

# **The Importance of Being Known: Relationship Banking and Credit Limits**

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## **Abstract**

This paper measures the importance of bank-firm relationships in obtaining higher credit “limits.” We use data from a relatively unused section of the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993) on credit limits, credit sources, and contract terms for firms with lines of credit from multiple banks. This lets us isolate the credit limit that each bank provides the same firm, eliminating the need to control for often immeasurable, unreliable, or firm-specific “soft” information. For a median Line of Credit (LOC) of \$250,000, we find that a bank with a five-year information advantage provides a LOC limit that is \$20,000 higher. We also find that purchase of loan and non-loan services by firm from the contracting bank affects the credit limit differently. Non-loan services increase the credit limit and loan services decrease the credit limit. Our findings confirm anecdotal claims from the small business community that relationships are vital to secure higher credit limits.

Keywords: Lending Relationship, Small Business Finance, Credit limits

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## **Abstract**

This paper measures the importance of bank-firm relationships in obtaining higher credit “limits.” We use data from a relatively unused section of the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993) on credit limits, credit sources, and contract terms for firms with lines of credit from multiple banks. This lets us isolate the credit limit that each bank provides the same firm, eliminating the need to control for often immeasurable, unreliable, or firm-specific “soft” information. For a median Line of Credit (LOC) of \$250,000, we find that a bank with a five-year information advantage provides a LOC limit that is \$20,000 higher. We also find that purchase of loan and non-loan services by firm from the contracting bank affects the credit limit differently. Non-loan services increase the credit limit and loan services decrease the credit limit. Our findings confirm anecdotal claims from the small business community that relationships are vital to secure higher credit limits.

## **1. Introduction**

How does a bank’s ability to produce private information about a borrower affect its credit rationing practices? Do firms obtain higher credit limits from the banks with which they have transacted for longer durations vis-à-vis from banks with which they have transacted for shorter durations? If so, how much?

Economic theory predicts that a bank’s ability to produce reliable private information lowers the information asymmetry between the firm and the bank, and facilitates higher credit limits (Leland and Pyle, 1977, Diamond, 1984).<sup>1</sup> The social embeddedness approach in sociological theory predicts that bank/firm interactions over time would lead to private networks of social relations between entrepreneurs and bank officials; again, leading to higher credit limits (Uzzi, 1999).<sup>2</sup> While access to such private information and networks is particularly important in lending to legally opaque, personality-driven

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<sup>1</sup> See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) for recent surveys.

<sup>2</sup> This is a consequence of social networks leading to exchange protocols and a system of long-term reciprocity beyond the immediate credit transaction.

small businesses, direct empirical evidence of the effect of bank/borrower relationships on credit limits is sparse.

Previous work on relationship banking has examined the effect of relationship durations on the interest rate charged (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), on the probability of the loan being secured by collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995), and on the probability of the loan application being rejected (Cole, 1998). Yet there is little empirical evidence to suggest that relationships may affect the credit limit banks are willing to commit and supply to a firms' future financing needs.

Credit limits on lines of credits (LOCs) are an important source of financing for small business (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999 and Mitusch, 1999). Since these funds are not asset or project specific, they also represent substantial credit risk for a lender. A lender can reduce some of these risks by producing reliable private information through repeated interaction over time. This paper examines the extent to which credit *limits* are affected by bank-borrowing relationships using data from the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993).

The credit limits that banks are willing to commit to firms are a function of owner, firm, contract, and bank characteristics plus the strength of the embedded relationship between the bank and the firm. For small businesses, owner characteristics may be the most important determinant of the banks' credit decisions. Unfortunately, most of these attributes are "soft" information, i.e., information that cannot be unambiguously documented by any dataset (Stein, 2000). For instance, the owner might be a skilled entrepreneur with specialized knowledge and experience in a field of enterprise. For the bank, the owner's expertise may become the most important determinant in making a credit decision—an example of what Stein calls a "character loan." Yet, in the absence of such "soft" information in the data, the researcher is forced to relegate this factor to the error term, causing omitted variable bias.

The NSSBF data allows us to design an estimating procedure that circumvents this problem. By looking at the *difference* in the LOC limits that two banks have provided the same firm, our econometric specification eliminates the need to control for owner and firm characteristics. These characteristics are treated as *Fixed Effects* that both contracting banks observe, but the dataset cannot measure. Our differencing procedure also allows us to incorporate other relationship-related variables that may be important to credit limits. Number of financial services that firms obtain from banks is included as a proxy for differences in the intensity of bank/firm activity. Additionally, we allow for differences in the lending institution and contract features to affect the difference in credit limits.

Our procedure of looking at how the differences in relationships affect the differences in credit limits allows us to overcome some of the “traditional” econometric problems encountered in this area. For example, (1) it avoids multicollinearity problems caused by the strong correlation between firm characteristics and key relationship measures,<sup>3</sup> (2) It avoids the problems of omitted variable bias in a level specification, and (3) it avoids measurement and reporting errors of firm characteristics given by company accounts—which may be easily altered by the owner.<sup>4</sup>

Our results add to the previous findings on relationship banking. For a median credit limit of \$250,000 a bank with a five-year information advantage provides a credit limit that is \$20,000 higher. Berger and Udell (1995) find that a one-year information advantage is associated with a 33-basis point reduction on the LOC interest rate and a reduction in the probability of the lender requiring collateral. Cole (1998) finds that having at least a year of relationship increases the probability of a loan application approval. The evidence confirms what is intuitively and anecdotally clear: Relationships matter even for credit limits.

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<sup>3</sup> For instance, the correlation coefficient between firm age (a proxy for public information about the firm) and the duration of relationship between the firms and their most recent lender (the principal proxy for the strength of relationship) is 0.49 (NSSBF, 1993). Berger and Udell (1995) report a correlation coefficient of 0.476 for the 1987 dataset. Cole (1998) argues the importance of disentangling these effects.

<sup>4</sup> Bushong (1995) questions the usefulness of small business financial statements for loan officers and their credit decisions.

We also find that a borrower's access to and purchase of other loan and non-loan financial services impacts credit limits differently. We find that the number of loan services obtained is negatively associated with the LOC limit, while the number of non-loan services is positively associated. The former, while generating additional information about the firms, also increases the banks' risk exposure. The latter generates information without increasing the banks' risk exposure. By providing a menu of services, banks generate information that is fungible across these services. For example, banks' decisions about LOC commitments may be influenced by information gathered while providing brokerage services to firms.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional details of a LOC loan and surveys the literature. Section 3 describes the econometric framework. Section 4 presents the data and the derivation of variables used. Section 5 presents the results, the stratification of the sample, and robustness checks to outliers. Section 6 discusses policy implications and research direction.

## **2. Background**

In an LOC contract, a bank promises to lend funds up to a limit, within a certain time period (usually a year), at preset price and non-price conditions.<sup>5</sup> The price conditions in a typical LOC contract include a borrower-specific markup over an economy-wide interest rate, and an up-front commitment fee. The non-price conditions include collateral requirements, compensating balances, and a Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause that gives the bank the option to escape its lending obligations if the borrower's condition deteriorates, in terms of balance sheet, litigation, etc. Commitments are usually for one year, with provisions made for extensions and renegotiation.<sup>6</sup> After the expiration of each commitment period the terms of the agreement are renegotiated, incorporating the information gathered by both parties in the preceding period.

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<sup>5</sup> This Section draws heavily from Melnik and Plaut (1986), Avery and Berger (1991), Shockley and Thakor (1999), and anecdotal evidence from Edward Bayone, Chief Credit Officer, BankBoston.

<sup>6</sup> 74 percent of all LOCs in the Most Recent Loan (MRL) Section of the NSSBF data are contracts of one year or less.

Avery and Berger (1991) condense the major motives behind the use of LOCs by firms. The liquidity-flexibility hypothesis holds that LOCs allow the loan paperwork and evaluation to be performed in advance, so that funds can be obtained quickly and cheaply at the appropriate time when expenditures are required. Moreover, in a 'credit crunch' LOCs provide protection against being rationed out. A second hypothesis suggests that LOCs provide firms with insurance against a potential decline in their credit worthiness by locking in loan parameters consistent with their current risk class. Thus, LOCs may be seen as put options on debt claims or call options on interest rate markups.

Lines of Credit are an attractive vehicle for studying the bank-borrower relationship because they are not "transaction-driven" (Berger and Udell, 1995). Given the fungible nature of funds, it is difficult to track their final use. For this reason they are perceived to be riskier for the lender.<sup>7</sup> In "transaction-driven" loans, magnitude and other parameters reflect the specific transaction the loan is financing. An LOC, on the other hand, is used mainly for working capital needs. In this sense, LOC contracts to firms are akin to credit cards to consumers, where a credit limit and other price and non-price conditions are specified without being tied to a specific transaction. Like a credit card limit, the LOC limit is the quantity of credit the bank is willing to supply to the firm. The firm's demand for credit may be more or less than this quantity.

Recent empirical work by Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole (1998) bases the empirical findings of firms' Most Recent Loan (MRL) data in measuring the importance of relationship on small business credit. Since the quantity reported for the MRL is determined both by demand and supply phenomena, no analysis of quantity is possible using the MRL data.<sup>8</sup> Instead, we utilize a relatively unused segment of the NSSBF data on Line of Credit limits that the banks have committed to supply.

This limit is a function of a firm's risk category as perceived by the lender, according to theories on credit rationing by Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).

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<sup>7</sup> Credit officers say that they derive information about the firm's use of active LOCs by the pattern of usage (Edward Bayone, BankBoston).

Repeated interactions with firms, over time, allow banks to place firms in a lower risk class by mitigating information asymmetries between them (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Hence, the length of relationship and the breadth of financial services firms obtain from banks must have explanatory power on credit limits.

### 3. Methodology

Consider firm  $i$  that has two LOCs from two banks:  $j$  and  $k$ . Following Melnik and Plaut (1986), we write two equations, [1a] and [1b]. Here,  $LIMIT_{ij}$  and  $LIMIT_{ik}$  are the credit limits that the firm has secured from the two banks. Both limits depend on the firm, and owner characteristics  $F_i$ . We assume these characteristics to be fixed effects that both banks observe uniformly.<sup>9</sup> In addition, these limits depend on the corresponding loan contract features  $C_{ij}$  and  $C_{ik}$ , on the bank characteristics  $B_j$  and  $B_k$ , and on the strength of the relationships  $R_{ij}$  and  $R_{ik}$ ,

$$LIMIT_{ij} = \mathbf{b}_0 + \mathbf{b}_1 F_i + \mathbf{b}_2 C_{ij} + \mathbf{b}_3 R_{ij} + \mathbf{b}_4 B_j + \mathbf{e}_{ij} \quad [1a]$$

$$LIMIT_{ik} = \mathbf{b}_0 + \mathbf{b}_1 F_i + \mathbf{b}_2 C_{ik} + \mathbf{b}_3 R_{ik} + \mathbf{b}_4 B_k + \mathbf{e}_{ik} \quad [1b]$$

In writing equations [1a] and [1b], we treat the credit limit as the quantity of funds the banks are willing to supply—conditioned on contract features, borrower characteristics, lender characteristics, and strength of relationship. Again, it is best to think of the credit card analogy, where the credit limit is different from the credit the consumer had utilized—the latter indicative of the consumer’s demand. Similarly, the demand for credit by the firm may be *more*, *less*, or *equal* to the credit limit. This is seen by examining the firms’ usage rates of their credit limits: in our sample, 50% of the firms used less than 50% of their limit, 25% used their entire limit. If we think of usage as indicative of the firms’ demands for credit, the under-utilizers are firms whose demands

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<sup>8</sup> A subset of MRLs are LOCs, but the quantity reported is the amount utilized by the firm.

were less than the limit, while firms at the limit had demands greater than or equal to the limit. For empirical estimation, we proceed to subtract [1b] from [1a] to obtain [1c].

$$(LIMIT_{ij} - LIMIT_{ik}) = \mathbf{b}_2(C_{ij} - C_{ik}) + \mathbf{b}_3(R_{ij} - R_{ik}) + \mathbf{b}_4(B_j - B_k) + (\mathbf{e}_{ij} - \mathbf{e}_{ik}) \quad [1c]$$

This explains the difference in credit limit that the firm had obtained from two banks as a function of the difference in contract features, the difference in relationship strength, and the difference in bank characteristics. Note that this eliminates the need to control for often unreliable or immeasurable firm and owner characteristics  $F_i$ .

Other than eliminating the need to control for  $F_i$ , this approach has additional advantages. The empirical literature on relationship banking has used the length of relationship as a measure for the strength of relationship (private information), while using the firm age as a measure of public information (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1995, and Cole, 1998). Both factors are important for the banks' credit decisions. In the data, the length of relationship with the contracting bank for the Most Recent Loan (MRL) and the firm age are highly correlated, resulting in strong multicollinearity (Cole, 1998). Disentangling the private from the public information effects caused problems. In the present formulation, firm age is a fixed effect that is eliminated in the subtraction. The result is a direct estimate of the benefit of private relationship.

#### **4. Data and Description of Variables**

Sections F7-F153 of the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993) provides information on LOC limits. The information includes the credit limit, collateral requirements, usage, and information about contracting banks. NSSBF also provides data on the length of the relationships that firms have had with banks, as well as information

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<sup>9</sup> It is possible that the firm may have changed between the negotiations of the first and the second credit limits. Since credit lines are mostly short term and typically renegotiated annually; significant changes in firm or owner characteristics are unlikely.



regarding the financial services firms obtained from the banks. We isolate the 226 firms that have two LOCs from two banks.<sup>10</sup>

From the credit limit data we construct our dependent variable  $\Delta LIMIT$ , which is the log difference between the two credit limits.<sup>11</sup> The log-differenced formulation compresses outliers and makes interpretation convenient. Approximately 15% of the firms obtained the same credit limit from both banks, and 35% got from one bank a limit that is more than double the limit they got from the other.

Our main proxy to measure the strength of relationship is the number of years the firm has transacted with the banks. The longer the borrower has been transacting with the lender, the more viable the business, and more trustworthy its owner (Diamond, 1984). Loans to longtime customers will be seen as less risky, and banks might increase their willingness to provide funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Moreover, social embeddedness increases with the duration of the relationship. Time permits personal opportunities for reciprocity to emerge between owners and loan officers outside the immediate realm of the loan transaction (Ongena and Smith, 2001 and Degryse and Ongena, 2001). The variable used in our estimation  $\Delta LENGTH$  is the difference in the length of relationship the firm has had with the two banks.<sup>12</sup> We expect a positive coefficient on  $\Delta LENGTH$ . As Table I illustrates, the average difference in length of relationship in the sample is 5 years, with a maximum of 20, and a skew to the right.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to interactions over time, relationships can be built through interactions over multiple financial products, sometimes called the multiplexity of relationship (Uzzi, 1999). Deposit accounts, brokerage services, cash management services, etc. help reveal

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<sup>10</sup> What firms have multiple lines of credit? Table I of Data Appendix presents results of two models: A binary Probit model that explains the presence or absence of multiple LOCs, and a Poisson model for count data for 0, 1, 2, or 3 LOCs. For a discussion on why firms might obtain credit from multiple sources see Chakraborty and Hu (working paper). It suffices to say here that larger firms, older firms, and corporations with a higher current ratio, serving multiple markets tend to have multiple LOCs.

<sup>11</sup> There are 8 firms with complete data for a third LOC. But including those firms in our differencing methodology would overweigh those firms in the sample and may cause possible estimation bias.

<sup>12</sup> The order of the subtraction in limit is preserved through all the differenced variables.

<sup>13</sup> This necessitates a check for sensitivity to outliers.

information about the firm and can mitigate information asymmetries between the borrower and the lender. We capture this dimension by counting the number of financial services firms obtain from banks. In looking at financial services, a distinction needs to be made between loan and non-loan services. The former, while providing information about the firm, also increases the bank's risk exposure vis-à-vis the firm. The latter provides information without increasing risks. Both provide the lender the opportunity to spread any fixed costs of information production and storage (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). We construct 3 variables: the difference in the total number of financial services  $\Delta SERV$ , the difference in the number of non-loan services  $\Delta NLSERV$ , and the difference in the number of loan services  $\Delta LSERV$ .<sup>14</sup> On average, there is a difference of 1.4 in the number of financial services firms obtain from banks, and this ratio is skewed to the right. We expect a positive coefficient on  $\Delta NLSERV$ . The coefficient signs of the other two service variables are ambiguous, due to the competing effects of risk and information.

For contract features, we obtain a count of various collateral types required to secure the line of credit. Collateral minimizes losses in case of default, enabling banks to commit more credit (Rajan and Winton, 1995, Bester, 1985 and Klapper 2001). We expect a positive coefficient on collateral requirements. The various types of collateral include inventory, equipment, real estate, security deposits, and compensating balances. The variable  $\Delta COLLAT$  is the difference in the count of collateral types required to secure the LOCs. This is an improvement from previous work that uses a binary variable to indicate collateral or no-collateral requirements in the contract (Berger and Udell, 1995).

To examine whether differences in the lending institution changes the provision of credit, we divide the lending institution into Commercial Banks and Other Institutions. If bank  $j$

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<sup>14</sup> Non-loan services are checking accounts, savings accounts, brokerage services, cash management services, transaction services, credit-related advisory services, and 401K plans. Loan services are leasing facilities, mortgages, equipment, and vehicle loans.

is a commercial bank, then  $BANK_j = 1$  and zero otherwise. We construct the trinomial dummy variable,<sup>15</sup>

$$\Delta BANK = BANK_j - BANK_k = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if institutions } i \text{ and } j \text{ are "similar"} \\ 1 & \text{if institution } j \text{ is a Commercial Bank and } k \text{ is not} \\ -1 & \text{if institution } k \text{ is a Commercial Bank and } j \text{ is not} \end{cases}$$

Commercial banks, which are usually larger, may enjoy economies of scale in information production and transaction costs (Boyd and Prescott, 1986, James and Weir, 1990 and Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001). This implies that commercial banks can better manage credit risk and provide more credit. We expect a positive coefficient on  $\Delta BANK$ .

## 5. Results

Column (1) of Table II reports the OLS estimates for explaining the difference in credit limit using our main measure of relationship  $\Delta LENGTH$  together with  $\Delta COLLAT$  and  $\Delta BANK$ . The variable  $\Delta LENGTH$  is significant in explaining the difference in credit limits. If a firm has an additional year of relationship with bank  $i$  relative to bank  $j$  then it will secure from bank  $i$  a Loan Commitment that is 1.6% higher. For a median LOC limit of \$250,000 a bank with a 5-year relationship advantage provides \$20,000 more in credit facilities. The significant coefficient on the collateral variable indicates that a bank will provide a credit limit that is 26% higher if the loan is secured by one additional type of collateral. There is no evidence to indicate that the bank type matters for LOC limits.

Column (2) of Table II incorporates a second measure of relationship:  $\Delta SERV$ ; the difference in the total number of financial services the firm obtains from the banks. This variable does not distinguish between loan and non-loan services. The insignificant coefficient indicates that, at least in its present form, the total number of services does not

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<sup>15</sup> See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), *Econometric Models*, pages 121-123 for a theoretical discussion on trinomial dummies.

add any explanatory power to the regression. The other variables remain unaffected in magnitude and significance.

Column (3) of Table II decomposes services into loan and non-loan services, while dropping the aggregate services term. The significance of non-loan services in explaining the LOC limit confirms our expectations. If the firm obtains one additional non-loan service from a bank, it can secure a credit limit that is 17% higher. This justifies the decomposition of financial services. The coefficient on loan services is insignificant, indicating the competing risk and information effects of loan services.

Column (4) of Table II drops the commercial bank dummy. This makes the loan services variable significant and negative. Since commercial banks tend to provide a larger array of loan services, the commercial bank dummy and the loan-services variables are correlated. By having an additional loan service, the firms obtain a credit limit that is on average 0.6% lower.

### **5.1 Stratification and Robustness to Outliers**

The first few years of relationship are likely to be more important in mitigating information asymmetries between firm and lender. The familiarity, thereon, must lead to an information-saturation, as in other relationships. Cole (1998) finds that completing a year of relationship is significant in explaining the probability of a loan application being accepted. Moreover, the information that the lender generated in the first few years of a 10-year relationship may have changed, and needs to be updated. Hence, the value of information from a 5-year relationship may not be different from the value of information generated from a 10-year relationship. In such a scenario, the purchase of services, which are current transactions, must be more important for the banks' credit decisions.

To test this, we divide our sample into firms that have had a 5-year relationship (called a 'mature' relationship) with both banks and the others that have either one or no 'mature' relationships. Column (1) of Table III reports the results for the sub-sample of firms with

two mature relationships, and Column (2) of Table III reports the results for the other firms. As expected, when both relationships are mature, the length of relationship adds no marginal value to the LOC limit. The length of relationship is important for those with one or no ‘mature’ relationships. The service variables are important for firms with two mature relationships and insignificant for the others. There is also a statistically significant increase in the strength of the collateral variable for firms with one or no mature relationships. For banks, the collateral that a new customer can provide is more important than the services it purchases, in case the firm is a “fly-by-night.”<sup>16</sup>

The relationship dimensions important for corporations are likely to be different than those for sole-proprietorships and partnerships. In particular, corporate management may change in the course of a relationship, and more current relations through financial services may be more important. Moreover, limited liability in corporations puts restrictions on assets that can be liquidated in case of default. To test these possible differences in corporations, Column (3) of Table III isolates the sub-sample of corporations. Due to degrees of freedom restrictions we can only compare the results of Column (3) to the full sample in Column (4) of Table II. For corporations relative to the full sample, the effect of relationship length weakens statistically, the effect of non-loan services strengthens, and the effect of collateral strengthens.

Column (4) of Table III includes a proxy for the relative interest rates. The NSSBF provides data on the unused proportion (typical balance) in LOC accounts. The proxy we suggest rests on the following argument: If a firm has two active lines of credit, it will first pay-off the LOC channel that charges the higher interest rate, i.e., given its availability of funds, it will keep a higher unused balance in the L/C that charges a higher interest rate. This is akin to a consumer with multiple credit cards paying off the card that charges a higher rate of interest first. Hence, we use the difference in balance  $\Delta BALANCE$  as a proxy for relative interest rates.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> The stratification was also done using 3 and 4 years of relationship as cut-off for ‘mature’ relationship. The shift in the significance of the length variable occurs at 5 years.

<sup>17</sup> In calculating this we exclude 26 firms that have used up their entire limit on both LOCs. Clearly, these data points convey no information on the *relative* interest rate.

A higher value of  $\Delta BALANCE$  proxies a higher relative interest rate on the LOC contract provided by bank  $j$  relative to bank  $k$ . As the Loan Commitment theory of Melnik and Plaut (1986) suggests, by charging a higher interest rate a bank can afford to offer a higher loan commitment; since the increase in risk due to lending more to an individual borrower has been compensated by the higher rate. Column (4) illustrates that the interest rate proxy returns the correct sign while keeping the other coefficients significant.

Recall from Section 4 that the variables used were skewed and need to be checked for sensitivity to outliers. Columns (1) to (3) of Table IV use the DFBETA method to check the robustness of the estimates to outliers (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). The method focuses on one coefficient at a time, and measures the change in the coefficient as one data point is dropped (jack-knifed) at each running of the regression. We drop the five most influential data points and check for the robustness of the result. Column (1) of Table IV focuses on the length-of-relationship coefficient, Columns (2) and (3) focus on the service coefficients. Our results are robust to the exclusion of outliers.

## **6. Conclusion and Discussion**

We investigated how bank-borrower relationships affect the credit limits of US small business. Our main finding is that the credit limit extended by the lender increases with the length of the borrower-lender relationship. In particular, for a median LOC limit of \$250,000, a bank with a 5-year relationship advantage provides \$20,000 more in credit facilities. Insofar as the length of relationship is a proxy for private information generated within a relationship, our results indicate that, after a certain threshold, added years of relationship may not be as useful. For example, for firms with two relationships that both exceed 5 years (“mature” relationships), an additional year of relationship adds no statistically significant benefit in terms of credit limit. Within 5 years of business, firms reveal their true type and banks incorporate the information fully into their loan decisions. It is for firms with either one or no “mature” relationships that an additional year of business brings statistically detectable credit benefits to firm.

We also find that the number of loan and non-loan services the firm purchases from banks affects credit limits differently. The credit limit increases with non-loan services and decreases with loan services. Loan services, while providing information about the firm's repayment patterns, punctuality, etc., also increase the lender's risk exposure vis-à-vis the borrowing firm. Non-loan services are primarily information generators, and have a strong positive effect on the credit limit.<sup>18</sup>

The methodology we used to obtain these results avoids a few important data problems that the empirical literature on relationship banking has struggled to overcome. We achieve this by looking at a single firm's interactions with two banks—eliminating the need to control for confounding firm and owner characteristics that we treat as *fixed effects*.

Our process subtracts out often immeasurable, unreliable, or “soft” information on balance sheets, owner characteristics, public information, etc. Also, among the fixed effects subtracted out is firm age—a proxy for the set of public information about firm, and a measure highly correlated with the length of bank-firm relationships. This allows a statistically clean derivation of the impact of private information from lender–borrower relationship.

Bank-borrower relationship captures an economic setting where formal arm's length ties seamlessly interact with personal bonds that borrowers form with loan officers and other bank agents. Legally opaque, personality driven small businesses benefit immensely from these interactions, in terms of credit availability, cheaper loans, less-restrictive terms, and higher limits. Given fairly specific loan pricing guidelines that banks require their officers to follow, the credit limit may be a loan variable that the loan officers find easier to influence. Furthermore, since credit lines are not directly tied to the size of a specific project, these credit limits are not strictly bound by the expected needs of the project. This gives the credit officer even more leeway in adjusting the credit limit in

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<sup>18</sup> When it comes to financial services, we are unable to distinguish between relationship effects and product “bundling” effects.

accordance with the set of private information acquired through the relationship. Our results are consistent with such behavior.

It is an important matter of public policy to realize the value of information that is generated through what we term a relationship—repeated interactions over a length of time. Banks act as repositories for this economically valuable information and use it to reduce uncertainties associated with lending to small businesses. As Stein (2000) argues, bank mergers and closures can lead to structures that limit bank-borrower relationships to arm's length ties, as well as a loss of valuable accrued information. Our results indicate that regulators overseeing bank consolidations must be wary of this concern.



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**Table I**  
**Univariate Statistics of Variables**

The derivation of the variables are given in parentheses. The descriptive statistics reported are for the absolute value of each differenced series. For an example, the data shows an average 5-year relationship difference between a firm's two contracting banks.

Variable	Mean	Median	Max
Difference in the Length of relationship (?LENGTH= Length of relationship with bank 1 minus Length of relationship with bank 2), in years	5	3	20
Difference in Number of Total Services (?SERV=Number of Financial Services obtained from bank 1 minus Number of Financial Services obtained from bank 2)	1.4	1	5
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services (?NLSERV=Number of Non-Loan Services obtained from bank 1 minus Number of NonLoan Services obtained from bank 2)	0.4	0	3
Difference in the Number of Loan Services (?LSERV=Number of Loan Services obtained from bank 1 minus Number of Loan Services obtained from bank 2)	1	1	5
Difference in the Number of Collateral Types Securing Credit Line (?COLLAT=Number of Collateral types securing credit line from bank 1 minus Number of Collateral types securing credit line from bank 2)	0.6	0	5

**Table II**  
**Difference in the LOC Limits Explained by Differences in Relationships, Loan Contract, and Banking Institution**

The results of the OLS regressions explaining the difference in Lines of Credit Limits using the differences in relationship variables, contract features, lending institution type. The dependent variable is the log difference between the two Lines of Credit Limits. The Eicker-White standard errors are in parentheses. \* & \*\* indicate significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels.

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Difference in the Years of Relationship (? <i>LENGTH</i> )	0.016** (0.006)	0.016** (0.006)	0.013** (0.006)	0.015** (0.006)
Difference in Number of Total Services (? <i>SERV</i> )	-	0.002 (0.06)	-	-
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services (? <i>NLSERV</i> )	-	-	0.17** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)
Difference in the Number of Loan Services (? <i>LSERV</i> )	-	-	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.035)
Difference in the Number of Collateral Types (? <i>COLLAT</i> )	0.26** (0.06)	0.25** (0.05)	0.23** (0.06)	0.22** (0.06)
Difference in Bank Type (? <i>BANK</i> )	-0.16 (0.101)	-0.15 (-1.29)	-0.06 (-0.12)	-
Intercept	0.09** (0.006)	0.09** (0.006)	0.09** (0.006)	0.09** (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.13
Observations	226	226	226	226

**Table III**  
**Robustness Check: Difference in the LOC Limits Explained by Differences in Relationships and Loan Contract**

The results of the OLS regressions explaining the difference in Lines of Credit Limits using the differences in relationship variables and contract features. The dependent variable is the log difference between the two Lines of Credit Limits. The Eicker-White standard errors are in parentheses. \* & \*\* indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels.

Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Stratification			With Interest Rate Proxy
	with "Mature" relationships	Otherwise	Corporations	
Difference in the Years of Relationship (?LENGTH)	0.013 (0.01)	0.016** (0.008)	0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services (?NLSERV)	0.38** (0.14)	0.09 (0.09)	0.20** (0.08)	0.22** (0.07)
Difference in the Number of Loan Services (?LSERV)	-0.13** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.037)	-0.08** (0.03)
Difference in the Number of Collateral Types (?COLLAT)	0.16** (0.10)	0.24** (0.07)	0.24** (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)
Difference in Unused Balance (?BALANCE)	-	-	-	0.11** (0.03)
Intercept	0.09** (0.01)	0.09** (0.007)	0.09** (0.006)	0.09** (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.2
Observations	67	159	181	200

**Table IV**  
**Sensitivity to Outliers**

The dependent variable is the log difference between the two Lines of Credit "Limits." The Eicker-White standard errors are in parentheses. \* & \*\* indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels. The data points with most influence on respective coefficients obtained by a Jack knife process of excluding one data point at a time and observing the change in coefficients. The 5 highest influence points in absolute value are excluded from the regressions. For an example, the five data points with most influence on the  $\beta$ LENGTH coefficient are excluded from the regression in Column (1)

Variable	(1) Excl. DFBETA $\beta$ LENGTH	(2) Excl. DFBETA $\beta$ NLSERV	(3) Excl. DFBETA $\beta$ LSERV
Difference in the Years of Relationship ( $\beta$ LENGTH)	0.012** (0.006)	0.015** (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)
Difference in Number of Non-Loan Services ( $\beta$ NLSERV)	0.15** (0.07)	0.15* (0.08)	0.18** (0.07)
Difference in the Number of Loan Services ( $\beta$ LSERV)	-0.06* (0.035)	-0.06* (0.035)	-0.07** (0.034)
Difference in the number of collateral types ( $\beta$ COLLAT)	0.23** (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)
Intercept	0.09** (0.006)	0.09** (0.006)	0.09** (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared	0.11	0.11	0.14
Observations	221	221	221



**Table A.1**  
**Firm Characteristics and Multiple Lines of Credit**

Column (1) presents the results of a Poisson regression explaining the number of Credit Lines in terms of firm characteristics. The Dependent Variable is Count Data on the number of Credit Lines firms have from different banks: 0,1,2, or 3. T-statistics in parentheses. Column (2) is a Probit regression explaining the binary variable (firm with multiple LOCs=1 all others = 0). \*\* & \* indicates significance at 5% & 10% respectively. Data is from the full sample of firms.

Variable	(1) Poisson Coefficients	(2) Probit Coefficients
<i>Firm Characteristics and Governance</i>		
Firm Age (Years)	0.01** (3.05)	0.003* (1.72)
Assets (\$ '000)	0.09** (4.71)	9E-9** (2.96)
S or C Corporation? (Yes=1)	0.43** (7.53)	0.15* (1.82)
<i>Market</i>		
Export Market? (Yes=1)	0.15** (2.18)	0.05 (0.46)
Sites of Operation (Multiple=1)	0.02** (3.28)	0.013* (1.62)
<i>Credit Issues and Risk Proxies</i>		
Credit Serious Problem in Last 12 months? (Yes=1)	0.79** (3.31)	0.15** (2.13)
Owner Bankrupt in Last 7 years? (Yes=1)	-0.36** (-2.20)	-0.13 (-0.62)
Business Delinquencies? (Yes=1)	-0.09 (-0.34)	-0.12 (-0.10)
Judgment Rendered Against Owner? (Yes=1)	-0.15 (-1.40)	-0.12 (-1.28)
Trade Credit used? (Yes=1)	0.18** (3.31)	-0.02 (-0.25)
<i>Bank Variables</i>		
Herfindahl for Banks in Region (1=More Competition)	0.07 (1.48)	0.02 (0.39)
<i>Industry</i> (Relative to Retail)		
Mining	-0.31 (-1.01)	-0.12 (-0.31)
Construction	0.12 (1.53)	-0.04 (0.12)
Manufacturing	0.12 (1.38)	-0.29** (-2.26)
Utilities/Transport	0.05 (0.31)	-0.16 (-0.99)
Wholesale	0.23** (2.40)	-0.11 (-0.92)
Insurance	-0.30** (-2.09)	0.22 (1.52)
Services	-0.16** (-2.35)	-0.38 (-3.90)
Constant	-0.55** (-4.98)	-0.49 (-3.16)
<i>Regression Statistics</i>		
Pseudo R-squared	0.09	0.06
Prob>Chi2	0	0
Observations	4514	4514