-Name: Krista E. Wiegand Author-X-Name-First: Krista E. Author-X-Name-Last: Wiegand Title: Democratizing the dispute: democratization and the history of conflict management Abstract: What explains the complex processes of democratization and conflict management? Are new democracies more likely to use peaceful means or engage in militarized means when presented with opportunities to resolve their territorial disputes? In this paper, we hypothesize that democratizing states still engaged in territorial disputes are more likely to attempt conflict management following the transition to democracy to remove flashpoints that the military and other former autocratic regime elements can use to discredit democracy and prevent consolidation of democracy. Depending on the history of past conflict management attempts, newly democratic leaders either continue or break with the past policies of non-democratic leaders, indicating a degree of interdependence in the conflict management process. Using multinomial logistic regression on claim-year dyad data from the Issues Correlates of War project, we find that previous management attempts and democratization interact to make peaceful conflict management more likely when past leaders have been successful in peaceful conflict management, but not with failed peaceful attempts or militarized attempts. Our results indicate that previous arguments overstate the propensity for democratization to spark armed conflict, attempted conflict management is more often peaceful, and current attempts are highly influenced by the history of attempts pursued by past leaders. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 720-749 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1835891 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1835891 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:720-749 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bryan Rooney Author-X-Name-First: Bryan Author-X-Name-Last: Rooney Author-Name: Matthew DiLorenzo Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: DiLorenzo Title: Political turnover, regime type, and investment behavior Abstract: Firms and individuals condition their investment choices on domestic political factors in host countries. Existing research describes how government preferences and policy choices influence investment behavior. Some have argued that investors take a cautious approach in response to possible government turnover. We argue that the results of domestic political competition also matter. Domestic turnover creates uncertainty about the future direction of policy in a variety of areas relevant to investment decisions – e.g., changes in privileged relationships between the state and certain domestic producers or industries, trade barriers, and tax policies. Investors and firms should therefore hesitate to invest following domestic turnover in potential host countries. However, various institutional features of democracies should mitigate the extent to which domestic turnover causes uncertainty and deters investment. Our statistical analysis suggests that while non-democracies see less foreign direct investment in the wake of a change in the source of leader support, investment to democracies does not change significantly following domestic turnover. The note enhances our understanding of the determinants of investment and provides further evidence that democratic institutions matter for conditioning the effects of domestic turnover in a new empirical domain. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 777-793 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898960 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898960 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:777-793 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Arthur Stein Author-X-Name-First: Arthur Author-X-Name-Last: Stein Author-Name: Marc-Olivier Cantin Author-X-Name-First: Marc-Olivier Author-X-Name-Last: Cantin Title: Crowding out the field: External Support to Insurgents and the Intensity of Inter-rebel Fighting in Civil Wars Abstract: How does external support to insurgents influence the likelihood that the latter will get involved in violent clashes against other rebel groups? In this article, we outline a theoretical framework which contends that, in multiparty civil wars, rebels sponsored by foreign states are more likely to participate in high-intensity inter-rebel conflicts than rebels receiving no support from external states. We argue that this is because external support creates strategic incentives for insurgent leaders to target other rebel contenders in order to signal resolve to their sponsors and to crowd out the battlefield ahead of the post-conflict period. External support, moreover, tends to activate potent socio-psychological mechanisms among rank-and-file combatants that may remove restraints on the use of violence against other rebel fighters. Using data on inter-rebel conflicts from 1989 to 2018, we test these hypotheses with a set of large-N regressions and find strong support for our theory. Further analyzes inductively reveal that our statistical results are likely, to some extent, to be driven by the prevalence of religious insurgencies in contemporary conflicts. Religious insurgencies display organizational features that could reinforce vertical strategic incentives and horizontal socio-psychological dynamics, thereby increasing their involvement in inter-rebel fighting. To further probe the ‘meso-foundations’ of inter-rebel fighting following rebel sponsorship, we then provide qualitative evidence on the Syrian Civil War. Our article contributes to scholarship by highlighting the consequences of external support on conflict processes beyond the insurgent-incumbent dyad.¿De qué manera el apoyo externo a los insurgentes influye en la probabilidad de que se involucren en enfrentamientos violentos contra otros grupos rebeldes? En este artículo, exponemos un marco teórico que sostiene que, en las guerras civiles en las que hay varias partes involucradas, los rebeldes financiados por estados extranjeros tienen más probabilidades de participar en conflictos de gran intensidad entre grupos rebeldes que los que no reciben apoyo de estados externos. Sostenemos que esto se debe a que el apoyo externo crea incentivos estratégicos para que los líderes insurgentes apunten a otros rivales rebeldes con la finalidad de dar una señal de resolución a sus financiadores y atestar el campo de batalla para tener una ventaja en el período posterior al conflicto. Además, el apoyo externo tiende a activar potentes mecanismos sociopsicológicos entre los combatientes de base que pueden eliminar las restricciones sobre el uso de violencia contra otros combatientes rebeldes. Mediante el uso de datos sobre conflictos entre rebeldes de 1989 a 2018, probamos estas hipótesis con un conjunto de regresiones de N grandes y descubrimos que nuestra teoría tiene un gran sustento. Análisis adicionales revelan por inducción que nuestros resultados estadísticos probablemente, en cierta medida, estén impulsados por la prevalencia de insurgencias religiosas en los conflictos contemporáneos. Las insurgencias religiosas muestran rasgos organizativos que podrían reforzar los incentivos estratégicos verticales y las dinámicas sociopsicológicas horizontales y, por consiguiente, aumentar su implicación en peleas entre rebeldes. Para indagar más las “bases a nivel meso” de las peleas entre rebeldes a consecuencia de la financiación, podemos proporcionar pruebas cualitativas de la guerra civil siria. Nuestro artículo contribuye a la investigación mediante el énfasis en las consecuencias del apoyo externo en los procesos de conflicto más allá de la díada formada por los insurgentes.Comment le soutien extérieur aux insurgés influence-t-il la probabilité que ces derniers s’impliquent dans des affrontements violents contre d’autres groupes rebelles ? Dans cet article, nous présentons un cadre théorique qui affirme que, dans les guerres civiles multipartites, les rebelles soutenus par des États étrangers sont davantage susceptibles de participer à des conflits entre rebelles de forte intensité que les rebelles ne bénéficiant d’aucun soutien d’États extérieurs. Nous affirmons que cela est dû au fait que le soutien extérieur donne lieu à des incitations stratégiques motivant les chefs insurgés à cibler des groupes rebelles concurrents afin de signaler leur détermination aux acteurs qui les soutiennent et d’évincer ces groupes concurrents du champ de bataille avant la période post-conflit. De plus, le soutien extérieur tend à activer des mécanismes socio-psychologiques puissants pouvant éliminer la retenue des combattants de base à recourir à la violence contre d’autres combattants rebelles. Nous nous sommes appuyés sur des données sur les conflits entre rebelles entre 1989 et 2018 pour vérifier ces hypothèses à l’aide d’un ensemble de régressions à grande échelle, et nous avons constaté que notre théorie était solidement étayée. D’autres analyses inductives ont révélé que nos résultats statistiques étaient susceptibles, dans une certaine mesure, d’être déterminés par la prévalence des insurrections religieuses dans les conflits contemporains. Les insurrections religieuses présentent des caractéristiques organisationnelles pouvant potentiellement renforcer les incitations stratégiques verticales et les dynamiques socio-psychologiques horizontales, ce qui peut accroître l’implication des insurgés dans des combats entre rebelles. Nous proposons ensuite des preuves qualitatives issues de la guerre civile syrienne pour explorer encore davantage les « bases au niveau méso » des combats entre rebelles qui interviennent suite au soutien aux rebelles. Notre article contribue aux recherches en soulignant les conséquences du soutien extérieur sur les processus de conflit au-delà de la dyade insurgés-pouvoir en place. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 662-691 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1922899 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1922899 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:662-691 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Marius Mehrl Author-X-Name-First: Marius Author-X-Name-Last: Mehrl Author-Name: Ioannis Choulis Author-X-Name-First: Ioannis Author-X-Name-Last: Choulis Title: The colonial roots of structural coup-proofing Abstract: Colonially inherited institutions are a key determinant of the regime type and economic outcomes of postcolonial countries. This study extends this claim to civil-military relations, arguing that former French colonies are especially likely to invest in structural coup-proofing. France created paramilitary units throughout its colonies for which many natives were recruited. After independence, these paramilitaries proved persistent and were consequently used to counterbalance the regular armed forces. In contrast, countries without existing paramilitary organizations had stronger militaries which deterred and even forcibly prevented structural coup-proofing. Quantitative tests using global data on coup-proofing and a paired comparison of civil-military relations in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana support the claim that former French colonies are more likely to heavily invest in counterbalancing. By showing how French colonial institutions provided post-independence governments with the opportunity to coup-proof, the study contributes to our understanding of civil-military relations as well as the institutional long-term effects of colonialism and foreign rule more generally. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 750-776 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:750-776 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Robert Carroll Author-X-Name-First: Robert Author-X-Name-Last: Carroll Author-Name: Amy Pond Author-X-Name-First: Amy Author-X-Name-Last: Pond Title: Costly signaling in autocracy Abstract: Those who would revolt against an autocrat often face a dilemma caused by uncertainty: they would like to revolt if the ruler would respond with democratization, but they would prefer to concede if the ruler would choose instead to violently suppress the revolution. Consequently, the autocrat must decide how to best signal his willingness to use violence in hope of deterring revolt. Using a simple signaling model, we find that rulers cannot meaningfully convey their type by transferring wealth to the citizenry. However, they can convey their type through shows of force, as long as the strong type of autocrat – who would use violent repression in the case of revolution – has a competitive advantage in displaying his strength. We additionally demonstrate that rulers favor shows of force when their willingness to suppress revolution is questioned and that citizens at times prefer to pay the direct cost of shows of force to learn about the ruler’s type, rather than to remain uninformed. The results illustrate a more general result in costly signaling models: information transmission is only possible when the cost of the signal is smaller for the type that wants to distinguish himself. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 612-632 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898956 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898956 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:612-632 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Martín Macías-Medellín Author-X-Name-First: Martín Author-X-Name-Last: Macías-Medellín Author-Name: Laura H Atuesta Author-X-Name-First: Laura Author-X-Name-Last: H Atuesta Title: Constraints and military coordination: How ICTs shape the intensity of rebel violence Abstract: Why and how do information and communication technologies (ICTs) shape the intensity of rebel violence? Recent studies find that ICTs can both increase and decrease such violence. We argue that, during civil wars, this effect depends on the type of ICTs. Mobile phones give rebels better military coordination to organize violence. In contrast, the internet increases the constraints of rebel groups to use violence. On the one hand, the internet increases the visibility of rebel groups forcing them to moderate their levels of violence. On the other hand, the internet gives rebels’ opponents better tools to limit the levels of rebel violence. We test these two arguments empirically with panel data of rebel violence in countries experiencing a civil war from 1989 to 2007. Through a series of negative binomial regressions, we find general support for our hypotheses. For the case of the internet, we specifically find that its effects are concentrated in more recent periods when social media became more widespread. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 692-719 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898959 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898959 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:692-719 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrea L. Everett Author-X-Name-First: Andrea L. Author-X-Name-Last: Everett Author-Name: Daniel C. Tirone Author-X-Name-First: Daniel C. Author-X-Name-Last: Tirone Title: Strategic Samaritanism: how armed conflict affects aid receipts Abstract: How does armed conflict affect the flow of foreign aid? Aid scholars have frequently argued that assistance is given either to serve donor interests or meet recipient needs and evaluated their theories using a single measure of aid. In this project we introduce the concept of an aid portfolio comprised of different types of assistance that a conflict-affected country might receive: humanitarian, economic, and aid to support governance and the social sector. We expect these components of a recipient country’s aid portfolio to vary according to both its needs and its capacity to absorb them. We call this logic, which assumes donors are motivated in part by considerations of efficacy, ‘strategic Samaritanism.’ We also expect conflict-affected countries’ needs and capacity to vary in predictable ways, with states that are severely affected by violence in need of more aid but less able to absorb some types of assistance until the fighting is over. Meanwhile, countries heavily affected by refugee flows should both need and be able to absorb more of each type of aid. We test our argument on a dataset of aid flows and violent conflicts in developing countries from 1989–2009 and find considerable supporting evidence for our expectations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 579-611 Issue: 4 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 07 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1909581 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1909581 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:4:p:579-611 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew M. Bell Author-X-Name-First: Andrew M. Author-X-Name-Last: Bell Author-Name: Fiona Terry Author-X-Name-First: Fiona Author-X-Name-Last: Terry Title: Combatant rank and socialization to norms of restraint: examining the Australian and Philippine armies Abstract: How does combatant rank influence the adoption of international humanitarian law (IHL) norms—or “norms of restraint”—within military organizations? To date, few political science studies have directly examined the impact of rank in influencing combatant socialization to norms of restraint. Such a gap in the literature is striking: rank is perhaps one of the most fundamentally important characteristics that shapes combatant identity. This study helps to fill this gap by examining combatant rank and the transmission and adoption of norms of restraint in military organizations. To do so, it conducts the first known comparative research study exploiting original survey and interview data from two state armed forces—the Australian Army and the Philippine Army. Research results show that under some conditions combatant rank can significantly influence the norm socialization process. Data further suggest that the adoption of such norms may be linked to the nature of command relationships within the military: the relative influence possessed by senior officers and junior enlisted members may affect the degree to which official norms are transmitted to enlisted combatants. Finally, data reveal the potentially problematic paradox of rank: the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) most influential for junior enlisted soldiers may themselves be more resistant to norms of restraint than senior officers operating at higher levels of command. Such data provide noteworthy new data enhancing our understanding of rank, military culture, and combatant socialization to norms of restraint. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 825-854 Issue: 5 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 09 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1881085 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1881085 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:825-854 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ferdaous Bouhlel Author-X-Name-First: Ferdaous Author-X-Name-Last: Bouhlel Author-Name: Yvan Guichaoua Author-X-Name-First: Yvan Author-X-Name-Last: Guichaoua Title: Norms, non-combatants’ agency and restraint in jihadi violence in northern Mali Abstract: In 2012, several Jihadi armed groups stormed the northern part of Mali and became the unchallenged rulers of two-thirds of the country. Each group governed based on Islamic Law, codifying violence against their enemies in combat and the populations they controlled. Despite drawing on similar jihadist ideology, these governing systems differed significantly in their uses of violence and jurisprudence. What explains the emergence and legitimization of such contrasting norms? We compare patterns of violence and restraint in the regions of Kidal and Gao based on interviews with diverse protagonists of the occupation, including former members of Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In Kidal, the Ansar Dine commander’s decision to follow local Islamic jurisprudence limited violence. In contrast, MUJAO rule over Gao used forms of punishment encompassing physical violence to assert political hegemony despite opposition from influential local imams and youth movements. Figures among the noncombatant population also influenced the formation and interpretation of norms among these groups, though less so under strong military imperatives. The findings highlight the importance of searching for a common language over norms of government between insurgents and populations as a key source of restraint. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 855-872 Issue: 5 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 09 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898954 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1898954 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:855-872 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hyeran Jo Author-X-Name-First: Hyeran Author-X-Name-Last: Jo Author-Name: Joshua K. Alley Author-X-Name-First: Joshua K. Author-X-Name-Last: Alley Author-Name: Yohan Park Author-X-Name-First: Yohan Author-X-Name-Last: Park Author-Name: Soren Jordan Author-X-Name-First: Soren Author-X-Name-Last: Jordan Title: Signaling restraint: international engagement and rebel groups’ commitment to international law Abstract: Approximately 20% of contemporary rebel groups have expressed commitment to international law and signaled their intention to exercise restraint during wartime. Which rebel groups make these commitments and under what conditions? We argue that international engagement shapes the likelihood of rebel commitment to international law. Rebel groups with transnational non-military support and clear organizational structure are likely to speak the language of international law, especially near peace negotiations. We find support for our argument in a statistical analysis of international law commitments by rebel groups between 1974 and 2010. The analysis has implications for humanitarian engagement and promoting restraint in war. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 928-954 Issue: 5 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 09 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2020.1814761 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814761 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:928-954 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Brian McQuinn Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: McQuinn Author-Name: Fiona Terry Author-X-Name-First: Fiona Author-X-Name-Last: Terry Author-Name: Oliver Kaplan Author-X-Name-First: Oliver Author-X-Name-Last: Kaplan Author-Name: Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanin Author-X-Name-First: Francisco Author-X-Name-Last: Gutiérrez-Sanin Title: Introduction: promoting restraint in war Abstract: Over the last decade, changes in the nature of conflict have generated profound operational challenges for international humanitarian organizations. The number of non-international armed conflicts doubled between 2001 and 2016, rising from fewer than 30 to more than 70. The number of armed groups fighting in them has also multiplied: more armed groups emerged in the last decade than in the previous century. Humanitarian organizations struggle to assist victims of these armed conflicts and to persuade fighters to act with restraint toward those individuals who are not, or no longer, taking part in hostilities. New research was required to identify sources of influence on battlefield restraint to inform operational activities. We present a theoretical framework that identifies the sources of norms of restraint in state and non-state armed groups. We argue that humanitarian organizations ought to broaden their notions of the processes that influence the socialization and uptake of norms of restraint and mobilize new societal actors to the cause of limiting violence. In our framing of the empirical articles in the collection, we argue that the structure of armed organizations and their embeddedness in local communities heavily influence how group norms and internal rules are formed and reinforced. While hierarchical militaries can largely be influenced by top-down discipline, restraint among more decentralized armed groups is strongly influenced by societal actors external to the group. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 795-824 Issue: 5 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 09 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1931864 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1931864 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:795-824 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Oliver Kaplan Author-X-Name-First: Oliver Author-X-Name-Last: Kaplan Title: The International Committee of the Red Cross and support for civilian self-protection in Colombia Abstract: How can international humanitarian actors support civilians in their efforts to protect themselves during armed conflicts? This study analyzes the wartime interactions between international organizations and communities with a particular focus on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) community-based protection activities. Although civilians are often viewed as weak and vulnerable noncombatants, the ICRC and other humanitarians can provide communities with crucial backing to implement nonviolent self-protection strategies. I examine these ICRC-community interactions in the municipality of El Bagre in northern Colombia in 2017 during a period of active contestation between ELN insurgents and BACRIM neo-paramilitary groups as the FARC insurgents withdrew from the area. Through participant-observation during an ICRC delegation deployment as well as interviews with civilians and ICRC staff, I find that the ICRC sharing of protection tactics, facilitation of inter-community cooperation, and other technical assistance catalyzed the civilians’ agency and their innovative efforts to avoid, negotiate with, or protest the armed groups. The civilians’ successes and perceptions of security were often amplified because of ICRC involvement. The insights suggest future research agendas and approaches for protecting civilian populations in Colombia and beyond. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 898-927 Issue: 5 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 09 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1945593 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1945593 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:898-927 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Naomi Pendle Author-X-Name-First: Naomi Author-X-Name-Last: Pendle Title: Competing authorities and norms of restraint: governing community-embedded armed groups in South Sudan Abstract: International humanitarian actors and academics continue to struggle to understand armed group conduct and how to restrain this conduct when it violates moral, legal and humanitarian norms. Armed groups that lack a visible, explicit formal hierarchical command structure, equivalent to those found in state militaries, have proved a particular puzzle. A growing body of scholarship on the strategic functions of patterns of violence and restraint has usefully moved beyond assumptions that extreme violence is indicative of an absence of authority over armed actors. However, literature has tended to ignore the potential plurality and complexity of authority figures that shape violence and the constraining, conservative nature of certain moral orders. This article makes use of qualitative and ethnographic research in South Sudan to understand patterns of restraint among the gojam and titweng cattle-guarding defense forces from 2014 to 2017. The analysis documents how public authorities gained legitimacy within these groups by renegotiating a group’s social order, moral boundaries, and restraint through their own reinterpretations of meta-ethical ideals and histories. Cultural norms of restraint were manipulated by elites but were also remade into acts of creative refusal against these same elites. The article specifically focuses on how the life-giving work of children, women and old friends was used to protect life as well as incite violence. The article has implications for how international humanitarians can engage with the remaking of custom to enhance armed group restraint and better protect civilians.Los actores humanitarios internacionales y los académicos continúan teniendo dificultades para comprender la conducta de los grupos armados y de qué manera contenerla cuando incumple las normas morales, legales y humanitarias. Los grupos armados que carecen de una estructura de mando jerárquica, formal, explícita y visible, equivalente a las que se encuentran en las fuerzas armadas estatales, han resultado un enigma particular. Un conjunto creciente de estudios sobre las funciones estratégicas de los patrones de la violencia y la limitación útilmente ha dejado atrás las suposiciones de que la violencia extrema es indicativa de una ausencia de autoridad sobre los actores armados. No obstante, la bibliografía ha tendido a ignorar la pluralidad y la complejidad potenciales de las figuras de autoridad que determinan la violencia y la naturaleza conservadora y restrictiva de ciertas órdenes morales. Este artículo hace uso de investigaciones cualitativas y etnográficas en Sudán del Sur para comprender los patrones de limitación entre las fuerzas de defensa protectoras del ganado titweng y gojam desde 2014 hasta 2017. El análisis documenta de qué manera las autoridades públicas obtuvieron legitimidad en estos grupos renegociando un orden social, límites morales y restricción del grupo a través de sus propias reinterpretaciones de los ideales y las historias metaéticos. Las normas culturales de la limitación no solo se vieron manipuladas por las élites, sino que también se convirtieron en actos de rechazo creativo contra estas mismas élites. El artículo se centra específicamente en cómo se utilizó el trabajo vital de niños, mujeres y antiguas amistades para proteger la vida, así como para incitar violencia. El artículo cuenta con implicaciones de cómo los humanitarios internacionales pueden comprometerse con el cambio de las costumbres para mejorar la limitación de los grupos armados y proteger mejor a los civiles.Les acteurs humanitaires et universitaires du monde entier continuent de s’efforcer de comprendre la conduite des groupes armés et la manière dont ils se retiennent dans cette conduite lorsqu’elle enfreint les normes morales, légales et humanitaires. Les groupes armés ne disposant pas d’une structure de commandement hiérarchique officielle et clairement visible équivalente à celles des armées d’État se sont avérés comme étant un véritable casse-tête. Un corpus croissant de recherches sur les fonctions stratégiques des schémas de violence et de retenue est utilement allé au-delà des hypothèses selon lesquelles la violence extrême est indicatrice d’une absence d’autorité sur les acteurs armés. Cependant, la littérature a eu tendance à ignorer la pluralité et la complexité potentielles des figures d’autorité façonnant la violence, la retenue et la nature conservative de certains ordres moraux. Cet article exploite des recherches qualitatives et ethnographiques effectuées au Soudan du Sud pour comprendre les schémas de retenue des forces de défense des gardiens de bétail gojams et titwengs entre 2014 et 2017. Son analyze document la manière dont les autorités publiques ont acquis une légitimité au sein de ces groupes en renégociant l’ordre social, les limites morales et la retenue du groupe par le biais de ses propres réinterprétations des idéaux et histoires méta-éthiques. Les normes culturelles de retenue ont été manipulées par les élites mais également traduites en actes de refus créatifs contre ces mêmes élites. Cet article se concenter plus particulièrement sur la façon dont le travail de subsistance des enfants, des femmes et des amis de longue date a été utilisé pour préserver la vie, mais aussi pour inciter à la violence. Cet article a des implications relatives à la manière dont les humanitaires internationaux peuvent s’engager dans la refonte de la coutume afin d’améliorer la retenue des groupes armés et de mieux protéger les civils. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 873-897 Issue: 5 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 09 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1918126 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1918126 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:873-897 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Maxim Slav Author-X-Name-First: Maxim Author-X-Name-Last: Slav Author-Name: Elena Smyslovskikh Author-X-Name-First: Elena Author-X-Name-Last: Smyslovskikh Author-Name: Vladimir Novikov Author-X-Name-First: Vladimir Author-X-Name-Last: Novikov Author-Name: Igor Kolesnikov Author-X-Name-First: Igor Author-X-Name-Last: Kolesnikov Author-Name: Andrey Korotayev Author-X-Name-First: Andrey Author-X-Name-Last: Korotayev Title: Deprivation, instability, and propensity to attack: how urbanization influences terrorism Abstract: The study investigates different ways in which urbanization and its tempo influence terrorist activity. In line with other researchers investigating nonlinear effects on instability, we suggest that the influence of both of them is nonlinear, with quadratic regression being more appropriate for urbanization level impact and interaction between urbanization and its tempo being more appropriate to measure the tempo’s influence. Nonlinearity has been confirmed in the robustness section of the paper, in which an alternative dependent variable distribution and a greater set of control variables were used. The findings are in line with those of other researchers who found that societies, in the process of modernization, demonstrate heavier instability than societies before modernization or those after the modernization period. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1100-1130 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1924703 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1924703 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:1100-1130 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: The Editors Title: International Interactions best paper award 2020 Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1151-1151 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1974583 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1974583 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:1151-1151 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lindsay R. Dolan Author-X-Name-First: Lindsay R. Author-X-Name-Last: Dolan Author-Name: Quynh Nguyen Author-X-Name-First: Quynh Author-X-Name-Last: Nguyen Title: Mutual gain or resource drain? Attitudes toward international financial assistance during the early COVID-19 pandemic Abstract: Despite the need for international cooperation on COVID-19, the United States displayed reluctance to contribute to a global response. To shed light on the domestic politics that may underlie this foreign policy, we investigate how the US public viewed financial assistance to international organizations (IO)s and developing countries during the early stages of the pandemic. On one hand, the pandemic may illustrate the importance of cooperation; on the other hand, voters may be reluctant to engage internationally during a national crisis. In a survey fielded to 2,500 Americans in early April 2020, we find that personal exposure to the effects of COVID-19 is associated with increased support for IOs but decreased support for foreign aid. We suggest that Americans, especially those most affected by COVID-19, perceive benefits to supporting IOs but not to assisting developing countries. Partisanship moderates this relationship: although Republicans are less likely to support both forms of economic engagement, the positive relationship between exposure and support for IOs is actually stronger for Republicans. These findings are consistent with the notion that Americans, and especially Republicans, support international engagement when they feel it benefits them. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1131-1150 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1962858 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1962858 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:1131-1150 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Huseyin Ilgaz Author-X-Name-First: Huseyin Author-X-Name-Last: Ilgaz Title: Qui bono? Foreign military, economic, diplomatic interventions, and the termination of civil wars: An integrative approach Abstract: Foreign interventions are generally considered as game changers in civil wars. Yet the extant literature on this topic typically focuses on a single type of intervention, neglecting the effect of other intervention types deployed within the same conflict. Breaking with tradition, this article proposes a more extensive, multi-faceted bargaining model that integrates multiple types of interventions – military, economic, and diplomatic – that may be employed in a given conflict. The new framework analyzes how the interventions – either alone or in combination with others – shift the balance of power, often partly because interventions reveal previously private information regarding the true capacities of the warring parties. By including the asymmetrical aspects of civil wars in the framework, the article argues and finds support that although rebel-sided interventions usually produce their desired effect by enhancing the opposition’s military capacity, state-sided interventions tend to backfire and ultimately undermine the government. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1069-1099 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1962857 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1962857 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:1069-1099 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jared Oestman Author-X-Name-First: Jared Author-X-Name-Last: Oestman Title: A price for peace: troop contributing countries’ responses to peacekeeper fatalities Abstract: How do states respond to fatalities of their troops in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs)? Recent research highlights that participation in peacekeeping is costly for most states. Personnel fatalities should create further costs for contributors and often result in a reduction of their commitments. Studies that evaluate this expectation yield mixed findings. One finds no evidence that OECD countries provide fewer personnel to UN PKOs following fatalities. In contrast, another finds that fatalities generally correspond with reductions in states’ personnel commitments to UN operations in Africa but also reveals that wealthier contributors tend to withdraw at larger magnitudes than their poorer counterparts. This study builds on this work by further hypothesizing that the incentives that motivate states to participate in PKOs condition their willingness to maintain their contributions after experiencing fatalities. An analysis of states’ troop fatalities and commitments to 41 UN operations from 1990 to 2015 supports this expectation. States that are contiguous to an operation, which face greater concerns about the externalities of nearby conflicts, and states that receive side payments for their troop commitments, via foreign aid, are more willing to maintain their commitments in response to fatalities of their troops than other contributors. Additional findings suggest that non-contiguous contributors that do not receive side payments are also inclined to withdraw troops in response to upticks in organized violence surrounding a mission as well as fatalities of other contributors’ troops. These results illustrate that the motives that states face to participate in PKOs also affect their willingness to maintain their troop commitments as their costs for participation increase. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 986-1015 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1959327 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1959327 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:986-1015 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andrew P. Owsiak Author-X-Name-First: Andrew P. Author-X-Name-Last: Owsiak Author-Name: John A. Vasquez Author-X-Name-First: John A. Author-X-Name-Last: Vasquez Title: Peaceful dyads: A territorial perspective Abstract: Many dyads develop peaceful relationships, avoiding war for long, historical periods. Are such dyads common? How many exist, and why have they never fought? This study provides a territorial perspective on peaceful dyads, defined as those that never fight a war over a given historical period. It compares two explanations for why peaceful dyads exist: the territorial peace and the democratic peace. A series of hypotheses test the relative ability of these two theories to account for peaceful dyads. The tests employ three samples – all dyads, politically relevant dyads, and grievance dyads – from 1816–2001, with an emphasis on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Through our analyses, we produce three major findings. First, the absence of territorial conflict – but not democracy – predicts peaceful dyads. Second, the absence of territorial disagreements appears in the vast majority (i.e., 85–96%) of peaceful dyads. Finally, approximately, 93–98% of democratic dyads lack any territorial disagreements. This implies that democratic dyads are peaceful because they face different issues than non-democratic dyads – ones less likely to undermine the development of peaceful, dyadic relationships. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1040-1068 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1962859 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1962859 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:1040-1068 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Douglas B Atkinson Author-X-Name-First: Douglas B Author-X-Name-Last: Atkinson Title: The issues are the issue: Intangible salience and war duration Abstract: While it has long been acknowledged that issues play an important role in conflict processes, research on war duration has paid insufficient attention to them. In this paper, I help to remedy this deficiency by devising an original theory concerning the role of issues in war. I do this by focusing on the tangibility of the issues under dispute. I contend as the intangible salience increases, the more difficult it will be for states to bring their wars to an end. Ultimately, the more intangible salience that the issues possess, the longer wars will be. I use a mixed-methods approach. In the quantitative analysis, I employ original measures of intangible salience using data from a world-wide expert survey as well as new data on issues fought over during war. In the qualitative portion, I perform an in-depth case study on the effects of the issues on the war duration during the Vietnam War. Ultimately, I find strong support for my assertions that the issues lead states to engage in war prolongation behavior which in turn leads to longer wars. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1016-1039 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1954637 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1954637 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:1016-1039 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Rebecca H. Best Author-X-Name-First: Rebecca H. Author-X-Name-Last: Best Author-Name: Simanti Lahiri Author-X-Name-First: Simanti Author-X-Name-Last: Lahiri Title: Hard choices, soft targets: Terror proscription and strategic targeting decisions of FTO Abstract: Proscription lists are common counter-terror tools, yet their impact on terrorist violence is unclear. We find that proscription can be effective at constraining the violence of some types of groups, especially those that are young, secular, and without institutional support. However, proscription also can backfire from a counter-terrorist prospective, especially when applied to groups that are well-established, religious, and/or sponsored by states. Our analysis evaluates 534 terrorist groups, including sixty-six that were ultimately proscribed under the United States’ Foreign Terror Organization list. Unsurprisingly, we find that terrorist groups that attract proscription are more violent and better equipped to tap into international terror networks. While younger groups and nationalist groups are more vulnerable to proscription, older religious groups and those with state sponsors seem to be more violent after proscription. Proscription can be an effective tool for reducing terrorist attacks and lethality, but it is most effective against younger terror groups and states should exercise caution in its use as it may not have the desired effects on all types of groups. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 955-985 Issue: 6 Volume: 47 Year: 2021 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1962856 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1962856 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:6:p:955-985 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gong Chen Author-X-Name-First: Gong Author-X-Name-Last: Chen Title: Utilitarianism or cosmopolitanism? A study of education’s impact on individual attitudes toward foreign countries Abstract: This article attempts to study two different causal mechanisms where education affects individual attitudes toward foreign countries. On the one hand, education stands for human capital and/or skill level. According to the factor endowments model, for example, well-educated people in a capital-abundant country can materially benefit from trade ties with other labor-abundant countries. On the other hand, education cultivates social trust, disseminates information, and expands breadth of social perspective, all of which can make one more pro-outsider. Hence, both explanations tend to predict that one’s educational attainment is associated with a positive opinion of outgroup members and foreigners. By cross-national comparison including both developed and developing economies, I find empirical evidence supporting the socializing not the utilitarian effect of education on outgroup attitudes, using data from the second wave of the Asian Barometer Survey. Further structural equation modeling shows that education socializes an individual to be more internationalist and cosmopolitan mainly through an expanded social perspective. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 110-138 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1968388 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1968388 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:110-138 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Chelsea L. Estancona Author-X-Name-First: Chelsea L. Author-X-Name-Last: Estancona Title: Banditry or business? Rebel labor markets and state economic intervention Abstract: Stationary banditry is ubiquitous in civil war, with some rebel groups even investing in and profiting from primary commodities for years or decades. But for many of these groups, labor is a necessary component of resource production, such that laborers’ economic participation is vital for rebel funding and survival. States, meanwhile, are eager to prevent rebels from establishing these economic footholds. In areas where rebels can assert control of primary commodity markets, military competition between states and rebels may be supplemented by economic competition over laborers’ efforts. Under what conditions do governments wage local economic war by providing incentives to laborers to minimize the appeal of economically partnering with rebels? I argue that laborers’ economic loyalty is a central and under-considered component to resource-driven conflicts. When rebels seek to establish stationary banditry, states incentivize laborers to participate in the legal economy rather than rebel-controlled markets. Specifically, states will pursue economic counterinsurgency policies in areas where rebels are most likely to profit from labor-intensive primary commodities. I find support for this argument using municipal-level Colombian data about the FARC’s involvement in the coca trade and government provision of agricultural credits. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 139-151 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1973454 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1973454 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:139-151 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andreas Dür Author-X-Name-First: Andreas Author-X-Name-Last: Dür Author-Name: Christoph Mödlhamer Author-X-Name-First: Christoph Author-X-Name-Last: Mödlhamer Title: Power and innovative capacity: Explaining variation in intellectual property rights regulation across trade agreements Abstract: The extent to which intellectual property rights (IPRs) are regulated varies strongly across preferential trade agreements (PTAs). What explains this variation? We argue that deep IPRs are mainly found in PTAs characterized by large differences in power and innovative capacity across member states. Computational text analysis on the IPR sections included in 467 PTAs signed between 1994 and 2020 allows us to test our expectation. The results show that, indeed, power asymmetries combined with asymmetries in innovative capacity drive deep IPR provisions. Our account adjusts the conventional wisdom that sees the developed North forcing IPRs on the developing South in a subtle but important way. In fact, we find that the internationalization of IPR regulation is not just driven by countries that form part of the traditional Global North. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 23-48 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.1991337 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.1991337 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:23-48 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jesse C. Johnson Author-X-Name-First: Jesse C. Author-X-Name-Last: Johnson Title: Designing Alliances: How adversaries provoke peacetime military coordination Abstract: States form military alliances for the security benefits they provide. Despite this common purpose of military alliances, alliances vary a great deal in their design. Notably, some states form alliances that involve extensive peacetime military coordination while others form alliances with minimal peacetime military coordination. I argue that this variation in alliance design is motivated by the bargaining power of any challengers the members face. When a state faces a relatively weak challenger it will not have an incentive to pay the greater cost associated with a high level of peacetime coordination because a low level of peacetime military coordination will deter the challenger. However, if a state faces a relatively strong challenger a low level of peacetime military coordination will fail to deter the challenger and, thus, it will be willing to pay the additional costs associated with a high level of peacetime military coordination. An empirical analysis of the design of alliances from 1816 to 2001 supports hypotheses derived from the argument. The findings highlight how the design of alliances is driven, in part, by the characteristics of nonmembers. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 49-74 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1973453 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1973453 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:49-74 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Boris Brekhov Author-X-Name-First: Boris Author-X-Name-Last: Brekhov Title: Rewards versus Sanctions in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bluffing Abstract: I use game-theoretic models to compare a sender's expected payoff across two methods of wielding influence under asymmetric information: offering rewards and threatening sanctions. Attempts to influence the actions of another can have the perverse effect of actually encouraging the behavior that one is trying to discourage by creating incentives to bluff, which may differ across foreign policy regimes. Under a reward regime, targets can bluff to extort larger inducements. Under a sanction regime, targets can bluff to deter coercion attempts. I find that while sanctions are a weakly dominant tool of influence under complete information, rewards can be preferable under incomplete information. Specifically, the sender finds promises more beneficial than threats if she expects that (i) coercion would likely fail and (ii) her willingness to offer bribes would not get exploited by the target. I examine the United States' foreign policy reversal from punishments to inducements towards North Korea during the nuclear crisis of 1993--4 to illustrate these theoretical propositions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 75-109 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1983565 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1983565 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:75-109 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lesley G. Terris Author-X-Name-First: Lesley G. Author-X-Name-Last: Terris Author-Name: Orit E. Tykocinski Author-X-Name-First: Orit E. Author-X-Name-Last: Tykocinski Title: Agents of peace or enablers of violence? The proximal effects of mediators in international disputes Abstract: The international relations literature typically portrays mediators as effective agents of dispute de-escalation. Upon mediation onset rivals are expected to lower the flames of conflict and enter into negotiations. We argue, however, that the mediator’s presence may actually prompt and facilitate conflict escalation, particularly immediately following the onset of mediation. Hostilities, which may be motivated by rivals’ strategic need to signal resolve, may be further energized by the belief that the mediator will curb retaliatory actions. In this sense, the mediator is perceived as an “insurance policy,” reducing both the perceived likelihood and the potential costs of escalation. To explore this phenomenon, we track rivals’ behavior patterns in the six-month period after mediation onset in intrastate conflicts, 1995–2010. We find that in 42% of the conflicts, the arrival of the mediator was significantly associated with increased hostilities. We discuss this pattern and examine factors that might be linked to its occurrence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-22 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1977637 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1977637 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:1-22 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Richard W. Frank Author-X-Name-First: Richard W. Author-X-Name-Last: Frank Title: Human trafficking indicators: A new dataset Abstract: This article describes the Human Trafficking Indicators (HTI) dataset, a new resource for research on the causes of, and policy responses to, human trafficking. HTI includes country-year level information on forty-six variables for up to 184 countries from 2000 to 2017. It is the first dataset to broadly capture different trafficking types and disaggregated measures of government responses. It includes seven types of trafficking including forced labor, sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, and debt bondage. The HTI also includes eighteen measures of a government’s prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. This paper presents an overview of the dataset, explains how it differs from other sources, describes several empirical trends, and highlights HTI’s potential uses with a brief empirical example. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 152-171 Issue: 1 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 01 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1968387 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1968387 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:152-171 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Wonjun Song Author-X-Name-First: Wonjun Author-X-Name-Last: Song Title: Dictators, personalized security forces, and coups Abstract: Dictators rely on coercive forces to remain in office, as violence is the ultimate arbiter of power in these regimes. However, coercive forces also can remove the dictator from office in a coup. This presents the dictator with a dilemma. One way to address this dilemma is to personalize the security forces. This paper argues that personalizing the security forces decreases coup risk by: (a) linking the security elites’ fate more closely to the leader’s and (b) increasing the informational advantage the leader has over security elites. Using a new measure of the personalization of security apparatus, I show that personalization decreases coup risk in dictatorships, but this stabilizing effect of personalization disappears after the dictator’s exit from office. This study documents how dictators transform the security apparatus to stabilize their rule, with implications for how dictatorships survive and collapse. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 204-232 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1977638 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1977638 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:204-232 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Manfred Elsig Author-X-Name-First: Manfred Author-X-Name-Last: Elsig Author-Name: Sebastian Klotz Author-X-Name-First: Sebastian Author-X-Name-Last: Klotz Title: Initiator conditions and the diffusion of digital trade-related provisions in PTAs Abstract: Digital trade has become an important driver of global commerce and accounts for an increasing share of many countries’ economies. While progress in digital trade-related discussions at the World Trade Organization has been limited until fairly recently, the topic has gradually been gaining importance in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) since the early 2000s. As we also observe that digital trade governance has become increasingly politicized, we know little about these provisions’ origins and diffusion in PTAs. This research note discusses novel data and analyzes 91 digital trade-related provisions and 347 trade agreements signed between 2000 and 2019. In this note, we focus primarily on the initiator conditions and how these might lead to differences in diffusion patterns. We find that almost half of digital trade-related provisions were initially introduced by PTAs in which the United States was a signatory. Using negative binomial regressions, we find no evidence, however, that these provisions diffuse relatively more often than provisions first introduced by other countries. Our analysis shows that the diffusion of digital trade-related provisions is influenced by original trade interests and the existence of domestic digital policies at the initiator stage. Interestingly, we find that the initial degree of legalization of the provisions themselves matters for a more substantial diffusion, which contradicts the established view that soft law provisions are the preferred approach for new trade topics. This research note highlights the need to factor in the extent to which new international law obligations are adopted through the treaty networks as a result of initiator conditions addressing a certain blind spot in the diffusion literature. By focusing on the initiating states, we also speak to the literature on how international agreements serve to diffuse leading states’ preferred policy options. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 292-308 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2004137 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2004137 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:292-308 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Faradj Koliev Author-X-Name-First: Faradj Author-X-Name-Last: Koliev Author-Name: James H. Lebovic Author-X-Name-First: James H. Author-X-Name-Last: Lebovic Title: Shaming into compliance? Country reporting of convention adherence to the International Labour Organization Abstract: When does social pressure in the form of “naming and shaming” induce states to concede their prerogatives by providing potentially compromising information to international organizations (IOs)? We provide answers to that question in what we believe is the first systematic study of the impact of social pressure on state reporting practices, as an act of member procedural compliance. We develop related hypotheses by drawing on realist theory and theories of social pressure and test them, in the 1992–2011 period, by analyzing government reporting on multiple conventions to the International Labour Organization (ILO). We find that governments tend to respond negatively to ILO “naming” (as we define it) for some, but not all, ILO conventions. More specifically, we conclude that governments tend to resist reporting on domestic social conditions—here, related to inequality, discrimination, and exploitation—but more readily report on issues (conventions) that are tied directly to the ILO’s core mission, where government culpability is also clearer. We conclude further that shaming—by “shortlisting” governments and holding them to account in public sessions—boosts compliance on some issues.¿Cuándo la presión social en forma de denuncia pública induce a los estados a ceder sus prerrogativas proporcionando información potencialmente comprometedora a las organizaciones internacionales (OI)? Respondemos a esta pregunta por medio de lo que creemos que es el primer estudio sistemático sobre el impacto de la presión social en las prácticas de información de los estados, como un acto de cumplimiento de los procedimientos por parte de los miembros. Desarrollamos hipótesis relacionadas partiendo de la teoría realista y las teorías de la presión social, y poniéndolas a prueba en el período 1992–2011, y analizamos los informes gubernamentales sobre múltiples convenciones destinados la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT). Descubrimos que los gobiernos tienden a responder negativamente a la “denominación” de la OIT (como la definimos nosotros) con respecto a algunos, no todos, los convenios de la OIT. Más específicamente, llegamos a la conclusión de que los gobiernos tienden a resistirse a informar sobre las condiciones sociales internas (en este caso, relacionadas con la desigualdad, la discriminación y la explotación), pero informan más fácilmente sobre cuestiones (convenciones) que están directamente relacionadas con la misión principal de la OIT, donde la culpabilidad del gobierno está también más clara. Concluimos, además, que la denuncia pública, al “preseleccionar” a los gobiernos y exigirles que rindan cuentas en las sesiones públicas, impulsa el cumplimiento de algunas cuestiones.À quels moments la pression sociale prenant la forme d’un « name and shame » incite-t-elle des États à faire des concessions sur leurs prérogatives en fournissant des informations potentiellement compromettantes aux organisations internationales (OI) ? Nous apportons des réponses à cette question dans ce que nous pensons être la première étude systématique de l’impact de la pression sociale sur les pratiques de déclaration des États en tant qu’acte de conformité procédurale des membres. Nous avons développé des hypothèses associées en nous appuyant sur la théorie réaliste et sur les théories de la pression sociale et nous les avons mises à l’épreuve sur la période 1992-2011 en analysant les déclarations gouvernementales communiquées à à l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIT) à l’occasion de plusieurs conventions. Nous avons constaté que les gouvernements avaient tendance à réagir négativement au « name » de l’OIT (tel que nous l’avons défini) pour certaines de ses conventions, mais pas pour toutes. Plus précisément, nous concluons que les gouvernements ont tendance à résister à l’idée de rendre compte des conditions sociales nationales - ici liées à l’inégalité, à la discrimination et à l’exploitation - mais qu’ils rendent plus facilement compte des questions (conventions) qui sont directement liées à la mission fondamentale de l’OIT, où la culpabilité du gouvernement est par ailleurs plus claire. Nous concluons en outre que le « shame » - qui intervient en « présélectionnant » des gouvernements et en leur demandant des comptes lors de séances publiques - améliore la conformité relative à certaines questions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 258-291 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1983567 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1983567 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:258-291 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Colin M. Barry Author-X-Name-First: Colin M. Author-X-Name-Last: Barry Author-Name: David L. Cingranelli Author-X-Name-First: David L. Author-X-Name-Last: Cingranelli Author-Name: K. Chad Clay Author-X-Name-First: K. Chad Author-X-Name-Last: Clay Title: Labor rights in comparative perspective: The WorkR dataset Abstract: We present new data on labor laws and practices for all countries of the world, recorded annually from 1994 to 2010. The dataset covers seven different labor standards. These are freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum wage, limitations on working hours, protection from unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, protection from forced and compulsory labor, and protection of children and young people. This list reflects an array of internationally recognized labor rights and closely corresponds with the standards identified in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. A simple analysis demonstrates the utility of the dataset and showcases some of the ways it might be used as a powerful tool in the scientific study of labor rights specifically, and human rights more generally.Presentamos nuevos datos sobre leyes y prácticas laborales para todos los países del mundo. Estos datos se registraron anualmente desde 1994 hasta 2010. El conjunto de datos abarca siete normas laborales diferentes. Se trata de la libertad de asociación, la negociación colectiva, el salario mínimo, la limitación de la jornada laboral, la protección contra las condiciones de trabajo inseguras e insalubres, la protección contra el trabajo forzado y obligatorio, y la protección de los niños y los jóvenes. Esta lista incluye una serie de derechos laborales reconocidos internacionalmente y se corresponde estrechamente con las normas identificadas en la Declaración sobre los Principios y Derechos Fundamentales en el Trabajo de la OIT de 1998. Mediante un sencillo análisis, se demuestra la utilidad del conjunto de datos y se muestran algunas de las formas en que podría utilizarse como una herramienta eficaz en el estudio científico de los derechos laborales en particular, y de los derechos humanos en general.Nous présentons de nouvelles données sur les lois et pratiques du travail pour tous les pays du monde qui ont été enregistrées annuellement de 1994 à 2010. Le jeu de données couvre sept normes du travail différentes. Elles comprennent la liberté syndicale, les négociations collectives, le salaire minimum, la limitation du temps de travail, la protection contre les conditions de travail dangereuses et insalubres, la protection contre le travail forcé et obligatoire et la protection des enfants et des jeunes. Cette liste reflète toute une série de droits du travail internationalement reconnus et correspond étroitement aux normes identifiées dans la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail de 1998. Une analyse simple démontre l’utilité de ce jeu de données et présente certaines des façons dont il pourrait être utilisé en tant qu’outil puissant dans l’étude scientifique des droits du travail en particulier, et des droits de l’homme de manière plus générale. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 327-344 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2040495 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2040495 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:327-344 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Neil Narang Author-X-Name-First: Neil Author-X-Name-Last: Narang Author-Name: Yanjun Liu Author-X-Name-First: Yanjun Author-X-Name-Last: Liu Title: Does female ratio balancing influence the efficacy of peacekeeping units? Exploring the impact of female peacekeepers on post-conflict outcomes and behavior Abstract: The UN. has intensified efforts to recruit female peacekeepers for peacekeeping missions. From 2006 to 2014, the number of female military personnel in UN peacekeeping missions nearly tripled. The theory driving female recruitment is that female peacekeepers employ distinctive skills that make units more effective along a variety of dimensions. Yet skeptics argue that deeper studies are needed. This paper explores the theoretical mechanisms through which female military personnel are thought to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping units. Using new data, we document variation in female participation across missions over time, and we explore the impact of female ratio balancing on various conflict outcomes, including the level of female representation in post-conflict political institutions, the prevalence of sexual violence in armed conflict, and the durability of peace. We find evidence that a greater proportion of female personnel is systematically associated with greater implementation of women’s rights provisions and a greater willingness to report rape, and we find no evidence of negative consequences for the risk of conflict recurrence. We conclude that the inclusion of more female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping does not reduce the ability to realize mission goals. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 173-203 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.1995729 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.1995729 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:173-203 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Miranda Simon Author-X-Name-First: Miranda Author-X-Name-Last: Simon Author-Name: Cassilde Schwartz Author-X-Name-First: Cassilde Author-X-Name-Last: Schwartz Author-Name: David Hudson Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Hudson Title: Covid-19 insecurities and migration aspirations Abstract: Using an original survey, this paper examines how pandemic-driven insecurities have affected aspirations to migrate internationally among youth in The Gambia. We find that individuals perceive wide inequalities between their government’s performance and the speed of Covid-19 recovery abroad. However, superior recovery abroad does not have significant effects on aspirations to migrate. Individual and local sources of security are more important: Individuals who were able to maintain their jobs throughout the pandemic are less likely to aspire to move abroad. The insecurity of Covid-19 job loss may be compensated by confidence in one’s government’s ability to tackle the pandemic. This suggests that, in the context of an event that has upended people’s lives, would-be migrants who managed to maintain a source of stability may seek comfort in familiar contexts; even if they appear worse than alternatives abroad. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 309-326 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.1991919 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.1991919 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:309-326 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ahmer Tarar Author-X-Name-First: Ahmer Author-X-Name-Last: Tarar Title: Risk preferences, uncertainty, and war Abstract: In the game-theoretic literature on international conflict, risk-acceptance leads to war if it is severe enough to eliminate the bargaining range, in which case war occurs even under complete information. I analyze the effect of varying risk-propensities in incomplete-information crisis bargaining. In this setting, an additional lottery (beyond just the war lottery) is involved due to the proposer’s uncertainty about whether the proposal will be accepted. This has the effect that even small increases in either side’s willingness to take risks increase the probability of war, as opposed to the all-or-nothing, eliminating-the-bargaining-range mechanism. This result holds regardless of whether either side is risk-averse or risk-acceptant on the whole, and even if no bargaining range is being eliminated. I also show that uncertainty about the opponent’s risk-propensity can lead to war via a standard risk-return tradeoff, which is another way that risk-preferences can affect war and peace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 233-257 Issue: 2 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1983566 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1983566 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:2:p:233-257 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Mihai Croicu Author-X-Name-First: Mihai Author-X-Name-Last: Croicu Author-Name: Kristine Eck Author-X-Name-First: Kristine Author-X-Name-Last: Eck Title: Reporting of non-fatal conflict events Abstract: Temporally and spatial disaggregated datasets are commonly used to study political violence. Researchers are increasingly studying the data generation process itself to understand the selection processes by which conflict events are included in conflict datasets. This work has focused on conflict fatalities. In this research note, we explore how non-fatal conflict events are reported upon and enter into datasets of armed conflict. To do so, we compare reported non-fatal conflict events with the population of events in two direct observation datasets, collected using a boots-on-the-ground strategy: mass abductions in Nepal (1996–2006) and troop movements in Darfur. We show that at the appropriate level of aggregation media reporting on abductions in Nepal largely mirrors the “true” population of abductions, but at more disaggregated levels of temporal or spatial analysis, the match is poor. We also show that there is no overlap between a media-driven conflict dataset and directly-observed data on troop movements in Sudan. These empirics indicate that non-fatal data can suffer from serious underreporting and that this is particularly the case for events lacking elements of coercion. These findings are indicative of selection problems in regards to the reporting on non-fatal conflict events.Los conjuntos de datos desagregados temporal y espacialmente se utilizan de manera habitual para analizar la violencia política. Los investigadores estudian cada vez más el proceso de generación de datos para comprender los procesos de selección a través de los que se incluyen eventos de conflicto en los conjuntos de datos sobre conflictos. Este trabajo se centró en las víctimas fatales resultantes de los conflictos. En esta nota de investigación, exploramos cómo se informan los acontecimientos conflictivos no fatales y cómo se incorporan esos datos al conjunto de datos sobre conflictos armados. Para ello, comparamos los casos informados de acontecimientos conflictivos no fatales con el resto de los acontecimientos en dos conjuntos de datos de observación directa, recopilados mediante una estrategia de observación sobre el terreno: los secuestros masivos en Nepal (1996–2006) y los movimientos de tropas en Darfur. Demostramos que, en el nivel adecuado de agregación de datos, la información de los medios de comunicación sobre los secuestros en Nepal refleja en gran medida la verdadera cantidad de secuestros, pero, en niveles más desagregados del análisis temporal o espacial, la coincidencia es deficiente. También demostramos que no hay coincidencia entre un conjunto de datos sobre conflictos impulsados por los medios de comunicación y los datos recopilados mediante la observación directa durante los movimientos de tropas en Sudán. Estos datos empíricos indican que los casos de víctimas no fatales presentan un problema grave de infradeclaración, en especial, en hechos que carecen de elementos de coerción. Estos resultados indican problemas de selección en lo que respecta a la declaración de acontecimientos conflictivos no fatales.Des jeux de données désagrégées dans le temps et dans l’espace sont couramment utilisés pour étudier la violence politique. Des chercheurs étudient de plus en plus le processus de génération de données en lui-même pour comprendre les processus de sélection par lesquels les événements de conflits sont inclus dans les jeux de données sur les conflits. Mais ce travail se concentre sur les décès liés aux conflits. Dans cet exposé de recherche, nous étudions la manière dont les événements de conflits non mortels sont rapportés et inclus dans les jeux de données sur les conflits armés. Pour ce faire, nous comparons les événements de conflits non rapportés avec la population des événements de deux jeux de données d’observation directe recueillies à l’aide d’une stratégie de terrain : l’un de ces jeux de données concerne enlèvements de masse au Népal (1996–2006) et l’autre concerne les mouvements de troupes au Darfour. Nous montrons qu’au niveau d’agrégation approprié, les reportages des médias sur les enlèvements au Népal reflètent en grande partie la population réelle victime d’enlèvement, mais qu’à des niveaux plus désagrégés d’analyse dans le temps ou dans l’espace, la concordance est faible. Nous montrons également qu’il n’y a pas de recoupement entre le jeu de données sur les conflits alimenté par les médias et les données acquises par observation directe des mouvements de troupes au Soudan. Ces analyses empiriques indiquent que les données sur les événements non mortels souffrent d’une grave sous-déclaration et que c’est particulièrement le cas pour les événements dépourvus d’éléments de coercition. Ces résultats indiquent des problèmes de sélection en ce qui concerne les rapports sur les événements de conflits non mortels. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 450-470 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2044325 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2044325 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:450-470 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hirotaka Fujibayashi Author-X-Name-First: Hirotaka Author-X-Name-Last: Fujibayashi Title: Why do states contribute to the global refugee governance? Fiscal burden-sharing in the post-2011 Syrian refugee crisis Abstract: Why are some states motivated to contribute financially to international efforts to protect refugees and assist host countries? Despite general agreement on the need for burden-sharing in global refugee governance, research up to now has not explained the underlying motivations behind the provision of financial assistance tied to the international protection of refugees. In addressing this gap, this article offers two competing perspectives of the potential impact of refugee migration on the decisions by individual states concerning whether and how much they contribute to a given refugee crisis. The article further hypothesizes that the connection between refugee migration and states’ financial contribution depends on the geographic context. The proposed hypotheses are tested using the cross-country panel data on humanitarian assistance to the post-2011 Syrian refugee crisis, and the test confirms that states receiving a more significant number of refugees have a greater incentive to offer a financial contribution. However, this explanation only holds for contributing states remote from Syria. Conversely, states in the geographical proximity of Syria likely have fewer interests to take on a financial burden to support Syrian refugees staying outside of their territories. These findings provide several important insights into the broader policy of refugee governance and into academic debates on the sharing of financial burdens to protect refugees.¿Por qué algunos estados tienen la motivación de aportar dinero a los esfuerzos internacionales para proteger a los refugiados y ayudar a los países anfitriones? A pesar del acuerdo general sobre la necesidad de compartir la carga en la gestión global de los refugiados, la investigación realizada hasta ahora no ha explicado las motivaciones subyacentes a la provisión de ayuda financiera relacionada con la protección internacional de los refugiados. A fin de abordar esta brecha, en el presente artículo, se ofrecen dos perspectivas contrapuestas sobre el impacto potencial de la migración de los refugiados en las decisiones de los estados individuales respecto a si contribuyen o no, y en qué medida, a una determinada crisis de refugiados. En el artículo, también se plantea la hipótesis de que la conexión entre la migración de refugiados y la contribución financiera de los estados depende del contexto geográfico. Las hipótesis propuestas se ponen a prueba utilizando los datos del panel de países sobre la asistencia humanitaria a la crisis de refugiados sirios después de 2011, y la prueba confirma que los estados que reciben una cantidad más considerable de refugiados tienen un mayor incentivo para ofrecer una contribución financiera. Sin embargo, esta explicación solo es válida para los estados contribuyentes alejados de Siria. Por el contrario, los estados situados en la proximidad geográfica de Siria probablemente estén menos interesados en asumir una carga financiera para ayudar a los refugiados sirios que se encuentran fuera de sus territorios. Estos resultados ofrecen varias ideas importantes sobre la política general de gobernanza de los refugiados y los debates académicos sobre la distribución de las cargas financieras para proteger a los refugiados.Pourquoi certains États sont-ils motivés à contribuer financièrement aux efforts internationaux visant à protéger les réfugiés et à aider les pays d’accueil? Malgré l’accord général sur la nécessité d’un partage des charges dans la gouvernance mondiale des réfugiés, les recherches menées jusqu’à présent n’ont pas permis d’expliquer les motivations sous-jacentes à l’apport d’une aide financière liée à la protection internationale des réfugiés. Pour combler cette lacune, cet article propose deux perspectives concurrentes sur l’impact potentiel de la migration des réfugiés sur les décisions des États individuels quant à leur contribution à la gestion d’une crise des réfugiés donnée et à l’ampleur de celle-ci. Il émet en outre l’hypothèse que la relation entre migration des réfugiés et contribution financière des États dépendrait du contexte géographique. Les hypothèses proposées sont mises à l’épreuve à l’aide de données de panel transnationales sur l’aide humanitaire apportée à la crise des réfugiés syriens après 2011 et cette analyse confirme que les États qui accueillent un nombre plus important de réfugiés sont davantage motivés à offrir une contribution financière. Cependant, cette explication ne tient que pour les États contributeurs éloignés de la Syrie. À l’inverse, les États géographiquement proches de la Syrie sont moins susceptibles d’avoir des intérêts à assumer une charge financière pour soutenir les réfugiés syriens séjournant en dehors de leur territoire. Ces conclusions apportent plusieurs renseignements importants pour la politique plus large de la gouvernance des réfugiés et les débats intellectuels concernant le partage des charges financières de protection des réfugiés. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 345-373 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2040496 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2040496 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:345-373 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Scott J. Cook Author-X-Name-First: Scott J. Author-X-Name-Last: Cook Author-Name: Nils B. Weidmann Author-X-Name-First: Nils B. Author-X-Name-Last: Weidmann Title: Race to the bottom: Spatial aggregation and event data Abstract: Researchers now have greater access to granular georeferenced (i.e., spatial) data on social and political phenomena than ever before. Such data have seen wide use, as they offer the potential for researchers to analyze local phenomena, test mechanisms, and better understand micro-level behavior. With these political event data, it has become increasingly common for researchers to select the smallest spatial scale permitted by the data. We argue that this practice requires greater scrutiny, as smaller spatial or temporal scales do not necessarily improve the quality of inferences. While highly disaggregated data reduce some threats to inference (e.g., aggregation bias), they increase the risk of others (e.g., outcome misclassification). Therefore, we argue that researchers should adopt a more principled approach when selecting the spatial scale for their analysis. To help inform this choice, we characterize the aggregation problem for spatial data, discuss the consequences of too much (or too little) aggregation, and provide some guidance for applied researchers. We demonstrate these issues using both simulated experiments and an analysis of spatial patterns of violence in Afghanistan.Los investigadores tienen ahora un acceso como nunca antes a datos georreferenciados granulares (es decir, espaciales) sobre fenómenos sociales y políticos. Estos datos se han utilizado ampliamente, ya que ofrecen a los investigadores la posibilidad de analizar fenómenos locales, probar mecanismos y comprender mejor el comportamiento a nivel micro. Con estos datos sobre acontecimientos políticos, es cada vez más frecuente que los investigadores seleccionen la escala espacial más pequeña que permitan los datos. Sostenemos que esta práctica requiere un mayor escrutinio, ya que las escalas espaciales o temporales no necesariamente mejoran la calidad de las inferencias. Si bien los datos altamente desagregados reducen algunas amenazas para la inferencia (por ejemplo, el sesgo de agregación), aumentan el riesgo de otras (por ejemplo, la clasificación errónea de los resultados). Por lo tanto, sostenemos que los investigadores deberían adoptar un enfoque basándose más en principios a la hora de seleccionar la escala espacial para su análisis. Para contribuir a realizar esta elección, caracterizamos el problema de la agregación de los datos espaciales, analizamos las consecuencias de una agregación excesiva (o insuficiente) y ofrecemos algunas orientaciones para la investigación aplicada. Demostramos estas cuestiones utilizando tanto experimentos simulados como un análisis de los patrones de violencia en Afganistán.Les chercheurs ont maintenant un meilleur accès à des données granulaires géoréférencées (c-à-d, spatiales) sur les phénomènes politiques et sociaux que jamais auparavant. Ces données ont été largement utilisées, car elles offrent aux chercheurs le potentiel d’analyser des phénomènes locaux, de tester des mécanismes et de mieux comprendre les comportements au niveau micro. Avec ces données sur les événements politiques, il est devenu de plus en plus courant pour les chercheurs de sélectionner la plus petite échelle spatiale permise par les données. Nous soutenons que cette pratique exige un examen plus approfondi, car des échelles spatiales ou temporelles plus petites n’améliorent pas nécessairement la qualité des déductions. Bien que les données très désagrégées réduisent certains risques pour les déductions (p. ex. biais d’agrégation), elles accroissent le risque d’autres facteurs (p. ex. mauvaise classification des résultats). Par conséquent, nous soutenons que les chercheurs devraient adopter une approche plus raisonnée lorsqu’ils choisissent l’échelle spatiale pour leur analyse. Afin d’éclairer ce choix, nous caractérisons le problème de l’agrégation des données spatiales, nous discutons des conséquences d’une trop grande (ou trop faible) agrégations des données et nous fournissons quelques conseils aux chercheurs appliqués. Nous démontrons ces problèmes en utilisant à la fois des expérimentations simulées et une analyse des schémas spatiaux de la violence en Afghanistan. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 471-491 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2025365 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2025365 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:471-491 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Bimal Adhikari Author-X-Name-First: Bimal Author-X-Name-Last: Adhikari Author-Name: Jin Mun Jeong Author-X-Name-First: Jin Mun Author-X-Name-Last: Jeong Author-Name: Dursun Peksen Author-X-Name-First: Dursun Author-X-Name-Last: Peksen Title: Compliant or defiant? Economic sanctions and United Nations General Assembly voting by target countries Abstract: What effect do economic sanctions have on the foreign policy orientation of sanctioned (target) countries towards sanctioning (sender) countries? Do sanctions create more or fewer incentives for targets to pursue divergent foreign policy agendas from that of their senders in major international forums? We posit that economic sanctions escalate tension between target and sender countries, prompting target governments to vote against the interests of sender countries at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). To assess the empirical merits of this theoretical claim, we combine US sanctions data with the data on the UNGA votes for over 150 countries for the 1984–2006 period. The findings show that US sanctions, particularly high-cost sanctions, are significantly associated with more dissimilar UNGA votes between the US and its targets. Our analysis suggests that sanctions not only often fail to achieve their intended policy goals but also instigate more defiant behavior by target countries.¿Qué efecto tienen las sanciones económicas en la orientación de la política exterior de los países sancionados (objetivo) hacia los países que emiten la sanción (emisores)? ¿Crean las sanciones más o menos incentivos para que los países objetivos apliquen programas de política exterior divergentes de los de sus países emisores en los principales foros internacionales? Sostenemos que las sanciones económicas aumentan la tensión entre los países objetivo y los emisores, lo que lleva a los gobiernos objetivo a votar en contra de los intereses de los países emisores en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (AGNU). Para evaluar los méritos empíricos de esta afirmación teórica, combinamos los datos de las sanciones de EE. UU. con los datos de las votaciones de la AGNU de más de 150 países para el periodo 1984–2006. Los resultados muestran que las sanciones de EE. UU., en particular las de alto costo, están relacionadas en gran medida con votaciones más disímiles en la AGNU entre EE. UU. y sus países objetivos. Nuestro análisis sugiere que las sanciones no solo no logran a menudo cumplir sus objetivos políticos previstos, sino que además instigan un comportamiento más desafiante por parte de los países objetivo.Quelle est l’incidence des sanctions économiques sur la politique pratiquée par les pays sanctionnés à l’égard des pays émetteurs? Ces sanctions ont-elles pour effet d’encourager, ou bien au contraire de décourager les pays sanctionnés à adopter des stratégies antagoniques par rapport aux pays émetteurs dans les grandes instances internationales? Nous émettons l’idée que les sanctions économiques accentuent les tensions entre pays émetteurs et pays sanctionnés en poussant ces derniers à voter contre les intérêts des pays émetteurs à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (AGNU). Pour déterminer la valeur empirique de cette théorie, nous avons comparé les sanctions américaines et les votes à l’AGNU de plus de 150 pays entre 1984 et 2006. Cette analyse met en évidence une forte corrélation entre sanctions (notamment celles entraînant un coût économique élevé) et votes contre les intérêts des États-Unis à l’AGNU. Notre analyse montre que les sanctions, souvent inefficaces sur le plan politique, ont pour effet de susciter des comportements hostiles chez les pays sanctionnés. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 397-422 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2059478 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2059478 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:397-422 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hans-Inge Langø Author-X-Name-First: Hans-Inge Author-X-Name-Last: Langø Author-Name: Curtis M. Bell Author-X-Name-First: Curtis M. Author-X-Name-Last: Bell Author-Name: Scott Wolford Author-X-Name-First: Scott Author-X-Name-Last: Wolford Title: Oil discovery, oil production, and coups d’état Abstract: We analyze a model of bargaining in the shadow of coups d’état in which oil rents increase the value of capturing the state but also allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth has already been realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before the government can use oil wealth to shift the distribution of power decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are also likely to fail. We uncover these relationships in an empirical analysis of oil production, oil discovery, coup attempts, and coup outcomes in a global sample of states from 1980 to 2010. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 374-396 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2061968 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2061968 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:374-396 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Osman Zeki Gökçe Author-X-Name-First: Osman Zeki Author-X-Name-Last: Gökçe Author-Name: Emre Hatipoğlu Author-X-Name-First: Emre Author-X-Name-Last: Hatipoğlu Title: Documenting energy flows between states: The Global Energy Relations Dataset (GERD), 1978–2014 Abstract: Being the most globally traded commodity in terms of monetary value, energy remains one of the important shapers of interstate relations. States’ quest to secure exports and imports of energy resources and the resultant efforts to govern energy flows have created numerous phenomena that have been of immediate interest to international relations (IR) scholars. However, few studies have so far aimed to systematically examine how energy relations shape global politics. One important reason for this paucity relates to the lack of a dataset with wide spatiotemporal coverage that allows for such systematic analysis. The Global Energy Relations Dataset (GERD), featured in this study, aims to facilitate systematic analyses of energy relations in IR. The dataset offers yearly energy flow data for all country-pairs around the globe between 1978 and 2014. The data are compiled from major international and national agencies that offer reliable data on energy trade. Standardized over megajoules, the data are offered in directed-dyadic (exporter-importer) and monadic (country-only) format. The data are further broken down by resource (i.e., coal, oil, gas, and electricity) whenever possible. Preliminary analyses indicate energy relations exhibit considerable variance among pairs of states and over time, and that trade in some energy resources may pacify relations more than others. Correlating this variance with canonical variables used in international relations points to promising areas of research.Al ser el producto más comercializado en todo el mundo en términos de valor monetario, la energía sigue siendo uno de los principales factores que determinan las relaciones entre los estados. El afán de los estados por garantizar las exportaciones e importaciones de los recursos energéticos y las acciones resultantes para controlar los flujos de energía crearon numerosos fenómenos que generaron un interés inmediato en los especialistas en relaciones internacionales (RR. II.). Sin embargo, son pocos los estudios que, hasta ahora, analizaron de manera sistemática cómo las relaciones en materia de energía configuran la política mundial. Un motivo importante de esta escasez de estudios es la falta de un conjunto de datos con una amplia cobertura espacio-temporal que permita dicho análisis sistemático. El Conjunto de datos de las relaciones energéticas mundiales (Global Energy Relations Dataset, GERD), presentado en este estudio, tiene como objetivo facilitar el análisis sistemático de las relaciones en materia de energía en las RR. II. El conjunto de datos ofrece todos los años información sobre el flujo de energía para todos los pares de países del mundo entre 1978 y 2014. Los datos proceden de los principales organismos internacionales y nacionales que ponen a disposición información confiable sobre la comercialización de la energía. Estandarizados en megajulios (MJ), los datos se ofrecen en formato diádico (exportador-importador) y en formato monádico (país solo). Los datos se desglosan, además, por recursos (es decir, carbón, petróleo, gas y electricidad), siempre que sea posible. Los análisis preliminares indican que las relaciones energéticas presentan una considerable variación entre los estados pares y con el paso del tiempo, y que la comercialización de algunos recursos energéticos puede pacificar las relaciones más que otros. La correlación de esta variación con las variables canónicas utilizadas en las relaciones comerciales es un indicador de campos de investigación prometedores.En tant que produit de base occupant la plus grande place dans le commerce international en termes de valeur monétaire, l’énergie reste l’un des facteurs importants qui façonnent les relations interétatiques. La quête de sécurisation des exportations et des importations de ressources énergétiques des États et les efforts qui en résultent pour régir les flux énergétiques ont donné lieu à de nombreux phénomènes qui ont suscité un intérêt immédiat des chercheurs en relations internationales (RI). Cependant, seules quelques études ont jusqu’ici eu pour objectif d’examiner systématiquement la manière dont les relations énergétiques façonnaient la politique mondiale. L’une des principales raisons de cette insuffisance est l’absence d’un jeu de données à large couverture spatio-temporelle qui permettrait une telle analyse systématique. Le Jeu de données sur les relations énergétiques mondiales (GERD, Global Energy Relations Dataset) présenté dans cette étude a pour objectif de faciliter les analyses systématiques des relations énergétiques en RI. Ce jeu de données fournit des données annuelles sur les flux énergétiques de 1978 à 2014 pour toutes les paires de pays du monde entier. Les données ont été compilées après avoir été recueillies auprès des principales agences nationales et internationales consacrées à l’énergie qui offrent des données fiables sur le commerce d’énergie. Les données sont normalisées en mégajoules (MJ) et fournies au format dyadique avec direction (exportateur/importateur) et au format monadique (pays seulement). Elles sont par ailleurs réparties par ressource (c-à-d, charbon, pétrole, gaz et électricité) dès que possible. Les analyses préliminaires indiquent que les relations énergétiques présentent une variance considérable entre les paires d’États et au fil du temps et que le commerce de certaines ressources énergétiques plus que d’autres peut pacifier des relations. La corrélation de cette variance avec des variables canoniques utilisées en relations internationales met en évidence des domaines de recherche prometteurs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 492-519 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2045286 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2045286 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:492-519 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Hyo Won Lee Author-X-Name-First: Hyo Won Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Yena Kim Author-X-Name-First: Yena Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Author-Name: Whasun Jho Author-X-Name-First: Whasun Author-X-Name-Last: Jho Title: Domestic politics and requests for UNESCO’s international assistance program Abstract: Recently, the world has witnessed increased participation from nondemocratic countries in international cultural institutions, such as UNESCO’s International Assistance (IA) program. This study poses the question of why several authoritarian countries request IA programs more frequently than others do. In addition to economic and international factors, we argue that differences in domestic institutions within autocracies influence the decision-making of such states in requesting IA programs because these programs can be a useful tool for several incumbent regimes to generate public support or maintain their status. We implement negative binomial regressions for 131 authoritarian countries between 1979 and 2014 and demonstrate that politically competitive regimes are more likely to request IA programs than non-competitive ones. The findings suggest that authoritarian regimes with competitive political institutions are likely to utilize the programs of cultural international regimes.Recientemente, el mundo ha observado una mayor participación de países no democráticos en instituciones culturales internacionales, tales como el programa de Asistencia Internacional (International Assistance, IA) de la UNESCO. Este estudio plantea la pregunta de por qué numerosos países autoritarios solicitan programas de IA con más frecuencia que otros países. Además de los factores internacionales y económicos, sostenemos que las diferencias en las instituciones nacionales dentro de las autocracias influyen en la toma de decisiones de tales estados al solicitar programas de IA, ya que estos programas pueden ser una herramienta útil para que los regímenes de turno obtengan el apoyo del público o mantengan su posición. Implementamos regresiones binomiales negativas para 131 países autoritarios entre 1979 y 2014, y demostramos que los regímenes políticamente competitivos son más propensos a solicitar programas de IA que los que no lo son. Los resultados sugieren que es probable que los regímenes autoritarios con instituciones políticas competitivas utilicen los programas de regímenes culturales internacionales.Le monde a récemment été témoin d’une participation accrue des pays non démocratiques aux institutions culturelles internationales, notamment au niveau des programmes d’aide internationale de l’UNESCO. Cette étude s’interroge sur les raisons pour lesquelles plusieurs pays autoritaires demandent des programmes d’aide internationale plus fréquemment que d’autres. En plus des facteurs économiques et internationaux, nous soutenons que les différences dans les institutions nationales des autocraties influencent la prise de décision de ces États lorsqu’ils demandent des programmes d’aide internationale, car ces programmes peuvent être un outil utile pour plusieurs régimes en place pour générer un soutien public ou maintenir leur statut. Nous avons appliqué des régressions binomiales négatives pour 131 pays autoritaires entre 1979 et 2014 et nous démontrons que les régimes politiquement concurrents sont davantage susceptibles de demander des programmes d’aide internationale que les régimes non concurrents. Nos conclusions suggèrent que les régimes dont les institutions politiques sont concurrentes sont susceptibles d’avoir recours aux programmes des régimes culturels internationaux. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 423-449 Issue: 3 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2051025 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2051025 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:3:p:423-449 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2049772_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: David Randahl Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Randahl Author-Name: Johan Vegelius Author-X-Name-First: Johan Author-X-Name-Last: Vegelius Title: Predicting escalating and de-escalating violence in Africa using Markov models Abstract: This contribution to the ViEWS prediction competition 2020 proposes using Markov modeling to model the change in the logarithm of battle-related deaths between two points in time in a country. The predictions are made using two ensembles of observed and hidden Markov models, where the covariate sets for the ensembles are drawn from the ViEWS country month constituent models. The weights for the individual models in the ensembles were obtained using a genetic algorithm optimizing the fit on the TADDA-score in a calibration set. The weighted ensembles of visible and hidden Markov models outperform the ViEWS prediction competition benchmark models on the TADDA score in the test period of January 2017 to December 2019 for all time steps. Forecasts until March 2021 predict increased violence primarily in Algeria, Libya, Tchad, Niger, and Angola, and decreased or unchanged levels of violence in most of the remaining countries in Africa. An analysis of the model weights in the ensembles shows that the conflict history constituent model provided by ViEWS was dominant in the ensembles.Esta contribución a la competencia de predicciones 2020 del Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) propone utilizar la modelización de Márkov para elaborar un modelo del cambio en el logaritmo de las muertes relacionadas con batallas entre dos puntos temporales en un país. Las predicciones se elaboran con dos conjuntos de modelos observados y ocultos de Márkov, en los que los grupos de covariables de los conjuntos se obtienen de los modelos constituyentes mensuales de los países del ViEWS. La relevancia de los modelos individuales en los conjuntos se obtuvo mediante un algoritmo genético que optimiza el ajuste de la puntuación TADDA en un grupo de calibración. Los conjuntos ponderados de los modelos visibles y ocultos de Márkov superan los modelos de referencia de la competencia de predicciones del ViEWS en relación con la puntuación TADDA (Distancia absoluta orientada con aumento de dirección) en el período de prueba de enero de 2017 a diciembre de 2019 para todos los intervalos de tiempo. Las predicciones hasta marzo de 2021 pronostican un aumento en la violencia principalmente en Argelia, Libia, Chad, Níger y Angola, y niveles de violencia disminuidos o sin variaciones en la mayoría de los países restantes en África. Un análisis de la relevancia de los modelos en los conjuntos demuestra que los modelos constituyentes de la historia de conflictos que proporciona el ViEWS fueron dominantes en dichos conjuntos.Cette contribution au concours de prévision ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) 2020 propose d’utiliser la modélisation de Markov pour modéliser l’évolution du logarithme des décès liés aux conflits entre deux moments de l’histoire d’un pays. Les prédictions sont effectuées à l’aide de deux ensembles de modèles de Markov cachés et de modèles de Markov observés, et les jeux de covariables de ces ensembles sont tirés des modèles constituants par mois et pays du système ViEWS. Les pondérations des modèles individuels des ensembles ont été obtenues en utilisant un algorithme génétique optimisant l’ajustement sur le score TADDA (Distance absolue ciblée avec augmentation de direction) dans un jeu de calibration. Les ensembles pondérés de modèles de Markov visibles et cachés sont plus performants que les modèles de référence du concours de prédiction ViEWS pour ce qui est du score TADDA de la période de test de janvier 2017 à décembre 2019, et ce pour tous les pas de temps. Les prévisions jusqu’à mars 2021 ont permis de prédire une augmentation de la violence principalement en Algérie, en Libye, au Tchad, au Niger et en Angola, et une diminution ou un maintien des niveaux de violence dans la plupart des autres pays d’Afrique. Une analyse des pondérations des modèles dans les ensembles montre que le modèle constituant basé sur l’histoire des conflits fourni par ViEWS serait dominant dans les ensembles. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 597-613 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2049772 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2049772 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:597-613 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2021198_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Jonas Vestby Author-X-Name-First: Jonas Author-X-Name-Last: Vestby Author-Name: Jürgen Brandsch Author-X-Name-First: Jürgen Author-X-Name-Last: Brandsch Author-Name: Vilde Bergstad Larsen Author-X-Name-First: Vilde Bergstad Author-X-Name-Last: Larsen Author-Name: Peder Landsverk Author-X-Name-First: Peder Author-X-Name-Last: Landsverk Author-Name: Andreas Forø Tollefsen Author-X-Name-First: Andreas Forø Author-X-Name-Last: Tollefsen Title: Predicting (de-)escalation of sub-national violence using gradient boosting: Does it work? Abstract: This article presents a prediction model of (de-)escalation of sub-national violence using gradient boosting. The prediction model builds on updated data from the PRIO-GRID data aggregator, contributing to the ViEWS prediction competition by predicting changes in violence levels, operationalized using monthly fatalities at the 0.5 × 0.5-degree grid (pgm) level. Our model's predictive performance in terms of mean square error (MSE) is marginally worse than the ViEWS baseline model and inferior to most other submissions, including our own supervised random forest model. However, while we knew that the model was comparatively worse than our random forest model in terms of MSE, we propose the gradient boosting model because it performed better where it matters—in predicting when (de-)escalation happens. This choice means that we question the usefulness of using MSE for evaluating model performance and instead propose alternative performance measurements that are needed to understand the usefulness of predictive models. We argue that future endeavors using this outcome should measure their performance using the Concordance Correlation, which takes both the trueness and the precision elements of accuracy into account, and, unlike MSE, seems to be robust to the issues caused by zero inflation.Este artículo presenta un modelo de predicción de la desescalada de la violencia subnacional mediante el uso de la potenciación del gradiente. El modelo de predicción se basa en los datos actualizados que provienen del agregador de datos de PRIO-GRID, contribuye al concurso de predicciones de ViEWS al predecir cambios en los niveles de violencia y es operacionalizado utilizando las muertes mensuales a nivel de cuadrícula de 0.5 × 0.5 grados (pgm). El rendimiento predictivo de nuestro modelo desde el punto de vista del error cuadrático medio (mean square error, MSE) es ligeramente peor que el modelo de referencia del sistema de alerta temprana sobre la violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) e inferior en relación con la mayoría de las otras presentaciones, incluido nuestro modelo de bosque aleatorio y supervisado. No obstante, si bien sabíamos que el modelo era comparativamente peor que nuestro modelo de bosque aleatorio en relación con el MSE, proponemos el modelo de potenciación del gradiente porque funcionó mejor en el aspecto que importa: predecir cuándo ocurre la desescalada. Esta elección significa que cuestionamos la utilidad del uso del MSE para evaluar el rendimiento del modelo y, en cambio, proponemos mediciones de rendimiento alternativas que son necesarias para comprender la utilidad de los modelos predictivos. Sostenemos que, en los futuros proyectos en los que se utilice este resultado, se debería medir el rendimiento mediante la correlación de concordancia, la cual tiene en cuenta tanto los elementos de veracidad como los de precisión de la exactitud y, a diferencia del MSE, parece ser resistente a los problemas generados por la inflación cero.Cet article présente un modèle de prédiction de la (dés)escalade de la violence infranationale utilisant un boosting de gradient. Ce modèle de prédiction repose sur des données à jour de l’agrégateur de données de la grille PRIO. Il contribue au concours de prédiction ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) en prédisant les évolutions des niveaux de violence qui sont opérationnalisés sur la base du nombre mensuel de décès au niveau 0.5 × 0.5 degré de la grille (PGM). Les performances prédictives de notre modèle en termes d’erreur quadratique moyenne (EQM) sont légèrement moins bonnes que celles du modèle de référence ViEWS et inférieures à la plupart des autres modèles soumis, y compris à celles de notre propre modèle à forêt aléatoire supervisée. Cependant, bien que nous sachions que ce modèle à boosting de gradient était comparativement moins bon que notre modèle à forêt aléatoire en termes d’EQM, nous l’avons proposé car il était plus efficace dans le domaine qui compte : la prédiction du moment auquel une (dés)escalade interviendrait. Ce choix signifie que nous remettons en question l’utilité de l’utilisation de l’EQM pour évaluer les performances des modèles et nous proposons au lieu de cela des mesures de performances alternatives nécessaires pour comprendre l’utilité des modèles prédictifs. Nous soutenons que les futurs efforts utilisant ce résultat devraient plutôt mesurer leurs performances à l’aide de la Corrélation de concordance, qui prend à la fois en compte les éléments Exactitude et Précision et qui, contrairement à l’EQM, semble être robuste face aux problèmes causés par l’inflation zéro. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 841-859 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2021198 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2021198 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:841-859 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2009821_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Thomas Chadefaux Author-X-Name-First: Thomas Author-X-Name-Last: Chadefaux Title: A shape-based approach to conflict forecasting Abstract: Do conflict processes exhibit repeating patterns over time? And if so, can we exploit the recurring shapes and structures of the time series to forecast the evolution of conflict? Theory has long focused on the sequence of events that precedes conflicts (e.g., escalation or brinkmanship). Yet, current empirical research is unable to represent these complex interactions unfolding over time because it attempts to match cases on the raw value of covariates, and not on their structure or shape. As a result, it cannot easily represent real-world relations which may, for example, follow a long alternation of escalation and détente, in various orders and at various speeds. Here, I aim to address these issues using recent machine-learning methods derived from pattern recognition in time series to study the dynamics of casualties in civil war processes. I find that the methods perform well on out-of-sample forecasts of the count of the number of fatalities per month from state-based conflict. In particular, our results yield Mean Squared Errors that are lower than the competition benchmark. We discuss the implication for conflict research and the importance of comparing entire sequences rather than isolated observations in time.¿Los procesos de conflicto muestran patrones que se repiten con el paso del tiempo? Y si es así, ¿podemos aprovechar las formas y estructuras recurrentes de las series temporales para prever la evolución del conflicto? Durante mucho tiempo, la teoría se ha centrado en la secuencia de acontecimientos que preceden a los conflictos (por ejemplo, la escalada o la política suicida). Sin embargo, la investigación empírica actual es incapaz de representar estas complejas interacciones que surgen a lo largo del tiempo porque trata de comparar los casos en función del valor bruto de las covariables, y no de su estructura o forma. Por consiguiente, no puede representar fácilmente las relaciones del mundo real que, por ejemplo, pueden seguir una larga alternancia de escalada y distensión, en varios órdenes y a distintas velocidades. En este artículo, mi objetivo es abordar estas cuestiones utilizando métodos recientes de aprendizaje automático derivados del reconocimiento de patrones en series temporales para estudiar la dinámica de las bajas en los procesos de guerra civil. Me parece que los métodos funcionan bien en las previsiones fuera de muestra y, en particular, arrojan Errores Cuadráticos Medios inferiores a la referencia de la competencia. Se analizan las implicaciones para la investigación de conflictos y la importancia de comparar secuencias completas en lugar de observaciones aisladas en el tiempo.Les processus de conflit présentent-ils des schémas qui se répètent au fil du temps ? Et si tel est le cas, pouvons-nous exploiter ces formes et structures récurrentes de la chronologie pour prédire l’évolution du conflit ? La théorie s’est longtemps concentrée sur la séquence d’événements qui précède les conflits (p. ex. escalade ou stratégie du bord de l’abîme). Pourtant, les recherches empiriques actuelles ne sont pas en mesure de représenter ces interactions complexes qui se déroulent au fil du temps car elles tentent d’apparier des cas sur la base de la valeur brute de leurs covariables, et non sur celle de leur structure ou de leur forme. Elles ne parviennent par conséquent pas à représenter facilement les relations du monde réel qui peuvent, par exemple, suivre une longue alternance entre escalade et détente, dans divers ordres et à diverses vitesses. Mon objectif est ici d’aborder ces problèmes en utilisant de récentes méthodes de machine learning dérivées de la reconnaissance des schémas des chronologies pour étudier les dynamiques des pertes lors des processus de guerre civile. Je constate que ces méthodes sont performantes pour les prévisions hors échantillon, et en particulier qu’elles produisent des erreurs quadratiques moyennes inférieures par comparaison à leurs méthodes concurrentes. Nous abordons l’implication pour les recherches sur les conflits et l’importance de comparer l’intégralité des séquences plutôt que des observations isolées dans le temps. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 633-648 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2009821 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2009821 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:633-648 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2090934_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Fulvio Attinà Author-X-Name-First: Fulvio Author-X-Name-Last: Attinà Author-Name: Marcello Carammia Author-X-Name-First: Marcello Author-X-Name-Last: Carammia Author-Name: Stefano M. Iacus Author-X-Name-First: Stefano M. Author-X-Name-Last: Iacus Title: Forecasting change in conflict fatalities with dynamic elastic net Abstract: This article illustrates an approach to forecasting change in conflict fatalities designed to address the complexity of the drivers and processes of armed conflicts. The design of this approach is based on two main choices. First, to account for the specificity of conflict drivers and processes over time and space, we model conflicts in each individual country separately. Second, we draw on an adaptive model—Dynamic Elastic Net, DynENet—which is able to efficiently select relevant predictors among a large set of covariates. We include over 700 variables in our models, adding event data on top of the data features provided by the convenors of the forecasting competition. We show that our approach is suitable and computationally efficient enough to address the complexity of conflict dynamics. Moreover, the adaptive nature of our model brings a significant added value. Because for each country our model only selects the variables that are relevant to predict conflict intensity, the retained predictors can be analyzed to describe the dynamic configuration of conflict drivers both across countries and within countries over time. Countries can then be clustered to observe the emergence of broader patterns related to correlates of conflict. In this sense, our approach produces interpretable forecasts, addressing one key limitation of contemporary approaches to forecasting. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 649-677 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2090934 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2090934 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:649-677 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2017290_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Vito D’Orazio Author-X-Name-First: Vito Author-X-Name-Last: D’Orazio Author-Name: Yu Lin Author-X-Name-First: Yu Author-X-Name-Last: Lin Title: Forecasting conflict in Africa with automated machine learning systems Abstract: The ViEWS problem is to forecast changes in the level of state-based violence for each of the next six months at the PRIO-GRID and country level. For this competition and toward the goal of improving sub-national and country level forecasts, we experiment with combinations of automated machine learning (autoML) systems and limited datasets that emphasize the endogenous nature of conflict. Two core findings emerge: autoML improves predictive performance and the Dynamics model performs best. The data used for the Dynamics model is limited to measures of state-based violence built from the event-level violence data plus those describing the spatial and temporal structure of the data. The intent is to capture spatial and temporal conflict dynamics while not overfitting to exogenous factors, which is especially problematic with flexible autoML algorithms and the types of highly disaggregate data used here. At the PGM level, this model won the ViEWS competition for “predictive accuracy” and split the win for “originality.” Beyond the ViEWS competition, we expect conflict forecasting models that couple advanced autoML systems with variables that reflect a diverse set of conflict dynamics to have high predictive performance, especially at sub-national and sub-annual aggregations.El problema del ViEWS es que predice los cambios en el nivel de violencia estatal de cada uno de los próximos seis meses a nivel de PRIO-GRID y de país. En el marco de esta competencia y con el objetivo de mejorar las predicciones a nivel regional y nacional, probamos combinaciones de sistemas de aprendizaje automático (autoML) y conjuntos de datos limitados que ponen de relieve la naturaleza endógena de los conflictos. Hay dos resultados principales: el autoML mejora el rendimiento predictivo y el modelo Dynamics es el que mejor funciona. Los datos utilizados para el modelo Dynamics se limitan a las medidas de la violencia a nivel estatal establecidas a partir de los datos de la violencia sobre eventos más los que describen la estructura espacial y temporal de los datos. La intención es captar la dinámica espacial y temporal de los conflictos sin caer en el exceso de ajuste de los factores exógenos, lo que supone un problema, sobre todo con los algoritmos autoML flexibles y los tipos de datos altamente desagregados que se utilizan aquí. A nivel de PGM, este modelo ganó la competencia del ViEWS tanto por su “precisión predictiva” como por su “originalidad”. Más allá de la competencia del ViEWS, esperamos que los modelos de previsión de conflictos que combinan sistemas avanzados de autoML con variables que reflejan un conjunto diverso de dinámicas de conflicto tengan un alto resultado predictivo, sobre todo en agregados regionales y semestrales.La problématique du ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) est de prévoir les évolutions du niveau de violence étatique pour chacun des six prochains mois au niveau de la grille PRIO et au niveau national. Pour ce concours et dans l’objectif d’améliorer les prévisions au niveau infranational et au niveau national, nous avons expérimenté des combinaisons de systèmes de machine learning automatisés (autoML) et de jeux de données limités mettant l’accent sur la nature endogène des conflits. Deux résultats fondamentaux sont apparus : l’autoML améliore les performances prédictives et le modèle Dynamiques est le plus efficace. Les données utilisées pour le modèle Dynamiques sont limitées aux mesures de la violence étatique établies à partir des données sur la violence au niveau des événements ainsi que de celles qui décrivent la structure spatiale et temporelle des données. L’objectif est de capturer les dynamiques spatiales et temporelles des conflits tout en évitant un ajustement excessif aux facteurs exogènes, ce qui est particulièrement problématique avec les algorithmes d’autoML flexibles et les types de données très désagrégées qui sont utilisés ici. Au niveau PGM, ce modèle a remporté le concours ViEWS à la fois dans les catégories « Précision prédictive » et « Originalité ». Au-delà du concours ViEWS, nous nous attendons à ce que les modèles de prévision des conflits qui allient des systèmes avancés d’autoML à des variables reflétant un ensemble diversifié de dynamiques de conflits aient de hautes performances prédictives, en particulier aux niveaux d’agrégation infranationaux et infra-annuels. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 714-738 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2017290 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2017290 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:714-738 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2094921_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Andreas Lindholm Author-X-Name-First: Andreas Author-X-Name-Last: Lindholm Author-Name: Johannes Hendriks Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Hendriks Author-Name: Adrian Wills Author-X-Name-First: Adrian Author-X-Name-Last: Wills Author-Name: Thomas B. Schön Author-X-Name-First: Thomas B. Author-X-Name-Last: Schön Title: Predicting political violence using a state-space model Abstract: We provide a proof-of-concept for a novel state-space modelling approach for predicting monthly deaths due to political violence. Attention is focused on developing the method and demonstrating the utility of this approach, which provides exciting opportunities to engage with domain experts in developing new and improved state-space models for predicting violence. The prediction is made on a grid of cells with spatial resolution of 0.5 × 0.5 degrees, and each cell is modeled to have two mathematically well-defined unobserved/latent/hidden states that evolves over time and encode the “onset risk” and “potential severity”, respectively. This offers a certain level of interpretability of the model. By using the model for computing the probability distribution for a death count at a future time conditioned on all data observed up until the current time, a predictive distribution is obtained. The predictive distribution typically places a certain mass at the death count 0 (no violent outbreak) and the remaining mass indicating a likely interval of the fatality count, should a violent outbreak appear. To evaluate the model performance we—lacking a better alternative—report the mean of the predictive distribution, but the access to the predictive distribution is in itself an interesting contribution to the application. This work merely serves as a proof-of-concept for the state-space modeling approach for this type of data and several possible directions for further work that could improve the predictive performance are suggested. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 759-777 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2094921 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2094921 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:759-777 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_1993210_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Cornelius Fritz Author-X-Name-First: Cornelius Author-X-Name-Last: Fritz Author-Name: Marius Mehrl Author-X-Name-First: Marius Author-X-Name-Last: Mehrl Author-Name: Paul W. Thurner Author-X-Name-First: Paul W. Author-X-Name-Last: Thurner Author-Name: Göran Kauermann Author-X-Name-First: Göran Author-X-Name-Last: Kauermann Title: The role of governmental weapons procurements in forecasting monthly fatalities in intrastate conflicts: A semiparametric hierarchical hurdle model Abstract: Accurate and interpretable forecasting models predicting spatially and temporally fine-grained changes in the numbers of intrastate conflict casualties are of crucial importance for policymakers and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Using a count data approach, we propose a hierarchical hurdle regression model to address the corresponding prediction challenge at the monthly PRIO-grid level. More precisely, we model the intensity of local armed conflict at a specific point in time as a three-stage process. Stages one and two of our approach estimate whether we will observe any casualties at the country- and grid-cell-level, respectively, while stage three applies a regression model for truncated data to predict the number of such fatalities conditional upon the previous two stages. Within this modeling framework, we focus on the role of governmental arms imports as a processual factor allowing governments to intensify or deter from fighting. We further argue that a grid cell’s geographic remoteness is bound to moderate the effects of these military buildups. Out-of-sample predictions corroborate the effectiveness of our parsimonious and theory-driven model, which enables full transparency combined with accuracy in the forecasting process.Los modelos de previsión precisos e interpretables que predicen los cambios a nivel espacial y temporal en la cantidad de víctimas de los conflictos intraestatales son de vital importancia para los responsables políticos y las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) internacionales. Utilizando un enfoque de datos de recuento, proponemos un modelo de regresión Hurdle jerárquico para abordar el correspondiente reto de predicción a nivel mensual de PRIO-GRID. Más concretamente, modelamos la intensidad del conflicto armado local en un momento determinado como un proceso de tres etapas. Las etapas uno y dos de nuestro enfoque estiman si observaremos alguna víctima a nivel de país y de celda de la red, respectivamente, mientras que la etapa tres aplica un modelo de regresión para datos truncados con el propósito de predecir la cantidad potencial de dichas víctimas mortales en función de las dos etapas anteriores. Dentro de este marco de modelización, nos centramos en el rol de las importaciones de armas por parte de los gobiernos como un factor de proceso que permite a los gobiernos intensificar o impedir los enfrentamientos. Además, sostenemos que la lejanía geográfica de una célula de la red está destinada a moderar los efectos de estas concentraciones militares. Las predicciones fuera de la muestra corroboran la eficacia de nuestro modelo parsimonioso y basado en la teoría, que permite una transparencia total combinada con precisión en el proceso de previsión.Les modèles de prévision précis et interprétables, qui permettent de prédire spatialement et temporellement les détails des changements dans les nombres de victimes de conflits intra-étatiques, sont d’une importance cruciale pour les décideurs politiques et les organizations non gouvernementales (ONG) internationales. Nous adoptons une approche par données de comptage et nous proposons un modèle de régression hiérarchique à obstacle (hurdle) pour relever le défi de la prédiction correspondante au niveau de la grille mensuelle du PRIO (Peace research institute Oslo, Institut de recherche sur la paix d’Oslo). Plus précisément, nous modélisons l’intensité des conflits armés locaux à un moment spécifique sous la forme d’un processus en trois étapes. Les étapes un et deux de notre approche consistent à estimer si nous observerons des pertes respectivement au niveau du pays et de la cellule de grille, tandis que l’étape trois consiste à appliquer un modèle de régression pour les données tronquées afin de prédire le nombre de ces pertes en fonction des deux étapes précédentes. Dans ce cadre de modélisation, nous nous concentrons sur le rôle des importations d’armes gouvernementales en tant que facteur processuel permettant aux gouvernements d’intensifier ou de dissuader les combats. Nous soutenons également que l’isolement géographique d’une cellule de la grille est susceptible de modérer les effets de ces renforcements militaires. Des prédictions hors échantillon corroborent l’efficacité de notre modèle parcimonieux fondé sur la théorie qui permet une totale transparence associée à une précision du processus de prévision. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 778-799 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.1993210 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.1993210 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:778-799 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_1993209_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Felix Ettensperger Author-X-Name-First: Felix Author-X-Name-Last: Ettensperger Title: Forecasting conflict using a diverse machine-learning ensemble: Ensemble averaging with multiple tree-based algorithms and variance promoting data configurations Abstract: The article examines the potential of multi-model ensemble learning techniques for conflict research and applies an ensemble averaging framework to the prediction task of the 2020 ViEWS armed conflict forecasting competition. The goal is to predict changes of conflict intensity in fifty-four African countries for 6 months into the future. The presented ensemble combines six individual models, using two tree-based learning algorithms, incorporating two distinct data foundations and two geographical selections into a unified forecasting framework. In one of the two applied datasets, the combination of conflict variables from recent months is implemented to train for inter-temporal connections of previous conflict levels. The second dataset contains important structural, economic, political, and social information relevant for each individual case. Both datasets are used to predict changes in conflict levels. The framework structure and the combination method are presented in detail, and the prediction results for both test periods between 2014–2016 and 2016–2019 are evaluated regarding their quality. The effect of the ensemble structure and the performance of all individual components is comprehensively examined. Real forecasts over the timespan of six months into the future are presented for the upcoming months of October 2020 through March 2021 generated from data available until August 2020. The paper concludes with the presentation and examination of three selected case forecasts for Egypt, Cameroon, and Mozambique.El artículo examina el potencial de las técnicas de aprendizaje de conjuntos multimodelos para la investigación de conflictos y aplica un marco de promedio de conjuntos a la tarea de predicción del concurso de previsión de conflictos armados; ViEWS 2020. La meta es predecir los cambios en la intensidad de los conflictos en cincuenta y cuatro países africanos durante seis meses en el futuro. El conjunto presentado combina seis modelos individuales, que utilizan dos algoritmos de aprendizaje basados en árboles, y que incorporan dos bases de datos distintas y dos selecciones geográficas en un marco de previsión unificado. En uno de los dos conjuntos de datos aplicados, se implementa la combinación de variables de conflicto de los últimos meses para estudiar las conexiones intertemporales de los niveles de conflicto anteriores. El segundo conjunto de datos contiene información estructural, económica, política y social importante para cada caso individual. Ambos conjuntos de datos se utilizan para predecir los cambios en los niveles de conflicto. La estructura del marco y el método de combinación se presentan en detalle, y se evalúa la calidad de los resultados de la predicción para ambos períodos de prueba entre 2014-2016 y 2016-2019. Se analiza a fondo el efecto de la estructura del conjunto y el funcionamiento de todos los componentes individuales. Se presentan previsiones reales a seis meses, para los próximos meses de octubre de 2020 a marzo de 2021, generados a partir de los datos disponibles hasta agosto de 2020. El artículo concluye con la presentación y el análisis de tres previsiones de casos seleccionados de Egipto, Camerún y Mozambique.Cet article examine le potentiel des techniques d’apprentissage ensembliste multi-modèles pour les recherches sur les conflits et applique un cadre de moyennage ensembliste à la tâche de prédiction du concours de prévision des conflits armés ViEWS (violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) 2020. L’objectif est de prédire les changements d’intensité des conflits dans cinquante-quatre pays africains sur les six mois à venir. L’ensemble présenté combine six modèles individuels en utilisant deux algorithmes d’apprentissage basés sur des arbres et en intégrant deux fondations de données distinctes et deux sélections géographiques à une infrastructure de prévision unifiée. Dans l’un des deux jeux de données appliqués, la combinaison des variables de conflit des derniers mois est implémentée pour entraîner les algorithmes sur les relations inter-temporelles des intensités de conflits précédentes. Le deuxième jeu de données contient d’importantes informations structurelles, économiques, politiques et sociales concernant chacun des cas individuels. Les deux jeux de données sont utilisés pour prédire les changements d’intensité des conflits. La structure de l’infrastructure et la méthode de combinaison sont présentées en détails et la qualité des résultats des prédictions est évaluée pour les deux périodes de test, 2014-2016 et 2016-2019. L’effet de la structure ensembliste et les performances de toutes les composantes individuelles sont examinés en profondeur. Les prévisions réelles sur une période de six mois sont présentées pour les mois à venir qui étaient octobre 2020 à mars 2021. Ces prévisions avaient été générées à partir des données disponibles jusqu’août 2020. L’article conclut par une présentation et un examen d’une sélection de prévisions pour trois cas, ceux de l’Égypte, du Cameroun et du Mozambique.Video AbstractRead the transcriptWatch the video on Vimeo Journal: International Interactions Pages: 555-578 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.1993209 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.1993209 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:555-578 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2063853_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Hannes Mueller Author-X-Name-First: Hannes Author-X-Name-Last: Mueller Author-Name: Christopher Rauh Author-X-Name-First: Christopher Author-X-Name-Last: Rauh Title: Using past violence and current news to predict changes in violence Abstract: This article proposes a new method for predicting escalations and de-escalations of violence using a model which relies on conflict history and text features. The text features are generated from over 3.5 million newspaper articles using a so-called topic-model. We show that the combined model relies to a large extent on conflict dynamics, but that text is able to contribute meaningfully to the prediction of rare outbreaks of violence in previously peaceful countries. Given the very powerful dynamics of the conflict trap these cases are particularly important for prevention efforts.Este artículo propone un nuevo método para la predicción de escaladas y desescaladas de violencia a través de la aplicación de un modelo basado en los antecedentes del conflicto y las características propias del texto. Las características del texto se generan a partir de más de 3,5 millones de artículos de periódicos mediante el uso de lo que se denomina “modelo de tópicos”. Demostramos que, si bien este modelo combinado hace referencia a una extensa dinámica del conflicto, el texto es una contribución relevante que permite predecir los estallidos de violencia inesperados en países que antes eran pacíficos. Dada la dinámica de gran intensidad característica de la trampa del conflicto, estos casos son de especial importancia en lo que se refiere a las iniciativas de prevención.Dans cet article, nous proposons une nouvelle méthode destinée à anticiper les escalades et désescalades de violence grâce à un modèle reposant sur les antécédents conflictuels et sur des caractéristiques textuelles. Ces caractéristiques sont extraites à partir de plus de 3,5 millions d’articles de presse à l’aide d’un modèle thématique (topic model). Nous montrons que si ce modèle mixte s’appuie largement sur les dynamiques conflictuelles, les données textuelles peuvent être très utiles en vue d’anticiper les rares explosions de violence dans les pays habituellement pacifiques. Étant donné la puissante dynamique qui sous-tend les conflits récurrents, les exemples exposés revêtent une importance particulière dans une optique de prévention. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 579-596 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2063853 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2063853 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:579-596 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2016736_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Iris Malone Author-X-Name-First: Iris Author-X-Name-Last: Malone Title: Recurrent neural networks for conflict forecasting Abstract: Can history predict the escalation of future violence? This research note evaluates the use of a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for the Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition. Existing research on civil conflict shows violence is a persistent and recurring process, often shaping the direction of future conflicts. Building on this insight, I build a RNN model to examine how well historical patterns in conflict predict long-term escalation trends. A RNN is a simple, but powerful machine learning tool for time series forecasting due to its capacity to learn long sequences of information. I show that an RNN model can produce relatively accurate forecasts due to systematic patterns in conflict processes, consistent with existing research on “conflict traps.” The results provide important lessons for conflict forecasting and ground opportunities for using RNN models in future political science research.¿La historia puede predecir el aumento de la violencia en el futuro? Esta nota de investigación evalúa el uso de una red neuronal recurrente (Recurrent Neural Network, RNN) para la competencia de predicciones del Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS). Las investigaciones existentes sobre los conflictos civiles demuestran que la violencia es un proceso persistente y recurrente que, a menudo, da forma a la dirección de futuros conflictos. Con base en esta percepción, elaboro un modelo de RNN para examinar la eficacia de los patrones históricos de los conflictos al momento de predecir tendencias a largo plazo. La RNN es una herramienta de aprendizaje automático sencilla, pero poderosa, para la predicción de series temporales debido a su capacidad para aprender secuencias extensas de información. Los resultados demuestran que el modelo genera pronósticos relativamente precisos en los Estados débiles y fallidos, lo cual coincide con las investigaciones existentes sobre las “trampas de conflictos.” No obstante, el modelo presenta dificultades para predecir nuevos conflictos civiles; esto es coincidente con las teorías informativas sobre el inicio de conflictos. Los resultados brindan lecciones importantes para la predicción de conflictos y demuestran oportunidades para las aplicaciones de RNN en futuras investigaciones sobre ciencias políticas.L’histoire peut-elle permettre de prédire l’escalade future de la violence ? Cet exposé de recherche évalue l’utilization d’un Réseau de neurones récurrents pour le concours de prédiction ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence). Des recherches existantes sur les conflits civils montrent que la violence est un processus persistant et récurrent qui façonne souvent l’orientation des conflits futurs. Je me suis appuyé sur cette idée pour développer un modèle de réseau de neurones récurrents dans l’objectif d’examiner à quel point les schémas historiques des conflits pouvaient permettre de prédire des tendances à long terme. Un réseau de neurones récurrents est un outil de machine learning simple mais puissant pour la prévision de séries chronologiques du fait de sa capacité à apprendre de longues séquences d’informations. Les résultats montrent que ce modèle produit des prévisions relativement précises pour les États faibles et défaillants qui sont cohérentes avec les recherches existantes sur les « pièges des conflits ». Il est difficile de prédire les nouveaux conflits civils avec ce modèle, ce qui est cohérent avec les théories informationnelles sur le déclenchement des conflits. Ces résultats permettent de tirer d’importants enseignements pour la prévision des conflits et démontrent des opportunités d’applications des réseaux de neurones récurrents dans les futures recherches en sciences politiques. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 614-632 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2016736 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2016736 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:614-632 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2031182_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Benjamin J. Radford Author-X-Name-First: Benjamin J. Author-X-Name-Last: Radford Title: High resolution conflict forecasting with spatial convolutions and long short-term memory Abstract: The 2020 Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition challenged participants to produce predictive models of violent political conflict at high spatial and temporal resolutions. This paper presents a convolutional long short-term memory (ConvLSTM) recurrent neural network capable of forecasting the log change in battle-related deaths resulting from state-based armed conflict at the PRIO-GRID cell-month level. The ConvLSTM outperforms the benchmark model provided by the ViEWS team and performs comparably to the best models submitted to the competition. In addition to providing a technical description of the ConvLSTM, I evaluate the model’s out-of-sample performance and interrogate a selection of interesting model forecasts. I find that the model relies heavily on lagged levels of battle-related fatalities to forecast future decreases in violence. The model struggles to forecast escalations in violence and tends to underpredict the magnitude of escalation while overpredicting the spatial spread of escalation.El concurso de predicciones del sistema de alerta temprana sobre la violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) de 2020 desafió a los participantes a producir modelos predictivos de conflictos políticos violentos a altas resoluciones espaciales y temporales. Este documento presenta una red neuronal recurrente de memoria convolucional a corto y largo plazo (convolutional long short-term memory, ConvLSTM) capaz de predecir el cambio de registro en las muertes relacionadas con las batallas como resultado de los conflictos armados de estado a nivel de mes de celda de PRIO-GRID. La ConvLSTM supera el modelo de referencia proporcionado por el equipo de ViEWS y funciona de manera similar a los mejores modelos presentados en el concurso. Además de proporcionar una descripción técnica de la ConvLSTM, analizo el rendimiento del modelo fuera de la muestra y cuestiono una serie de interesantes previsiones del modelo. Considero que el modelo se basa, principalmente, en niveles rezagados de víctimas mortales a causa de las batallas para predecir las futuras disminuciones de la violencia. El modelo se esfuerza por predecir las escaladas de la violencia y tiende a predecir con poca frecuencia la magnitud de la escalada, pero con más frecuencia la propagación espacial de esta.Le concours 2020 du système d’alerte précoce sur la violence (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) a mis les participants au défi de produire des modèles prédictifs des conflits politiques violents à hautes résolutions temporelles et spatiales. Cet article présente un réseau de neurones récurrents à mémoire convolutive à long terme à court terme (ConvLSTM) capable de prévoir l’évolution logarithmique des décès liés aux combats résultant de conflits armés étatiques au niveau Cellule par mois de la grille PRIO. La ConvLSTM surpasse le modèle de référence fourni par l’équipe ViEWS et offre des performances comparables à celles des meilleurs modèles soumis pour le concours. En plus de fournir une description technique de la ConvLSTM, j’évalue les performances hors échantillon du modèle et j’interroge une sélection de prévisions intéressantes du modèle. J’ai constaté que le modèle dépendait fortement des niveaux décalés des décès liés aux combats pour prévoir les futures diminutions de la violence. Le modèle peine à prévoir les escalades de la violence et tend à sous-estimer la magnitude de l’escalade tout en surestimant sa propagation spatiale. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 739-758 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2031182 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2031182 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:739-758 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2036987_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Patrick T. Brandt Author-X-Name-First: Patrick T. Author-X-Name-Last: Brandt Author-Name: Vito D’Orazio Author-X-Name-First: Vito Author-X-Name-Last: D’Orazio Author-Name: Latifur Khan Author-X-Name-First: Latifur Author-X-Name-Last: Khan Author-Name: Yi-Fan Li Author-X-Name-First: Yi-Fan Author-X-Name-Last: Li Author-Name: Javier Osorio Author-X-Name-First: Javier Author-X-Name-Last: Osorio Author-Name: Marcus Sianan Author-X-Name-First: Marcus Author-X-Name-Last: Sianan Title: Conflict forecasting with event data and spatio-temporal graph convolutional networks Abstract: This paper explores three different model components to improve predictive performance over the ViEWS benchmark: a class of neural networks that account for spatial and temporal dependencies; the use of CAMEO-coded event data; and the continuous rank probability score (CRPS), which is a proper scoring metric. We forecast changes in state based violence across Africa at the grid-month level. The results show that spatio-temporal graph convolutional neural network models offer consistent improvements over the benchmark. The CAMEO-coded event data sometimes improve performance, but sometimes decrease performance. Finally, the choice of performance metric, whether it be the mean squared error or a proper metric such as the CRPS, has an impact on model selection. Each of these components–algorithms, measures, and metrics–can improve our forecasts and understanding of violence.En este artículo se exploran tres componentes diferentes del modelo para mejorar el rendimiento predictivo con respecto a la referencia ViEWS: una clase de redes neuronales que tienen en cuenta las dependencias espaciales y temporales, el uso de datos de eventos codificados por CAMEO, y la puntuación de probabilidad de rango continuo (CRPS), que es una métrica de puntuación adecuada. Predecimos los cambios en la violencia estatal en toda África a nivel mensual. Los resultados muestran que los modelos de redes neuronales convolucionales de gráficos espacio-temporales ofrecen mejoras consistentes sobre el punto de referencia. Los datos de eventos codificados por CAMEO a veces mejoran el rendimiento, pero otras veces lo empeoran. Por último, la elección de la métrica de rendimiento, ya sea el error cuadrático medio o una métrica propia como la CRPS, influye en la selección del modelo. Cada uno de estos componentes (algoritmos, medidas y métricas) puede mejorar nuestras previsiones y nuestra comprensión de la violencia.Cet article explore trois composantes de modèles différentes pour améliorer les performances prédictives par rapport à la référence de ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) : une classe de réseaux de neurones qui prennent en compte les dépendances spatiales et temporelles ; l’utilisation de données d’événements codées par CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Events Observations, Observation des événements de médiation et de conflit) ; et le CRPS (Continuous Rank Probability Score, Score de probabilité de catégories ordonnées de variables continues), qui est une métrique de score propre. Nous effectuons des prédictions des évolutions de la violence étatique en Afrique au niveau grille/mois. Les résultats montrent que les modèles à réseaux convolutifs de neurones graphiques spatiotemporels offrent des améliorations constantes par rapport à la référence. Les données d’événements codées par CAMEO améliorent parfois les performances mais peuvent aussi parfois les réduire. Enfin, le choix de la métrique de performances, qu’il s’agisse de l’erreur quadratique moyenne ou d’une métrique de score propre telle que le CRPS, a un impact sur la sélection du modèle. Chacune de ces composantes - algorithmes, mesures et métriques - peut améliorer nos prévisions et notre compréhension de la violence. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 800-822 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2036987 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2036987 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:800-822 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2029856_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Paola Vesco Author-X-Name-First: Paola Author-X-Name-Last: Vesco Author-Name: Håvard Hegre Author-X-Name-First: Håvard Author-X-Name-Last: Hegre Author-Name: Michael Colaresi Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Colaresi Author-Name: Remco Bastiaan Jansen Author-X-Name-First: Remco Bastiaan Author-X-Name-Last: Jansen Author-Name: Adeline Lo Author-X-Name-First: Adeline Author-X-Name-Last: Lo Author-Name: Gregor Reisch Author-X-Name-First: Gregor Author-X-Name-Last: Reisch Author-Name: Nils B. Weidmann Author-X-Name-First: Nils B. Author-X-Name-Last: Weidmann Title: United they stand: Findings from an escalation prediction competition Abstract: This article presents results and lessons learned from a prediction competition organized by ViEWS to improve collective scientific knowledge on forecasting (de-)escalation in Africa. The competition call asked participants to forecast changes in state-based violence for the true future (October 2020–March 2021) as well as for a held-out test partition. An external scoring committee, independent from both the organizers and participants, was formed to evaluate the models based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria, including performance, novelty, uniqueness, and replicability. All models contributed to advance the research frontier by providing novel methodological or theoretical insight, including new data, or adopting innovative model specifications. While we discuss several facets of the competition that could be improved moving forward, the collection passes an important test. When we build a simple ensemble prediction model—which draws on the unique insights of each contribution to differing degrees—we can measure an improvement in the prediction from the group, over and above what the average individual model can achieve. This wisdom of the crowd effect suggests that future competitions that build on both the successes and failures of ours, can contribute to scientific knowledge by incentivizing diverse contributions as well as focusing a group’s attention on a common problem.Este artículo presenta los resultados y las enseñanzas extraídas en el marco de un certamen de predicción organizado por los responsables del proyecto Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Violencia (Violence Early-Warning System, ViEWS) con el propósito de mejorar los conocimientos científicos colectivos sobre la previsión de la (des)escalada en el continente africano. En el certamen se pidió a los participantes que desarrollaran una previsión con respecto a los cambios en la violencia estatal para el futuro real (de octubre de 2020 a marzo de 2021), así como para una muestra de prueba que se mantendría. Se formó un comité de calificación externo, independiente tanto de los organizadores como de los participantes, para evaluar los modelos en función de criterios cualitativos y cuantitativos, como el rendimiento, la novedad, la singularidad y la replicabilidad. Todos los modelos contribuyeron a avanzar en la frontera de la investigación mediante el aporte de nuevos conocimientos metodológicos o teóricos, la inclusión de nuevos datos o la adopción de especificaciones innovadoras del modelo. Aunque se debarió sobre varios aspectos del certamen que podrían mejorarse de cara al futuro, lo que se recopiló pasó una prueba importante. Cuando se construye un simple modelo de predicción de conjunto, que se basa en los conocimientos únicos de cada contribución en diferentes grados, se puede medir una mejora en la predicción del grupo, por encima de lo que el modelo individual promedio puede lograr. Este efecto de la sabiduría de la multitud sugiere que los futuros certámenes que se basen tanto en los éxitos como en los fracasos propios, pueden contribuir al conocimiento científico incentivando diversas contribuciones, así como centrando la atención de un grupo en un problema común.Cet article présente les résultats et les enseignements tirés d’un concours de prédiction organisé par ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) pour améliorer nos connaissances scientifiques collectives en prévision de la (dés)escalade de la violence sur le continent africain. L’appel à concours demandait aux participants de prévoir les évolutions de la violence étatique pour le futur réel (octobre 2020-mars 2021) ainsi que pour une partition test retenue. Un comité de notation externe, indépendant à la fois des organisateurs et des participants, a été constitué pour évaluer les modèles à la fois sur des critères qualitatifs et quantitatifs, notamment sur leurs performances, leur nouveauté, leur unicité et leur reproductibilité. Tous les modèles ont contribué à faire avancer la frontière des recherches en apportant un éclairage méthodologique ou théorique inédit, en incluant de nouvelles données ou en adoptant des caractéristiques de modèle innovantes. Bien que nous abordions plusieurs facettes du concours qui pourraient être améliorées en allant de l’avant, l’ensemble de modèles a réussi un test important. Lorsque nous concevons un modèle de prédiction par ensemble simple - qui s’appuie sur les renseignements uniques de chaque contribution aux différents degrés -, nous pouvons mesurer une amélioration de la prédiction du groupe par rapport à ce que le modèle individuel moyen permet d’obtenir. Cet effet de sagesse de la foule suggère que les futurs concours, qui s’appuieront à la fois sur les réussites et les échecs du nôtre, pourront contribuer aux connaissances scientifiques en encourageant des contributions diverses et en concentrant l’attention d’un groupe sur un problème commun. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 860-896 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2029856 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2029856 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:860-896 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2070745_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Håvard Hegre Author-X-Name-First: Håvard Author-X-Name-Last: Hegre Author-Name: Paola Vesco Author-X-Name-First: Paola Author-X-Name-Last: Vesco Author-Name: Michael Colaresi Author-X-Name-First: Michael Author-X-Name-Last: Colaresi Title: Lessons from an escalation prediction competition Abstract: Recent research on the forecasting of violence has mostly focused on predicting the presence or absence of conflict in a given location, while much less attention has been paid to predicting changes in violence. We organized a prediction competition to forecast changes in state-based violence both for the true future and for a test partition. We received contributions from 15 international teams. The models leverage new insight on the targeted problem, insisting on methodological advances, new data and features, and innovative frameworks which contribute to the research frontiers from various perspectives. This article introduces the competition, presents the main innovations fostered by the teams and discusses ways to further expand and improve upon this wisdom of the crowd. We show that an optimal modeling approach builds on a good number of the presented contributions and new evaluation metrics are needed to capture substantial models’ improvements and reward unique insights.La investigación reciente sobre la previsión de la violencia se ha centrado principalmente en predecir la presencia o ausencia de conflictos en un determinado lugar, mientras que se ha prestado mucha menos atención a predecir los cambios en la violencia. Organizamos una competencia de predicción para predecir los cambios en la violencia estatal tanto para el futuro cierto como para una división del análisis. Recibimos aportes de quince equipos internacionales. Los modelos aprovechan las nuevas ideas sobre el problema específico insistiendo en los avances metodológicos, los nuevos datos y características, así como en los marcos innovadores que contribuyen a las fronteras de la investigación desde diversas perspectivas. Este artículo presenta la competencia y las principales innovaciones que los equipos fomentan, y analiza maneras de expandirse y mejorar aún más a partir de esta sabiduría del público. Mostramos que un enfoque de modelación óptimo se crea a partir de un buen número de aportes presentados y que se necesitan nuevas métricas de evaluación para capturar las mejoras considerables de los modelos y para premiar las ideas únicas.Les recherches récentes sur la prévision de la violence se sont principalement concentrées sur la prédiction de la présence ou de l’absence de conflit dans un lieu donné, alors que beaucoup moins d’attention a été accordée à la prédiction des évolutions de la violence. Nous avons organisé un concours de prédictions dont l’objectif était de prévoir les évolutions de la violence étatique à la fois pour le futur réel et pour une partition test. Nous avons reçu des contributions de 15 équipes internationales. Les modèles concernés tirent profit de nouveaux renseignements sur le problème ciblé en insistant sur les progrès méthodologiques, sur de nouvelles données et caractéristiques et sur des cadres innovants contribuant à élargir les frontières des recherches de divers points de vue. Cet article présente le concours et les principales innovations proposées par les équipes et aborde les moyens d’étendre et d’améliorer cette sagesse de la foule. Nous montrons qu’une approche optimale de la modélisation repose sur bon nombre des contributions présentées et que de nouvelles métriques d’évaluation sont nécessaires pour saisir les améliorations substantielles des modèles et récompenser les idées uniques. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 521-554 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2070745 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2070745 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:521-554 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2061969_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Christian Oswald Author-X-Name-First: Christian Author-X-Name-Last: Oswald Author-Name: Daniel Ohrenhofer Author-X-Name-First: Daniel Author-X-Name-Last: Ohrenhofer Title: Click, click boom: Using Wikipedia data to predict changes in battle-related deaths Abstract: Data and methods development are key to improve our ability to forecast conflict. Relatively recent data sources such as mobile phone and social media data or images have received widespread attention in conflict research. Oftentimes these do not cover substantial parts of the globe or they are difficult to obtain and manipulate, which makes regular updating challenging. The sometimes vast amounts of data can also be computationally and financially costly. The data source we propose instead is cheap, readily and openly available, and updated in real time, and it provides global coverage: Wikipedia. We argue that the number of country page views can be considered a measure of interest or salience, whereas the number of page changes can be considered a measure of controversy between competing political views. We expect these predictors to be particularly successful in capturing tensions before a conflict escalates. We test our argument by predicting changes in battle-related deaths in Africa on the country-month level. We find evidence that country page views do increase predictive performance while page changes do not. Contrary to our expectation, our model seems to capture long-term trends better than sharp short-term changes.El desarrollo de datos y métodos es fundamental para perfeccionar nuestra habilidad de previsión de conflictos. Las fuentes de datos relativamente nuevas, tales como los datos o las imágenes de los teléfonos celulares y de las redes sociales, han recibido una atención generalizada en la investigación de conflictos. A menudo, dichas fuentes no cubren las partes primordiales del mundo o son difíciles de obtener y manejar, lo que hace que la actualización periódica sea un desafío. Las cantidades de datos, en ocasiones enormes, también pueden ser costosas desde el punto de vista informático y financiero. En su lugar, la fuente de datos que proponemos es económica, está disponible fácil y públicamente, se actualiza en tiempo real y proporciona una cobertura global: Wikipedia. Planteamos que la cantidad de páginas vistas por país puede considerarse una medida de interés o prominencia, mientras que el número de cambios de página puede considerarse una medida de controversia entre las opiniones políticas rivales. Esperamos que estos indicadores tengan especial éxito a la hora de captar las tensiones antes de que el conflicto se intensifique. Ponemos a prueba nuestro argumento prediciendo cambios en las muertes relacionadas con las batallas en África a nivel mensual y por país. Encontramos pruebas de que esas páginas vistas por país aumentan el rendimiento predictivo, mientras que los cambios de página no lo hacen. Al contrario de lo que esperábamos, nuestro modelo parece registrar mejor las tendencias a largo plazo que los cambios bruscos a corto plazo.Les données et le développement des méthodes sont essentiels à l’amélioration de notre capacité à prévoir les conflits. La recherche sur les conflits a étudié avec application des sources de données relativement récentes, telles que celles fournies par les téléphones portables ou les médias sociaux. Néanmoins, dans de nombreux cas, les données obtenues n’englobent pas l’ensemble de la planète. Elles sont parfois difficiles à obtenir et sont délicates à manipuler, ce qui rend difficile toute mise à jour régulière. En outre, du fait de leur quantité, l’analyse de ces données peut être chronophage et coûteuse. Au contraire, la source de données que nous proposons est bon marché, publique et immédiatement disponible, mise à jour en temps réel, et inclut l’ensemble de la planète : Wikipédia. Nous soutenons que le nombre de pages vues par pays permet de mesurer l’intérêt ou l’importance d’un sujet, tandis que le nombre de changements apportés aux pages permet de mesurer le niveau de controverses entre des opinions politiques concurrentes. Nous estimons que ces éléments permettent d’identifier avec succès des tensions avant qu’un conflit n’éclate. Nous vérifions la justesse de nos hypothèses en prédisant des changements en ce qui concerne le nombre de victimes dans des combats en Afrique, par pays et par mois. Nous apportons la preuve que le nombre de pages vues par pays a une valeur prédictive, mais que le nombre de changements apportés aux pages n’en a pas. Contrairement à nos attentes, notre modèle semble permettre d’identifier des tendances de long terme, et non des changements soudains de court terme. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 678-696 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2061969 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2061969 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:678-696 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2055010_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Lisa Hultman Author-X-Name-First: Lisa Author-X-Name-Last: Hultman Author-Name: Maxine Leis Author-X-Name-First: Maxine Author-X-Name-Last: Leis Author-Name: Desirée Nilsson Author-X-Name-First: Desirée Author-X-Name-Last: Nilsson Title: Employing local peacekeeping data to forecast changes in violence Abstract: One way of improving forecasts is through better data. We explore how much we can improve predictions of conflict violence by introducing data reflecting third-party efforts to manage violence. By leveraging new sub-national data on all UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa, 1994–2020, from the Geocoded Peacekeeping (Geo-PKO) dataset, we predict changes in violence at the local level. The advantage of data on peacekeeping deployments is that these vary over time and space, as opposed to many structural variables commonly used. We present two peacekeeping models that contain several local peacekeeping features, each with a separate set of additional variables that form the respective benchmark. The mean errors of our predictions only improve marginally. However, comparing observed and predicted changes in violence, the peacekeeping features improve our ability to identify the correct sign of the change. These results are particularly strong when we limit the sample to countries that have seen peacekeeping deployments. For an ambitious forecasting project, like ViEWS, it may thus be highly relevant to incorporate fine-grained and frequently updated data on peacekeeping troops. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 823-840 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2055010 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2055010 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:823-840 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2101217_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: The Editors Title: Correction Journal: International Interactions Pages: iii-v Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2101217 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2101217 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:iii-v Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2051024_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Konstantin Bätz Author-X-Name-First: Konstantin Author-X-Name-Last: Bätz Author-Name: Ann-Cathrin Klöckner Author-X-Name-First: Ann-Cathrin Author-X-Name-Last: Klöckner Author-Name: Gerald Schneider Author-X-Name-First: Gerald Author-X-Name-Last: Schneider Title: Challenging the status quo: Predicting violence with sparse decision-making data Abstract: This article addresses the discrepancy between the explanation and the prediction of political violence through the development of different models that approximate the decision-making on war and peace. Borrowing from the crisis bargaining literature, the prediction models particularly consider the situational attributes through which players can challenge the status quo. We distinguish between direct and indirect proxies of a weakening of the status quo and show that adding decision-making data can improve the accuracy of cross-sectional forecasting models. The study, which demonstrates the increased conflict risk due to the COVID-19 pandemic and thus another development upsetting the status quo, discusses the usefulness of decision-making forecasts through various case study illustrations.Este artículo aborda la discrepancia entre la explicación y la predicción de la violencia política mediante la elaboración de diversos modelos que se acercan a la toma de decisiones sobre la guerra y la paz. Inspirados en las publicaciones sobre negociaciones de crisis, los modelos de predicción consideran, en particular, las características situacionales a través de las cuales las piezas claves pueden desafiar el statu quo. Distinguimos entre indicadores directos e indirectos de un debilitamiento del statu quo y demostramos que la incorporación de datos sobre la toma de decisiones puede mejorar la precisión de los modelos de previsión transversal. El estudio, que demuestra el aumento del riesgo de conflicto durante la pandemia de la COVID-19 y, por lo tanto, otro acontecimiento que altera el statu quo, analiza la utilidad de las previsiones para la toma de decisiones mediante diferentes ejemplos de casos prácticos.Cet article aborde la divergence entre l’explication et la prédiction de la violence politique par le développement de différents modèles qui permettent une estimation des prises de décisions sur la guerre et la paix. S’inspirant de la littérature sur les négociations de crises les modèles de prédiction prennent en particulier en compte les attributs situationnels par lesquels les acteurs peuvent remettre en question le statu quo. Nous distinguons les variables directes des variables indirectes de l’affaiblissement du statu quo et montrons que l’ajout de données sur les prises de décisions peut améliorer la précision des modèles de prévision transversaux. L’étude, qui démontre l’augmentation du risque de conflit par la pandémie de COVID et donc une autre évolution bouleversant le statu quo, discute de l’utilité des prévisions de prises de décisions à travers diverses illustrations par des études de cas. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 697-713 Issue: 4 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2051024 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2051024 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:4:p:697-713 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2090933_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Jonathan Pinckney Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan Author-X-Name-Last: Pinckney Author-Name: Babak RezaeeDaryakenari Author-X-Name-First: Babak Author-X-Name-Last: RezaeeDaryakenari Title: When the levee breaks: A forecasting model of violent and nonviolent dissent Abstract: Forecasting major political conflicts is a long-time interest in conflict research. However, the literature thus far has focused almost exclusively on armed conflicts such as civil wars. Attempts to forecast primarily unarmed conflicts have yet to identify a model able to forecast such uprisings with a high degree of accuracy. This thorny forecasting problem may in part be due to the literature’s heavy focus on parametric forecasting methods and relatively rare testing and comparison of a wide range of forecasting algorithms. This paper addresses these gaps in the literature by developing the first unified forecasting model of both major armed and unarmed conflicts at the country-year level based on extensive training, cross-validation, and comparison of eight machine learning algorithms and five forecasting ensembles. We draw on two types of data: slow-moving structural factors such as geography and levels of economic development and short-term political dynamics captured by events data trends, to inform our forecasting models. This approach significantly improves predictive power for both armed and unarmed conflict in comparison to commonly used methods in the literature and suggests that there is significant room for improving forecasts of major political conflicts. However, our algorithms still forecast armed conflict significantly better than unarmed conflict, suggesting the need for continued theory development to inform future forecasting efforts in this area.El poder predecir los grandes conflictos políticos es un tema que interesa desde hace tiempo dentro del campo de la investigación de conflictos. Sin embargo, hasta ahora, la literatura especializada se ha centrado casi exclusivamente en los conflictos armados, como, por ejemplo, las guerras civiles. Los intentos de predecir conflictos, principalmente no armados, aún no han podido identificar un modelo capaz de pronosticar estos levantamientos con un alto grado de precisión. Este azaroso problema para realizar predicciones puede deberse, en parte, a que la literatura se centra mucho en los métodos predictivos paramétricos y a que las pruebas y comparaciones de una amplia gama de algoritmos de predicción son relativamente escasas. Este artículo aborda estas lagunas en la literatura desarrollando el primer modelo unificado de predicción, tanto de los grandes conflictos armados como de los no armados a nivel de país-año, basado en formación intensiva, validación cruzada y en la comparación de ocho algoritmos de aprendizaje automático y cinco conjuntos predictivos. Recurrimos a dos tipos de datos: factores estructurales de evolución lenta, como la geografía y los niveles de desarrollo económico, así como la dinámica política a corto plazo plasmada en las tendencias registradas en los datos de los acontecimientos, para fundamentar nuestros modelos de predicción. Este enfoque mejora significativamente el poder de predicción, tanto para los conflictos armados como para los no armados, en comparación con los métodos que se usan habitualmente en la literatura y sugiere que hay un margen significativo para mejorar las predicciones de los grandes conflictos políticos. Sin embargo, nuestros algoritmos siguen prediciendo mucho mejor los conflictos armados que los no armados, lo que sugiere la necesidad de seguir desarrollando la teoría para fundamentar los futuros esfuerzos de predicción en este ámbito.L’anticipation de conflits politiques majeurs est un objet de recherche déjà ancien. Toutefois, à ce jour, la littérature spécialisée existante est presque exclusivement focalisée sur les conflits armés, tels que les guerres civiles. Les efforts de prédiction portant sur des conflits principalement non armés requièrent donc l’identification d’un modèle capable de prévoir les soulèvements, et ce avec un haut degré de précision. Cet épineux problème de prévision est probablement partiellement dû à une littérature fortement axée sur des méthodes de prévision de type paramétrique, laissant peu de place au test et à la comparaison d’un vaste éventail d’algorithmes prédictifs. Cet article a vocation à combler cette lacune en développant le premier modèle prédictif unifié pour des conflits majeurs armés comme non armés, par pays et par année. Ce type de modèle s’appuie sur un entraînement approfondi, une validation croisée et une comparaison portant sur huit algorithmes d’apprentissage automatique et cinq ensembles prédictifs. Pour informer nos modèles, nous nous appuyons sur deux types de données : des facteurs structurels à évolution lente, tels que la géographie ou le niveau de développement économique, d’une part, et sur des dynamiques politiques à court terme, illustrées par des données sur les tendances événementielles, d’autre part. Cette approche permet d’améliorer de manière significative les capacités de prédiction pour les conflits armés comme non armés, par rapport aux méthodes habituellement utilisées dans la littérature, et suggère que la prévision des conflits politiques majeurs peut encore être considérablement optimisée. Toutefois, nos algorithmes restent nettement plus performants pour la prévision des conflits armés que pour les conflits non armés ; un constat reflétant la nécessité de poursuivre ce travail théorique, de manière à mieux informer les futurs efforts de prévision dans ce domaine. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 997-1026 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2090933 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2090933 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:997-1026 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2090936_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Federica Genovese Author-X-Name-First: Federica Author-X-Name-Last: Genovese Author-Name: Héctor Hermida-Rivera Author-X-Name-First: Héctor Author-X-Name-Last: Hermida-Rivera Title: Government ideology and bailout conditionality in the European financial crisis Abstract: The political economy literature on international bailouts has repeatedly shown that the domestic politics of rescued countries influence international bailout compliance. However, we know less about the domestic politics of bailout negotiations, and especially the type of conditions negotiated by governments of more developed countries with strong ties to international lenders. This paper puts forward an argument about the role of a government’s partisanship in shaping the conditions stipulated between international lenders and developed countries when crises confront the latter. Consistent with political cover theories, we argue that governments of crisis countries seek to scapegoat international institutions in order to push domestically unpleasant reforms. However, when crises affect countries significantly close to international lenders, international institutions may tolerate the scapegoating attitude and accept to emphasize governments’ reforms in the direction of their core ideological constituencies. Focusing on bailout negotiations during the Eurocrisis (2008–2016), we maintain that while important and painful reforms were discussed at the negotiation tables, the involved international lenders also accommodated the policy preferences of both left and right governments of crisis-ridden countries, everything else constant. So, conditionality came with duress, but governments were also able to emphasize reforms on the opponents’ policy issues, hence systematically obtaining fewer measures on their voters’ main policy areas. Regression analyses of an original country-quarter dataset of EU bailout conditionality measures provide support to our hypothesis. The findings are relevant to the analysis of partisan politics in economic negotiations and of democratic deficits in international organizations. Furthermore, this study contributes to understanding the political accessibility and ideological dynamics of international lending beyond the Eurocrisis. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 897-935 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2090936 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2090936 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:897-935 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2065272_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Tianjing Liao Author-X-Name-First: Tianjing Author-X-Name-Last: Liao Author-Name: Wonjae Hwang Author-X-Name-First: Wonjae Author-X-Name-Last: Hwang Title: Political protests and the diversionary use of media: Evidence from China Abstract: This research examines whether and to what extent political protests affect media coverage on external conflict in China for the purpose of diversion. Though there has been little evidence suggesting a diversionary use of force in contemporary China, we argue that, as the number of political protests increases, state-owned media are likely to expose the populace to media reports of external conflict as a way to divert public attention from domestic troubles/issues and instigate their nationalist sentiments. Our time-series analyses of China's weekly data from Global Times, one of the most influential Chinese tabloids, from February 2011 through December 2018 confirm this expectation. By weighting news reports based on the number of reposts of each report, which is significantly influenced by the 50c's activities, this study also accounts for the extent to which political protests affect the government's diversionary efforts.Esta investigación analiza si, y en qué medida, las protestas políticas impactan en la cobertura sobre conflictos externos por parte de los medios de comunicación en China como estrategia de distracción. Si bien la evidencia que sugiere un uso de la fuerza diversionaria es escasa en la región de China contemporánea, sostenemos que, dado que la cantidad de protestas políticas está en aumento, los medios de comunicación propiedad del Estado tienden a exponer a la población a noticias que refieren a conflictos externos, como un medio para distraer la atención pública sobre los problemas y conflictos internos, a la vez que instigan sentimientos nacionalistas. Nuestros análisis cronológicos sobre datos semanales de China provenientes del Global Times, uno de los periódicos sensacionalistas más influyentes de China, desde febrero de 2011 hasta diciembre de 2018, confirman nuestras expectativas. Asimismo, este estudio, través de la ponderación de noticias realizada según la cantidad de republicaciones de cada noticia, que sufre una gran influencia de las actividades del partido de los 50 centavos, da cuenta de la medida en la cual las protestas políticas impactan en las iniciativas diversivas del gobierno.Dans cet article, nous analysons les effets de la contestation politique sur la couverture médiatique des conflits internationaux en Chine à des fins de diversion. S’il existe peu d’éléments attestant d’un recours à la force à cet effet dans la Chine d’aujourd’hui, nous pensons que plus le nombre de manifestations politiques augmente, plus les médias d’État sont susceptibles d’exposer la population à des informations sur les conflits internationaux afin de détourner son attention des problèmes et troubles nationaux et de susciter un sentiment nationaliste. Notre analyse chronologique des parutions hebdomadaires entre février 2011 et décembre 2018 du Global Times, l’un des tabloïdes chinois les plus influents, confirme cette théorie. En pondérant les articles en fonction de leur nombre de partages, lequel dépend grandement de l’activité de l’Armée des 50 centimes, cette étude met également en évidence les effets de la contestation politique sur les manoeuvres de diversion du gouvernement chinois. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1027-1055 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2065272 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2065272 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:1027-1055 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2090935_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Jillienne Haglund Author-X-Name-First: Jillienne Author-X-Name-Last: Haglund Author-Name: Courtney Hillebrecht Author-X-Name-First: Courtney Author-X-Name-Last: Hillebrecht Author-Name: Hannah Roesch Read Author-X-Name-First: Hannah Roesch Author-X-Name-Last: Read Title: International human rights recommendations at home: Introducing the Women’s Rights Compliance Database (WRCD) Abstract: The legalization of international human rights has led to an explosion in the number of recommendations states receive each year regarding their domestic human rights practices. How do states respond to these recommendations, some of which may ask them to engage in significant domestic human rights reform? In this article, we introduce the Women’s Rights Compliance Database (WRCD), which allows scholars to answer this and a number of related questions. The WRCD provides compliance data on 2,558 recommendations across three institutions: CEDAW, the UPR, and the European Court of Human Rights. This article introduces the conceptual and empirical foundations of the WRCD and provides descriptive statistics of the data. Then, we situate the WRCD within the larger body of compliance data and illustrate how it not only fills a critical gap in the human rights compliance data landscape but also facilitates a robust future research agenda.La legalización de los derechos humanos internacionales ha provocado una explosión en el número de recomendaciones que los Estados reciben cada año en lo que se refiere a sus prácticas nacionales en materia de derechos humanos. ¿Cómo responden los Estados a estas recomendaciones, algunas de las cuales pueden pedirles que lleven a cabo importantes reformas internas en materia de derechos humanos? En este artículo, presentamos la Base de Datos sobre el Cumplimiento de los Derechos de la Mujer (WRCD, por sus siglas en inglés), que permite a los investigadores contestar no solo esta pregunta, sino también una serie de preguntas relacionadas. La WRCD proporciona datos sobre el cumplimiento de 2558 recomendaciones en tres instituciones: La Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CETFDCM), el Examen Periódico Universal (EPU) y el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH). Este artículo presenta los fundamentos conceptuales y empíricos de la WRCD y ofrece estadísticas descriptivas de los datos. A continuación, posicionamos la WRCD dentro del conjunto más amplio de datos sobre el cumplimiento de los derechos humanos e ilustramos cómo no solo cubre un vacío crítico en el panorama de los datos sobre el cumplimiento de los derechos humanos, sino que también facilita una sólida base para la investigación futura.L’apparition d’une législation internationale en matière de droits humains a entraîné une explosion du nombre de recommandations émises chaque année aux différents États en ce qui concerne leurs pratiques nationales dans ce domaine. Comment les États répondent-ils à ces recommandations, certaines les invitant à mettre en place d’importantes réformes dans le domaine des droits humains ? Dans cet article, nous présentons la WRCD, la Women’s Rights Compliance Database (base de données sur la conformité en matière de droits des femmes), qui permet aux chercheurs de trouver la réponse à cette question et à un certain nombre d’autres sur le sujet. La WRCD propose des données de conformité relatives à 2558 recommandations, englobant trois institutions : le CEDAW (Comité pour l'élimination de la discrimination à l'égard des femmes), l’EPU (Examen périodique universel) et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Cet article présente les bases conceptuelles et empiriques de la WRCD et fournit des statistiques descriptives pour les données utilisées. Nous situons ensuite la WRCD au sein d’un corpus élargi de données de conformité, et démontrons que non seulement elle vient combler une lacune dans le paysage des données relatives aux droits humains, mais également qu’elle favorise l’élaboration d’un futur solide programme de recherche. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1070-1087 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2090935 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2090935 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:1070-1087 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2068542_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Lauren Sukin Author-X-Name-First: Lauren Author-X-Name-Last: Sukin Title: Why “cheap” threats are meaningful: Threat perception and resolve in North Korean propaganda Abstract: Threatening propaganda—particularly when extreme and frequent—is often considered “cheap talk.” However, this article argues systematic and comprehensive analysis of such threats can still lend valuable insights. In particular, the aggregate content of threats reveals information about the threat perceptions of the messenger, while the frequency of threats provides information about the messenger’s resolve. To test this theory, I analyze a comprehensive dataset of North Korean propaganda between 1996 and 2018, showing that North Korea systematically issues threats to its adversaries when they engage in joint military exercises or when they take steps, such as the development of missile defenses, that challenge the survivability or deterrent capability of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Additionally, North Korea’s rhetoric signals its resolve. As the volume of North Korean threats increases, so too does the likelihood that North Korea will engage in military provocations, including nuclear and missile tests.La propaganda amenazante, especialmente cuando es extrema y frecuente, generalmente se considera "discurso barato". Sin embargo, este artículo sostiene que un análisis sistemático e integral de dichas amenazas puede aportar observaciones valiosas. En concreto, el contenido global de las amenazas revela información sobre las percepciones de la amenaza del mensajero, mientras que la frecuencia de las amenazas proporciona información sobre la resolución del mensajero. Para probar esta teoría, analizo un conjunto detallado de datos de propaganda de Corea del Norte de entre 1996 y 2018, que muestra que Corea del Norte envía amenazas sistemáticamenta a sus adversaries cuando participant en ejercicios militares conjuntos o cuando toman medidas que desafían la capacidad de supervivencia o de dissuasion del arsenal nuclear norcoreano, como el desarollo de defensa con misiles. Además, la retórica de Corea del Norte indica resolución. A medida que las amenazas de Corea del Norte aumentan, también lo hacen sus probabilidades de involucrarse en provocaciones militares, como pruebas nucleares y de misiles.La propagande menaçante – particulièrement lorsqu’elle est extrême et fréquente – est souvent considérée comme étant de la « conversation libre ». Cependant, cet article soutient qu’une analyse systématique et exhaustive de telles menaces peut tout de même apporter de précieux renseignements. En particulier, le contenu agrégé des menaces révèle des informations concernant la manière dont le messager perçoit ces menaces, alors que la fréquence des menaces offre des informations sur la détermination du messager. Pour mettre cette théorie à l’épreuve, j’analyse un jeu de données complet portant sur la propagande nord-coréenne entre 1996 et 2018 et je montre que la Corée du Nord émet systématiquement des menaces envers ses adversaires lorsqu’ils s’engagent dans des exercices militaires conjoints ou lorsqu’ils entreprennent des démarches, telles que le développement de défenses antimissiles, qui remettent en cause la capacité de survie ou de dissuasion de l’arsenal nucléaire nord-coréen. De plus, la rhétorique de la Corée du Nord signale sa détermination. Plus le volume des menaces nord-coréennes augmente, plus il en va de même pour la probabilité que la Corée du Nord se livre à des provocations militaires, notamment à des essais nucléaires et de missiles. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 936-967 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2068542 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2068542 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:936-967 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2044326_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Elad Segev Author-X-Name-First: Elad Author-X-Name-Last: Segev Author-Name: Atsushi Tago Author-X-Name-First: Atsushi Author-X-Name-Last: Tago Author-Name: Kohei Watanabe Author-X-Name-First: Kohei Author-X-Name-Last: Watanabe Title: Could leaders deflect from political scandals? Cross-national experiments on diversionary action in Israel and Japan Abstract: The diversionary theory of war is one of the best-known conflict initiation theories focusing on democratic leaders’ incentives to divert public attention away from political scandals or economic policy failures. While this assumption is well-known, few studies have examined if and how the use of force could divert public attention from such a scandal or failure. By using cross-national experiments in Japan and Israel, we provide empirical tests of this particular assumption and test the other theoretically discussed implications. Our contribution is twofold. First, we confirm that, in both Japan and Israel, diverting public attention from salient political scandals may fail. Second, drawing from an experiment using a mock news article predicting the prime minister’s hawkish policy, we demonstrate that actual escalation against a potentially nuclear-armed enemy would not directly lead to greater support for the prime minister compared to the mere emphasis on the threat posed by the enemy. Simply warning of an imminent threat from North Korea or Iran is critical and sufficient to induce political support from the general public; we call it threat-induced political support.La teoría de la guerra de distracción es una de las más conocidas sobre el inicio de los conflictos que se enfoca en los intereses de los líderes democráticos de desviar la atención pública de los escándalos políticos o las políticas económicas fallidas. Si bien este postulado es bien conocido, en pocos estudios se analizó si el uso de la fuerza podría desviar la atención del público de un escándalo o una política fallida, y de qué manera. Mediante la utilización de experimentos transnacionales en Japón e Israel, proporcionamos pruebas empíricas de este supuesto en particular y ponemos a prueba las otras implicancias debatidas en marcos teóricos. Nuestro aporte es doble. En primer lugar, confirmamos que, tanto en Japón como en Israel, desviar la atención de la opinión pública de los escándalos políticos más destacados puede fracasar. En segundo lugar, a partir de un experimento en el que se utiliza un artículo de prensa simulado que predice una política agresiva del primer ministro, demostramos que la escalada real contra un potencial enemigo armado con armas nucleares no conduce directamente a un mayor apoyo al primer ministro en comparación con el mero énfasis en la amenaza que supone el enemigo. La simple advertencia de una amenaza inminente por parte de Corea del Norte o Irán es determinante y suficiente para inducir el apoyo político del público; lo llamamos “apoyo político inducido por la amenaza.”La théorie de la diversion de la guerre est l’une des théories les plus connues sur le déclenchement des conflits. Elle se concentre sur les motivations des dirigeants démocratiques à détourner l’attention du public des scandales politiques ou des échecs de la politique économique. Bien que cette hypothèse soit bien connue, peu d’études ont examiné si et comment le recours à la force pouvait détourner l’attention du public de tels scandales ou échecs. Nous nous appuyons sur des expériences transnationales menées au Japon et en Israël, nous proposons des analyses empiriques de cette hypothèse particulière et nous analysons les autres implications qui sont discutées d’un point de vue théorique. Notre contribution est en deux volets. D’une part, nous confirmons que, tant au Japon qu’en Israël, les tentatives de détourner l’attention du public des scandales politiques importants peuvent échouer. Et d’autre part, à partir d’une expérience reposant sur un article de presse fictif prédisant une politique belliciste du premier ministre, nous démontrons que l’escalade réelle du conflit contre un ennemi potentiellement doté de l’arme nucléaire ne conduirait pas directement à un plus grand soutien pour le premier ministre par rapport à la simple insistance sur la menace présentée par l’ennemi. Le simple fait d’avertir d’une menace imminente de la part de la Corée du Nord ou de l’Iran est essentiel et suffisant pour déclencher le soutien politique du grand public; nous qualifions cela de soutien politique induit par la menace. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1056-1069 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2044326 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2044326 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:1056-1069 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2068541_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Marina G. Petrova Author-X-Name-First: Marina G. Author-X-Name-Last: Petrova Title: Is it all the same? Repression of the media and civil society organizations as determinants of anti-government opposition Abstract: States may use repression to control establishments such as the media and civil society organizations (CSOs). Yet, repressing the media and CSOs may backfire and trigger anti-government opposition. I study the effects of state repression targeting the media and CSOs on the onset of violent and nonviolent anti-government opposition by employing a global panel dataset with a timespan between 1961 and 2013. The findings suggest that repression of the media and CSOs have a divergent impact on anti-government opposition: repression of the media is the major driver of nonviolence, but it has no effect on the onset of violent opposition; repression of CSOs matters only for violent opposition, but not for nonviolence. I explain this result by concentrating on the different ways in which repression targeting the media and CSOs affect the resources and opportunity for mobilization, with a focus on the diversity of mobilization pools available for anti-government opposition.Los estados pueden recurrir a la represión para controlar a instituciones como los medios de comunicación y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (Civil Society Organizations, CSO). Sin embargo, la represión de los medios de comunicación y las CSO puede resultar contraproducente y desencadenar una oposición contra el gobierno. Me dedico al estudio de los efectos que tiene la represión estatal orientada hacia los medios de comunicación y las CSO en el surgimiento de la oposición violenta y no violenta contra el gobierno. Para ello utilizo un conjunto de datos de paneles globales de un período de tiempo entre 1961 y 2013. Los resultados sugieren que la represión de los medios de comunicación y las CSO tienen un impacto divergente en la oposición contra el gobierno: la represión de los medios de comunicación es el principal motor de la oposición no violenta, pero no tiene efectos sobre el surgimiento de la oposición violenta; la represión de las CSO tiene importancia solo en el caso de la oposición violenta, pero no en el caso de la oposición no violenta. Para explicar este resultado me concentro en las diferentes maneras en que la represión orientada hacia los medios de comunicación y las CSO afectan los recursos y las oportunidades de movilización, con un enfoque en la diversidad de grupos de movilización de oposición contra el gobierno.Des États peuvent avoir recours à la répression pour contrôler des entités telles que les médias et les organisations de la société civile (OSC). Cependant, la répression des médias et des OSC peut être contreproductive et déclencher une opposition antigouvernementale. J’étudie les effets de la répression étatique ciblant les médias et les OSC sur le déclenchement d’oppositions antigouvernementales violentes et non violentes en employant un jeu de données portant sur un panel mondial et sur la période 1961-2013. Mes conclusions suggèrent que la répression ciblant les médias et les OSC a un impact divergent sur l’opposition antigouvernementale: d’une part, la répression ciblant les médias est le principal moteur de l’opposition non violente, mais elle n’a aucun effet sur le déclenchement d’une opposition violente, et d’autre part, la répression ciblant les OSC n’a de l’importance que pour l’opposition violente, mais pas pour l’opposition non violente. J’explique ce résultat en me concentrant sur les différentes façons dont la répression ciblant les médias et les OSC affecte les ressources et l’opportunité de mobilisation en mettant l’accent sur la diversité des viviers de mobilisation disponibles pour l’opposition antigouvernementale. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 968-996 Issue: 5 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2068541 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2068541 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:5:p:968-996 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2089133_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Matthew DiGiuseppe Author-X-Name-First: Matthew Author-X-Name-Last: DiGiuseppe Author-Name: Colin M. Barry Author-X-Name-First: Colin M. Author-X-Name-Last: Barry Title: Do consumers follow the flag? Perceptions of hostility and consumer preferences Abstract: Do consumers discriminate against foreign products made in countries they deem adversarial? While previous studies have examined how nationalist boycotts influence trade, there is little evidence consumers “follow the flag” more generally. In this study, we employ a conjoint choice survey experiment in the United States and India to assess how individuals’ geopolitical attitudes affect their product preferences. By permitting heterogeneity in perceptions of foreign relations, and examining how these perceptions affect consumer behavior, we reveal one of the micro-level mechanisms at work in the macro-level relationship between trade and conflict. The results show that, when compared to goods made in countries perceived as “neutral” or “friendly,” consumers are 2–6% less likely to select goods made in countries they perceive as being “hostile.” We conclude that, along with organized boycotts, firms, and states, consumers are also partially responsible for the observed correlation between international political relations and trade flows.¿Los consumidores discriminan los productos extranjeros fabricados en países que consideran adversos? Si bien estudios anteriores han examinado la forma cómo los boicots nacionalistas afectan al comercio, hay pocas pruebas de que, de un modo más general, los consumidores prefieran «lo nacional». En este estudio, empleamos un experimento de encuesta de elección conjunta realizada en los Estados Unidos y en la India para evaluar cómo las actitudes geopolíticas de los individuos afectan a sus preferencias a la hora de elegir un producto. Al permitir la heterogeneidad en las percepciones de las relaciones exteriores, y examinar cómo estas percepciones afectan al comportamiento de los consumidores, desvelamos uno de los mecanismos a nivel micro que actúan en la relación a nivel macro entre el comercio y el conflicto. Los resultados muestran que, en comparación con los productos fabricados en países percibidos como «neutrales» o «amistosos», los consumidores son entre un 2% y un 6% menos propensos a escoger productos fabricados en países que perciben como «hostiles». Concluimos que, además de los boicots organizados, las empresas y los Estados, los consumidores también son parcialmente responsables de la correlación observada entre las relaciones políticas internacionales y los flujos comerciales.Les consommateurs sont-ils réticents à acheter des produits étrangers provenant de pays qu’ils considèrent comme antagonistes ? Si de précédents travaux ont examiné l’influence de boycotts nationalistes sur le commerce, il est plus difficile de trouver des preuves attestant d’une tendance plus générale au patriotisme de la part des consommateurs. Cet article s’appuie sur une enquête conjointe réalisée aux États-Unis et en Inde, destinée à évaluer dans quelle mesure les postures des individus en matière de géopolitique affectent leurs choix de consommation. Grâce à la pluralité des perceptions des relations internationales reflétée et à l’analyse de l’impact de ces perceptions sur les comportements des consommateurs, nous révélons l’un des mécanismes à l’oeuvre, au niveau micro, dans la relation qui s’observe au niveau macro entre commerce et conflits. Les résultats de nos recherches démontrent que les consommateurs sont 2 à 6 % moins enclins à acheter des produits provenant de pays perçus comme « hostiles » que des produits issus de pays considérés comme « neutres » ou « amis ». Nous en concluons que, tout comme les entreprises, les États et les boycotts organisés, les consommateurs sont partiellement responsables des corrélations observées entre relations politiques internationales et flux commerciaux. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1200-1215 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2089133 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2089133 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1200-1215 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2115038_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Rafael Mesquita Author-X-Name-First: Rafael Author-X-Name-Last: Mesquita Author-Name: Rodrigo Martins Author-X-Name-First: Rodrigo Author-X-Name-Last: Martins Author-Name: Pedro Seabra Author-X-Name-First: Pedro Author-X-Name-Last: Seabra Title: Estimating ideal points from UN General Assembly sponsorship data Abstract: The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) represents a microcosm of global politics that offers a valuable snapshot of interstate relations and state preferences. In this context, roll-call votes and measures of voting affinity often receive the bulk of scholarly attention. However, even though techniques such as ideal point estimation have grown more sophisticated over time when applied to voting data, they remain grounded by an original selection bias that discards 2/3 of the UNGA yield. This share of disregarded output can prove highly informative if drafting and sponsorship procedures receive a closer look instead. This research note applies ideal point estimation to UNGA sponsorship data for the first time for every member from 2009 to 2019. It advances a cutting-edge approach to better estimate state preferences over a contested policy space, while correcting for the narrow focus of previous UNGA analyses on voting data. The results detect an underlying issue space that bears external validity with the inclination of states toward multilateralism.La Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (AGNU) representa un microcosmos da la política global que ofrece una importante panorámica de las relaciones interestatales y las preferencias de los Estados. En este contexto, las votaciones nominales y las medidas de afinidad de voto suelen recibir la mayor parte de la atención por parte de los investigadores. Sin embargo, aunque las técnicas como la estimación de puntos ideales (“ideal point estimation”) se han vuelto más sofisticadas con el tiempo cuando se aplican a los datos de las votaciones, siguen basándose en un sesgo de selección original que descarta 2/3 de lo que produce la AGNU. Esta proporción de lo producido que no se tiene en cuenta puede resultar muy informativa si, en cambio, se examinan más detenidamente los procedimientos de redacción y patrocinio. Esta nota de investigación aplica por primera vez la estimación de puntos ideales a los datos de patrocinio de la AGNU para cada miembro desde 2009 hasta 2019. El artículo emplea una de las herramientas más recientes para estimar mejor las preferencias de los Estados en un espacio de disputa política, al tiempo que corrige el enfoque limitado de análisis anteriores de la AGNU sobre los datos de las votaciones. Los resultados detectan una dimensión política subyacente que tiene validez externa con la inclinación de los Estados hacia el multilateralismo.L’Assemblée générale des Nations unies (AGNU) constitue un microcosme de la politique internationale, et offre un aperçu éloquent des relations interétatiques et des préférences des différentes nations. Dans ce contexte, les travaux de recherche se concentrent souvent sur les votes par appel nominal et l’analyse des affinités politiques lors des votes. Cependant, bien que les méthodes telles que l’estimation des points idéaux (« ideal point estimation ») aient gagné en précision avec le temps lorsqu’appliquées aux votes, elles demeurent entravées par un biais de sélection initial, qui écarte les deux tiers des données produites par l’AGNU. Or, cette quantité d’informations négligées peut se révéler riche en enseignements lorsque les procédures de rédaction et de parrainage font l’objet de davantage d’attention. Cette note de recherche applique de manière inédite la méthode de l’estimation des points idéaux aux données de parrainage de l’AGNU, pour chaque membre, de 2009 à 2019. Elle propose ainsi une approche innovante permettant de mieux évaluer les préférences des différents États dans un espace politique contesté, tout en palliant les limites des précédentes analyses des données de vote de l’AGNU. Les conclusions révèlent une dimension sous-jacente de contestation, qui démontre validité externe en ce que concerne la tendance des États au multilatéralisme. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1233-1252 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2115038 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2115038 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1233-1252 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2111419_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Yufan Yang Author-X-Name-First: Yufan Author-X-Name-Last: Yang Author-Name: Joshua Tschantret Author-X-Name-First: Joshua Author-X-Name-Last: Tschantret Author-Name: Cody Schmidt Author-X-Name-First: Cody Author-X-Name-Last: Schmidt Title: Is terrorism deadlier in democracies? Abstract: A long literature examines the relationship between terrorism and democracy. However, little research examines the lethality of terrorist attacks across regime type. This article theorizes the terrorism that democracies do experience will be less deadly. Democracy increases the opportunity for nonstate actors to use terrorism to attract attention to their causes, which we argue also mitigates the need to carry out deadly attacks. Using cross-national data on domestic terrorist attacks committed between 1970 and 2013, a multilevel statistical analysis demonstrates that terrorist attacks in democracies are less lethal. A time-series cross-sectional analysis further reveals that consolidated democracies and harsh authoritarian regimes experience few deaths from terrorism. While democracies experience high volumes of nonlethal terrorism, strong autocracies experience low amounts of deadly terrorism. Thus, there is strong evidence that—in one important sense—democracies are safer from terrorism.Existe una extensa literatura que examina la relación entre el terrorismo y la democracia. Sin embargo, son pocos los estudios que examinan la letalidad de los atentados terroristas según el tipo de régimen. Este artículo sostiene que el terrorismo que registran las democracias será menos mortífero. La democracia aumenta la oportunidad de que los actores no estatales utilicen el terrorismo para atraer la atención hacia sus causas, lo que, según argumentamos, también mitiga la necesidad de llevar a cabo ataques mortales. Utilizando datos transnacionales sobre ataques terroristas nacionales cometidos entre 1970 y 2013, un análisis estadístico multinivel demuestra que los ataques terroristas en las democracias son menos mortales. Un análisis transversal de series cronológicas revela además que las democracias consolidadas y los regímenes autoritarios duros registran pocas muertes por terrorismo. Mientras las democracias registran grandes volúmenes de terrorismo no letal, las autocracias fuertes registran bajas cantidades de terrorismo mortal. Por lo tanto, hay pruebas sólidas de que, en un sentido importante, las democracias son más seguras frente al terrorismo.Si une vaste littérature analyse les relations entre terrorisme et démocratie, peu de travaux se sont penchés sur la létalité des attaques terroristes selon le type de régime. Cet article émet l’hypothèse que le terrorisme qui frappe les démocraties est moins meurtrier. En effet, dans la mesure où le régime démocratique augmente les possibilités, pour les acteurs non étatiques, de recourir au terrorisme pour attirer l’attention sur les causes qu’ils défendent, il limite également la nécessité de perpétrer des attaques meurtrières. S’appuyant sur des données transnationales portant sur les attaques terroristes intérieures entre 1970 et 2013, une analyse statistique multiniveau démontre que les attaques terroristes sont moins létales dans les démocraties. Par ailleurs, une analyse transverse et temporelle révèle que les démocraties solidement établies et les régimes autoritaires ne subissent que peu de morts dues au terrorisme. Tandis que les démocraties connaissent une quantité importante de terrorisme non létal, les autocraties fortes ne souffrent que de peu de formes de terrorisme meurtrières. Par conséquent, il est clair que, dans un sens (particulièrement important), les démocraties sont un meilleur rempart contre le terrorisme. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1170-1199 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2111419 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2111419 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1170-1199 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2133113_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Dawid Walentek Author-X-Name-First: Dawid Author-X-Name-Last: Walentek Title: Reputation or interaction: What determines cooperation on economic sanctions? Abstract: This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organizations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation positively mediate its effect through repeated interaction.Este artículo analiza la cooperación en materia de sanciones económicas multilaterales. A pesar de la escasa eficacia y de la violación de las sanciones, las sanciones económicas multilaterales son una herramienta popular de la política exterior. Exploramos un enfoque decisivo de las sanciones y desarrollamos un marco de teoría del juego en el que los Estados de origen se enfrentan a un problema de acción colectiva cuando coordinan la coerción multilateral. Indicamos que la cooperación puede lograrse mediante repetidas interacciones y mediante la reputación. Comprobamos empíricamente los dos mecanismos con los datos sobre la amenaza y la imposición de sanciones económicas (TIES, por su sigla en inglés), así como la adhesión a regímenes sancionadores anteriores y los datos del proyecto Correlates of War sobre la pertenencia a organizaciones internacionales. Nuestros resultados indican que la reputación es un fuerte predictor de la cooperación en materia de coerción económica multilateral. El efecto de la interacción repetida se ve condicionado por la reputación; los Estados con mala reputación median positivamente su efecto a través de la interacción repetida.Le présent article s’intéresse à la coopération dans le cadre de sanctions économiques multilatérales. Malgré qu’elles soient peu efficaces et souvent violées, les sanctions économiques multilatérales restent un outil largement utilisé en politique étrangère. Nous nous intéressons à l’approche instrumentale des sanctions et développons un cadre de théorie des jeux dans lequel les États exportateurs sont confrontés au problème de l’action collective lors de la coordination de coercition multilatérale. Selon nous, la coopération est possible au moyen d’interactions répétées et grâce à la réputation. Nous testons empiriquement ces deux mécanismes à l’aide des données TIES sur les sanctions économiques et le respect des régimes de sanctions imposés par le passé, mais aussi des données du projet Correlates of War sur l’adhésion aux organisations internationales. Nos résultats indiquent que la réputation constitue un indicateur important de coopération en matière de coercition économique multilatérale. L’effet des interactions répétées semble dépendre de la réputation. En effet, les États jouissant d’une moins bonne réputation en atténuent les effets grâce aux interactions répétées. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1121-1143 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2133113 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2133113 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1121-1143 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2141842_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Jeffrey Pickering Author-X-Name-First: Jeffrey Author-X-Name-Last: Pickering Title: International Interactions best paper award 2022 Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1253-1254 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2141842 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2141842 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1253-1254 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2115039_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Christopher S. P. Magee Author-X-Name-First: Christopher S. P. Author-X-Name-Last: Magee Author-Name: Tansa George Massoud Author-X-Name-First: Tansa George Author-X-Name-Last: Massoud Title: Diffusion of protests in the Arab Spring Abstract: This paper examines how protests spread across countries in the 2011 Arab Spring. Based on the diffusion literature, we form hypotheses about the factors that influence the transmission of protests across borders. To test the hypotheses, we use an events data set measuring media reports of protests, government reforms, and acts of repression on a daily basis by country. We show that the strength of the protest movement in one country is significantly affected by protest activities in other countries over the previous 1 or 2 weeks and that protests were more likely to spread between countries that had high levels of bilateral trade. When we examine periods longer than 2 weeks, we find that protests spread across borders only when they were successful in pressuring Arab governments into enacting reforms and when the protests did not lead to government reprisals. In all our models, government repression in one country significantly stifled protests in other countries. Each country was thus significantly affected by the choices that governments in other Arab League nations made, and this interdependence meant that governments had incentives to cooperate with each other in their responses to the Arab Spring protests.Este artículo analiza cómo se extendieron las protestas a través de distintos países durante la Primavera Árabe de 2011. Basándonos en la literatura sobre difusión, formulamos hipótesis sobre los factores que influyen en la transmisión de las protestas a través de fronteras. Para comprobar nuestras hipótesis, utilizamos un conjunto de datos de eventos que miden la información de los medios de comunicación sobre las protestas, las reformas gubernamentales y los actos de represión a diario por país. Demostramos que la fuerza del movimiento de protesta en un país se ve significativamente afectada por las actividades de protesta en otros países durante la semana o las dos semanas anteriores y que las protestas eran más propensas a extenderse entre los países que tenían altos niveles de comercio bilateral. Cuando examinamos periodos superiores a dos semanas, comprobamos que las protestas se extienden a través de las fronteras solo cuando estas consiguen presionar a los gobiernos árabes para que promulguen reformas y cuando las protestas no provocan represalias por parte del gobierno. En todos nuestros modelos, la represión gubernamental en un país frenó significativamente las protestas en otros países. Por lo tanto, cada país se vio significativamente afectado por las decisiones que tomaron los gobiernos de otras naciones de la Liga Árabe, y esta interdependencia significó que los gobiernos tenían incentivos para cooperar entre sí en sus respuestas a las protestas de la Primavera Árabe.Le présent article analyse la manière dont les protestations se sont propagées à travers les pays lors du Printemps arabe de 2011. Sur la base de la documentation diffusée, nous émettons des hypothèses sur les facteurs ayant influencé la transmission des protestations à travers les frontières. Afin de vérifier les hypothèses, nous utilisons un ensemble de données d’événements évaluant les comptes-rendus que les médias ont fait des protestations, des réformes du gouvernement et des actes de répression, jour après jour et par pays. Nous montrons que la force du mouvement de protestation dans un pays est affectée de manière significative par les actes de protestation dans d’autres pays au cours de la ou des deux semaines précédentes, et que les protestations avaient beaucoup plus de chance de s’étendre entre des pays ayant des niveaux élevés de commerce bilatéral. Lorsqu’on examine des périodes supérieures à deux semaines, on observe que les protestations se propagent à travers les frontières uniquement lorsqu’elles ont réussi à faire pression sur les gouvernements arabes pour qu’ils adoptent des réformes et lorsque ces protestations n’ont pas entraîné de représailles de la part du gouvernement. Dans tous nos modèles, la répression du gouvernement dans un pays a sensiblement étouffé les protestations dans les autres pays. Chaque pays était donc affecté de manière significative par les choix effectués par les gouvernements dans les autres nations de la Ligue arabe, et cette interdépendance signifiait que les gouvernements avaient intérêt à coopérer les uns avec les autres quant à leur réponse face aux protestations du Printemps arabe. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1144-1169 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2115039 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2115039 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1144-1169 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2106480_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Vivian P. Ta-Johnson Author-X-Name-First: Vivian P. Author-X-Name-Last: Ta-Johnson Author-Name: Eric Keels Author-X-Name-First: Eric Author-X-Name-Last: Keels Author-Name: A. Burcu Bayram Author-X-Name-First: A. Burcu Author-X-Name-Last: Bayram Title: How women promote peace: Gender composition, duration, and frames in conflict resolution Abstract: Research shows that the inclusion of women in negotiations and conflict resolution efforts contributes to peaceful solutions to disputes and armed conflict. Yet we know little about how women contribute to peacebuilding. What, specifically, are women doing to help produce more peaceful outcomes? We present evidence from an international bargaining experiment showing that women contribute to peace by seeking more equitable and symmetrical solutions, even if these provide lower material payoffs. Critically, however, women are willing to give up on asymmetric advantage only when they negotiate with other women. The gender composition of negotiation dyads also significantly influences the duration of negotiations. Statistical analysis of historical territorial disputes probes the external validity of these results, offering suggestive complementary evidence. The main policy implication of our findings is that bilateral disputes will be settled more efficiently and equitably when both sides are represented by women. Our findings should encourage scholars to develop dyadic, not monadic, models of how gender affects international negotiations.La investigación demuestra que la inclusión de las mujeres en las negociaciones y en los esfuerzos de resolución de conflictos contribuye a conseguir soluciones pacíficas a las disputas y los conflictos armados. Sin embargo, sabemos poco sobre cómo contribuyen las mujeres a la construcción de la paz. ¿Qué hacen en concreto las mujeres para ayudar a conseguir resultados más pacíficos? Presentamos pruebas de un experimento de negociación internacional que demuestran que las mujeres contribuyen a la paz al buscar soluciones más equitativas y simétricas, aunque estas proporcionen menores beneficios materiales. No obstante, las mujeres están dispuestas a renunciar a la ventaja asimétrica solo cuando negocian con otras mujeres. La composición de género de las díadas de negociación también influye de modo considerable en la duración de las negociaciones. El análisis estadístico de las disputas territoriales históricas examina la validez externa de estos resultados, ofreciendo pruebas complementarias sugerentes. La principal implicación política de nuestras conclusiones es que las disputas bilaterales se resolverán de forma más eficaz y equitativa cuando ambas partes estén representadas por mujeres. Nuestras conclusiones deberían animar a los investigadores a desarrollar modelos diádicos, no monádicos, sobre cómo el género afecta a las negociaciones internacionales.La recherche a démontré que l’inclusion de femmes dans les processus de négociations et les initiatives de résolution des conflits contribue à déboucher sur des solutions pacifiques aux désaccords et aux conflits armés. Pourtant, nous disposons de peu d’informations sur la manière dont les femmes participent au maintien de la paix. Que font précisément les femmes pour produire des résultats davantage orientés vers une résolution pacifique? Nous nous appuyons sur une expérience de négociations internationales démontrant que les femmes contribuent à la paix par la recherche de solutions plus équitables et symétriques, y compris lorsque ces dernières impliquent des gains matériels moindres. Il convient cependant de noter que les femmes sont enclines à abandonner un avantage asymétrique uniquement lorsqu’elles négocient avec d’autres femmes. Par ailleurs, la composition des dyades de négociation en termes de genres a une influence considérable sur la durée des négociations en question. Une analyse statistique de conflits territoriaux historiques démontre la validité externe de ces résultats et constitue une preuve supplémentaire significative. La principale implication politique de nos conclusions est que les conflits bilatéraux sont résolus de manière plus efficace et plus équitable lorsque les deux parties sont représentées par des femmes. Nos travaux ont donc vocation à encourager les chercheur·euses à développer des modèles dyadiques, et non monadiques, pour comprendre la manière dont le genre affecte les négociations internationales. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1089-1120 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2106480 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2106480 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1089-1120 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2115037_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20220907T060133 git hash: 85d61bd949 Author-Name: Herman Wieselgren Author-X-Name-First: Herman Author-X-Name-Last: Wieselgren Title: Sexual violence along ethnic lines? Revisiting rebel-civilian ethnic ties and wartime sexual violence Abstract: Previous research suggests that wartime sexual violence by rebel groups should generally be committed between rather than within ethnic groups. Since rebels can mobilize through and draw support from coethnic civilian networks, they should be less prone to commit sexual violence against their ethnic brethren. Moreover, ethnic divisions between groups are argued to spur inter-ethnic sexual violence as a strategy of war. Yet, much remains to be tested empirically. A major hindrance has been the lack of data on sexual violence that captures the ethnic identities of victims. This issue is circumvented by geocoding occurrences of sexual violence from the SVAC dataset and intersecting these with geographic patterns of ethnic settlement. Interestingly, the results show no indication of restraint in coethnic areas. They also indicate that mixed areas with both coethnic and non-coethnic civilians are more likely to experience sexual violence than entirely non-coethnic areas.Investigaciones anteriores sugieren que la violencia sexual en tiempos de guerra por parte de grupos rebeldes generalmente debería cometerse entre grupos étnicos y no dentro de ellos. Dado que los rebeldes pueden movilizarse a través de redes civiles coétnicas y obtener el apoyo de estas, deberían ser menos propensos a cometer actos de violencia sexual contra sus hermanos étnicos. Además, se argumenta que las divisiones étnicas entre grupos estimulan la violencia sexual interétnica como estrategia de guerra. Sin embargo, aún queda mucho por comprobar empíricamente. La falta de datos sobre la violencia sexual que capten las identidades étnicas de las víctimas ha sido un obstáculo importante. Este problema se evita mediante la geocodificación de los casos de violencia sexual del conjunto de datos sobre la violencia sexual en los conflictos armados y mediante su intersección con los patrones geográficos de asentamiento étnico. Curiosamente, los resultados no muestran ningún indicio de moderación en las zonas coétnicas. También indican que las zonas mixtas con civiles coétnicos y no coétnicos tienen más probabilidades de sufrir violencia sexual que las zonas totalmente no coétnicas.Une recherche antérieure laisse à penser que les violences sexuelles perpétrées en temps de guerre par des groupes rebelles devraient généralement être commises entre groupes ethniques plutôt qu’au sein d’un même groupe ethnique. Les rebelles, pouvant se mobiliser grâce aux réseaux civils de leur ethnie et obtenir le soutien de ces derniers, devraient être moins enclins à commettre des violences sexuelles à l’encontre de leurs frères ethniques. De plus, on estime que les divisions ethniques entre les groupes stimulent les violences sexuelles entre les ethnies en tant que stratégie militaire. Toutefois, beaucoup reste à tester empiriquement. L’absence de données sur les violences sexuelles enregistrant l’identité ethnique des victimes constituait un obstacle majeur. Le géocodage des occurrences de violence sexuelle émanant de l’ensemble des données SVAC et leur recoupage avec les modèles géographiques de peuplement ethnique ont permis de contourner ce problème. Curieusement, les résultats ne montrent aucune indication de retenue dans les zones coethniques. Ils indiquent également que les zones mixtes, peuplées à la fois de civils de la même ethnie ou non, ont davantage de probabilité de connaître des violences sexuelles que celles qui sont entièrement peuplées d’ethnies différentes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1216-1232 Issue: 6 Volume: 48 Year: 2022 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2115037 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2115037 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:48:y:2022:i:6:p:1216-1232 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2156996_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Lauren Ferry Author-X-Name-First: Lauren Author-X-Name-Last: Ferry Title: Getting to yes: The role of creditor coordination in debt restructuring negotiations Abstract: How do indebted governments restructure their debts with private creditors? What explains variation in indebted states’ negotiating behavior? Existing explanations of debt restructuring have largely treated creditors as a profit-maximizing monolith; Yet creditors have different exposures, ties to borrowers, and roles in the international banking system. Inter-creditor disputes are common. In this paper, I argue that because institutional norms dictate burden sharing, the makeup of the creditor group matters for indebted states’ negotiating behavior. The requirement of near-consensus decision-making allows almost any creditor to hold up negotiations. It limits the outcome to what the most reluctant creditors will agree to. Debtor governments are aware of compositional issues and where coordination is most difficult ex-ante, they can use more coercive behaviors to bring reluctant creditors into the fold. I focus on publicly issued declarations of default as one such tool. Using existing data on public moratoriums alongside original data on creditor composition, I find that governments are more likely to publicly announce default as the number of creditors involved in a restructuring increases. The findings imply that who the government is bargaining against matters to how they choose to bargain. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 31-58 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2156996 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2156996 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:31-58 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2155151_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: David Lektzian Author-X-Name-First: David Author-X-Name-Last: Lektzian Author-Name: Glen Biglaiser Author-X-Name-First: Glen Author-X-Name-Last: Biglaiser Title: Sanctions, aid, and voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of U.S. economic sanctions on UN General Assembly voting patterns. Using panel data for 123 developing countries from 1990 to 2014, and employing an instrumental variables approach to account for potential endogeneity, we find that U.S.-imposed sanctions generally lead to a decline in voting coincidence between the U.S. and target countries when the sanctioned country receives low U.S. aid. However, in instances where the U.S. sanctions countries dependent on U.S. foreign aid, we find targets are increasingly more likely to vote with the U.S. This is because sanctions send a credible signal of the U.S.’s willingness to carry out punishment and cancel future aid to countries that publicly oppose it. Our research shows how sanctions alone tend to pull countries apart while, together with aid dependence, have the potential to bring countries in line with the U.S.’s position on issues, adding nuance to the sanctions literature.Este artículo investiga los efectos de las sanciones económicas por parte de Estados Unidos en los patrones de voto de la Asamblea General de la ONU. Utilizando datos de panel de 123 países en vías de desarrollo entre 1990 y 2014, y empleando un enfoque de variables instrumentales para tener en consideración la posible endogeneidad, comprobamos que las sanciones impuestas por Estados Unidos conllevan generalmente una disminución de la coincidencia de votos entre Estados Unidos y los países objetivo cuando el país sancionado recibe poca ayuda por parte de Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, en los casos en los que Estados Unidos impone sanciones a los países que dependen de la ayuda exterior estadounidense, observamos que los países objetivo son cada vez más propensos a votar conforme a Estados Unidos. Esto se debe a que las sanciones envían una señal creíble de la voluntad de Estados Unidos de llevar a cabo un castigo y cancelar la ayuda futura a los países que se les oponen públicamente. Nuestra investigación muestra cómo las sanciones por sí solas tienden a separar a los países, mientras que, junto con la dependencia de la ayuda, tienen el potencial de hacer que los países se alineen con la posición de Estados Unidos respecto a determinados temas, lo que añade matices a la literatura sobre las sanciones.Le présent article s’intéresse aux effets des sanctions économiques des États-Unis sur les schémas de vote de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies. À l’aide de données de panel de 123 pays en voie de développement entre 1990 et 2014 et de la méthode des variables instrumentales pour prendre en compte la potentielle endogénéité, nous observons que les sanctions imposées par les États-Unis conduisent généralement à une baisse de la coïncidence des votes entre les États-Unis et les pays cibles quand le pays sanctionné reçoit peu d’aides américaines. Néanmoins, quand les pays sanctionnés par les États-Unis dépendent de l’aide financière américaine, nous remarquons que les cibles ont plus souvent tendance à voter avec les États-Unis. Pour expliquer ce phénomène, nous proposons que les sanctions envoient un signal crédible de la volonté américaine d’appliquer une punition et d’annuler des aides futures pour les pays qui s’opposent publiquement à eux. Nos recherchent montrent comment les sanctions, à elles seules, ont tendance à diviser les pays, quand, couplées à la dépendance aux aides, elles ont le potentiel d’aligner les pays sur les positions américaines sur certaines problématiques, ce qui apporte quelques nuances à la littérature sur les sanctions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 59-85 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2155151 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2155151 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:59-85 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2149514_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Nicholas D. Anderson Author-X-Name-First: Nicholas D. Author-X-Name-Last: Anderson Title: Introducing the Warring-States Japan Battle Data Abstract: This article introduces the “Warring-States Japan Battle Data,” a new dataset covering 2,889 battles occurring within Japan during its Warring-States period, from 1467 to 1600. The dataset contains fifteen variables covering various features of the battles, including the date, location, participants, initiators, and victors, among others. This article introduces the sources of the data, describes the collection procedures and coding rules, presents basic descriptive statistics of key variables of interest, and applies the battle data to an important question in the political violence and international relations literature: whether conflict “contagiously” diffuses across time and space. The data introduced here should be of interest to scholars of international relations, civil conflict, early modern East Asia, and Japanese history, among others. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 147-162 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2149514 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2149514 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:147-162 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2135513_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Soyoung Lee Author-X-Name-First: Soyoung Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: The Strong, the Weak, and the Honored: Examining the decline in honored alliances post-1945 Abstract: The rate at which states defend their allies in war has dropped from 81% during 1816–1944 to 7% in 1945–2016. I attribute the decline in honored alliances to a dramatic shift in the military capability of alliances. Contrary to the popular belief that alliances have become stronger after 1945, I find that the post-1945 international system also witnessed a significant increase in the number of weaker alliances. This bimodal distribution of alliances produced a pattern where alliances were either violated upon being attacked or never attacked in the first place, leading to a decline in the rate at which alliances were honored. I support my argument using alliance data over two centuries. This research advances our understanding of military alliances by documenting a polarization of alliances in terms of their military capability post-1945 and by providing an explanation for an empirical puzzle—a sharp decline in the rate of honored alliances after 1945.El porcentaje en que los Estados defienden a sus aliados en una guerra ha descendido del 81% durante el periodo de 1816-1944 al 7% durante el periodo de 1945-2016. Atribuimos el deterioro de las alianzas de honor a un cambio drástico en la capacidad militar de las alianzas. En contra de la creencia popular de que las alianzas se han fortalecido después de 1945, observamos que el sistema internacional posterior a 1945 también ha sido testigo de un aumento significativo del número de alianzas más débiles. Esta distribución bimodal de las alianzas produjo un patrón en el que las alianzas fueron vulneradas al ser atacadas o nunca llegaron a ser atacadas, lo que condujo a un descenso en la tasa de cumplimiento de las alianzas. Apoyamos nuestro argumento en los datos sobre las alianzas a lo largo de dos siglos. Esta investigación profundiza nuestra comprensión de las alianzas militares al documentar una polarización de las alianzas en términos de su capacidad militar después de 1945 y al proporcionar una explicación para un rompecabezas empírico: una fuerte disminución en la tasa de alianzas de honor después de 1945.Le taux auquel les États défendent leurs alliés lors de guerres est passé de 81 % durant la période 1816-1944 à 7 % de 1945 à 2016. J’attribue ce déclin du respect des alliances à un changement radical de leurs capacités militaires. Contrairement à la croyance populaire selon laquelle les alliances se sont renforcées depuis 1945, selon moi, le système international a depuis cette date été le témoin d’une augmentation importante des alliances plus fragiles. Cette distribution bimodale des alliances a généré un schéma dans lequel les alliances étaient soit violées lors d’attaques, soit ne subissaient jamais d’attaques, ce qui a conduit à une diminution du taux de respect des alliances. J’étaye mon propos à l’aide de données sur les alliances collectées durant plus de deux siècles. Cet article de recherche vise à affiner notre compréhension des alliances militaires, en documentant une polarisation des alliances relativement à leurs capacités militaires d’après 1945 et en fournissant une explication au puzzle empirique du fort déclin du taux de respect des alliances après 1945. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 114-131 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2135513 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2135513 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:114-131 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2149513_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Felix Schulte Author-X-Name-First: Felix Author-X-Name-Last: Schulte Author-Name: Christoph V. Steinert Author-X-Name-First: Christoph V. Author-X-Name-Last: Steinert Title: Repression and backlash protests: Why leader arrests backfire Abstract: This study investigates how different targets of state-sanctioned arrests shape the likelihood of collective action. We hypothesize that leader arrests are especially likely to result in backlash protests. Leader arrests symbolize the suppression of social collectives, they create collective grievances, and constitute focal points for mobilization. Building on a global sample of arrests of cultural identity group members, we qualitatively traced for each arrest whether it sparked a backlash protest. Drawing on coarsened exact matched models, we find that protests are significantly more likely following leader arrests. In contrast, mass arrests are not significantly linked to backlash protests. Additional tests show that organizational membership does not drive this findings, whereas the symbolic value of leaders is linked to protest outbreaks. Our findings cast doubt on the narrow focus on quasi-constant structural variables and make the case for the disaggregation of repression and the importance of triggering events. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-30 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2149513 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2149513 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:1-30 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2172002_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Merih Angin Author-X-Name-First: Merih Author-X-Name-Last: Angin Author-Name: Albana Shehaj Author-X-Name-First: Albana Author-X-Name-Last: Shehaj Author-Name: Adrian J. Shin Author-X-Name-First: Adrian J. Author-X-Name-Last: Shin Title: IMF: International Migration Fund Abstract: Existing models of international organizations focus on the strategic and commercial interests of major shareholders to explain why some countries secure better deals from international organizations. Focusing on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that the Fund’s major shareholders pressure the IMF to minimize short-term adjustment costs in the borrowing country when they host a large number of the country’s nationals. Stringent loan packages often exacerbate short-term economic distress in the borrowing country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Analyzing all IMF programs from 1978 to 2014, we assess our hypothesis that IMF borrowers with larger diasporas in the major IMF shareholder countries tend to secure better arrangements from the IMF. Our findings show that when migration pressures on the G5 countries increase, borrowing countries receive larger loan disbursements and fewer conditions.Los modelos existentes de organizaciones internacionales se centran en los intereses estratégicos y comerciales de los principales accionistas para explicar por qué algunos países obtienen mejores tratos por parte de las organizaciones internacionales. Centrándonos en el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), argumentamos que los principales accionistas del Fondo presionan al FMI para que minimice los costes de ajuste a corto plazo en el país prestatario cuando acogen a un gran número de ciudadanos de ese país. Los severos paquetes de préstamos suelen exacerbar las dificultades económicas a corto plazo en el país prestatario, lo que a su vez provoca que más personas emigren a países donde residen otros de sus compatriotas. Analizando todos los programas del FMI desde 1978 hasta 2014, evaluamos nuestra hipótesis de que los prestatarios del FMI con mayores diásporas en los principales países accionistas del FMI tienden a obtener mejores acuerdos por parte del FMI. Nuestras conclusiones muestran que cuando aumentan las presiones migratorias en los países del G5, los países prestatarios reciben mayores desembolsos de préstamos y con menos condiciones.Les modèles actuels d’organisations internationales se focalisent sur les intérêts stratégiques et commerciaux des actionnaires majoritaires pour expliquer pourquoi certains pays obtiennent de meilleurs accords auprès des organisations internationales. En nous concentrant sur le Fonds monétaire international (FMI), nous affirmons que ses actionnaires majoritaires appliquent une certaine pression pour réduire les coûts d’ajustement à court terme du pays emprunteur, quand un grand nombre de ressortissants de ce pays vit chez eux. Les prêts aux conditions strictes aggravent souvent la détresse économique à court terme dans le pays emprunteur. Cette situation renforce ensuite fréquemment l’immigration vers les pays où des compatriotes résident. Après l’analyse de tous les programmes du FMI de 1978 à 2014, nous évaluons notre hypothèse : quand les emprunteurs disposent d’une diaspora plus importante dans les pays actionnaires majoritaires du fonds, ils obtiennent de meilleurs accords auprès du FMI. Nos résultats montrent que lorsque la pression migratoire sur les pays du G5 s’accroît, les pays emprunteurs reçoivent des versements de prêt plus importants et sont soumis à moins de conditions. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 86-113 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2172002 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2172002 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:86-113 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2162512_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Austin Horng-En Wang Author-X-Name-First: Austin Horng-En Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Author-Name: Charles K. S. Wu Author-X-Name-First: Charles K. S. Author-X-Name-Last: Wu Author-Name: Yao-Yuan Yeh Author-X-Name-First: Yao-Yuan Author-X-Name-Last: Yeh Author-Name: Fang-Yu Chen Author-X-Name-First: Fang-Yu Author-X-Name-Last: Chen Title: High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan Abstract: Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during a one-week national survey (n = 1,500) in June 2021. Propensity score matching and regression discontinuity analysis showed that the visit significantly increased Taiwanese respondents’ confidence in their own military, the government’s security policy, and support for the security policy favored by the US (strengthening the Taiwanese military). Limitations, scope conditions, and suggestions for future work were also discussed.Las grandes potencias suelen utilizar las visitas de alto nivel para tranquilizar a los Estados más débiles. La literatura sobre diplomacia pública muestra que estas visitas pueden aportar una serie de ventajas, al tiempo que pasa por alto su impacto potencial en el aumento del apoyo a la agenda de seguridad de la gran potencia y de la confianza en la política de defensa y el ejército del país anfitrión. Esta nota empleó un cuasi-experimento en Taiwán, en el que tres senadores estadounidenses de alto perfil visitaron Taiwán inesperadamente durante una encuesta nacional de una semana (n = 1500) en junio de 2021. El pareamiento por puntaje de propensión y el análisis de regresión discontinua mostraron que la visita aumentó significativamente la confianza de los encuestados taiwaneses en su propio ejército, la política de seguridad del gobierno y el apoyo a la política de seguridad propugnada por Estados Unidos (fortalecimiento del ejército taiwanés). También se debatieron las limitaciones, las condiciones del ámbito de aplicación y las sugerencias para futuros trabajos.Généralement, les grandes puissances emploient les visites officielles pour réassurer les États plus faibles. La littérature sur la diplomatie politique montre que ces visites peuvent apporter quantité d’avantages, mais omet l’effet potentiel de renforcement du soutien au programme de sécurité de la grande puissance et de la confiance dans la politique de défense et l’armée du pays hôte. Cette note s’appuie sur une quasi-expérience à Taïwan, au cours de laquelle trois importants sénateurs américains ont effectué une visite inattendue à Taïwan, lors d’un sondage national d’une semaine (n = 1 500) en juin 2021. L’appariement sur le score de propension et l’analyse de la régression sur discontinuité ont montré que la visite a fortement renforcé la confiance des Taïwanais interrogés en leur propre armée, la politique de sécurité du gouvernement et le soutien à la politique de sécurité que préféraient les États-Unis (renforcement de l’armée taïwanaise). Nous nous sommes également intéressés aux limites, aux conditions du champ d’application et aux suggestions de travaux ultérieurs. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 132-146 Issue: 1 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2162512 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2162512 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:1:p:132-146 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2180500_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Javier Osorio Author-X-Name-First: Javier Author-X-Name-Last: Osorio Title: Are many sets of eyes better than one? Evaluating multiple databases of armed actors in Colombia Abstract: In contrast to the pervasive scarcity of disaggregated data affecting sub-national conflict studies, Colombia concentrates a wealth of databases measuring armed actors. How comparable are these databases? What are the implications of their differences for statistical inference? This research compares seven prominent sub-national measures of armed actors in Colombia. Using the Jaccard Similarity Index, the analysis reveals low similarity between measures. At best, results show 28.7% similarity when considering aggregated actor types, but similarity drops to 14.4% when considering specific armed groups. These measures also yield diverging statistical results when used as dependent or independent variables. In addition to their conceptual and methodological differences, pervasive missing data seem to be driving estimate discrepancies. The nuances of these measurement sets make it difficult to categorically determine if this low similarity is an asset or a limitation for empirical research. Yet, the analysis provides clear prescriptions for researchers in data-abundant settings.En contraste con la escasez generalizada de datos desglosados que afecta a los estudios de conflictos subnacionales, Colombia concentra una gran cantidad de bases de datos que cuantifican agentes armados. ¿Qué tan comparables son estas bases de datos? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones de sus diferencias para la inferencia estadística? Este estudio compara siete prominentes medidas subnacionales de agentes armados en Colombia. Utilizando el índice de similitud de Jaccard, el análisis revela una baja similitud entre estas medidas. En el mejor de los casos, los resultados muestran una similitud del 28.7% cuando se consideran los tipos agregados de actores. Sin embargo, la similitud desciende al 14.4% cuando se consideran grupos armados específicos. Estas medidas también devengan resultados estadísticos divergentes cuando se utilizan como variables dependientes o independientes. Además de las diferencias conceptuales y metodológicas entre ellas, la falta de datos generalizada parece generar las discrepancias en las estimaciones. Los matices de estos conjuntos de medición hacen que sea difícil determinar categóricamente si esta baja similitud es una ventaja o una limitación para la investigación empírica. Aun así, el análisis proporciona recomendaciones claras para los investigadores en entornos en los que existen abundantes datos.Les études sur les conflits sous-nationaux disposent généralement d’un accès très limité aux données, mais la Colombie, elle, possède nombre de bases de données pour mesurer les acteurs armés. Dans quelle mesure sont-elles comparables ? Que signifient leurs différences pour l’inférence statistique ? Ce travail de recherche compare sept mesures sous-nationales importantes des acteurs armés en Colombie. À l’aide de l’indice de similarité de Jaccard, l’analyse révèle un faible niveau de similarités entre les mesures. Au mieux, les résultats révèlent une similarité de 28,7 % pour les agrégations de types d’acteurs, mais elle chute pour atteindre 14,4 % quand on s’intéresse à des groupes armés spécifiques. Ces mesures génèrent aussi des résultats statistiques différents quand elles sont employées comme variables dépendantes ou indépendantes. Outre les différences conceptuelles et méthodologiques, le grand nombre de données encore absentes permettrait d’expliquer les écarts entre les estimations. Cet ensemble de mesures étant nuancé, il est difficile d’établir de façon catégorique si ce faible niveau de similarités représente un atout ou un inconvénient pour la recherche empirique. Néanmoins, l’analyse fournit des recommandations claires pour les chercheurs qui évoluent dans des milieux où les données sont abondantes. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 268-285 Issue: 2 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2180500 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2180500 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:2:p:268-285 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2186406_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Jose Antonio Fortou Author-X-Name-First: Jose Antonio Author-X-Name-Last: Fortou Author-Name: Sandra Lillian Johansson Author-X-Name-First: Sandra Lillian Author-X-Name-Last: Johansson Author-Name: Juan Carlos Muñoz Mora Author-X-Name-First: Juan Carlos Author-X-Name-Last: Muñoz Mora Title: Control, dispute, and concentration of land during civil war: Evidence from Colombia Abstract: How are patterns of armed control and dispute by armed actors related to land concentration, land property rights, and distribution? We argue that armed actors affect land tenure by using different land transfer mechanisms to distribute the land, which reflects the dynamics of control and dispute during civil conflict. We test this argument by studying the case of Urabá, a region in northwestern Colombia, using a mixed-method strategy. First, using extensive qualitative fieldwork, we find that armed actors systematically applied different land transfer mechanisms in areas where they held control. Armed actors strategically changed from employing one land transfer mechanism to another in relation to the level of dispute, political and economic objectives, and alignment with the state, among others. In our fieldwork, we identify how these land transfer mechanisms led to patterns of territorial control and land tenure structure. We then analyze an original dataset of rural plot ownership in Urabá, based on official cadastral information, to empirically verify our qualitative findings. We estimate a village-level fixed effects model that shows that disputed territories and those under paramilitary control had larger plots, higher land inequality, and fewer land transfers. In contrast, territories with established control by left-wing insurgents exhibit a small landholder scheme. These results offer important insights into the relationship between civil armed conflict and land and the logic of rebel governance.¿Cómo se relacionan los patrones de control armado y de disputa por parte de los agentes armados con la concentración de tierras, los derechos de propiedad de las tierras y su distribución? Argumentamos que los agentes armados ejercen un efecto en la tenencia de tierras utilizando diversos mecanismos de transferencia de tierras para distribuir las tierras, lo que refleja la dinámica de control y de disputa durante un conflicto civil. Ponemos a prueba esta hipótesis, utilizando una estrategia de método mixto, a través del estudio del caso de Urabá, una región en el noroeste de Colombia. En primer lugar, hallamos, utilizando un extenso trabajo de campo cualitativo, que los agentes armados aplicaron sistemáticamente diferentes mecanismos de transferencia de tierras en las áreas donde tenían el control. Los agentes armados fueron cambiando, de manera estratégica, el uso entre uno u otro mecanismo de transferencia de tierras en función del nivel de disputa, de los objetivos políticos y económicos, y de la alineación con el Estado, entre otros factores. En nuestro trabajo de campo, identificamos cómo estos mecanismos de transferencia de tierras provocaron patrones de control territorial y de estructura de tenencia de la tierra. A continuación, analizamos un conjunto de datos originales, basado en información catastral oficial, de propiedades parcelarias rurales en Urabá con el fin de verificar empíricamente nuestros hallazgos cualitativos. Estimamos un modelo de efectos fijos en las aldeas que demuestra que los territorios en disputa y aquellos bajo control paramilitar tenían parcelas más grandes, mayor desigualdad de tierras y menor transferencia de tierras. En contraposición, aquellos territorios cuyo control está establecido por insurgentes de izquierdas exhiben un pequeño esquema de terratenientes. Estos resultados ofrecen información importante acerca de la relación entre el conflicto armado civil y la tierra, y acerca de la lógica de la gobernanza rebelde.Quels sont les liens qui unissent les schémas de contrôle armé et de conflits des acteurs armés à la concentration et la distribution des terres, ainsi que les droits à la propriété foncière? Selon nous, les acteurs armés ont une incidence sur le régime foncier en utilisant différents mécanismes de transfert des terres, qui reflètent la dynamique de contrôle et les oppositions lors d’un conflit civil. Afin de vérifier cette hypothèse, nous appliquons une stratégie aux méthodes mixtes pour analyser le cas d’Urabá, une région au nord-ouest de la Colombie. D’abord, à l’aide d’un travail de terrain qualitatif approfondi, nous observons que les acteurs armés ont systématiquement appliqué différents mécanismes de transfert de terres dans les régions qu’ils contrôlaient. Ils passaient stratégiquement d’un mécanisme de transfert des terres à l’autre, notamment selon l’intensité du conflit, les objectifs politiques et économiques ou leur accord avec l’État. Dans notre travail de terrain, nous identifions comment ces mécanismes de transfert de terres ont engendré des schémas de contrôle territorial et une structure de régime foncier. Ensuite, afin de vérifier empiriquement nos observations qualitatives, nous analysons un ensemble de données original de la propriété des parcelles rurales à Urabá, en nous appuyant sur les informations officielles du cadastre. Nous élaborons un modèle des effets fixe au niveau d’un village qui montre que les territoires disputés, et ceux contrôlés par des forces paramilitaires, se caractérisent par de plus grandes parcelles, une inégalité foncière plus marquée et des transferts de terres plus rares. À l’inverse, l’organisation des territoires non disputés et contrôlés par des rebelles de gauche favorise les petits propriétaires terriens. Ces résultats fournissent des renseignements importants sur la relation entre un conflit armé civil, les terres et la logique de gouvernance rebelle. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 201-236 Issue: 2 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2186406 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2186406 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:2:p:201-236 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2045287_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: German Lambardi Author-X-Name-First: German Author-X-Name-Last: Lambardi Author-Name: Paola Palacios Author-X-Name-First: Paola Author-X-Name-Last: Palacios Title: Land use and the incidence of forced displacement Abstract: In the context of the Colombian internal conflict, rural communities engaged in subsistence agriculture and traditional modes of production, most of which are not highly profitable, are significantly affected by displacement. We explain this finding by the use of a game-theoretical model where the government obtains income and provides security for regions while the armed group extorts productive agriculture and chooses the percentage of subsistence farmers to force out from their lands. By displacing population, the armed group reallocates land from subsistence to modern agriculture, increasing the potential gains from extortion. We find that if land productivity is sufficiently high and the proportion of land devoted to modern productive agriculture is small, the government provides low security, and displacement occurs. The government only prevents displacement if the income obtained from the region exceeds the cost of security provision which occurs when the proportion of land devoted to subsistence agriculture is sufficiently small. Predictions from the theoretical model are tested using a panel data set of Colombian municipalities for 2003–2017. Results from the fixed-effects panel estimations indicate that municipalities with collective titles exhibit higher IDPs expulsion rates, in accordance with the theory. Findings from the model could also shed light on other countries where forced displacement is aimed at land reallocation that allows for a more productive use of this resource.En el contexto del conflicto interno de Colombia, las comunidades rurales que implementan la agricultura de subsistencia y los métodos de producción tradicionales, la mayoría de los cuales no son muy rentables, se ven afectadas por el desplazamiento de manera significativa. Explicamos este descubrimiento mediante un modelo simple de la teoría de juegos, en el que el Gobierno obtiene ingresos y brinda seguridad para las regiones, mientras que el grupo armado extorsiona la agricultura productiva y selecciona el porcentaje de agricultores de subsistencia para expulsar de sus tierras. Mediante el desplazamiento de la población, el grupo armado redistribuye la tierra de la agricultura de subsistencia a la moderna y aumenta las posibles ganancias provenientes de la extorsión. Observamos que, si la productividad de la tierra es lo suficientemente alta y la proporción de tierra dedicada a la agricultura productiva moderna es pequeña, el Gobierno brinda poca seguridad, y tiene lugar el desplazamiento. El Gobierno solo evita el desplazamiento si los ingresos obtenidos de la región superan el costo de la provisión de seguridad, lo cual se produce cuando la proporción de tierra dedicada a la agricultura de subsistencia es lo suficientemente pequeña. Los descubrimientos del modelo teórico se contrastan con el caso de las comunidades que ocupan los territorios ancestrales en la región del Pacífico del país y participaron en un gran programa colectivo de títulos de propiedad. Los descubrimientos del modelo también pudieron clarificar otros casos de migración forzada en las comunidades que implementan los métodos tradicionales de producción en todo el mundo.Dans le contexte du conflit intérieur colombien, les communautés rurales pratiquant une agriculture de subsistance et des modes de production traditionnels, dont la plupart ne sont pas très rentables, sont fortement touchées par les déplacements de population. Nous expliquons cette conclusion en utilisant un modèle simple de théorie des jeux où le gouvernement obtient des recettes et assure la sécurité des régions tandis que le groupe armé extorque l’agriculture productive et choisit le pourcentage d’agriculteurs de subsistance à expulser de leurs terres. En déplaçant la population, le groupe armé réaffecte les terres d’agriculture de subsistance à l’agriculture moderne, augmentant ainsi les gains potentiels liés à l’extorsion. Nous constatons que si la productivité des terres est suffisamment élevée et que la proportion de terres consacrées à l’agriculture productive moderne est faible, le gouvernement offre une faible sécurité et des déplacements de population ont lieu. Le gouvernement n’empêche ces déplacements que si les recettes obtenues de la région dépassent le coût de la fourniture de la sécurité, ce qui se produit lorsque la proportion de terres consacrées à l’agriculture de subsistance est suffisamment faible. Les conclusions du modèle théorique sont mises en contraste avec le cas des communautés occupant des territoires ancestraux dans la région Pacifique du pays qui ont pris part au vaste programme d’attribution de titres de propriété collective. Les conclusions du modèle pourraient également apporter un éclairage sur d’autres cas de migration forcée intervenant dans des communautés pratiquant des modes traditionnels de production dans le monde entier. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 171-200 Issue: 2 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2045287 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2022.2045287 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:2:p:171-200 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2142218_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Juan Albarracín Author-X-Name-First: Juan Author-X-Name-Last: Albarracín Author-Name: Juan Pablo Milanese Author-X-Name-First: Juan Pablo Author-X-Name-Last: Milanese Author-Name: Inge H. Valencia Author-X-Name-First: Inge H. Author-X-Name-Last: Valencia Author-Name: Jonas Wolff Author-X-Name-First: Jonas Author-X-Name-Last: Wolff Title: Local competitive authoritarianism and post-conflict violence. An analysis of the assassination of social leaders in Colombia Abstract: The threat of continued violence is a primary concern in post-conflict societies. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized Colombia since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement: the assassination of social leaders. Building on explanations that emphasize state weakness, illicit economies, and the role of illegal armed actors, we argue that the assassination of social leaders also responds to efforts by local elites to sustain local competitive authoritarian orders in the face of bottom-up threats to their power by sociopolitical actors mobilized around the local implementation of the peace agreement. Using a cross-sectional dataset of Colombian municipalities, we find that assassinations of social leaders are more likely and more frequent in municipalities with intermediate levels of party fragmentation and low levels of voter turnout—that is, in municipalities with restricted electoral competition. Furthermore, a higher share of votes for leftist parties, which signals the presence of challengers to local elites, correlates with a higher probability and a higher number of assassinations. Overall, this article suggests that the nature of local political orders constitutes a key dimension shaping the micro-dynamics of violence and repression in post-conflict contexts.La amenaza de la continuación de la violencia es una de las principales preocupaciones en las sociedades en posconflicto. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre la violencia en el posconflicto analizando un fenómeno específico que ha caracterizado a Colombia desde la firma del acuerdo de paz de 2016: el asesinato de líderes sociales. Partiendo de las explicaciones que enfatizan la debilidad del Estado, las economías ilícitas y el papel de los actores armados ilegales, argumentamos que el asesinato de líderes sociales también responde a los esfuerzos de las élites locales para sostener los órdenes autoritarios competitivos locales frente a las amenazas a su poder por parte de los actores sociopolíticos movilizados en torno a la implementación local del acuerdo de paz. Utilizando un conjunto de datos de municipios colombianos, observamos que los asesinatos de líderes sociales son más probables y más frecuentes en municipios con niveles intermedios de fragmentación partidista y bajos niveles de participación electoral, es decir, en municipios con competencia electoral restringida. Además, se correlaciona una mayor proporción de votos a los partidos de izquierda, un indicador de la presencia de contendientes a las élites locales, con una mayor probabilidad de que ocurran asesinatos, así como un mayor número de casos. Como conclusión, este artículo sugiere que la naturaleza de los órdenes políticos locales constituye una dimensión clave que determina las microdinámicas de la violencia y la represión en contextos de posconflicto.Le risque de la poursuite des violences est une préoccupation majeure dans les sociétés post-conflit. Cet article contribue à la littérature sur la violence post-conflit en analysant un phénoméne spécifique qui caractérise la Colombie depuis la signature de l'accord de paix de 2016 : l'assassinat de leaders sociaux. En s'appuyant sur des explications qui mettent l'accent sur la faiblesse de l'État, les économies illicites et le rôle des acteurs armés illégaux, nous soutenons que l'assassinat des leaders sociaux répond également aux efforts des élites locales pour maintenir des ordres autoritaires compétitifs locaux face aux menaces à leur pouvoir de la part des acteurs sociopolitiques mobilisés autour de la mise en œuvre locale de l'accord de paix. En utilisant des données provenant de municipalités colombiennes, nous constatons que les assassinats de leaders sociaux sont plus probables et plus fréquents dans les municipalités où la concurrence électorale est limitée. En outre, une part plus importante de votes pour les partis de gauche, un indicateur de la présence de concurrents (challengers) aux élites locales, est corrélée à une plus grande probabilité d'assassinats, ainsi qu'à un nombre plus élevé de cas. En conclusion, cet article suggére que la nature des ordres politiques locaux constitue une dimension clé déterminant la micro-dynamique de la violence et de la répression dans les contextes post-conflit. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 237-267 Issue: 2 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2142218 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2142218 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:2:p:237-267 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2189705_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Santiago Sosa Author-X-Name-First: Santiago Author-X-Name-Last: Sosa Title: The micro-dynamics of conflict and peace: Evidence from Colombia Abstract: This article introduces the special issue “The Micro-dynamics of Conflict and Peace: Evidence from Colombia.” It contributes to the burgeoning literature on the study of micro-dynamics in peace and conflict studies, with a special empirical focus on the Colombian case. The contributors to the special issue use a variety of methods and interdisciplinary approaches to study questions regarding land tenure and forced displacement during conflict, the assassination of social leaders in post-conflict scenarios, as well as dataset comparability and accuracy in micro-level analyses. They tackle the challenges of micro-level studies of conflict, namely the disconnect between the macro- and the micro-levels, data quality, and generalization. Indeed, although all articles use Colombia in their empirical analyses, the theoretical contributions are broad and general: land tenure structures cause and are caused by conflict dynamics; national policies will be met with violence to preserve local orders; and relatively rich data environments are not as reliable as they might seem. Este artículo presenta el número especial “Las microdinámicas de conflicto y paz: evidencia de Colombia”. Contribuye a la creciente literatura sobre las microdinámicas en los estudios de paz y conflicto, con un enfoque empírico especial en el caso colombiano. Los autores en este número especial usan una variedad de métodos y aproximaciones interdisciplinares para estudiar preguntas acerca de la tenencia de la tierra y el desplazamiento forzado durante el conflicto, el asesinato de líderes sociales en escenarios de posconflicto, así como la comparabilidad y certeza de bases de datos en los análisis a un nivel micro. Los autores enfrentan los retos del estudio a nivel micro del conflicto, a saber: la desconexión entre los niveles macro y micro, la calidad de los datos, y la generalización. En efecto, aunque todos los artículos usan a Colombia en sus análisis empíricos, las contribuciones teóricas son amplias y generales: las estructuras de la tenencia de la tierra causan y son causadas por las dinámicas del conflicto; las políticas nacionales serán enfrentadas con violencia para preservar órdenes locales; y ambientes relativamente ricos en datos no necesariamente son tan fiables como aparentan. Cet article présente le numéro spécial “Les microdynamiques des conflits et de la paix : évidence de la Colombie”. Il contribue à la littérature croissante sur les microdynamiques dans les études sur la paix et les conflits, avec un focus empirique particulier sur le cas colombien. Les auteurs de ce numéro spécial utilisent une variété de méthodes et d'approches interdisciplinaires pour étudier des questions sur le régime foncier et les déplacements forcés pendant les conflits, le meurtre de leaders sociaux dans les situations post-conflit, ainsi que la comparabilité et la certitude des bases de données dans l'analyse à un niveau micro. Les auteurs sont confrontés aux défis de l'étude du conflit au niveau micro, à savoir : la déconnexion entre les niveaux macro et micro, la qualité des données et la généralisation. En effet, bien que tous les articles utilisent la Colombie dans leurs analyses empiriques, les contributions théoriques sont amples et générales : les structures fonciéres causent et sont causées par la dynamique des conflits; les politiques nationales se heurteront à la violence pour préserver l'ordre local; et les environnements relativement riches en données ne sont pas nécessairement aussi fiables qu'ils le paraissent. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 163-170 Issue: 2 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2189705 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2189705 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:2:p:163-170 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2179046_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Mohammad Reza Farzanegan Author-X-Name-First: Mohammad Reza Author-X-Name-Last: Farzanegan Author-Name: Hassan F. Gholipour Author-X-Name-First: Hassan Author-X-Name-Last: F. Gholipour Title: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and votes in favor of Russia in the UN General Assembly Abstract: Why did some countries decline to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly’s first emergency session since 1997? Our research investigates the various economic, military, political, geographic, and historical factors that may have influenced the voting behavior of these countries in favor of Russia. Our Probit regressions reveal that the probability of voting in favor of Russia is significantly and robustly higher in countries that have defense cooperation agreements with Russia, have a longer history of leftist governments, are major recipients of Russian aid, have political similarities with Russia, and have no history of war with the Soviet Union. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 454-470 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2179046 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2179046 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:454-470 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2172003_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Yooneui Kim Author-X-Name-First: Yooneui Author-X-Name-Last: Kim Title: A network analysis of naming and shaming in the universal periodic review Abstract: What decides naming and shaming behavior of states? In the present paper I examine state recommendations in the Universal Periodic Review and show that naming and shaming is inherently a social phenomenon and network analysis can contribute to the better understanding of this broader social context. Using original qualitative data collected from Geneva, Switzerland, I develop a theory of the interdependent nature of state shaming, mainly through the work of non-governmental organizations. I argue that states are more likely to name and shame other states if many other countries have also named and shamed the same states. As non-governmental organizations contribute to revealing information about reviewer states’ interests to one another, states believe their costs are lower when states shame together than when they shame alone. The empirical analyses of Exponential Random Graph Models of the Universal Periodic Review shaming network from 2012 to 2016 find evidence of bandwagon effects even after controlling for the effects of other network structures, dyadic geopolitical relations, and state level attributes. This paper helps us better understand the decision of state-to-state shaming by incorporating social relations and networks.¿Qué hace que un Estado decida usar el recurso de citar por el nombre a otros estados con el propósito de avergonzarlos? En el presente documento examinamos las recomendaciones estatales en el Examen Periódico Universal y mostramos que citar por el nombre a otros estados con el propósito de avergonzarlos es, intrínsecamente, un fenómeno social y que el análisis de redes puede contribuir a comprender mejor este contexto social más amplio. Utilizando datos cualitativos originales recogidos en Ginebra (Suiza), desarrollamos una teoría sobre la naturaleza interdependiente del avergonzamiento por parte del Estado, principalmente a través de la labor de las organizaciones no gubernamentales. Sostenemos que es más probable que los Estados citen por el nombre a otros Estados con propósito de avergonzarlos si algunos otros países también han citado y avergonzado a los mismos Estados. Como las organizaciones no gubernamentales contribuyen a revelar información sobre los intereses de los Estados revisores entre sí, los Estados creen que sus costes son más reducidos cuando los Estados se avergüenzan juntos que cuando se avergüenzan solos. Los análisis empíricos de los modelos gráficos aleatorios exponenciales de la red de avergonzamiento del Examen Periódico Universal de 2012 a 2016 encuentran pruebas de efectos de arrastre, incluso después de controlar los efectos de otras estructuras de red, de relaciones geopolíticas diádicas y de atributos a nivel estatal. Este artículo nos ayuda a comprender mejor la decisión de un Estado de avergonzar a otro incorporando las relaciones y redes sociales.Pourquoi les États en dénoncent-ils d’autres ? Dans cet article, j’analyse les recommandations des États dans l’Examen périodique universel, puis je montre que la dénonciation est un phénomène social par nature et que l’analyse des mécanismes peut permettre de mieux comprendre ce contexte social dans son ensemble. À l’aide de données qualitatives originales issues de Genève, je théorise l’interdépendance naturelle de la dénonciation des États, principalement grâce au travail des organisations non gouvernementales. Selon moi, les États en dénoncent plus facilement d’autres quand ils sont déjà nombreux à l’avoir fait. Comme les intérêts qui unissent les États examinateurs sont mis au jour par des ONG, les États sont convaincus qu’ils courent moins de risques si la dénonciation est collective. En analysant empiriquement des modèles de graphes aléatoires exponentiels des mécanismes de dénonciation de l’Examen périodique universel entre 2012 et 2016, on observe que les États prennent souvent « le train en marche », et ce, même après avoir neutralisé les effets d’autres structures de mécanisme, relations géopolitiques dyadiques et attributs nationaux. En intégrant les relations sociales et les mécanismes, cet article facilite notre compréhension des décisions de dénonciation interétatique. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 287-314 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2172003 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2172003 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:287-314 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2184815_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Tim Haesebrouck Author-X-Name-First: Tim Author-X-Name-Last: Haesebrouck Title: The populist radical right and military intervention: A coincidence analysis of military deployment votes Abstract: Although populist radical right (PRR) parties have been studied intensively for the last few decades, only very few comparative studies on the parliamentary behavior of PRR parties have been conducted. This article aims to fill this gap in academic research by examining the pattern of PRR voting on military deployments. More specifically, it examines under what conditions PRR parties support military deployment decisions in national parliaments. The results of our analysis indicate that PRR parties are more inclined to vote in favor of contributions to operations that are deployed to balance the threat of Jihadi terrorism. However, the majority of PRR party votes on military deployments is not determined by factors related to the operation in which forces are deployed, but is driven by the expected impact of the parliamentary vote on the PRR parties’ broader vote-, office- and policy-seeking objectives. This expected impact, in turn, is determined by a complex interplay between party size, government experience, the party’s level of anti-elitism and the ideological composition of the government.A pesar de que los partidos de la derecha radical populista (DRP) se han estudiado intensamente durante las últimas décadas, se han realizado muy pocos estudios comparativos sobre el comportamiento parlamentario de los partidos de la DRP. Este artículo tiene como objetivo llenar este vacío en la investigación académica mediante el estudio del patrón de votación de los partidos de la DRP en materia de despliegues militares. De manera más específica, el artículo estudia en qué condiciones los partidos de la DRP apoyan, en los parlamentos nacionales, las decisiones de despliegue militar. Los resultados de nuestro análisis indican que los partidos de la DRP se decantan más a votar a favor de las contribuciones a las operaciones que se despliegan con el fin de equilibrar la amenaza del terrorismo yihadista. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los votos de los partidos de la DRP en materia de despliegues militares no se encuentra determinada por factores relacionados con la operación en la que se despliegan las fuerzas, sino que está impulsada por el impacto esperado de la votación parlamentaria en los objetivos más amplios de búsqueda de los votos, de búsqueda de los cargos públicos y de búsqueda de las políticas por parte los partidos de la DRP. Este impacto esperado está determinado, a su vez, por una compleja interacción entre el tamaño del partido, la experiencia a nivel de gobierno, el nivel de antielitismo del partido y la composición ideológica del gobierno.Bien que les partis de droite radicale populiste (DRP) aient fait l’objet de nombreuses études ces dernières décennies, seules quelques études comparatives sur le comportement parlementaire de ces partis ont été menées. Cet article vise à combler cette lacune de la recherche académique en analysant les schémas de vote DRP sur les déploiements militaires. Plus précisément, il s’intéresse aux conditions qui poussent les partis DRP à soutenir les décisions de déploiement militaire au sein des parlements nationaux. Selon les résultats de notre analyse, les partis DRP sont plus enclins à voter en faveur de contributions aux opérations déployées pour faire face à la menace terroriste djihadiste. Néanmoins, la majorité des votes de partis DRP concernant les déploiements militaires ne sont pas déterminés par des facteurs relatifs à l’opération où les forces sont déployées. Ils sont plutôt motivés par les conséquences attendues de ce vote pour les objectifs plus larges poursuivis par les partis DRP, que ce soit en termes d’élection, de fonction ou de politique. À leur tour, ces conséquences attendues se décident à l’aide d’un ensemble compliqué de facteurs : la taille du parti, son niveau d’anti-élitisme, l’expérience du gouvernement et sa composition idéologique. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 345-371 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2184815 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2184815 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:345-371 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2177283_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Nazmus Sakib Author-X-Name-First: Nazmus Author-X-Name-Last: Sakib Author-Name: Md Muhibbur Rahman Author-X-Name-First: Md Muhibbur Author-X-Name-Last: Rahman Title: Military in the cabinet and defense spending of civilian governments Abstract: In this article, we assess the variation in civilian governments’ defense spending as a function of civil-military relations. We present a novel explanation based on the military’s presence in the political decision-making apparatus. We argue that the appointment of an active military officer in a key governmental position allows the government to make a more credible commitment to provide the military with adequate rents and thereby stabilizes civil-military relations. The appointment helps solve the commitment problem on the part of the government by reducing the coordination costs for the military to challenge the government more successfully in the event of the government’s defection. Hence, the military’s incentive to intervene in politics to prevent the government’s monopoly over rents lessens markedly. Defense spending increases as a result because this arrangement requires the government to honor its promises to distribute increased rents among the military members of the winning coalition. Our theory predicts higher defense spending in cases where the military has a presence in the top-level policy-making positions within a civilian government. We find strong empirical evidence in support of our argument using data from 1984 to 2011. Civilian governments with a military presence in the cabinet’s security-related portfolios experience up to a 20% increase in their defense spending on average. This study offers important insights into governments’ motivation to appoint active-duty military officers in key policy-making positions and the effects of such appointments on civil-military resource allocation. En este artículo, evaluamos la variación del gasto en defensa de los gobiernos civiles en función de las relaciones cívico-militares. Presentamos una explicación novedosa basada en la presencia militar en el aparato de toma de decisiones políticas. Argumentamos que el nombramiento de un militar en activo en un puesto gubernamental clave permite al gobierno comprometerse de forma más creíble a proporcionar a los militares rentas adecuadas y, por tanto, permite estabilizar las relaciones cívico-militares. El nombramiento ayuda a mitigar el problema del compromiso por parte del gobierno al reducir los costes de coordinación de los militares para desafiar al gobierno con un mayor éxito en caso de deserción del gobierno. Por consiguiente, el incentivo de los militares para intervenir en la política con el fin de impedir los monopolios gubernamentales sobre las rentas disminuye de forma considerable. El gasto en defensa aumenta en consecuencia porque este acuerdo exige que el gobierno cumpla sus promesas de distribuir mayores rentas entre los miembros militares de la coalición ganadora. Nuestra teoría predice un mayor gasto en defensa en los casos en los que los militares están presentes en los puestos políticos de más alto nivel dentro de un gobierno civil. Encontramos sólidas pruebas empíricas en apoyo de nuestro argumento utilizando datos de 1984 a 2011. Los gobiernos civiles con presencia militar en los puestos relacionados con la seguridad del gabinete registran un aumento medio de hasta el 20% en sus gastos de defensa. Este estudio ofrece importantes perspectivas sobre la motivación de los gobiernos para nombrar a militares en activo para puestos clave en la formulación de políticas y los efectos de dichos nombramientos en la asignación de recursos cívico-militares. Dans cet article, nous établissons un lien entre les dépenses de défense des gouvernements civils et les relations entre civils et militaires. Nous proposons une nouvelle explication fondée sur la présence militaire dans le mécanisme de prise de décision politique. Selon nous, quand un gouvernement nomme un officier en service à un rôle clé au sein du gouvernement, il renforce la crédibilité de son engagement à attribuer au corps militaire des rentes adéquates et donc, stabilise les relations entre civils et militaires. Grâce à cette nomination, le gouvernement lève tout doute concernant son engagement : ses coûts de coordination réduits, le corps militaire pourra plus facilement défier le gouvernement en cas de défection. Les forces armées seront d’autant moins tentées d’intervenir politiquement contre les monopoles du gouvernement sur les rentes. Par conséquent, les dépenses de défense augmentent : le gouvernement doit honorer ses promesses de distribution de davantage de rentes aux officiers de la coalition gagnante. Selon notre théorie, les dépenses de défense augmenteraient quand des officiers occupent des fonctions importantes dans la prise de décisions au sein d’un gouvernement civil. À l’aide de données datant de 1984 à 2011, nous obtenons des preuves empiriques convaincantes pour étayer notre propos. En cas de présence militaire dans les dossiers du conseil des ministres relatifs à la sécurité, les dépenses de défense des gouvernements civils augmentent en moyenne de 20 pour cent. Cette étude permet de mieux comprendre ce qui motive les gouvernements quand ils nomment des officiers en service à des fonctions clés du processus de prise de décisions. Elle montre par ailleurs les effets de ces nominations sur la répartition des ressources entre civils et militaires. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 315-344 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2177283 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2177283 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:315-344 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2180501_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Yuichi Kubota Author-X-Name-First: Yuichi Author-X-Name-Last: Kubota Author-Name: Gaku Ito Author-X-Name-First: Gaku Author-X-Name-Last: Ito Author-Name: Masataka Harada Author-X-Name-First: Masataka Author-X-Name-Last: Harada Title: Making sense of violence in semi-technologized conventional civil war: Evidence from nineteenth-century Japan Abstract: While existing studies highlight features of violence in conventional civil wars, they overlook how war technology is linked to the tactics of armed forces. To shed light on the understudied phenomenon of semi-technologized regular forces in a civil war, this article explores why and how violence is executed by such forces. To do so, we examine patterns of violence in the Boshin War that took place in Japan between 1868 and 1869. Our analyses of novel geocoded event data demonstrate that violent incidents occurred in strategically important locations but in ways that differed from conventional and guerrilla wars. Armed forces were unable to operate as technologically sophisticated forces do in modern conventional civil war due to limited logistics capabilities. Avoiding encounters in less accessible areas, the forces tended to fight in and contest areas that allowed them to establish relationships with local civilians. Additionally, violence against civilians was more likely to occur on the front lines where armed forces and civilians interacted because the former relied on the latter to convey provisions, arms, and ammunition. Unlike in conventional civil wars, military battles and one-sided violence were not unrelated to each other. With these findings, we address temporal, regional, and typological biases in civil war studies.Si bien los estudios existentes enfatizan las características de la violencia en las guerras civiles convencionales, estos estudios pasan por alto cómo se vincula la tecnología de guerra con las tácticas de las fuerzas armadas. Este artículo analiza, con el fin de arrojar luz sobre el poco estudiado fenómeno de las fuerzas regulares «semi-tecnologizadas» en una guerra civil, por qué y de qué manera estas fuerzas ejercen esta violencia. Para ello, estudiamos los patrones de violencia en la Guerra Boshin que tuvo lugar en Japón entre 1868 y 1869. Los análisis que realizamos de nuevos datos de eventos geocodificados demuestran que los incidentes violentos tuvieron lugar en lugares estratégicamente importantes, pero de maneras que diferían de las guerras convencionales y de las guerras de guerrillas. Las fuerzas armadas no pudieron operar de la misma manera que lo harían las fuerzas tecnológicamente sofisticadas en la guerra civil convencional moderna debido a las limitadas capacidades logísticas. Las fuerzas armadas evitaban encuentros en áreas menos accesibles y tendían a luchar y a disputar áreas que les permitieran establecer relaciones con civiles locales. Además, era más probable que la violencia contra civiles tuviera lugar en las líneas del frente donde las fuerzas armadas y los civiles interactuaban debido a que las fuerzas armadas dependían de los civiles para transportar provisiones, armas y municiones. En contraposición a las guerras civiles convencionales, las batallas militares y la violencia unilateral no eran independientes una de la otra. Con estas conclusiones, abordamos los sesgos temporales, regionales y tipológicos en los estudios de la guerra civil.Bien que les études actuelles mettent en évidence les caractéristiques de la violence lors des guerres civiles traditionnelles, elles omettent la relation entre la technologie et les tactiques militaires. Pour expliquer ce phénomène sous-étudié, notre article analyse pourquoi et comment les forces traditionnelles semi-technologisées ont recours à la violence dans une guerre civile. Pour ce faire, nous étudions des schémas de violence au cours de la guerre de Boshin qui a sévi au Japon de 1868 à 1869. Nos analyses de données géocodées inédites sur cet événement montrent que des incidents violents ont eu lieu dans des lieux stratégiques, mais pas de la même façon que dans les guerres traditionnelles ou guérillas. La limitation de leurs capacités logistiques empêchait les forces armées d’intervenir comme elles l’auraient fait si elles bénéficiaient de technologies sophistiquées dans des guerres civiles traditionnelles modernes. Elles évitaient les rencontres dans les zones aux accès limités, préférant se battre pour le contrôle d’espaces qui leur permettaient d’établir des relations avec la population locale. En outre, les violences contre les populations civiles survenaient plus souvent sur le front, lors des interactions avec les forces armées en quête de provisions, d’armes et de munitions. À la différence des guerres civiles traditionnelles, il existait des liens entre les batailles militaires et la violence unilatérale. Grâce à nos observations, nous étudions les biais temporels, régionaux et typologiques des études sur les guerres civiles. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 401-423 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2180501 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2180501 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:401-423 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2184814_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Omer Zarpli Author-X-Name-First: Omer Author-X-Name-Last: Zarpli Title: Sanctions and target public opinion: Experimental evidence from Turkey Abstract: The research on economic sanctions effectiveness has highlighted the importance of public opinion. Yet the effect of sanctions on public opinion has attracted relatively limited scholarly attention. The few recent studies on this question report mixed findings. In this essay, I investigate the role of uncertainty over intentions in influencing public support for policy change in the target state. The literature on crisis bargaining have identified asymmetric information as a key problem. Studies on sanctions also highlight how sanctioning states (i.e. senders) often have unclear goals. Yet we do not have any firm evidence about how such uncertainties would affect public opinion. How do uncertainties about the intentions of the sender affect public support for policy change in the sanctioned (i.e. target) country? I argue that individuals would be less supportive of policy-change when they suspect that the sender has “ulterior motives” or a “hidden agenda.” I field a pre-registered online survey experiment in Turkey using the recent US sanctions to test this claim. The findings suggest that uncertainty has a negative impact on support for policy change, but only among certain subgroups. The main analysis is complemented by automated text analysis of respondents’ answers to provide suggestive evidence about uncertainty’s negative impact.La investigación acerca de la eficacia de las sanciones económicas ha puesto de relieve la importancia de la opinión pública. Sin embargo, el efecto que tienen las sanciones sobre la opinión pública ha atraído una atención académica relativamente limitada. Los pocos estudios recientes sobre esta cuestión declaran resultados variados. En este artículo, investigamos el papel que juega la incertidumbre sobre las intenciones de influenciar el apoyo público a un cambio de políticas en el estado receptor. La bibliografía sobre la negociación de crisis ha identificado la información asimétrica como un problema clave. Los estudios sobre sanciones también destacan cómo los estados sancionadores (es decir, los emisores) a menudo tienen objetivos poco claros. Sin embargo, no tenemos ninguna evidencia firme sobre cómo estas incertidumbres podrían afectar a la opinión pública. ¿Cómo afectan las incertidumbres sobre las intenciones del emisor al apoyo público al cambio de política en el país sancionado (es decir, receptor)? Argumentamos que los individuos apoyarían el cambio de política en menor medida cuando sospechasen que el emisor tiene «motivos ocultos» o una «agenda oculta». Llevamos a cabo un experimento de encuesta en línea prerregistrado en Turquía utilizando las recientes sanciones de los EE. UU. con el fin de probar esta afirmación. Las conclusiones sugieren que la incertidumbre tiene un impacto negativo en el apoyo al cambio de políticas, pero solo entre ciertos subgrupos. El análisis principal se complementa con un análisis de texto automatizado de las respuestas de los encuestados con el fin de proporcionar evidencia indicativa del impacto negativo de la incertidumbre.La recherche sur l’efficacité des sanctions économiques a mis en évidence l’importance de l’opinion publique. Pourtant, l’effet des sanctions sur celle-ci n’a jusqu’ici que peu intéressé les chercheurs. Les résultats des quelques travaux récents sur cette question sont mitigés. Dans cet article, je m’intéresse à l’effet de l’incertitude quant aux intentions qui se cachent derrière une volonté d’influencer le peuple pour qu’il soutienne un changement de politique dans un État cible. La littérature sur la négociation en temps de crise a établi que les informations asymétriques constituaient un problème clé. Les études relatives aux sanctions soulignent également que les objectifs des États qui imposent des sanctions (c.-à-d., les émetteurs) manquent souvent de clarté. Pourtant, nous ne possédons pas de preuves définitives de l’influence de ces incertitudes sur l’opinion publique. Comment les incertitudes quant aux intentions de l’émetteur influencent-elles l’attitude du peuple à l’égard d’un changement de politique dans l’État sanctionné (c.-à-d., la cible)? J’affirme qu’une population est moins encline à soutenir un changement de politique si elle soupçonne que l’émetteur possède des « arrière-pensées » ou des « intentions cachées ». Je réponds à un sondage en ligne préexistant en Turquie à l’aide des récentes sanctions américaines pour vérifier cette hypothèse. Les résultats indiquent que l’incertitude s’accompagne de conséquences négatives sur le soutien d’un changement politique, mais seulement chez des sous-groupes précis. Une analyse textuelle automatique des réponses des personnes interrogées vient compléter l’analyse principale pour démontrer les conséquences négatives de l’incertitude. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 424-453 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2184814 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2184814 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:424-453 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2184813_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Burak Giray Author-X-Name-First: Burak Author-X-Name-Last: Giray Title: Troop-providers' ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping and effectiveness Abstract: Countries contribute to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations for a variety of reasons. That diversion of interest affects how the operations’ mandates are fulfilled. While some troop-providers align with the principles of UN peacekeeping, others act in favor of their private benefits. Drawing on the conflict-of-interest theory, I posit that divergent interests within peacekeeping operations reduce the commitment of troop-providers to the principles of UN peacekeeping; therefore, the functionality of UN peacekeeping missions is damaged. This article explores the effect of troop-providers’ ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping on reducing the length of conflicts and civilian victimization by the combatants in all terminated and ongoing peacekeeping operations from November 1990 to December 2019. The results show that an increase in troop-providers’ ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping reduces both the length of conflicts and civilian victimization. The article makes three contributions. First, it elaborates on the consequences of how peacekeeping operations are composed, bringing in the primary motivations of troop-providers. Second, it develops a new measure of troop-providers’ ideational commitment to UN peacekeeping, taking into account their human rights stance in the UNGA. Third, the study suggests that troop-providers’ commitment to the principles of UN peacekeeping becomes more pivotal in large deployments.Los países contribuyen a las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas (UNPKO, por sus siglas en inglés) por diversas razones. Esa diversidad de intereses afecta la forma en la que se cumplen los mandatos de las operaciones. Mientras que algunos de los países proveedores de tropas se alinean con los principios del mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU, otros actúan a favor de sus beneficios privados. Basándonos en la teoría del conflicto de intereses, postulamos que los intereses divergentes dentro de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz reducen el compromiso de los países proveedores de tropas con los principios del mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas y que, por lo tanto, la funcionalidad de las misiones de mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas queda menoscabada. Este artículo explora el efecto del compromiso ideológico de los países proveedores de tropas con el mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU en cuanto a la reducción de la duración de los conflictos y de la victimización civil por parte de los combatientes en todas las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz, terminadas y en curso, desde noviembre de 1990 hasta diciembre de 2019. Los resultados muestran que un aumento en el compromiso ideológico de los países proveedores de tropas con el mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU reduce tanto la duración de los conflictos como la victimización civil. El artículo realiza tres contribuciones. En primer lugar, el artículo desarrolla las consecuencias de la composición de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz, aportando las motivaciones principales de los países proveedores de tropas. En segundo lugar, el artículo desarrolla una nueva forma de medir el compromiso ideológico de los países proveedores de tropas con el mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU, teniendo en cuenta su postura sobre los derechos humanos en la AGNU (Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas). En tercer lugar, el artículo sugiere que el compromiso de los países proveedores de tropas con los principios del mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas resulta más crucial en los grandes despliegues.Les pays peuvent avoir de multiples raisons de participer aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies. À cause de ces divergences d’intérêts, les mandats sont exécutés de différentes façons. Bien que certains fournisseurs de troupes partagent les principes du maintien de la paix de l’ONU, d’autres agissent dans leur propre intérêt. En m’appuyant sur la théorie des conflits d’intérêts, je postule que les divergences d’intérêts au sein des opérations de maintien de la paix nuisent à l’engagement des fournisseurs de troupes à respecter les principes de l’ONU. Le fonctionnement même de ces missions de maintien de la paix est donc remis en cause. Cet article étudie comment l’engagement idéationnel des fournisseurs de troupes pour les opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU réduit la durée des conflits et la victimisation des civils par les combattants dans toutes les opérations menées entre novembre 1990 et décembre 2019, qu’elles soient passées ou encore en cours. Les résultats indiquent qu’un renforcement de l’engagement idéationnel des fournisseurs de troupes pour les opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU réduit à la fois la durée des conflits et la victimisation des civils. L’article offre trois contributions. D’abord, il développe les conséquences de la composition des opérations de maintien de la paix, en incluant les motivations principales des fournisseurs de troupe. Ensuite, il propose une nouvelle mesure de l’engagement idéationnel des fournisseurs de troupe pour le maintien de la paix de l’ONU, en prenant en compte leur position sur les droits de l’homme à l’AGNU. Enfin, l’étude suggère que l’engagement des fournisseurs de troupe en faveur des principes de maintien de la paix de l’ONU devient crucial lors de déploiements importants. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 372-400 Issue: 3 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2184813 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2184813 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:3:p:372-400 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2214844_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Zhiyuan Wang Author-X-Name-First: Zhiyuan Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Title: Unemployment, central bank independence, and diversionary conflict Abstract: According to the diversionary use of force literature, unemployment as an indicator of poor economy should increase the likelihood of diversionary conflict. I argue, however, leaders do not engage in such conflict unconditionally simply when unemployment is rising. Whether worsening unemployment leads to diversionary conflict depends on the availability of policies that can alleviate the condition. Only when such policy availability is low, will diversionary conflict become more likely as unemployment deteriorates. When ameliorating policies are available, unemployment should reduce the likelihood of diversionary conflict. Focusing on central bank independence (CBI) as a primary institution that shapes the availability of policies that tackle unemployment, I expect that high CBI encourages the use of diversionary conflict as unemployment surges. An augmented zero-inflated negative binomial analysis of an updated militarized dispute dataset for the period 1975-2013 lends strong and robust support to this theoretical postulate. The causal mechanism is also empirically validated.De acuerdo con la bibliografía con relación al uso de la fuerza como maniobra de distracción, el desempleo, en su calidad de indicador de una economía deficiente, debería aumentar la probabilidad del uso de conflictos como maniobra de distracción. Sin embargo, argumentamos que los gobernantes no se involucran en un conflicto de este tipo de manera incondicional por el mero hecho de que el desempleo esté aumentando. Lo posibilidad de que el empeoramiento del desempleo conduzca a un conflicto como maniobra distracción depende de la disponibilidad de políticas que puedan aliviar esta situación. Solo cuando se dé caso de que la disponibilidad de estas políticas sea baja, resultará más probable que se produzcan conflictos como maniobra de distracción a medida que se vaya deteriorando la situación del desempleo. Cuando se dispone de políticas de mejora, el desempleo debería reducir la probabilidad del uso de conflictos como maniobra de distracción. Centrándonos en la independencia del banco central (IBC) como un mecanismo primario que da forma a la disponibilidad de políticas que abordan el desempleo, pronosticamos que una IBC alta fomentará el uso del conflicto como maniobra de distracción a medida que aumenta el desempleo. Un análisis binomial negativo aumentado inflado a cero llevado a cabo sobre un conjunto de datos de disputas militarizadas actualizado para el período entre 1975 y 2013 brinda un apoyo fuerte y robusto a este postulado teórico. El mecanismo causal también está validado empíricamente.D’après la littérature sur l’emploi de la force pour détourner l’attention, le chômage en tant qu’indicateur de la faiblesse d’une économie devrait augmenter la probabilité d’un conflit visant à faire diversion. Néanmoins, j’affirme que les dirigeants ne s’engagent pas de façon inconditionnelle dans de tels conflits en se fondant simplement sur une montée du chômage. La relation entre aggravation du chômage et conflit visant à faire diversion dépend de la disponibilité des politiques qui peuvent remédier à cette situation. Quand cette disponibilité est faible, et seulement à cette condition, la probabilité des conflits pour détourner l’attention se renforce quand le chômage s’intensifie. Quand des politiques bénéfiques sont présentes, le chômage devrait réduire la probabilité d’un conflit visant à faire diversion. En me focalisant sur l’indépendance des banques centrales (IBC) en tant que mécanisme qui façonne principalement la disponibilité des politiques relatives au chômage, je prédis qu’une IBC élevée encourage l’utilisation d’un conflit pour détourner l’attention en cas de pic de chômage. En complétant une analyse binomiale négative à inflation de zéro d’un ensemble de données mis à jour sur les conflits militarisés pour la période 1975-2013, nous trouvons maints éléments pour fortement étayer ce postulat théorique. Le mécanisme causal a également fait l’objet d’une validation empirique. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 612-638 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2214844 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2214844 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:612-638 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2201881_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Mark Berlin Author-X-Name-First: Mark Author-X-Name-Last: Berlin Author-Name: Iris Malone Author-X-Name-First: Iris Author-X-Name-Last: Malone Title: Go arm me: How militant fragmentation affects external support Abstract: Over the last 50 years, civil conflicts have grown increasingly complex due to the proliferation of new armed groups and rebel fragmentation. Yet, existing research on external support for armed groups often ignores this multi-actor dimension, overlooking the unusual amount of discretion sponsors have in deciding whom to support in any given target state. This paper explores how multi-militant conflict environments impact foreign state sponsorship decisions. Conventional wisdom predicts that shared ethnic and ideological ties increase the likelihood of external support for an armed group because these ties signal a lower risk of misuse (agency slack). In contrast, this paper highlights how an increasing number of armed groups in a conflict setting can decrease the importance of shared ties between state sponsors and militants. We argue this change occurs because multi-militant environments reduce a group’s willingness to misuse support and improve a sponsor’s options to shift support if misuse occurs. We utilize a mixed-methods approach to examine this logic, drawing on an original dataset of 1,402 armed groups and qualitative evidence from Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule. The results advance understanding of the consequences of conflict fragmentation and external support for non-rebel actors.Durante los últimos cincuenta años, los conflictos civiles se han vuelto cada vez más complejos debido a la proliferación de nuevos grupos armados y a la fragmentación de los grupos rebeldes. Sin embargo, la investigación existente acerca del apoyo externo a los grupos armados ignora, a menudo, esta dimensión formada por agentes múltiples, y pasa por alto la inusual discrecionalidad de la que gozan los Estados a la hora de decidir a quién apoyar en un determinado Estado objetivo. Este artículo analiza cómo los entornos de conflicto con diversos militantes afectan las decisiones de apoyo de los Estados extranjeros. La sabiduría tradicional predice que la existencia de unos lazos étnicos e ideológicos compartidos aumenta la probabilidad de apoyo externo hacia un grupo armado debido a que estos vínculos indican un menor riesgo de uso indebido (holgura de agencia). Por el contrario, este artículo destaca cómo la existencia de un número cada vez mayor de grupos armados en un entorno de conflicto puede hacer disminuir la importancia de los lazos compartidos entre los Estados que proporcionan apoyo y los militantes. Argumentamos que este cambio ocurre porque los entornos con diversos militantes reducen la disposición de un grupo a hacer un mal uso del apoyo y mejoran las opciones de los Estados que proporcionan apoyo a la hora de modificar su apoyo en caso de la existencia de un mal uso. Utilizamos un enfoque de métodos mixtos para estudiar esta lógica. Para ello, nos basamos en un conjunto de datos originales de 1,402 grupos armados y en evidencia cualitativa obtenida de Iraq durante el gobierno de Saddam Hussein. Los resultados amplían la comprensión de las consecuencias de la fragmentación del conflicto y el apoyo externo a los agentes no rebeldes.Ces cinquante dernières années, les conflits civils se sont complexifiés à cause de la prolifération de nouveaux groupes armés et de la fragmentation des rebelles. Pourtant, les travaux de recherche existants sur le soutien externe des groupes armés ignorent souvent ces acteurs multiples, et donc omettent l’ampleur inhabituelle de la discrétion des entités quand il s’agit de décider qui soutenir dans un État cible. Cet article s’intéresse aux conséquences des environnements conflictuels aux multiples militants sur les décisions de soutien d’États étrangers. Il est généralement admis que les liens ethniques et idéologiques accroissent la probabilité de soutien externe pour un groupe armé, car ils diminuent les risques de détournement. Par opposition, cet article met en évidence qu’un nombre croissant de groupes armés au sein d’une zone de conflit est susceptible d’affaiblir l’importance relative des liens qui unissent les États soutiens aux militants. Nous affirmons que cette évolution intervient parce que les environnements aux multiples militants permettent d’orienter les soutiens différemment en cas de détournement. Les groupes sont donc moins enclins à mal agir. Nous employons une stratégie aux méthodes mixtes pour analyser cette logique, en nous appuyant sur un ensemble de données original de 1,402 groupes armés et des éléments probants qualitatifs issus d’Irak à l’époque où Saddam Hussein était au pouvoir. Les résultats enrichissent notre compréhension des conséquences de la fragmentation des conflits et du soutien externe pour des acteurs non rebelles. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 557-586 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2201881 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2201881 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:557-586 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2214845_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: J. Andrés Gannon Author-X-Name-First: J. Andrés Author-X-Name-Last: Gannon Author-Name: Kerry Chávez Author-X-Name-First: Kerry Author-X-Name-Last: Chávez Title: A Wiki-based dataset of military operations with novel strategic technologies (MONSTr) Abstract: Research on strategies and force employment in modern warfare is prolific, but siloed. While some examine boots on the ground, others focus on aerial bombing or unpiloted platforms. Consequently, most studies focus on the effects of one approach, seldom considering it in lieu of or conjunction with others. Furthermore, there is less knowledge on the origins and implementations of these strategic choices analyzed in isolation. The primary reason for these gaps lies in data limitations. This paper introduces a comprehensive dataset on the universe of United States military operations from 1989 to 2021 from a single source: Wikipedia. Using automated extraction techniques on its two structured knowledge databases–Wikidata and DBpedia–we uncover information about individual operations within nearly every post-1989 military intervention described in existing academic datasets. The data we introduce offers unprecedented coverage and granularity that enables analysis of myriad factors associated with when, where, and how the United States employs military force. We describe the data collection process, demonstrate its contents and validity, and discuss its potential applications to existing theories about force employment and strategy in war.La investigación en materia de estrategias y estructuras de fuerza en la guerra moderna es prolífica, pero se realiza de forma aislada. Mientras que algunos se centran en las tropas terrestres, otros se centran más en los bombardeos aéreos o las plataformas no pilotadas. En consecuencia, la mayoría de los estudios se centran en los efectos de un solo enfoque, y rara vez lo consideran en lugar de otros enfoques o la posibilidad de considerarlo junto con otros enfoques. Además, existe un menor conocimiento sobre los orígenes y las formas de llevar a cabo estas opciones estratégicas si se analizan de forma aislada. La razón principal de estas brechas radica en las limitaciones de los datos. Este artículo presenta un conjunto de datos exhaustivo acerca del universo de las intervenciones militares de los Estados Unidos entre 1989 y 2021 obtenidas de una sola fuente: Wikipedia. Utilizando técnicas de extracción automatizada sobre sus dos bases de datos de conocimiento estructurado, Wikidata y DBpedia, obtenemos información sobre casi todas las intervenciones militares posteriores a 1989 descritas en conjuntos de datos académicos existentes, además de sobre 425 operaciones adicionales. Los datos que presentamos ofrecen una cobertura y un nivel de detalle sin precedentes, de forma que permiten el análisis de innumerables factores asociados con el cómo, el cuándo y el dónde lleva a cabo Estados Unidos intervenciones militares. Describimos el proceso de recopilación de datos, demostramos su contenido y su validez, y debatimos sus posibles aplicaciones a las teorías existentes sobre el diseño de la estructura de la fuerza y sobre la estrategia en la guerra.La recherche sur les stratégies et les structures des forces de la guerre moderne est prolifique, mais cloisonnée. Quand certains travaux s’intéressent aux militaires sur le terrain, d’autres se concentrent sur les bombardements aériens ou les plateformes sans pilote. Par conséquent, la plupart des études se focalisent sur les effets d’une approche, mais la conjuguent ou la confrontent rarement à d’autres. En outre, nous en savons moins sur les origines et les mises en œuvre de ces choix stratégiques analysés séparément. Ces lacunes s’expliquent principalement par la limitation des données. Cet article présente un ensemble de données exhaustif sur l’univers des interventions militaires des États-Unis de 1989 à 2021 à partir d’une seule source: Wikipédia. À l’aide de techniques d’extraction automatique appliquées à ses deux bases de données de connaissances structurées (Wikidata et DBpedia), nous découvrons des informations concernant pratiquement toutes les interventions militaires postérieures à 1989 décrites dans des ensembles de données académiques existants, mais aussi 425 opérations supplémentaires. Les données que nous présentons proposent une couverture et une granularité sans précédent qui permettent d’analyser une myriade de facteurs relatifs à la manière, le moment et le lieu des interventions militaires américaines. Nous décrivons le processus de collecte de données, démontrons son contenu et sa validité, avant de discuter des applications potentielles aux théories existantes concernant la conception de la structure des forces et la stratégie militaire. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 639-668 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2214845 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2214845 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:639-668 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2190111_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Sumin Lee Author-X-Name-First: Sumin Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Author-Name: Andrey Tomashevskiy Author-X-Name-First: Andrey Author-X-Name-Last: Tomashevskiy Title: Punish or tolerate? State capacity, military oversight, and wartime sexual violence Abstract: How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a game-theoretic model in which the military deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of government oversight. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government’s capacity to carry out the punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain “strategically ignorant” of the military’s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of punishment, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. We examine the empirical implications of the model using data on sexual violence, military oversight, and state capacity and find support for the hypotheses generated by the model.¿Cuál es el efecto que tiene la supervisión por parte del Gobierno a las fuerzas armadas sobre la aparición de violencia sexual en tiempos de guerra? Este artículo destaca el papel de las relaciones cívico-militares y de la capacidad del Estado en la aparición de violencia sexual. Proponemos, sobre la base de la investigación que estudia la violencia sexual en tiempos de guerra dentro del marco de la relación principal-agente, un modelo de teoría de juegos en el que las fuerzas armadas despliegan la violencia sexual en tiempos de guerra en función de sus expectativas de supervisión gubernamental. Describimos un equilibrio en el que esta supervisión es una señal informativa de la capacidad del Gobierno para llevar a cabo sanciones. El Gobierno realiza la supervisión de manera estratégica y puede optar por permanecer «estratégicamente ignorante» de la conducta de las fuerzas armadas. Dado que la supervisión gubernamental es una señal informativa de la capacidad del Estado, las fuerzas armadas se abstienen de llevar a cabo violencia sexual en tiempos de guerra cuando la supervisión es alta. Examinamos las implicaciones empíricas del modelo utilizando datos sobre violencia sexual, supervisión militar y capacidad estatal y encontramos apoyo para las hipótesis generadas por el modelo.Quels sont les effets de la surveillance de l’armée par le gouvernement sur la survenance de violences sexuelles en temps de guerre ? Cet article met en évidence le rôle des relations entre civils et militaires et de la capacité de l’État dans la survenance de violences sexuelles. En nous fondant sur la recherche sur les violences sexuelles en temps de guerre dans le cadre des relations mandant-mandataire, nous proposons un modèle basé sur la théorie des jeux au sein duquel les actes de violence sexuelle du corps militaire en temps de guerre dépendent du degré de surveillance gouvernementale anticipé. Nous décrivons la mise en place d’un équilibre par la surveillance du gouvernement qui indique sa capacité à infliger des sanctions. La surveillance du gouvernement revêt un caractère stratégique, car il peut choisir de maintenir « une ignorance stratégique » du comportement des militaires. Comme la surveillance du gouvernement constitue un indicateur de la capacité de l’État, l’armée s’abstient de toute violence sexuelle en temps de guerre quand la surveillance est élevée. Nous analysons les implications empiriques du modèle à l’aide de données sur les violences sexuelles, la surveillance militaire et la capacité de l’État. Nos conclusions confirment les hypothèses générées par le modèle. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 471-496 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2190111 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2190111 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:471-496 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2185235_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Jared Oestman Author-X-Name-First: Jared Author-X-Name-Last: Oestman Title: Burden sharing in UN peacekeeping operations: Who deploys to violent locations? Abstract: Which countries deploy troops to violent locations within UN peacekeeping operations? Troop contributing countries face different incentives to participate in peacekeeping operations. These motivating factors should also condition their willingness to take on risks to implement mission mandates. I argue that states motivated to ensure the effectiveness of an operation as well as states that expect to receive private gains by deploying to riskier locales within missions will send more of their troops to these areas. In contrast, states with leaders that are more sensitive to the potential costs associated with riskier commitments will be less willing to send their service members to violent locations. Results from an analysis of spatially disaggregated data across 23 UN missions from 1994 to 2015 support these expectations. States hosting refugees from a mission location tend to deploy more troops to local areas that experience major violent episodes. States that generate greater benefits to their militaries through their involvement in peacekeeping also provide more troops to these areas. In contrast, democratic contributors send fewer troops to violent locations. The results further reveal important disparities in troop deployments within UN peacekeeping operations.¿Qué países despliegan tropas en áreas violentas dentro del marco de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU? Los países que aportan contingentes cuentan con diferentes incentivos para participar en las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz. Estos factores motivadores también pueden condicionar su disposición a asumir riesgos durante la ejecución de los mandatos de las misiones. Sostenemos que aquellos Estados que estén motivados en garantizar la efectividad de una operación y aquellos Estados que esperen recibir beneficios privados debido a su despliegue en áreas más arriesgadas dentro de las misiones, son los que enviarán una mayor proporción de sus tropas a estas áreas. En contraposición, aquellos Estados cuyos líderes son más sensibles a los costes potenciales asociados a los compromisos más arriesgados, tendrán una menor disposición a enviar a sus miembros fuerzas armadas a áreas violentas. Los resultados obtenidos de un análisis de datos desglosados espacialmente de 23 misiones de la ONU entre 1994 y 2015 ofrecen respaldo a estas expectativas. Los Estados que acogen a refugiados desde un emplazamiento de misión tienden a desplegar más tropas en las áreas locales en las que tienen lugar episodios violentos importantes. Los Estados que generan mayores beneficios a sus fuerzas armadas a través de su participación en el mantenimiento de la paz también proporcionan más tropas a estas áreas. En contraposición, los contribuyentes democráticos envían menos tropas a las áreas violentas. Los resultados revelan, además, importantes disparidades en el despliegue de tropas dentro de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU.Quels sont les pays qui déploient des troupes dans les zones de conflits où interviennent les opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU ? Les pays qui fournissent des troupes participent aux opérations de maintien de la paix pour différentes raisons. Ces motivations s’accompagnent logiquement de conséquences quand il s’agit de prendre des risques pour mettre en œuvre des mandats de mission. Selon moi, les États qui souhaitent garantir l’efficacité d’une opération, mais aussi ceux qui agissent dans leur propre intérêt en déployant des forces sur les lieux d’intervention les plus risqués des missions, enverront davantage de troupes dans ces zones. À l’inverse, les États plus sensibles aux coûts potentiels des engagements plus risqués seront moins enclins à envoyer leurs militaires dans les zones de violence. Les résultats d’une analyse de données ventilées dans l’espace issues de 23 missions de l’ONU de 1994 à 2015 viennent étayer cette hypothèse. Quand un État accueille des réfugiés provenant d’un lieu d’intervention d’une mission, il a tendance à déployer davantage de troupes sur les zones qui subissent des épisodes de violence importants. Les États dont les armées bénéficient davantage de leur engagement dans le maintien de la paix fourniront aussi davantage de troupes pour ces lieux. À l’opposé, les contributeurs démocratiques envoient moins de troupes dans les zones de violence. D’après les résultats, il existe encore d’autres disparités importantes dans le déploiement de troupes dans le cadre des opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 497-524 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2185235 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2185235 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:497-524 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2208726_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: James A. Piazza Author-X-Name-First: James A. Author-X-Name-Last: Piazza Title: Fear of terrorism and support for non-democratic rule in democracies Abstract: Does fear of terrorism prompt some residents of democracies to abandon the ideal of democratic rule and instead endorse non-democratic governance? If so, why? In this study, I theorize that fear of terrorism triggers intolerance of social outgroups which, in turn, contributes to the erosion of pro-democratic norms and embrace of authoritarian rule. I test this argument using an original survey of the US and an investigation of cross-national survey results from 23 democracies. I find that individuals who fear terrorism are more likely to endorse non-democratic governance and the effect of fear of terrorism on support for authoritarianism is mediated through increased racism and xenophobia.¿Provoca el miedo al terrorismo que algunos residentes de las democracias sientan el impulso de abandonar el ideal del gobierno democrático y, en cambio, respalden la gobernanza no democrática? Si es así, ¿por qué ocurre esto? En este estudio, teorizamos que el miedo al terrorismo desencadena la intolerancia con respecto a los grupos externos lo cual, a su vez, contribuye a la erosión de las normas prodemocráticas y a la aceptación de un gobierno autoritario. Probamos este argumento usando una encuesta original de los Estados Unidos, así como una investigación de los resultados de una serie de encuestas transnacionales relativas a 23 democracias. Concluimos que las personas que temen el terrorismo son más propensas a respaldar una gobernanza no democrática y que el efecto del miedo al terrorismo, que causa un apoyo al autoritarismo, se manifiesta a través de un aumento del racismo y la xenofobia.La peur du terrorisme pousse-t-elle certaines personnes vivant en démocratie à abandonner l’idéal démocratique pour, au contraire, soutenir des formes de gouvernance non-démocratiques ? Si oui, pourquoi ? Dans le cadre de cette analyse, j’avance comme théorie que la peur du terrorisme est vecteur d’intolérance envers les exogroupes; une intolérance qui, à son tour, contribue à l’érosion des normes démocratiques et à l’adoption d’un régime autoritaire. Je mets cette hypothèse à l’épreuve d’une enquête originale menée aux États-Unis et d’une analyse des résultats d’une enquête transnationale réalisée dans 23 démocraties. J’en conclus que les individus craignant le terrorisme sont plus enclins à soutenir une gouvernance non-démocratique, et que cette peur, dans l’adhésion à l’autoritarisme qu’elle entraîne, a pour effet d’accentuer les phénomènes de racisme et de xénophobie. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 587-611 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2208726 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2208726 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:587-611 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2190589_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Alastair Smith Author-X-Name-First: Alastair Author-X-Name-Last: Smith Author-Name: James Raymond Vreeland Author-X-Name-First: James Raymond Author-X-Name-Last: Vreeland Title: UN Security Council membership: Increased security and reduced conflict Abstract: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership comes with privileges. Existing research shows that the world’s most powerful countries funnel financial favors to governments elected to the UNSC, arguably to influence their votes on matters of international importance. This study investigates whether these governments, whose election elevates them to prominent positions of power, also receive security benefits. We argue that elected UNSC members win the attention and protection of the world’s super powers, and, as a result, are less likely to be attacked. But we further argue that the General Assembly and the world’s super powers prefer pacific countries on the UNSC. In support of our theory, we find empirically that temporary membership on the UNSC is associated with lower rates of being targeted and lower rates of initiating conflict. We conclude that UNSC membership has existential benefits and is associated with a reduced likelihood of militarized disputes.La afiliación al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (CSNU) conlleva algunos privilegios. La investigación existente demuestra que los países más poderosos del mundo canalizan favores financieros a los gobiernos de los países que han sido elegidos para el CSNU, posiblemente con el fin de influenciar sus votos en asuntos de importancia internacional. Este estudio investiga si estos gobiernos, cuya elección los eleva a posiciones prominentes de poder, reciben también beneficios en materia de seguridad. Argumentamos que los miembros electos del CSNU reciben una mayor atención y protección por parte de las superpotencias mundiales y, como resultado, tienen menos probabilidades de ser atacados. Pero, además, argumentamos que la Asamblea General y las superpotencias mundiales prefieren la presencia de países pacíficos en el CSNU. Para apoyar nuestra teoría, constatamos de forma empírica que la afiliación temporal al CSNU se asocia con unas menores probabilidades de estar en el punto de mira y con unos menores índices en lo que se refiere a iniciar conflictos. Concluimos que la afiliación al CSNU conlleva beneficios existenciales y que está asociada con una menor probabilidad de participar en disputas militarizadas.L’appartenance au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) n’est pas sans avantages. Des travaux de recherche ont déjà montré que les pays les plus puissants du monde accordent des faveurs financières aux gouvernements élus au CSNU, supposément pour influencer leur vote sur des thématiques internationales importantes. Cette étude tente de déterminer si ces gouvernements, promus à de puissantes positions grâce à leur élection, reçoivent aussi des avantages en matière de sécurité. Nous affirmons que les membres élus du CSNU obtiennent l’attention et la protection des superpuissances mondiales et, par conséquent, ont moins de risques de faire l’objet d’une attaque. Toutefois, nous soutenons aussi que l’Assemblée générale et les superpuissances mondiales préfèrent voir des pays pacifistes au CSNU. Pour vérifier notre théorie, nous observons empiriquement qu’une appartenance temporaire au CSNU s’accompagne de taux plus faibles d’attaques subies et d’initiations de conflits. Nous concluons que l’appartenance au CSNU revêt des avantages existentiels et qu’elle est associée à une probabilité plus faible de conflits militarisés Journal: International Interactions Pages: 525-556 Issue: 4 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 7 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2190589 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2190589 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:4:p:525-556 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2216352_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Ilayda B. Onder Author-X-Name-First: Ilayda B. Author-X-Name-Last: Onder Title: Signaling Resolve through Credit-claiming Abstract: What explains when militant groups claim attacks? In this study, I argue that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks early in the organization’s lifespan and after major blows to reputation like loss of a leader due to leadership decapitation. This is because credit-claiming helps militants signal resolve to a wider audience, thereby burnishing the organization’s reputation. Specifically, I argue that claims of militant attacks are costly for organizations because they may be met with government retaliation. However, groups that are younger or have recently suffered the loss of a leader seek to use government retaliation to signal resolve. I find support for this proposition using two sets of empirical analyses. First, I show that claims increase the risk of government retaliation. Then, using a comprehensive data set of 592 groups, I show that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks in the earliest phases of their lifespans and after their leaders are killed/captured. Although civilian victimization and emerging due to splintering are found to be depressing credit claiming, the findings also suggest that (i) groups that only target security forces, (ii) groups that victimize civilians, (iii) groups that emerged independently without known affiliations with existing groups, and (iv) splinter groups all issue fewer claims as they age. These findings help elucidate a largely overlooked dimension of strategic militant behavior.¿Qué es lo que explica el hecho de que los grupos militantes reivindiquen los ataques? En este artículo, sostenemos que los grupos militantes son más propensos a reivindicar los ataques dentro de las fases tempranas de la vida útil de la organización y después de sufrir importantes impactos sobre su reputación como, por ejemplo, la pérdida de un líder debido a la decapitación del liderazgo. Esto se debe a que la reivindicación ayuda a los militantes a mostrar su determinación a un público más amplio, ayudando así a mejorar la reputación de la organización. De manera específica, sostenemos que las reivindicaciones de ataques militantes resultan costosas para las organizaciones debido a pueden ser respondidas con represalias por parte del Gobierno. Sin embargo, los grupos que son más jóvenes, o que han sufrido recientemente la pérdida de un líder, buscan usar las represalias del Gobierno para señalar su determinación. Encontramos apoyo para esta proposición mediante el uso de dos conjuntos de análisis empíricos. En primer lugar, mostramos que las reivindicaciones aumentan el riesgo de represalias por parte del Gobierno. A continuación, demostramos, mediante el uso un conjunto de datos completo procedente de 592 grupos, que los grupos militantes tienen más probabilidades de reivindicar ataques dentro de las primeras fases de su ciclo de vida y después de que sus líderes hayan sido asesinados o capturados. Aunque se considera que tanto la victimización de civiles como la aparición debida a la fragmentación contribuyen a disminuir el número de reivindicaciones, los hallazgos también sugieren que los siguientes tipos de grupos realizan menos reivindicaciones a medida que avanzan en su ciclo de vida: (i) los grupos que solo atacan a las fuerzas de seguridad, (ii) los grupos que victimizan a civiles, (iii) los grupos que surgieron independientemente sin afiliaciones conocidas con grupos existentes, y (iv) los grupos disidentes. Estas conclusiones ayudan a dilucidar una dimensión del comportamiento militante estratégico que ha sido pasada por alto en gran medida.Comment expliquer les revendications d’attaques par les groupes militants ? Dans cette étude, j’affirme que les groupes militants auront plus de chances de revendiquer des attaques quand l’organisation est encore jeune ou après des crises de réputation majeures, comme la perte d’un dirigeant après la décapitation du pouvoir. En effet, la revendication de responsabilité permet aux militants de montrer leur détermination auprès d’un public plus large, et donc de perfectionner la réputation de leur organisation. Plus précisément, j’affirme que les revendications d’attaques par les militants sont coûteuses pour les organisations, car elles risquent de subir les représailles de gouvernements. Cependant, les groupes plus jeunes ou qui viennent de perdre leur dirigeant veulent se servir des représailles gouvernementales pour signifier leur détermination. Je trouve des éléments pour venir étayer mon hypothèse dans deux ensembles d’analyses empiriques. D’abord, je montre que les revendications accentuent le risque de représailles de la part des gouvernements. Ensuite, à l’aide d’un ensemble de données exhaustif de 592 groupes, je montre que les groupes militants ont plus de chances de revendiquer des attaques lorsque l’organisation est jeune ou à la suite du décès/de la capture de son dirigeant. Bien que la persécution des civils et l’apparition de nouveaux groupes à la suite d’une division nuisent à la revendication de responsabilité, les résultats indiquent aussi que (i) les groupes qui ne ciblent que les forces de sécurité, (ii) les groupes qui persécutent des civils, (iii) les groupes qui émergent de façon indépendante, sans affiliations connues à des groupes existants, et (iv) les groupes issus de divisions revendiquent tous moins souvent leur responsabilité au fur et à mesure qu’ils prennent de l’âge. Ces conclusions permettent d’éclaircir une dimension largement ignorée du comportement stratégique des militants. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 755-784 Issue: 5 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2216352 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2216352 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:5:p:755-784 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2216351_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Tanja Eschenauer-Engler Author-X-Name-First: Tanja Author-X-Name-Last: Eschenauer-Engler Title: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Abstract: This article studies the military’s decision to repress major, regime-threatening mass protests in autocracies or refuse violence from a set-theoretic perspective. So far, knowledge on such diametrical military reactions has been mainly derived from temporally and geographically restricted small-N analyses. This article expands on existing research by studying the combined relevance of five factors in a Qualitative Comparative Analysis. This configurational method identifies which factors or combinations thereof induce an outcome and assumes that the same phenomenon can be reached through different causal pathways. Using a sample of 24 nonviolent anti-regime uprisings in autocracies between 1986 and 2011, the analysis uncovers that no factor is individually sufficient for military repression. Instead, military repression arises from an interplay of factors and different combinations lead to repression: Militaries repress when (1) they are materially spoiled and internally cohesive, or (2) enjoy financial benefits, are recruited along sectarian lines, and there is conscription. They refuse repression if (1) they are incohesive and not recruited along social cleavages, or (2) are not materially spoiled. Finally, the analysis shows that different ensembles of determinants are at work in different socio-political environments. The article’s findings could inspire ideas for future research in the broader field of civil–military relations. Acknowledging the complexity of military behavior could deliver precious insights into the determinants of armed forces’ conduct in other highly relevant areas, such as coups or armed conflicts.Este artículo estudia la decisión que pueden llevar a cabo las fuerzas armadas entre reprimir las principales protestas masivas que amenacen al régimen en las autocracias o rechazar la violencia desde una perspectiva teórica de conjuntos. Hasta este momento, el conocimiento acerca de estas reacciones militares diametrales se había derivado principalmente de análisis de N pequeña que estaban restringidos temporal y geográficamente. Este artículo amplía la investigación existente mediante el estudio de la relevancia combinada de cinco factores en un análisis comparativo cualitativo. Este método configuracional identifica qué factores o combinaciones de estos pueden inducir a un determinado resultado y asume que se puede alcanzar el mismo fenómeno a través de diferentes vías causales. El análisis concluye, mediante el uso de una muestra de veinticuatro levantamientos no violentos contra el régimen tomada de varias autocracias entre 1986 y 2011, que ninguno de estos factores resulta suficiente, de manera individual, para provocar una represión militar. En cambio, la represión militar surge de una interacción de factores y de diferentes combinaciones que pueden causar la represión: las fuerzas armadas usan la represión cuando (1) están «mimadas» en el sentido material y están cohesionadas internamente, o cuando (2) disfrutan de beneficios financieros, son reclutadas a través de líneas sectarias y existe reclutamiento obligatorio. Las fuerzas armadas rechazan la represión si (1) no están cohesionadas y no han sido reclutadas durante divisiones sociales, o si (2) no están materialmente «mimadas». Por último, el análisis muestra que existen diferentes conjuntos de determinantes que intervienen en diferentes entornos sociopolíticos. Las conclusiones de este artículo podrían inspirar nuevas ideas de cara a futuras investigaciones dentro del campo, más amplio, de las relaciones cívico-militares. El hecho de poder reconocer la complejidad del comportamiento militar podría aportar información valiosa sobre los determinantes de la conducta de las fuerzas armadas en otras áreas altamente relevantes, tales como golpes de Estado o conflictos armados.Cet article analyse les décisions militaires de répression des importantes manifestations de masse qui menacent le régime dans les autocraties ou de refus de la violence du point de vue de la théorie des ensembles. Jusqu’ici, les connaissances relatives à ces réactions militaires diamétralement opposées dérivent principalement d’analyses petit N restreintes sur le plan temporel et géographique. Cet article approfondit la recherche existante en étudiant la pertinence conjointe de cinq facteurs dans une analyse comparative qualitative. Cette méthode configurationnelle identifie les facteurs, ou les combinaisons de ceux-ci, qui génèrent un résultat avant de supposer que le même phénomène peut être obtenu en empruntant différents chemins causaux. À l’aide d’un échantillon de vingt-quatre soulèvements pacifistes contre le régime au sein d’autocraties entre 1986 et 2011, l’analyse conclut qu’aucun facteur, à lui seul, ne suffit à provoquer une répression militaire. Elle découle plutôt de différentes combinaisons de facteurs interconnectés: le corps militaire réprime quand (1) il ne manque de rien sur le plan matériel et jouit d’une bonne cohésion interne; ou (2) il profite d’avantages financiers, le recrutement se fonde sur des critères sectaires et une conscription est en place. À l’inverse, il s’opposera à la répression (1) s’il manque de cohésion et si le recrutement ne se base pas sur des clivages sociaux; ou (2) s’il n’y a pas d’opulence sur le plan matériel. Enfin, l’analyse montre que différents ensembles de déterminants interviennent dans divers environnements sociopolitiques. Les conclusions de l’article peuvent susciter des idées de nouvelles recherches dans le domaine plus large des relations entre civils et militaires. Admettre la complexité du comportement militaire pourrait permettre de mieux comprendre les facteurs déterminants de la conduite des forces armées dans d’autres domaines extrêmement pertinents, comme les coups d’État ou les conflits armés. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 785-812 Issue: 5 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2216351 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2216351 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:5:p:785-812 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2237175_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Seulah Choi Author-X-Name-First: Seulah Author-X-Name-Last: Choi Title: Where You Sit Matters: The Power of Brokers in Diplomatic Networks & Interstate Conflict Abstract: How does a state’s broker position in diplomatic networks influence its tendency to engage in conflict? While the existing scholarship typically characterizes brokers as ideal mediators or facilitators of peace, there is little systematic analysis that examines the impact of broker position on a state’s conflict propensity. I argue that the exclusive emphasis on the mediating role of brokers has elided the fact that broker position serves as strategic assets for states. Building on the existing literature on diplomacy and brokerage, I posit that broker position in diplomatic networks provides a state with leverage that can be used to coerce and co-opt other states into supporting its military operations, thereby increasing its propensity to initiate militarized interstate disputes. I assemble diplomatic networks from the past two centuries to examine the impact of broker position and find that the more a state occupies a broker position, the more likely it is to initiate militarized disputes. These findings challenge the prevalent notions that diplomatic ties are insignificant in shaping state conflict behavior and that broker position is solely used to promote peace.¿Cómo influye el posicionamiento como intermediario dentro de las redes diplomáticas por parte de un determinado Estado en su tendencia a participar en conflictos? Si bien el mundo académico actual caracteriza, generalmente, a los intermediarios como mediadores ideales o como facilitadores de la paz, existe un número reducido de análisis sistemáticos que examinen el impacto que tiene el hecho de estar posicionado como intermediario sobre la propensión al conflicto de ese Estado. Argumentamos que el énfasis exclusivo en el papel como mediador de los intermediarios ha omitido el hecho de que la posición como intermediario sirve como activo estratégico para los Estados. Postulamos, partiendo de la base que proporciona la bibliografía existente sobre diplomacia e intermediación, que el estar posicionado como intermediario dentro de las redes diplomáticas proporciona a un determinado Estado un grado de influencia que puede usarse para coaccionar y cooptar a otros Estados para que apoyen sus operaciones militares, lo cual aumentaría, de esta forma, su propensión a iniciar disputas interestatales militarizadas. Hemos reunido diversas redes diplomáticas formadas durante los últimos dos siglos con el fin de estudiar el impacto que tiene el posicionamiento como intermediario y llegamos a la conclusión de que cuanto más ocupa un Estado una posición de intermediario, más probable resulta que pueda iniciar disputas militarizadas. Estas conclusiones desafían las nociones prevalentes de que las relaciones diplomáticas resultan insignificantes para la confirmación del comportamiento en materia de conflicto estatal y de que la posición de intermediario se utiliza únicamente con el fin de promover la paz.Quels sont les effets du rôle de négociateur d’un État au sein de réseaux diplomatiques sur sa propension à prendre part à un conflit ? Bien que la littérature existante définisse généralement les négociateurs comme des médiateurs idéaux ou des facilitateurs de paix, il existe peu d’analyses systématiques qui s’intéressent aux conséquences du rôle de négociateur sur la propension au conflit d’un État. J’affirme qu’en mettant exclusivement l’accent sur le rôle de médiation des négociateurs, nous avons éludé le fait que la position de négociateur constitue un avantage stratégique pour un État. En me fondant sur la littérature existante sur la diplomatie et la négociation, j’émets l’hypothèse qu’une position de négociateur au sein de réseaux diplomatiques fournit à un État un avantage qu’il peut utiliser pour contraindre et coopter d’autres États à soutenir ses opérations militaires. Aussi, sa propension à initier des conflits interétatiques militarisés augmente. Je rassemble des données sur les réseaux diplomatiques des deux derniers siècles pour analyser les effets du rôle de négociateur. J’observe que plus un État occupe un rôle de négociateur, plus il aura de chance d’initier des conflits militarisés. Ces conclusions remettent en question les notions prédominantes selon lesquelles les liens diplomatiques n’ont pas d’incidence sur le comportement d’un État en matière de conflits et que le rôle de négociateur n’est utilisé que pour promouvoir la paix. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 669-695 Issue: 5 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2237175 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2237175 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:5:p:669-695 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2224919_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Jerry Urtuzuastigui Author-X-Name-First: Jerry Author-X-Name-Last: Urtuzuastigui Title: American Diasporas, Homeland Human Rights Conduct, and the Onset of Human Rights-Based Economic Sanctions Abstract: Why does the US government choose to initiate human rights-based economic sanctions against some highly repressive target countries, but not others? And, under what conditions does it do so? In this paper, I posit an interactive theory wherein I argue that diaspora size moderates the relationship between target human rights conduct and the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions. I contend that as the size of a diaspora increases, its capacity to influence the onset of human rights-based economic sanctions strengthens, as it can more effectively (1) lobby decisionmakers in Congress and the White House directly as well as (2) indirectly via using contentious action to mobilize public opinion, which intensifies the pressure on Congresspersons and the President to act. To test my contention, I combine US sanctions data with data on American diasporas and homeland human rights conduct and find that while diaspora size strongly and consistently moderates the relationship between homeland human rights conduct and the onset of Congressional sanctions, its moderating impact on Presidential sanctions is inconsistent and, moreover, negligible when addressing endogeneity and other concerns.¿Por qué el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos elige iniciar sanciones económicas basadas en los derechos humanos contra algunos países objetivo altamente represivos, pero no contra otros? y, ¿en qué condiciones lo hace? En este artículo, postulamos una teoría interactiva en la que sostenemos que el tamaño de la diáspora modera la relación entre el comportamiento en materia de derechos humanos en los países objetivo y el inicio de sanciones económicas relacionadas con los derechos humanos. Sostenemos que a medida que aumenta el tamaño de una diáspora, su capacidad para influir en el inicio de sanciones económicas basadas en los derechos humanos se fortalece, ya que puede ser más eficiente en materia de: (1) presionar a los tomadores de decisiones en el Congreso y en la Casa Blanca directamente, así como (2) indirectamente mediante el uso de acciones contenciosas para movilizar a la opinión pública, lo cual intensifica la presión sobre los congresistas y el presidente para que actúen. Con el fin de demostrar esta afirmación, combinamos los datos de las sanciones de los Estados Unidos con los datos sobre las diásporas estadounidenses y la conducta en materia de derechos humanos del país de origen y concluimos que, si bien el tamaño de la diáspora modera fuerte y consistentemente la relación entre la conducta en materia de derechos humanos del país de origen y el inicio de las sanciones por parte del Congreso, su impacto moderador en las sanciones presidenciales es inconsistente y, además, insignificante cuando se abordan la endogeneidad y otras preocupaciones.Pourquoi le gouvernement américain choisit-il d’appliquer des sanctions économiques en fonction du respect des droits de l’Homme seulement contre certains pays extrêmement répressifs? Et à quelles conditions le fait-il? Dans cet article, je postule une théorie interactive dans laquelle j’affirme que la taille de la diaspora modère la relation entre la conduite vis-à-vis des droits de l’Homme du pays cible et l’instauration de sanctions économiques en fonction du respect de ceux-ci. J’affirme que lorsque la taille de la diaspora augmente, sa capacité d’influencer l’instauration de sanctions économiques fondées sur le respect des droits de l’Homme se renforce, car elle est en mesure d’efficacement (1) faire pression sur les décideurs politiques au Congrès ou à la Maison-Blanche directement, mais aussi (2) indirectement, en agissant de manière controversée pour mobiliser l’opinion publique, ce qui intensifie la pression sur les membres du Congrès ou le Président. Pour vérifier mon hypothèse, je combine des données sur les sanctions américaines avec des données sur les diasporas aux États-Unis et les droits de l’Homme par pays d’origine. J’observe que, bien que la taille de la diaspora modère toujours fortement la relation entre la conduite vis-à-vis des droits de l’Homme dans le pays d’origine et l’apparition de sanctions par le Congrès, son effet de modération sur les sanctions présidentielles est fluctuant, en plus d’être négligeable dans la réponse à l’endogénéité et d’autres préoccupations. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 727-754 Issue: 5 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2224919 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2224919 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:5:p:727-754 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2250901_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Emil Petersson Author-X-Name-First: Emil Author-X-Name-Last: Petersson Title: Looking to the Skies: Operation Unified Protector and the Strategy of Aerial Intervention Abstract: What are the different ways in which an intervener can use airpower to enhance a rebel organization’s ability to capture government-held territory? Multiple studies have analyzed how foreign airpower can be employed as a counterinsurgency tool, intended to reduce the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks. However, many civil wars are fought conventionally, and non-state actors can benefit from military interventions that helps them to overcome the advantage in capabilities often enjoyed by their government adversaries. I analyze how airpower can be used in support of a rebel organization engaged in a conventional civil war, contributing to its ability to produce salient battlefield information. I argue that that an intervener can employ direct attack against heavy weapons and anti-aircraft assets, and interdiction of command and control capabilities and logistics, in order to diminish the government’s advantage in conventional capabilities. In doing so, foreign airpower contributes to the rebels’ ability to capture territory, a crucial intermediary goal and source of battlefield information when attempting to impose defeat on the government. Through a quantitative case study of Operation Unified Protector and the 2011 Libyan Civil War, I find that coalition airstrikes against the Libyan government’s heavy weapons, logistics, and anti-aircraft assets contributed to the Libyan rebels’ ability to capture territory. By contrast, strikes against the government’s command and control capabilities had no effect.¿Cuáles son las diferentes formas en las que una parte interviniente puede usar el poder aéreo con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de una organización rebelde para ganar territorios controlados por el Gobierno? Existen múltiples estudios que han analizado cómo puede emplearse el poder aéreo extranjero como una herramienta de contrainsurgencia, destinada a reducir la frecuencia y la letalidad de los ataques insurgentes. Sin embargo, muchas guerras civiles se libran convencionalmente, y los agentes no estatales pueden salir beneficiados de intervenciones militares que les ayuden a superar la ventaja a nivel de capacidades que, a menudo, disfrutan sus adversarios gubernamentales. Analizamos cómo se puede usar el poder aéreo en apoyo de una organización rebelde que esté involucrada en una guerra civil convencional, contribuyendo a su capacidad para producir información importante acerca del campo de batalla. Argumentamos que una de las partes intervinientes podría emplear un ataque directo contra armas pesadas y medios antiaéreos, así como la interdicción de las capacidades de mando y control y de la logística, con el fin de disminuir la ventaja del Gobierno en lo referente a las capacidades convencionales. Al hacer esto, el poder aéreo extranjero contribuye a la capacidad de los rebeldes para ganar territorio, lo cual resulta no solo un objetivo intermedio crucial sino también una fuente de información sobre el campo de batalla cuando se intenta imponer la derrota al Gobierno. Concluimos, a partir de un estudio de caso cuantitativo de la Operación Protector Unificado (Operación enmarcada dentro de la intervención militar en Libia de 2011) y de la Guerra Civil Libia de 2011, que los ataques aéreos de la coalición contra las armas pesadas, la logística y los medios antiaéreos del Gobierno libio contribuyeron a la capacidad de los rebeldes libios para ganar territorio. Por el contrario, los ataques contra las capacidades de mando y control del Gobierno no tuvieron ningún efecto.Comment un intervenant peut-il employer les forces aériennes pour améliorer la capacité d’une organisation rebelle de s’emparer de territoires détenus par le gouvernement ? De nombreuses études ont analysé l’emploi des forces aériennes en tant qu’outil de lutte contre l’insurrection, dont le but est de réduire la fréquence et la létalité des attaques des insurgés. Cependant, nombre de guerres civiles se sont déroulées de façon conventionnelle, et les acteurs non étatiques peuvent bénéficier d’interventions militaires qui les aident à contrer l’avantage en matière de capacité que les adversaires gouvernementaux possèdent souvent. J’analyse comment les forces aériennes peuvent être utilisées pour soutenir une organisation rebelle impliquée dans une guerre civile conventionnelle, en contribuant à sa capacité de production d’informations cruciales sur le champ de bataille. J’affirme qu’un intervenant peut avoir recours à une attaque directe à l’encontre d’armes lourdes et d’actifs antiaériens, ainsi qu’à l’interception des capacités logistiques, de commande et de contrôle, afin de réduire l’avantage du gouvernement en matière de capacités conventionnelles. Ce faisant, les forces aériennes étrangères contribuent à la capacité rebelle de capturer des territoires, un objectif intermédiaire et une source d’informations sur le champ de bataille qui s’avèrent déterminants quand on essaie de l’emporter face à un gouvernement. Grâce à une étude de cas quantitative de l’opération Unified Protector et de la guerre civile de 2011 en Libye, j’observe que les frappes aériennes de la coalition à l’encontre des armes lourdes, des capacités logistiques et des actifs antiaériens du gouvernement libyen ont contribué à la capacité des rebelles libyens de capturer des territoires. En revanche, les frappes visant les capacités de commande et de contrôle du gouvernement n’ont eu aucun effet. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 813-844 Issue: 5 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2250901 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2250901 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:5:p:813-844 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2236774_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20230119T200553 git hash: 724830af20 Author-Name: Darren Hawkins Author-X-Name-First: Darren Author-X-Name-Last: Hawkins Author-Name: Jay Goodliffe Author-X-Name-First: Jay Author-X-Name-Last: Goodliffe Title: “Leave It as It Is”: International Network Effects on Protected Lands Abstract: The protection of a portion of a country’s land is vital for sustainable economic growth and biodiversity, though land protection also imposes important costs. States have set aside a growing proportion of their land for protection over time, with wide variation among states. What explains this variation? Theoretically, we argue that states exist internationally in dependence networks with each other and that those networks provide pathways for influence on a state’s environmental choices. A state’s dependence network is the other states with which it regularly exchanges valued goods. We find strong evidence that increases in protected lands among trade partners and international organization partners (both weighted by importance) increase a given state’s protected lands, with substantive effects larger than domestic-level variables like democracy. This paper expands our understandings of the ways that states may influence each other on environmental policy.La protección de una parte del terreno de un país es vital para el crecimiento económico sostenible y para la biodiversidad, aunque la protección de la tierra también conlleva unos costes importantes. Los Estados han estado reservando para su protección una proporción, cada vez mayor, de sus tierras a lo largo del tiempo. Sin embargo, existe una amplia variación a este respecto entre los Estados. ¿Qué explica esta variación? De forma teórica, argumentamos que los Estados existen internacionalmente en redes de dependencia entre sí y que esas redes proporcionan diversas vías que influyen en las elecciones ambientales de un Estado. La red de dependencia de un Estado está formada por otros Estados con los cuales intercambia regularmente bienes valiosos. Encontramos pruebas sólidas de que los aumentos en el número de áreas protegidas entre los socios comerciales y entre los socios de las organizaciones internacionales (ambos ponderados por importancia) aumentan también la cantidad de áreas protegidas de un Estado determinado. Estos aumentos conllevan unos efectos sustantivos mayores que las variables a nivel nacional como la democracia. Este artículo amplía nuestra comprensión acerca de las formas en que los Estados pueden influir mutuamente en la política ambiental.La protection d’une partie des terres d’un pays est cruciale pour une croissance économique durable et la biodiversité, mais elle impose aussi des coûts importants. Au fil des années, les États consacrent une part croissante de leur territoire à la sauvegarde, mais elle varie grandement de l’un à l’autre. Comment expliquer ces différences ? Sur le plan théorique, nous affirmons que les États existent à l’international au sein de réseaux d’interdépendances qui ont tendance à influencer les choix environnementaux étatiques. Le réseau d’interdépendances d’un État regroupe les États avec lesquels il échange régulièrement des marchandises de valeur. Nous trouvons nombre d’éléments probants pour justifier qu’une augmentation de terres protégées chez des partenaires commerciaux et des organisations internationales partenaires (en pondérant les deux en fonction de leur importance) débouche sur une augmentation des terres protégées dans un État donné. Cet effet se révèle plus important que les variables nationales comme la démocratie. Cet article enrichit notre compréhension des moyens par lesquels les États peuvent s’influencer mutuellement en politique environnementale. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 696-726 Issue: 5 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 9 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2236774 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2236774 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:5:p:696-726 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2264464_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20231203T183118 git hash: be90730853 Author-Name: Stefano Jud Author-X-Name-First: Stefano Author-X-Name-Last: Jud Author-Name: Dan Reiter Author-X-Name-First: Dan Author-X-Name-Last: Reiter Title: Populism, Party Ideology, and Economic Expropriations Abstract: What is the connection between populism, globalization, and international political economy (IPE) more broadly? Many presume that all populists oppose all forms of globalization, focusing on trade, migration, and international institutions. This article examines the underexplored but important relationship between populism and foreign direct investment, specifically whether populists are more likely than other leaders to expropriate foreign-owned economic assets. The article develops a theory proposing that left populists but not right populists are more likely to expropriate foreign-owned assets, to maintain their domestic political support. The article presents new quantitative panel data on expropriations in all states from 1990 to 2018, finding that left populists but not right populists are significantly more likely than other leaders to expropriate. Further, neither bilateral investment treaties or domestic political institutions, such as democratic constraints, prevent left populists from expropriating. Complementing the quantitative analysis, the article demonstrates these points with an illustrative case study of Bolivia under Evo Morales. The article advances our understanding of the relationship between populism, globalization, and IPE, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between left and right populism and different forms of globalization.¿Cuál es la conexión existente entre el populismo, la globalización y la economía política internacional (IPE, por sus siglas en inglés), en un sentido más amplio? Mucha gente presupone que todos los populistas se oponen a todas las formas de globalización, y se centran en el comercio, la migración y las instituciones internacionales. Este artículo estudia la relación, poco estudiada hasta ahora, pero que resulta de importancia, entre el populismo y la inversión extranjera directa. En concreto, el artículo estudia si los populistas son más propensos que otros líderes a expropiar activos económicos de propiedad extranjera. El artículo desarrolla una teoría que propone que los populistas de izquierdas, pero no los populistas de derechas, cuentan con más probabilidades de expropiar activos de propiedad extranjera, con el fin de mantener su apoyo político interno. El artículo presenta nuevos datos cuantitativos sobre expropiaciones en todos los Estados entre 1990 y 2018. De estos datos, concluimos que los populistas de izquierdas son significativamente más propensos que otros líderes a expropiar, lo que no ocurre con los populistas de derechas. Además, concluimos que ni los tratados bilaterales en materia de inversión ni las instituciones políticas nacionales, tales como las restricciones democráticas, impiden que los populistas de izquierda expropien. Con el fin de complementar este análisis cuantitativo, el artículo demuestra estos puntos con un estudio de caso ilustrativo de Bolivia bajo la presidencia de Evo Morales. El artículo nos permite avanzar con respecto a nuestra comprensión de la relación entre populismo, globalización e IPE, destacando la importancia que tiene distinguir entre populismo de izquierdas y de derechas, así como las diferentes formas de globalización.Quel est le lien entre le populisme, la mondialisation et l’économie politique internationale (EPI) au sens large ? On pense souvent que tous les populistes s’opposent à toutes les formes de mondialisation, en se concentrant plus particulièrement sur le commerce, l’immigration et les institutions internationales. Cet article s’intéresse à la relation sous-étudiée mais importante entre le populisme et les investissements directs à l’étranger et, plus précisément, à si les populistes ont plus de chances que d’autres dirigeants de s’approprier des actifs économiques étrangers. L’article développe une théorie selon laquelle les populistes de gauche, contrairement aux populistes de droite, ont plus de chances de s’approprier des actifs étrangers afin de maintenir leur soutien politique à l’échelle nationale. Il présente de nouvelles données quantitatives de panel sur l’appropriation dans tous les États entre 1990 et 2018, avant de conclure que les populistes de gauche, à la différence des populistes de droite, ont bien plus de chances que les autres dirigeants de s’approprier ces actifs. En outre, ni les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements ni les institutions politiques nationales, comme les contraintes démocratiques, n’empêchent les populistes de gauche d’avoir recours à l’appropriation. En complément de l’analyse quantitative, l’article démontre ces points à l’aide d’une étude de cas de la Bolivie sous la présidence d’Evo Morales. Il enrichit notre compréhension de la relation entre le populisme, la mondialisation et l’EPI, en soulignant l’importance de la distinction entre le populisme de gauche et de droite et des différentes formes de mondialisation. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 904-934 Issue: 6 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2264464 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2264464 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:6:p:904-934 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2233677_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20231203T183118 git hash: be90730853 Author-Name: Baylee Harrell Author-X-Name-First: Baylee Author-X-Name-Last: Harrell Title: Can’t Live with Them or Can’t Live without Them? How Varying Roles of Women in Rebel Groups Influence One-Sided Violence Abstract: How do women’s roles in rebel groups influence the perpetration of violence against civilians? Research regarding women rebels’ impact on armed group behavior produces mixed findings, warranting further exploration. In this study, I provide the first cross-national analysis of women rebels’ influence on one-sided violence arguing that women’s impact is conditional upon their role within the group. War is considered a masculine phenomenon where violence is plauded, and women combatants are socialized to behave violently. Gendered perceptions of women as peaceful push women on the frontline to defy stereotypes and be exceptionally violent to be taken seriously as combatants. Meanwhile, these same stereotypes allow women to be especially lethal in their attacks because society does not expect it. Alternatively, women in outreach roles are tasked with acquiring support through nonviolent means. Perceptions of women as legitimate, trustworthy, and peaceful make women in outreach roles effective in garnering support for the group, reducing the group’s need to kill civilians to coerce support. Stereotypes of women are responsible for women killing both more and less civilians. Consequently, rebel groups composed of larger shares of frontline women fighters commit higher levels of one-sided violence (OSV) while groups using women in outreach roles commit less OSV. Using data from the Women’s Activities in Armed Rebellion data set and the Georeferenced Events Dataset, I find support for both hypotheses.¿Cómo influye el papel que juegan las mujeres dentro de los grupos rebeldes sobre la perpetración de actos de violencia contra civiles? La investigación existente acerca del impacto que tienen las mujeres rebeldes sobre el comportamiento de los grupos armados produce conclusiones variadas, lo cual justifica un mayor estudio de este tema. En este estudio llevamos a cabo el primer análisis transnacional con relación a la influencia que ejerce el papel de las mujeres rebeldes sobre la violencia unilateral y argumentamos que el impacto de las mujeres está condicionado al papel que estas desempeñan dentro del grupo. La guerra se considera un fenómeno masculino donde se aplaude la violencia y se socializa a las mujeres combatientes para que se comporten violentamente. Las percepciones de género, que caracterizan a las mujeres como pacíficas, obligan a las mujeres en primera línea a desafiar estos estereotipos y a ser excepcionalmente violentas para ser tomadas en serio como combatientes. Además, estos mismos estereotipos permiten que las mujeres puedan ser especialmente letales en sus ataques porque la sociedad no lo espera. De forma alternativa, pueden asignarse a las mujeres roles divulgativos en los cuales las mujeres tienen la tarea de adquirir apoyo a través de medios no violentos. Las percepciones de las mujeres como legítimas, dignas de confianza y pacíficas hacen que las mujeres que ejercen roles de divulgación resulten efectivas para obtener apoyo para el grupo, reduciendo la necesidad del grupo de matar civiles con el fin de coaccionar el apoyo. Los estereotipos existentes acerca de las mujeres son responsables de que las mujeres maten a más civiles, por un lado, pero también a menos civiles, por otro lado. En consecuencia, los grupos rebeldes que están compuestos por una mayor proporción de mujeres combatientes en primera línea cometen niveles más altos de violencia unilateral, mientras que los grupos que utilizan a mujeres en roles de divulgación cometen menos violencia unilateral. Encontramos apoyo para ambas hipótesis a través del uso de datos procedentes del conjunto de datos de actividades de mujeres en rebelión armada y del conjunto de datos de sucesos georreferenciados.Quelle est l’influence des rôles féminins au sein de groupes rebelles quand il s’agit de perpétrer des violences contre les civils ? Les travaux de recherche sur l’incidence des femmes rebelles dans les groupes armés ont produit des résultats mitigés, d’où la nécessité d’un approfondissement. Dans cette étude, je fournis la première analyse transnationale de l’influence des femmes rebelles sur la violence unilatérale en émettant l’hypothèse que l’incidence féminine est conditionnée par le rôle occupé au sein du groupe. La guerre est souvent considérée comme une affaire d’hommes : la violence est saluée et les femmes combattantes sont socialisées de façon à se comporter violemment. Les perceptions genrées des femmes comme pacifistes les poussent à se mettre en première ligne pour remettre en question les stéréotypes. Elles font d’ailleurs preuve d’une violence exceptionnelle pour être prises au sérieux comme combattantes. Ces mêmes stéréotypes permettent aussi aux femmes de se montrer particulièrement meurtrières quand elles attaquent, car la société ne s’y attend pas. D’un autre côté, les femmes qui occupent des rôles de contact auprès du public ont pour mission d’acquérir du soutien sans utiliser la violence. Comme elles sont perçues légitimes, dignes de confiance et pacifistes, les femmes qui occupent ces rôles sont efficaces quand il s’agit d’obtenir davantage de soutien pour le groupe. Aussi, ce dernier aura moins recours au meurtre de civils pour les contraindre à soutenir le groupe. Ainsi, les stéréotypes sur les femmes entraînent à la fois une augmentation et une diminution du nombre de civils tués par ces dernières. Par conséquent, les groupes rebelles qui disposent d’un grand nombre de femmes combattantes en première ligne présentent un niveau plus élevé de violence unilatérale. À l’inverse, ce niveau sera plus faible pour les groupes utilisant davantage de femmes à des rôles de contact auprès du public. À l’aide de l’ensemble de données Women’s Activities in Armed Rebellion (activités des femmes dans les rébellions armées) et du Georeferenced Events Dataset (ensemble de données sur les événements géoréférencés), je trouve des éléments pour venir étayer mes deux hypothèses. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 875-903 Issue: 6 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2233677 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2233677 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:6:p:875-903 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2260934_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20231203T183118 git hash: be90730853 Author-Name: Yujeong Yang Author-X-Name-First: Yujeong Author-X-Name-Last: Yang Title: Racing to the Bottom? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment and Collective Labor Rights Abstract: Studies have discussed how and if foreign direct investment (FDI) may improve collective labor rights in host countries. These studies presume FDI is from developed democracies to developing countries. Far less discussed is whether this positive effect of FDI on labor rights holds when FDI originates from a developing economy with oppressive labor conditions. The rapid rise of China as a new source of FDI provides an opportunity to examine this question. Using a time-series cross-sectional data set covering 123 countries from 2003 to 2017, I test how Chinese FDI is associated with collective labor rights of host countries in both developing and developed regions and whether the effect of Chinese FDI differs from that of FDI from other countries. I find that FDI from China is negatively associated with collective labor rights in host countries, while non-Chinese FDI does not show such a negative association. The negative association between Chinese FDI and collective labor rights is more pronounced in host countries in developing regions than in developed regions.Existen diversos estudios que han analizado cómo y si la inversión extranjera directa (IED) puede contribuir a mejorar los derechos laborales colectivos en los países receptores. Estos estudios parten de la base de que la IED procede de democracias desarrolladas y de que se destina a países en desarrollo. Sin embargo, se ha analizado en mucha menor medida si este efecto positivo de la IED sobre los derechos laborales se mantiene cuando la IED procede de una economía en desarrollo con condiciones laborales opresivas. El rápido ascenso de China como nueva fuente de IED constituye una oportunidad para estudiar esta cuestión. Comprobamos, mediante el uso de un conjunto de datos transversales de series cronológicas que abarca 123 países de 2003 a 2017, cómo influye la IED china en los derechos laborales colectivos de los países receptores, tanto en regiones en desarrollo como en regiones desarrolladas, y si el efecto de la IED china difiere del de la IED de otros países. Los resultados muestran que la IED procedente de China se asocia de forma negativa con los derechos laborales colectivos en los países receptores, mientras que la IED no china no tiene un efecto tan negativo. El impacto negativo de la IED china sobre los derechos laborales colectivos es más pronunciado en los países receptores de las regiones en desarrollo que en países receptores de regiones desarrolladas.Des études ont porté sur comment et si les investissements directs à l’étranger (IDE) peuvent améliorer le droit du travail dans les pays hôtes. Ces études supposent que les IDE proviennent des démocraties développées et sont dirigés vers des pays en voie de développement. On s’est beaucoup moins intéressé au maintien de cet effet positif des IDE sur le droit du travail quand ils proviennent d’un pays en développement aux conditions de travail oppressives. La montée rapide de la Chine en tant que nouvelle source d’IDE fournit une opportunité d’analyse de cette question. À l’aide d’ensembles de données chronologiques transversaux couvrant 123 pays de 2003 à 2017, j’évalue l’influence des IDE chinois sur le droit du travail des pays hôtes, tant dans les régions développées qu’en développement, et si celle-ci diffère de l’influence des IDE d’autres pays. J’observe que les IDE de la Chine entraînent des effets négatifs sur le droit du travail des pays hôtes, quand les IDE d’autres pays n’ont pas de tels effets négatifs. Les conséquences négatives des IDE chinois sur le droit du travail sont plus marquées chez les pays hôtes de régions en développement que de régions développées. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 962-988 Issue: 6 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2260934 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2260934 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:6:p:962-988 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2255923_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20231203T183118 git hash: be90730853 Author-Name: Johannes Bracher Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Bracher Author-Name: Lotta Rüter Author-X-Name-First: Lotta Author-X-Name-Last: Rüter Author-Name: Fabian Krüger Author-X-Name-First: Fabian Author-X-Name-Last: Krüger Author-Name: Sebastian Lerch Author-X-Name-First: Sebastian Author-X-Name-Last: Lerch Author-Name: Melanie Schienle Author-X-Name-First: Melanie Author-X-Name-Last: Schienle Title: Direction Augmentation in the Evaluation of Armed Conflict Predictions Abstract: In many forecasting settings, there is a specific interest in predicting the sign of an outcome variable correctly in addition to its magnitude. For instance, when forecasting armed conflicts, positive and negative log-changes in monthly fatalities represent escalation and de-escalation, respectively, and have very different implications. In the ViEWS forecasting challenge, a prediction competition on state-based violence, a novel evaluation score called targeted absolute deviation with direction augmentation (TADDA) has therefore been suggested, which accounts for both for the sign and magnitude of log-changes. While it has a straightforward intuitive motivation, the empirical results of the challenge show that a no-change model always predicting a log-change of zero outperforms all submitted forecasting models under the TADDA score. We provide a statistical explanation for this phenomenon. Analyzing the properties of TADDA, we find that in order to achieve good scores, forecasters often have an incentive to predict no or only modest log-changes. In particular, there is often an incentive to report conservative point predictions considerably closer to zero than the forecaster’s actual predictive median or mean. In an empirical application, we demonstrate that a no-change model can be improved upon by tailoring predictions to the particularities of the TADDA score. We conclude by outlining some alternative scoring concepts. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 989-1004 Issue: 6 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2255923 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2255923 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:6:p:989-1004 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2277959_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20231203T183118 git hash: be90730853 Author-Name: Carly Millerd Author-X-Name-First: Carly Author-X-Name-Last: Millerd Title: Peaceful Conflict Resolution through Densely Gender-Equal International Organizations Abstract: How does the gender density of an international organization affect its members’ willingness to engage in non-violent dispute resolution? Many scholars have devoted time and energy to determine whether international organizations promote or prevent peace without fully considering the characteristics of the organizations themselves. In this study, I argue that international organizations in which the average gender-equality of member states is high, “densely-gender-equal IOs,” are more likely to mitigate conflict among member states. Highly gender-equal states are more likely to “demand” and utilize conflict resolution mechanisms provided by these densely gender-equal IOs. Densely gender-equal IOs are also more likely to “supply” better dispute mechanisms and influence the behavior of states in which peaceful conflict resolution is not a norm. These effects are a result of norm diffusion of peaceful dispute resolution through repeated interactions with gender-equal states in international organizations. I test these arguments using an aggregated measure of gender-equality of the IO and find support for both of my main arguments.¿Cómo afecta la igualdad de género presente dentro de una organización internacional sobre la voluntad que pueden tener sus miembros de participar en la resolución no violenta de conflictos? Muchos académicos han dedicado tanto tiempo como energía con el fin de determinar si las organizaciones internacionales promueven o impiden la paz, sin entrar a considerar plenamente las características de las propias organizaciones. En este artículo, argumentamos que las organizaciones internacionales que presentan un alto promedio en materia de igualdad de género entre sus Estados miembros, es decir, las «OOII densamente igualitarias en materia de género», tienen más probabilidades de mitigar los conflictos entre los Estados miembros. Es más probable que los Estados con una alta igualdad de género «exijan» y utilicen los mecanismos de resolución de conflictos proporcionados por estas OOII densamente igualitarias en materia de género. También es más probable que las OOII densamente igualitarias en materia de género «proporcionen» mejores mecanismos de disputa e influyan en el comportamiento de los Estados en los que la resolución pacífica de conflictos no es la norma general. Estos efectos son el resultado de la difusión normativa de la resolución pacífica de controversias a través de interacciones repetidas con aquellos Estados que presentan igualdad de género dentro de las organizaciones internacionales. Ponemos a prueba estos argumentos utilizando una medida agregada de la igualdad de género de la OI y encontramos apoyo para nuestros dos argumentos principales.Quels sont les effets de l’égalité hommes-femmes au sein d’une organisation internationale sur la propension de ses membres à prendre part à des résolutions de litiges non violentes ? Nombre de chercheurs ont consacré du temps et de l’énergie pour déterminer si les organisations internationales promouvaient ou empêchaient la paix sans s’intéresser pleinement aux caractéristiques des organisations elles-mêmes. Dans cette étude, j’affirme que les organisations internationales dans lesquelles l’égalité hommes-femmes moyenne des États membres est élevée, les « OI à l’égalité hommes-femmes dense », atténueront plus souvent les conflits entre les États membres. Les États à l’égalité hommes-femmes forte « exigeront » plus souvent des mécanismes de résolution des conflits proposés par ces OI à l’égalité hommes-femmes dense et y auront plus souvent recours. Les OI à l’égalité hommes-femmes dense auront aussi plus de chance de « fournir » de meilleurs mécanismes pour les conflits et d’influencer le comportement des États dans lesquels la résolution pacifique des conflits n’est pas la norme. Ces effets découlent de la diffusion des normes de la résolution des litiges pacifique par des interactions répétées avec des États qui prônent l’égalité des sexes dans les organisations internationales. J’évalue ces arguments à l’aide d’une mesure totale de l’égalité hommes-femmes des OI et trouve des éléments pour venir étayer mes deux principaux arguments. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 845-874 Issue: 6 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2277959 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2277959 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:6:p:845-874 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2254461_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20231203T183118 git hash: be90730853 Author-Name: Sean D. Ehrlich Author-X-Name-First: Sean D. Author-X-Name-Last: Ehrlich Author-Name: Kimberly R. Frugé Author-X-Name-First: Kimberly R. Author-X-Name-Last: Frugé Author-Name: Jillienne Haglund Author-X-Name-First: Jillienne Author-X-Name-Last: Haglund Title: Lobbying, Access Points, and the Protection of Human Rights in Democracies Abstract: Why do some democracies better protect human rights than other democracies? Although research shows that democracies engage in fewer human rights abuses than nondemocracies, we know less about what explains the variation in respect for rights among democracies. Using Access Point Theory, we argue that the number of points of access for interest groups in democracies leads to better protection of physical integrity rights but has weaker or no effects on worker rights. By increasing the amount of access provided to interest groups, lobbying becomes cheaper which enables human rights organizations to lobby for better rights protection but, on worker rights, also enables businesses to lobby against those protections. We examine these expectations using data on all democracies from 1980 to 2002, as well as a new latent measure of worker rights constructed using item response theory.¿Por qué algunas democracias protegen mejor los derechos humanos que otras? Aunque la investigación muestra que las democracias cometen menos abusos contra los derechos humanos que las no democracias, existe una menor cantidad de información referente a los motivos que explican la variación en el respeto de los derechos entre las democracias. Argumentamos, mediante el uso de la teoría del punto de acceso, que el número de puntos de acceso existentes para los grupos de interés en las democracias provoca una mejor protección de los derechos en materia de integridad física, pero que tiene efectos más débiles, o incluso nulos, sobre los derechos de los trabajadores. Al aumentar el grado de acceso que se proporciona a los grupos de interés, la presión política se vuelve menos onerosa, lo que permite a las organizaciones de derechos humanos presionar en favor de una mejor protección de los derechos. Sin embargo, en lo que se refiere a los derechos de los trabajadores, esto también permite a las empresas presionar contra esas protecciones. Estudiamos estas expectativas utilizando tanto datos procedentes de todas las democracias desde 1980 hasta 2002, como una nueva medida, latente, de derechos económicos que fue creada utilizando la teoría de respuesta al ítem.Pourquoi certaines démocraties protègent-elles mieux les droits de l’Homme que d’autres? Bien que la recherche montre que les démocraties présentent moins de violations des droits de l’Homme que les pays non démocratiques, nous ne savons pas très bien expliquer les variations relatives aux droits dans les démocraties. À l’aide de la théorie des points d’accès (Access Point Theory), nous affirmons que plus le nombre de points d’accès des groupes d’intérêts dans les démocraties augmente, meilleure est la protection de l’intégrité physique des droits, mais que les effets sur les droits des travailleurs sont minimes, voire inexistants. En augmentant l’accès fourni aux groupes d’intérêts, le lobbying coûte moins cher. Les organisations des droits de l’Homme peuvent donc promouvoir plus facilement la protection des droits, mais, s’agissant des droits des travailleurs, les entreprises peuvent également faire pression contre ces protections. Nous analysons ces prédictions à l’aide de données sur toutes les démocraties entre 1980 et 2002, ainsi qu’une nouvelle mesure latente des droits économiques créée à l’aide de la théorie des réponses aux items. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 935-961 Issue: 6 Volume: 49 Year: 2023 Month: 11 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2254461 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2254461 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:49:y:2023:i:6:p:935-961 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2296038_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Joon Hyeok Lee Author-X-Name-First: Joon Hyeok Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: Release or Repress? The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Capital Account Openness Abstract: Despite the frequent use of economic sanctions by states, there are insufficient analyses of the collateral effects of these measures on target states. Under the sanctions, targeted leaders who pursue the longevity of their regimes adjust domestic policies to mitigate the costs associated with sanctions. Specifically, this article analyzes the effects of sanctions on capital account liberalization in target states. Economic sanctions trigger changes in the capital account openness of target states. However, the direction of the reform is dependent on the political institutions in target states, which characterize the behavioral incentive structure of the leaders. Specifically, economic sanctions lower capital account openness, albeit only in autocracies. Democracies, which are sensitive to the benefits of capital account openness, are less likely to tighten the restrictions. Instead, they are likely to open their markets. I employ the two-way fixed approach to test my argument, using time-series cross-sectional data spanning 145 countries for the period 1965–2005. In this regard, I find evidence in favor of my argument, with the findings suggesting the indirect impact of economic sanctions on target states’ financial policies on which the decisions are primarily driven by the political incentives of the targeted leaders.A pesar del uso frecuente de las sanciones económicas por parte de los Estados, no existen suficientes análisis acerca de los efectos colaterales que tienen estas medidas en los Estados de destino. En virtud de las sanciones, los líderes de los Estados de destino de estas sanciones, que tienen como objetivo la longevidad de sus regímenes, ajustan sus políticas nacionales con el fin de mitigar los costes asociados a las sanciones. En concreto, en este artículo se analizan los efectos que tienen las sanciones sobre la liberalización de la cuenta de capital en los Estados de destino. Las sanciones económicas provocan cambios en la transparencia de la cuenta de capital de los Estados de destino. Sin embargo, la dirección de las reformas depende de las instituciones políticas de los Estados de destino, las cuales caracterizan la estructura de incentivos conductuales de los líderes. De manera más concreta, las sanciones económicas reducen la transparencia de la cuenta de capital, aunque solo en las autocracias. Las democracias, que son sensibles a los beneficios de la transparencia de la cuenta de capital, son menos propensas a endurecer las restricciones. En cambio, es probable que abran sus mercados. Utilizamos el enfoque fijo bidireccional con el fin de demostrar nuestro razonamiento, mediante el uso de datos transversales de series temporales que abarcan 145 países durante el período entre 1965 y 2005. A este respecto, encontramos evidencias que apoyan nuestro razonamiento, ya que las conclusiones sugieren el impacto indirecto que tienen las sanciones económicas sobre las políticas financieras de los Estados de destino, cuyas decisiones están impulsadas principalmente por los incentivos políticos de los líderes del Estado de destino.Malgré la fréquence de l’utilisation des sanctions économiques par les États, les analyses des effets collatéraux de ces mesures sur les États cibles restent insuffisantes. Les dirigeants ciblés qui souhaitent assurer la longévité de leur régime ajustent les politiques nationales pour atténuer les coûts associés aux sanctions auxquelles ils sont soumis. Plus précisément, cet article analyse les effets des sanctions sur la libéralisation du compte de capital dans les États cibles. Les sanctions économiques déclenchent des modifications dans l’ouverture de celui-ci. Cependant, l’orientation de la réforme dépend des institutions politiques des États cibles, qui caractérisent la structure d’incitations comportementales des dirigeants. Plus précisément, les sanctions économiques réduisent l’ouverture du compte de capital, quoique seulement dans les autocraties. Les démocraties, plus sensibles aux avantages de l’ouverture du compte de capital, accentueront moins souvent les restrictions. Elles auront plutôt tendance à ouvrir leur marché. J’utilise une approche d’effets fixes bilatéraux pour évaluer mon argument, à l’aide de données chronologiques transversales couvrant 145 pays entre 1965 et 2005. À cet égard, je trouve des éléments pour étayer mon argument : les conclusions indiquent la présence de conséquences indirectes des sanctions économiques sur les politiques financières des États cibles. Les décisions concernant ces dernières se fondent principalement sur des incitations politiques des dirigeants ciblés. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 33-63 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2296038 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2296038 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:33-63 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2305968_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati Author-X-Name-First: Krishna Chaitanya Author-X-Name-Last: Vadlamannati Author-Name: Vinícius G. Rodrigues Vieira Author-X-Name-First: Vinícius G. Author-X-Name-Last: Rodrigues Vieira Author-Name: Tianyang Song Author-X-Name-First: Tianyang Author-X-Name-Last: Song Title: Calling the Shots through Health Diplomacy: China’s World-Wide Distribution of Anti-Covid Vaccines and the International Order Abstract: The donation and sale of vaccines are diplomatic tools that have impact well beyond health policies. May Chinese Covid-related vaccine diplomacy be understood beyond reactive terms vis-à-vis power disputes with the West, in particularly the United States? We then scrutinize the drivers of China’s vaccine diplomacy, assessing whether Beijing privileged the expansion of its diplomatic leverage in the Global South. By employing logit and tobit models in the analysis of a cross-sectional dataset covering 213 countries, we examine the probability of countries receiving vaccines from China. We find that low-income states, in particular, and middle-income ones and those with more Covid deaths were more likely to receive vaccines through either donations or purchases. For donations, states that integrate the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and/or oppose the United States at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) were also privileged. China’s vaccine diplomacy has therefore a twofold purpose. First, the expansion of the country’s soft power in the Global South. Second, the consolidation of the BRI bilateral ties and an anti-US allied network. Hence, current global health initiatives cannot be detached from debates on the contestation of the liberal international order (LIO) and China’s dual role as a responsible stakeholder and most successful emerging power that has the potential to challenge American hegemony. Moreover, the findings also suggest that bilateral donor-recipient flows may be less politicized than what prior works on development aid and health diplomacy have claimed. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 168-187 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2305968 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2305968 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:168-187 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2286448_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Peyman Asadzade Author-X-Name-First: Peyman Author-X-Name-Last: Asadzade Author-Name: Behzad Attarzadeh Author-X-Name-First: Behzad Author-X-Name-Last: Attarzadeh Author-Name: Roya Izadi Author-X-Name-First: Roya Author-X-Name-Last: Izadi Author-Name: Skip Mark Author-X-Name-First: Skip Author-X-Name-Last: Mark Author-Name: Almira Sadykova Author-X-Name-First: Almira Author-X-Name-Last: Sadykova Title: Significant Incidents against Americans Abroad: Introducing a New Dataset Abstract: This study introduces the Significant Incidents Against Americans Abroad (SIAAA) Dataset, the foremost systematic data compilation capturing antagonistic actions directed toward American nationals, entities, and interests across the globe from 1987 to 2015. Primarily derived from the US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security reports, the SIAAA assembles 5,272 events targeting American citizens and interests, encompassing both violent and non-violent actions across military, diplomatic, business, and civilian dimensions. In this article, we examine the general trend of incidents and introduce key variables including target typology, geographic dispersion, type of the incident, and perpetrator ideology. As an illustrative example of its potential research application, we focus on NATO's aerial bombing of Yugoslavia, highlighting how the SIAAA can be employed effectively. We conclude with propositions for future research, underscoring the dataset’s potential for both academic and policy analysis.Este trabajo presenta el conjunto de datos con relación a incidentes significativos contra estadounidenses en el extranjero (SIAAA, por sus siglas en inglés), el cual es la compilación sistemática de datos más importante que recoge acciones de carácter antagónico dirigidas a ciudadanos, entidades e intereses estadounidenses en todo el mundo desde 1987 hasta 2015. Los datos recogidos en el SIAAA provienen, principalmente, de los informes de la Oficina de Seguridad Diplomática del Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. El SIAAA reúne 5272 eventos dirigidos a ciudadanos e intereses estadounidenses, que abarcan acciones, tanto violentas como no violentas, en dimensiones militares, diplomáticas, comerciales y civiles. En este artículo, examinamos la tendencia general de estos incidentes e introducimos variables clave como la tipología del objetivo, la dispersión geográfica, el tipo de incidente y la ideología del perpetrador. A modo de ejemplo ilustrativo de la aplicación potencial del SIAAA para la investigación, nos centramos en el bombardeo aéreo que llevó a cabo la OTAN sobre Yugoslavia, destacando cómo se puede emplear el SIAAA de manera efectiva. Concluimos este artículo realizando propuestas para futuras investigaciones y subrayando el potencial de este conjunto de datos tanto para el análisis académico como para el análisis de las políticas.Cette étude présente l’ensemble de données Significant Incidents Against Americans Abroad (SIAAA, ou Incidents importants subis par des Américains à l’étranger), une compilation de données systématique de premier plan qui représente les actions antagonistes à l’encontre de ressortissants, entités et intérêts américains dans le monde entre 1987 et 2015. Principalement dérivé des rapports du Service de sécurité diplomatique du département d’État des États-Unis, le SIAAA regroupe 5 272 événements ciblant des citoyens et intérêts américains : des actes violents et pacifiques dans les domaines militaire, diplomatique, commercial et civil. Dans cet article, nous examinons la tendance générale des incidents et présentons des variables clés, dont la typologie de la cible, la dispersion géographique, le type d’incident et l’idéologie de l’auteur. À titre d’exemple d’illustration de son application potentielle en recherche, nous nous focalisons sur les bombardements aériens de l’OTAN en Yougoslavie pour montrer un emploi efficace du SIAAA. Nous concluons sur des propositions de futurs travaux de recherche qui soulignent le potentiel de l’ensemble de données pour l’analyse académique et politique. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 188-207 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2286448 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2286448 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:188-207 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2291659_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: John Gledhill Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: Gledhill Author-Name: Sabrina Karim Author-X-Name-First: Sabrina Author-X-Name-Last: Karim Title: Boon, bane, or business as usual: Perceptions of the economic consequences of peacekeeping withdrawal from Liberia Abstract: Existing studies show that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) can provide an economic boost to the host state and its population. Some of those studies also suggest that such a boost is unsustainable and that peacekeeping exit may trigger economic downturn within host states. If that is the case, however, do some locals feel the adverse economic effects of PKO exit more than others? In this article, we argue that individuals who come to directly or indirectly depend on economic opportunities that emerge following the deployment of peacekeepers are particularly likely to experience negative economic effects after PKO exit. However, those effects may be partly mitigated through individuals’ economic actions and/or their access to new sources of outside support after the exit of peacekeepers. We test our argument on original data gathered through a large-scale household survey of Monrovia, Liberia, conducted in early 2020. We also draw on qualitative interview data. After noting an overall downturn in Liberia’s economy after 2018 (when the UN Mission in Liberia closed), we find broad support for our claims in the survey data, albeit qualified by nuances in a secondary, disaggregated analysis. We conclude by highlighting implications of our study for the planning and management of peacekeeping withdrawal.Los estudios existentes demuestran que el despliegue de una operación de mantenimiento de la paz (OMP) puede proporcionar un impulso económico al Estado receptor y a su población. Algunos de esos estudios también sugieren que ese impulso resulta insostenible y que la finalización de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz puede llegar a desencadenar una recesión económica en los Estados receptores. Sin embargo, si ese es el caso, ¿existen algunos ciudadanos que noten en mayor medida los efectos económicos adversos derivados de la finalización de una OMP con relación al resto de la población? En este artículo, argumentamos que las personas que llegan a depender directa o indirectamente de las oportunidades económicas que surgen tras el despliegue del personal de mantenimiento de la paz tienen una mayor probabilidad de experimentar efectos económicos negativos después de la finalización de una OMP. Sin embargo, esos efectos pueden mitigarse, en parte, mediante las medidas económicas adoptadas por los ciudadanos y/o su acceso a nuevas fuentes de apoyo externo después de la partida del personal de mantenimiento de la paz. Ponemos a prueba nuestro argumento usando datos originales, que fueron recopilados a través de una encuesta realizada a gran escala en hogares de Monrovia, Liberia, a principios de 2020. También, nos basamos en datos cualitativos obtenidos de entrevistas. Observamos una desaceleración general de la economía de Liberia después de 2018 (cuando se cerró la Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Liberia), la cual proporciona un amplio apoyo a nuestras afirmaciones en los datos de la encuesta. Sin embargo, encontramos matices para este apoyo al realizar un análisis secundario y desagregado. Concluimos destacando las consecuencias que tiene nuestro estudio para la planificación y la gestión de la retirada de las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz.Des études existantes montrent que le déploiement d’opérations de maintien de la paix (OMP) peut stimuler l’État hôte et sa population sur le plan économique. Certaines d’entre elles suggèrent que cet effet n’est pas durable et que la fin de l’OMP peut avoir des effets négatifs sur l’économie des États hôtes. Néanmoins, si tel est le cas, certains résidents ressentent-ils ces effets plus que d’autres? Dans cet article, nous affirmons que les personnes qui finissent par dépendre directement ou indirectement des opportunités économiques créées par le déploiement de l’OMP auront plus de chances de ressentir des effets économiques négatifs quand cette opération prend fin. Toutefois, ces effets peuvent être atténués en partie par les actions économiques individuelles et/ou l’accès à de nouvelles ressources d’aide extérieure après la fin de l’OMP. Nous évaluons notre argument grâce à des données inédites collectées à l’aide d’un sondage de grande échelle auprès de particuliers de Monrovia, au Libéria, mené au début de l’année 2020. Nous nous fondons également sur des données qualitatives d’entretiens. Nous notons une récession généralisée au Libéria après 2018 (quand la mission de l’ONU au Libéria a pris fin), puis nous trouvons nombre d’éléments pour venir étayer nos arguments dans les données de sondage, malgré qu’ils soient nuancés par une analyse ventilée secondaire. En conclusion, nous soulignons les implications de notre étude pour la planification et l’organisation de la fin des OMP. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 1-32 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2291659 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2291659 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:1-32 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2279616_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Jonathan D. Moyer Author-X-Name-First: Jonathan D. Author-X-Name-Last: Moyer Author-Name: Austin S. Matthews Author-X-Name-First: Austin S. Author-X-Name-Last: Matthews Author-Name: Jen Evans Author-X-Name-First: Jen Author-X-Name-Last: Evans Author-Name: John McPhee Author-X-Name-First: John Author-X-Name-Last: McPhee Author-Name: Whitney Kettlun Author-X-Name-First: Whitney Author-X-Name-Last: Kettlun Title: Do Safety Expectations Affect the Location Strategies of Large Service Delivery INGOs? Abstract: Large service-delivery international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) help shape the lives of millions worldwide, contributing significantly to the betterment of global health, development, education, and more. However, these organizations operate on limited financial resources and must deliver services on-the-ground, requiring them to make calculated decisions about their location strategies for operations. Although these INGOs should aim to maximize their efforts by operating in countries with the greatest need, sometimes they may face challenges from political conditions in these environments. Do safety expectations in countries affect the assistance allocation decisions of large service delivery INGOs? We explore this question using new data on the location and operational-intensity of country-level projects across 90 of the largest service delivery INGOs worldwide between 1990 and 2015. We find that these INGOs do send greater operational resources to countries demonstrating need and that INGOs are not necessarily afraid to operate in countries with safety risks. However, large INGOs do send far fewer service operations to autocracies, suggesting that political factors affect their location strategies as well.Las grandes organizaciones no gubernamentales internacionales (ONGI) de prestación de servicios ayudan a dar forma a la vida de millones de personas en todo el mundo, contribuyendo significativamente a la mejoría de la salud mundial, al desarrollo y a la educación, entre otras muchas cosas. Sin embargo, estas organizaciones operan con recursos financieros limitados y tienen que prestar sus servicios sobre el terreno, lo que les obliga a tomar decisiones calculadas sobre sus estrategias de ubicación para las operaciones. Aunque, en teoría, estas ONGI deberían tratar de maximizar sus esfuerzos operando en los países que tienen unas mayores necesidades, a veces las ONGI pueden tener que enfrentarse a ciertos desafíos debido a las condiciones políticas existentes en estos entornos. ¿Afectan las expectativas de seguridad de los países a las decisiones de asignación de asistencia por parte de las grandes ONGI de prestación de servicios? Estudiamos esta cuestión utilizando nuevos datos acerca de la ubicación y de la intensidad operativa de los proyectos a nivel de país en las 90 ONGI de prestación de servicios más grandes del mundo entre 1990 y 2015. Encontramos que estas ONGI envían mayores recursos operativos a los países que demuestran una mayor necesidad y que las ONGI no necesariamente tienen miedo a operar en países con riesgos de seguridad. Sin embargo, las grandes ONGI envían muchas menos operaciones de servicio a las autocracias, lo que sugiere que los factores políticos también afectan sus estrategias de localización.Les grandes organisations non gouvernementales internationales (ONGI) qui fournissent des services ont une incidence sur la vie de millions de personnes dans le monde entier, notamment en contribuant considérablement à l’amélioration de la santé, du développement et de l’éducation à l’échelle mondiale. Néanmoins, ces organisations fonctionnent à partir de ressources financières limitées et doivent fournir des services sur le terrain. Elles doivent donc prendre des décisions réfléchies quant à leur stratégie d’emplacement pour leurs opérations. Bien que ces ONGI devraient souhaiter optimiser leurs efforts en concentrant leurs activités dans les pays où les besoins sont les plus importants, elles peuvent parfois se retrouver confrontées à des défis issus des conditions politiques de ces environnements. Les attentes en matière de sécurité dans les pays ont-elles une incidence sur les décisions d’attribution d’aides des grandes ONGI qui fournissent des services ? Nous examinons cette question à l’aide de nouvelles données sur l’emplacement et l’intensité des activités dans les projets au niveau national chez 90 des plus grandes ONGI qui fournissent des services dans le monde entier entre 1990 et 2015. Nous observons que ces ONGI envoient bel et bien plus de ressources opérationnelles dans les pays qui démontrent un besoin et qu’elles n’ont pas particulièrement peur d’aller dans les pays où il existe des menaces pour la sécurité. Néanmoins, les grandes ONGI lancent bien moins d’opérations de fourniture de services dans les autocraties, ce qui suggère que les facteurs politiques influencent aussi leurs stratégies de choix d’emplacement. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 64-93 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2279616 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2279616 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:64-93 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2288615_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Alexander Baturo Author-X-Name-First: Alexander Author-X-Name-Last: Baturo Author-Name: Julia Gray Author-X-Name-First: Julia Author-X-Name-Last: Gray Title: The Incentives of Leaders in International Organizations: Evidence from the UN General Assembly Abstract: Voters and selectorates tend to prioritize domestic policy, so when and why do national political leaders choose to spend their time at international organizations (IOs)? Heads of state only began to address international assemblies such as the UN in recent decades; their appearances are puzzling, considering that leaders rarely get direct political benefit from multilateral cooperation, whose gains tend to be diffuse and slow-moving. This paper presents a theory of the motivations behind leaders’ appearances at IOs. We argue that because multilateralism tends to be incidental to survival in office, heads of state tend to use IOs for prestige, not policy. But prestige is a luxury: both democrats and autocrats tend to prioritize international cooperation only when they can afford to do so domestically. Autocrats and democrats alike face domestic constraints—namely, the end of a term or gridlock in democracies, or under-institutionalized regimes in autocracies—when they consider international appearance, although the presence of other leaders amplifies the prestige value of a visit to an IO. Novel data on speakers at the United Nations General Assembly support our argument on leader appearances. We show that for the majority of leaders, domestic constraints temper their ability to appear at the UN, despite the draw of other leaders in recent years.Sabemos que los votantes y los selectorados tienden a priorizar la política interna, entonces, ¿cuándo y por qué eligen los líderes políticos nacionales pasar su tiempo en las organizaciones internacionales (OOII)? Los jefes de Estado solo comenzaron a dirigirse a asambleas internacionales como la ONU en las últimas décadas y sus apariciones en ellas aún resultan desconcertantes, teniendo en cuenta que los líderes rara vez obtienen beneficios políticos directos de la cooperación multilateral. Este artículo presenta una teoría con relación a las motivaciones existentes detrás de las apariciones de los líderes en las OOII. Argumentamos que, debido a que el multilateralismo tiende a ser incidental a la supervivencia en el cargo, los jefes de Estado tienden a utilizar a las OOII como una forma de ganar prestigio y no por motivaciones políticas. Sin embargo, el prestigio es un lujo: tanto los demócratas como los autócratas tienden a priorizar la cooperación internacional solo cuando pueden permitírselo a nivel nacional. Tanto los autócratas como los demócratas se enfrentan a limitaciones internas (por ejemplo, el final de un mandato o el estancamiento en las democracias, o los regímenes poco institucionalizados en las autocracias) cuando consideran una aparición internacional. Sin embargo, la presencia de otros líderes aumenta el valor en materia de prestigio que ofrece una visita a una OOII. Los nuevos datos sobre los oradores en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas respaldan nuestro argumento acerca de las apariciones de los líderes. Demostramos que, para la mayoría de los líderes, las limitaciones internas atenúan su capacidad para comparecer en la ONU, a pesar de la atracción que han podido ejercer otros líderes durante los últimos años. Nuestras conclusiones tienen implicaciones importantes para el estudio de cómo los incentivos de los ejecutivos afectan a la atención que estos prestan a la cooperación internacional.Les électeurs et les sélectorats ont tendance à s’intéresser davantage à la politique nationale, alors pourquoi et quand les dirigeants politiques nationaux choisissent-ils de passer du temps dans des organisations internationales (OI) ? Les chefs d’État ne s’adressent aux assemblées internationales, comme l’ONU, que depuis ces dernières décennies. Leurs apparitions sont déconcertantes, étant donné que les dirigeants ne bénéficient que rarement sur le plan politique d’une coopération multilatérale. Cet article présente une théorie des motivations qui se cachent derrière les apparitions des dirigeants aux OI. Nous affirmons que puisque le multilatéralisme a tendance à ne pas avoir d’incidence sur un mandat, les chefs d’État utilisent les OI pour gagner en prestige, et non pour la politique. Or, le prestige est un luxe : tant les démocrates que les autocrates n’ont tendance à privilégier la coopération internationale que lorsqu’ils peuvent se le permettre sur le plan national. Autocrates comme démocrates sont confrontés à des contraintes nationales quand ils envisagent une apparition internationale : la fin d’un mandat ou les blocages politiques dans les démocraties, et les régimes sous-institutionnalisés dans les autocraties. Néanmoins, la présence d’autres dirigeants décuple la valeur prestigieuse d’une visite dans une OI. Des données inédites sur les intervenants lors de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies soutiennent notre argument quant aux apparitions de dirigeants. Nous montrons que pour la majorité des dirigeants, les contraintes nationales restreignent leurs possibilités d’apparition à l’ONU, malgré le succès d’autres dirigeants ces dernières années. Nos conclusions s’accompagnent d’implications importantes pour l’étude des conséquences des motivations de l’exécutif sur son attention à la coopération internationale. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 138-167 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2288615 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2288615 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:138-167 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2266553_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Jenny Guardado Author-X-Name-First: Jenny Author-X-Name-Last: Guardado Author-Name: Steven Pennings Author-X-Name-First: Steven Author-X-Name-Last: Pennings Title: Shock Persistence and the Study of Armed Conflict: Empirical Biases and Some Remedies Abstract: Poor employment prospects for potential insurgents are often thought to increase the intensity of armed conflict. A large empirical literature tries to identify the strength of this “opportunity cost” channel, in part by regressing conflict on commodity price shocks that affect the demand for workers. In this research note we develop a theoretical framework to interpret these empirical results. We argue that because commodity price shocks are usually persistent, the estimated strength of the opportunity cost mechanism will be biased upwards (towards zero)—even for labor-intensive commodities whose price shocks are not permanent. We define this bias analytically and, using regressions on simulated data, show that it is quantitatively important for commodities studied in the literature. The bias occurs because persistent shocks that reduce employment prospects today are correlated with unobserved dynamic motivations to fight, such as the expected value of an oil field or a fighter’s subjective value of a grievance. We conclude that the opportunity cost mechanism may be even stronger than has been estimated, and that researchers should use transient, seasonal or anticipated shocks to identify its magnitude.Con frecuencia, se tiene la tendencia a pensar que el hecho de que los potenciales insurgentes tengan unas expectativas pobres en materia de empleabilidad contribuye a aumentar la intensidad de los conflictos armados. Existe una amplia bibliografía, de carácter empírico, que trata de identificar la fortaleza de este canal de «coste de oportunidad». Esto, lo hace, en parte, mediante la regresión del conflicto con respecto a las perturbaciones en materia de precios de los productos básicos, las cuales afectan la demanda de trabajadores. En esta nota de investigación, desarrollamos un marco teórico para interpretar estos resultados empíricos. Argumentamos que, debido a que las perturbaciones en materia de precios de los productos básicos suelen ser persistentes, la fortaleza estimada del mecanismo de coste de oportunidad estará sesgada al alza (hacia cero), incluso para aquellos productos básicos intensivos en mano de obra para los cuales las perturbaciones en materia de precios no resultan permanentes. Definimos este sesgo de forma analítica y demostramos, mediante el uso de regresiones en datos simulados, que este resulta cuantitativamente importante para los productos estudiados en la bibliografía. El sesgo se produce porque los cambios persistentes que contribuyen, actualmente, a reducir las perspectivas de empleo se correlacionan con motivaciones dinámicas para luchar que no han sido tenidas en cuenta, como el valor esperado de un campo petrolero o el valor subjetivo que un combatiente otorga a un agravio. Concluimos que el mecanismo de coste de oportunidad puede ser incluso más fuerte de lo que se había estimado, y que los investigadores deben usar perturbaciones transitorias o estacionales para poder identificar su magnitud.Des perspectives d’emploi médiocres pour les rebelles potentiels intensifieraient souvent les conflits armés. Une abondante littérature empirique tente d’identifier la force de ce canal de « coût d’opportunité », en partie en remontant le conflit jusqu’à une crise des prix des matières premières qui a une incidence sur la demande de travailleurs. Dans cette note de recherche, nous développons un cadre théorique pour interpréter ces résultats empiriques. Nous affirmons que puisque les crises des prix des matières premières sont généralement de longue durée, l’estimation de la force du mécanisme coût-opportunité sera haussière (vers zéro), même pour les marchandises intensives en travail dont les crises de prix ne sont pas permanentes. Nous définissons ce biais sur le plan analytique et, à l’aide de régressions à partir de données simulées, nous montrons son importance quantitative pour les matières premières étudiées dans la littérature. Le biais intervient quand des crises persistantes qui réduisent les perspectives d’emploi aujourd’hui sont corrélées à des motifs de conflit dynamiques, comme la valeur attendue d’un champ pétrolifère ou la valeur subjective qu’un combattant accorde à un grief. La conclusion indique que l’importance du mécanisme coût-opportunité pourrait bien être plus élevée que nos estimations, et suggère aux chercheurs d’utiliser des crises passagères ou saisonnières pour identifier son ampleur. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 121-137 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2266553 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2266553 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:121-137 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2279627_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Faradj Koliev Author-X-Name-First: Faradj Author-X-Name-Last: Koliev Author-Name: Andreas Duit Author-X-Name-First: Andreas Author-X-Name-Last: Duit Author-Name: Baekkwan Park Author-X-Name-First: Baekkwan Author-X-Name-Last: Park Title: The Impact of INGO Climate Shaming on National Laws Abstract: Does INGO climate shaming translate into actual climate laws, or is it ineffective in altering the behavior of governments? This article provides the first systematic assessment of whether and under what conditions INGO climate shaming can influence national climate policymaking. Drawing on social movement and NGO literatures, we argue that INGO climate shaming can incur reputational costs for governments through two main pathways: public opinion and transnational politics. To test our propositions, we generate a unique dataset on INGO climate shaming, utilizing natural language processing (NLP) to extract INGO climate shaming events from media sources, covering the period 1990–2020. We find that climate shaming is generally effective in pushing government to introduce climate laws. Particularly, we find that climate shaming is consequential when governments are trade-dependent and have committed to global climate norms. Our findings provide substantive implications for the global climate governance literature. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 94-120 Issue: 1 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 1 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2023.2279627 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2023.2279627 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:1:p:94-120 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2310014_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Miguel Alberto Gomez Author-X-Name-First: Miguel Alberto Author-X-Name-Last: Gomez Author-Name: Gregory Winger Author-X-Name-First: Gregory Author-X-Name-Last: Winger Title: Public opinion and alliance commitments in cybersecurity an attack against all? Abstract: Cyber operations as a facet of international competition pose a direct challenge to alliances. Designed to respond to conventional military attacks, alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must now determine whether their defensive commitments extend into cyberspace. This question is not limited to political and military elites, as the use of force in defense of allies is among the most politically charged decisions a state can make and relies significantly on public support. This article extends recent public opinion literature on cyber conflict to investigate public attitudes towards existing treaty commitments following a destructive cyber operation against an allied state. Using a survey experiment involving United States nationals, we find that while participants are sensitive to treaty obligations, these effects are moderated by individual factors like domain expertise. Furthermore, we observe that specific aggressor-ally dyads tied to geographic regions can shape public preferences, with participants being more reactive to Europe-based scenarios than comparable treatments in Asia.Las operaciones cibernéticas, como una faceta de la competencia internacional, plantean un desafío directo a las alianzas. Aunque fueron diseñadas para responder a ataques militares convencionales, alianzas como la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte deben determinar ahora cómo se traducen sus compromisos defensivos en el ámbito digital. Esta cuestión no está limitada a las élites políticas y militares, ya que el uso de la fuerza para la defensa de los aliados es una de las decisiones con mayor carga política que puede tomar un Estado y depende en gran medida del apoyo público. Este artículo amplía la literatura reciente, en materia de opinión pública, sobre conflictos cibernéticos con el fin de investigar las actitudes públicas hacia los compromisos de los tratados existentes después de una operación cibernética destructiva contra un Estado aliado. Descubrimos, mediante el uso de un experimento de encuesta en el que participaron ciudadanos estadounidenses, que, si bien los participantes son sensibles a las obligaciones de los tratados, estos efectos están moderados por factores individuales como la experiencia en el dominio. Además, observamos que las díadas específicas agresor-aliado que están vinculadas a regiones geográficas pueden dar forma a las preferencias del público, y que los participantes son más reactivos a los escenarios que tienen lugar en Europa que a aquellos comparables en Asia.Les cyberopérations, facettes de la concurrence internationale, présentent un défi direct pour les alliances. Conçues pour répondre aux attaques militaires conventionnelles, les alliances comme l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord doivent aujourd’hui déterminer comment leurs engagements défensifs se traduisent dans le domaine numérique. Cette question ne se limite pas aux élites politique et militaire, car l’usage de la force pour défendre des alliés compte parmi les décisions les plus polémiques qu’un État peut prendre. Or, elles reposent en grande partie sur le soutien public. Cet article s’inscrit dans le prolongement de la littérature récente sur l’opinion publique en matière de cyberconflits. Il s’intéresse à l’attitude de la population à l’égard des engagements existants par traité à la suite d’une cyberopération destructrice à l’encontre d’un État allié. À l’aide d’une expérience de sondage impliquant des citoyens américains, nous remarquons que bien que les participants soient sensibles aux obligations au titre de traités, leurs effets sont modérés par des facteurs personnels comme l’expertise au sein d’un domaine. De plus, nous remarquons que certaines dyades agresseur-allié au sein de régions spécifiques peuvent façonner les préférences de la population, les participants réagissant davantage à des scénarios basés en Europe qu’à des traitements comparables ayant lieu en Asie. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 332-348 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2310014 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2310014 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:332-348 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2318559_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Andrea Knapp Author-X-Name-First: Andrea Author-X-Name-Last: Knapp Title: Speaking of civilians: Automated text analysis of the United Nations’ framing of complex humanitarian emergencies Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, the protection of civilians has increased its weight on the United Nations (UN) agenda. This article (1) maps the evolution of civilian protection within the UN framework as an indicator of its shifting priorities, (2) identifies breakpoints in the prevalence and character of the protection discourse, and (3) explores how internal processes of policy development and real-world triggers (namely conflicts and peacekeeping operations) shaped this transformation. The article uses Structural Topic Modeling (STM) to analyze an original corpus of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on complex humanitarian emergencies since 1990. The analysis uncovers two distinct forms of protection, labeled as “Ground protection” and “Political–legal protection,” which are characterized by contrasting temporal and geographic trajectories. Moreover, critical junctures in the protection rhetoric (during the years 2000, 2005, and 2008) coincide with policy watersheds rather than conflict outbreaks or trends in peacekeeping deployment. This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the intricate evolution of civilian protection using text-as-data methods, which uses its theory-building design to encourage further explorations on the interplay between internal and external factors in shaping its progression within the UN framework. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 300-331 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2318559 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2318559 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:300-331 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2309999_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Pablo Argote Author-X-Name-First: Pablo Author-X-Name-Last: Argote Author-Name: Sarah Zukerman Daly Author-X-Name-First: Sarah Zukerman Author-X-Name-Last: Daly Title: The formation of attitudes toward immigration in Colombia Abstract: What explains elevated hostility toward immigrants? We identify two concerns that affect support for immigration: labor market competition and social proximity between immigrants and natives. Relying on a conjoint experiment embedded in an original face-to-face survey, we explore these dynamics in one of the largest migratory flows of the last decade: the Venezuelan exodus to Colombia. We find that respondents primarily reject lower-skill migrants. While ethnic proximity does not mitigate xenophobic attitudes in our context, familial ties and personal contact do. These findings confirm the relevance of pocketbook considerations in guiding attitudes toward foreigners but challenge the common assumption of positive in-group bias among co-ethnics. Moreover, we affirm the relevance of individual and familial proximity as key contributing factors to attenuating xenophobia in response to immigration in the Global South. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 370-384 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2309999 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2309999 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:370-384 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2307934_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Zhen Wang Author-X-Name-First: Zhen Author-X-Name-Last: Wang Author-Name: Huimin Cheng Author-X-Name-First: Huimin Author-X-Name-Last: Cheng Author-Name: Wenxuan Zhong Author-X-Name-First: Wenxuan Author-X-Name-Last: Zhong Author-Name: Ping Ma Author-X-Name-First: Ping Author-X-Name-Last: Ma Author-Name: Amanda Murdie Author-X-Name-First: Amanda Author-X-Name-Last: Murdie Title: Shifting sands: How change-point and community detection can enrich our understanding of international politics Abstract: When and how do international political arrangements change? International relations scholars have long examined the nature of shifts in international alliance and cooperation networks, often arguing that times of disruption in the international system are the most precarious for peace. In this research note, we rely on innovations in change-point and community detection methods to endogenously examine the timing and nature of shifts in country-to-country relationships through defense cooperative agreements. Using new methodical innovations from network science, we can see how countries move through different communities over time, changing the nature of polarity in the system. This empirical approach can help provide insights into determinants of peace, vulnerabilities in the international system, and potential aggressors in world politics. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 349-369 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2307934 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2307934 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:349-369 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2318551_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Perisa Davutoglu Author-X-Name-First: Perisa Author-X-Name-Last: Davutoglu Title: The logic of sexual violence by state security forces in civil wars Abstract: Wartime sexual violence exhibits significant variation both across and within civil conflicts. When explaining this variation, existing scholarly work primarily focuses on rebel groups and overlooks state actors engaged in sexualized civilian victimization. This paper extends the literature by concentrating on states as perpetrators of wartime sexual violence, linking the variation in state-perpetrated sexual violence to battlefield outcomes. It argues that when states suffer from battlefield losses, sexual violence by state security forces is likely to become more prevalent due to changes in motivations at both the command level and the rank-and-file level. Moreover, it suggests that the effect of battle losses on state-perpetrated sexual violence is greater if the states are particularly strong in terms of their military capabilities. Time-series cross-sectional analyses of all armed conflicts between the years 1989 and 2020 provide support for these theoretical expectations, indicating that the effect of battle losses on sexual violence is conditional on states’ military strength. The findings have important implications for the prevention of sexual violence in conflict zones. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 273-299 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2318551 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2318551 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:273-299 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2310005_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Damian Raess Author-X-Name-First: Damian Author-X-Name-Last: Raess Author-Name: Patrick Wagner Author-X-Name-First: Patrick Author-X-Name-Last: Wagner Title: The “Social Europe” effect: Does southern foreign direct investment in Europe improve labor rights in the Global South? Abstract: Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) relations between developing and developed countries can lead to ratcheting-up of labor standards. Past research, however, has relegated developing countries to a passive role in the global economy while simultaneously largely ignoring variation between developed countries’ degree of protection of labor rights. In this study, we consider FDI by developing countries into Europe and how it can lead to labor upgrading. We argue that the obligations to upgrade implied by Europe’s regulatory environment will pressure developing country firms with strategic asset-seeking FDI to upgrade their practices which can subsequently diffuse in their home countries. We tease out this specific mechanism from others through a comparative research design juxtaposing FDI into high standard social Europe and the relatively low standard United States for a panel of 122 developing countries in the period 2001–2010. Our analysis compares how FDI into each location affects both collective and individual labor rights, finding that FDI into “Social Europe" leads to the improvement of labor standards, particularly trade union rights and substantive rights relating to working conditions, while there is no such upgrading effect for FDI into the United States. These findings are robust to multiple specifications, including an innovative application of the measurement strategy in studies on trading-/investing-up effects. This research helps us to understand two underappreciated facets of this latest phase of globalization: the rise of developing countries as agents of global integration and how regulatory disparities between potential economic partners can affect labor upgrading in those same developing countries. Any weakening of the European social model should consider its external consequences. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 209-242 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2310005 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2310005 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:209-242 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2311736_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Susan Hannah Allen Author-X-Name-First: Susan Hannah Author-X-Name-Last: Allen Author-Name: Lauren Lee Ferry Author-X-Name-First: Lauren Lee Author-X-Name-Last: Ferry Author-Name: Obaida Shammama Author-X-Name-First: Obaida Author-X-Name-Last: Shammama Title: Affinity or effectiveness? Donors’ preferences for bypass aid Abstract: Western donors have progressively increased the amount of foreign aid allocated through bypass channels, particularly for recipients with weak domestic institutions. Rather than giving money directly to recipient governments, aid is given to non-governmental organizations working on the ground in those countries. Explanations for this shift range from increased donor attention to effectiveness, a desire to deliver assistance directly to those in need, and enhanced legitimacy by working with local civil society partners. Donors, however, face a trade-off when deciding whether or not to allocate aid through bypass channels. Because bypass aid is not given directly to the recipient government, the donor has less leverage to prop up friendly regimes or buy policy concessions. We argue that as donors balance competing motivations, geo-strategic incentives can, at times, trump concerns regarding best practices of poverty alleviation. Using data on bypass aid from 2004 to 2019, we find that donor’s commitment to good governance is ameliorated in strategically important recipient states. Strategic partners who improve their domestic governance are rewarded with less bypass aid (more government-to-government aid) at higher rates than less strategic recipients. These results highlight potential limitations of the good governance movement in foreign aid. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 243-272 Issue: 2 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 3 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2311736 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2311736 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:2:p:243-272 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2327996_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Willow Kreutzer Author-X-Name-First: Willow Author-X-Name-Last: Kreutzer Author-Name: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell Author-X-Name-First: Sara McLaughlin Author-X-Name-Last: Mitchell Title: The Three R’s of CEDAW Commitment: Ratification, Reservation, and Rejection Abstract: Human rights treaties have mixed success records for improving member states’ human rights behavior. Yet the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has been successful for improving women’s rights. However, few CEDAW analyses account for the influence of reservations on state compliance with the treaty. This study develops a theoretical approach drawn from the opposability (vs. permissibility) school of reservations in international law. We argue that states ratifying CEDAW with reservations are less likely to see improvements in women’s rights than states ratifying CEDAW without reservations. We also show that states with worse women’s rights place reservations on core articles most central to the treaty’s success, while states with better women’s rights place reservations on procedural or non-core articles. Ordered logit, regression, and Heckman selection models of state-year data from 1981 to 2019 show that reservations in CEDAW are detrimental to the success of the institution. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 418-447 Issue: 3 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2327996 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2327996 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:418-447 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2347214_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Xiran Chen Author-X-Name-First: Xiran Author-X-Name-Last: Chen Title: Chiefs and Pre-Election Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Precolonial Legacy of Centralized States Abstract: This article examines how African chiefs shape pre-election violence (PEV) locally. I argue that chiefs with greater capability of voter coordination, which stems from precolonial centralized states, reduce local risk of PEV. Utilizing existing and original data, I find that precolonial centralized states have a negative effect on PEV in Anglophone Africa, where precolonial institutions have been better preserved. This relationship is robust to a series of tests, including two-stage least-squares regressions. The findings contribute to our knowledge of how local political actors shape violent campaign strategies and of the diverse (pre-)colonial legacies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 537-566 Issue: 3 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2347214 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2347214 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:537-566 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2348063_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Kyung Suk Lee Author-X-Name-First: Kyung Suk Author-X-Name-Last: Lee Title: South Korean Cost Sensitivity and Support for Nuclear Weapons Abstract: How do the costs of proliferation shape the public support for building nuclear weapons? Public opinion matters, especially in a democracy, because the masses can affect the nuclear policy choices that political elites make. Yet the existing literature on nuclear proliferation has not incorporated the public’s cost sensitivity in the analysis. We therefore do not fully understand the sources of public attitudes toward nuclearization. By fielding a novel survey experiment in South Korea, I found that the economic and human costs of economic sanctions and preventive strikes dampen South Koreans’ preferences for nuclear armament. Relative to the no-cost condition, economic and human costs reduce the support levels by 25.1% points and 19.4% points, respectively and in the case of combined costs the support decreases by 29.6% points. However, South Koreans still have relatively high levels of support for a nuclear arsenal even after the exposure to the costs of nuclearization. This implies that the rally effect resulting from hostile international responses may mitigate the negative cost effects to some degree. This study can contribute to the growing literature by providing new theoretical foundations and empirical results. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 506-536 Issue: 3 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2348063 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2348063 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:506-536 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2352486_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Brian Blankenship Author-X-Name-First: Brian Author-X-Name-Last: Blankenship Author-Name: Qaraman Hasan Author-X-Name-First: Qaraman Author-X-Name-Last: Hasan Author-Name: Soran Mohtadi Author-X-Name-First: Soran Author-X-Name-Last: Mohtadi Author-Name: Indra Overland Author-X-Name-First: Indra Author-X-Name-Last: Overland Author-Name: Johannes Urpelainen Author-X-Name-First: Johannes Author-X-Name-Last: Urpelainen Title: Oil Prices and International Conflict: Why Low Oil Revenue May Not Pacify Petrostates1 Abstract: This article explores how declining oil revenue might shape the amount of international conflict initiated by major oil producers (petrostates). We analyze four potential mechanisms through which variation in oil prices could affect petrostate conflict initiation: emboldenment, battling over a smaller market, signaling strength, and diversionary conflict. The empirical findings suggest that higher oil prices are associated with lower rates of petrostate conflict initiation. From one standard deviation below the mean oil price to one standard deviation above it, the predicted number of militarized interstate disputes declines twofold, from .025 [95% CI: .016–.034] per petrostate per year to .012 [.007–.016]. Moreover, the evidence suggests that petrostates are more likely to target other petrostates when oil prices are low. This suggests that the energy transition may not be a boon for international peace among petrostates, and for a time, it may even prove to be the opposite. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 478-505 Issue: 3 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2352486 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2352486 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:478-505 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2331131_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Ilker Kalin Author-X-Name-First: Ilker Author-X-Name-Last: Kalin Author-Name: Mustafa Kirisci Author-X-Name-First: Mustafa Author-X-Name-Last: Kirisci Title: U.S. Military Training, External Support, and Security Defections during Nonviolent Resistance Abstract: Why do some armed forces remain loyal to the regime while others switch sides during nonviolent uprisings? The existing research predominantly focuses on the roles of domestic actors and dynamics in explaining security defections. We extend this line of research by exploring external factors that might potentially affect troops’ decision to defect. In particular, we suggest a combined effect of U.S. military training and external support for campaigns on defection decisions. Our findings show that substantial Western power involvement in support of campaigns might induce security defections in militaries with which the U.S. military has established ties. We further probe this relationship by disaggregating Western power support into its constituents and find that security defections are most likely to occur when a campaign is backed by both the U.S. and at least one other Western power. This study contributes to an understudied aspect of security force defections during nonviolent campaigns, highlighting how external dynamics might shape militaries’ decisions regarding loyalty and defection. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 448-477 Issue: 3 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2331131 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2331131 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:448-477 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 # input file: GINI_A_2319096_J.xml processed with: repec_from_jats12.xsl darts-xml-transformations-20240209T083504 git hash: db97ba8e3a Author-Name: Ida Rudolfsen Author-X-Name-First: Ida Author-X-Name-Last: Rudolfsen Author-Name: Todd G. Smith Author-X-Name-First: Todd G. Author-X-Name-Last: Smith Title: Nothing Compares? Investigating the Cost of Food as a Driver of Urban Unrest Abstract: Increasing food prices have implications for basic subsistence, have a strong price visibility and symbolic value, and are characterized by high volatility and inelasticity of demand. Research thus assumes that food price is an important trigger for unrest. Yet, whether food is an especially potent driver for people’s willingness to engage in collective action, or whether it concerns grievances about general inflation, is unknown. Does food have a greater effect on the willingness to participate in unrest? The paper investigates the relative importance of food in mobilization potential by using unique data from a survey experiment in Johannesburg, South Africa. The experiment collects information on how price increases in food, fuel, and electricity affects respondents’ willingness to engage in unrest. The results show a higher willingness to engage in collective action when presented with increasing living expenses, regardless of whether it is food, fuel or electricity, compared to stable prices. We also consider the level of risk exposure to price hikes, and find that those who report going hungry in the last year have a higher willingness to engage in unrest than those who do not. Thus, food access influences the willingness to partake in unrest during price hikes, also for commodities seemingly unrelated to food. This suggests that for those who are most affected by a price hike it is less important what type of commodity it is. The question is whether it introduces further strain on an already hard-stretched budget. Journal: International Interactions Pages: 385-417 Issue: 3 Volume: 50 Year: 2024 Month: 5 X-DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2319096 File-URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2024.2319096 File-Format: text/html File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:50:y:2024:i:3:p:385-417