

**Curriculum Vitae — UZI SEGAL**  
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**Office:** Dept. of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. Tel. (617) 552-1567.

Email: segalu@bc.edu

**DEGREES**

B.Sc. in Mathematics, Economics and Statistics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978.

M.A. in Economics, Hebrew University, 1980.

Ph.D. in Economics. Thesis: “The connection between beliefs and preferences in economics.” Supervisor: M.E. Yaari. Hebrew University, 1984.

**PROFESSIONAL CAREER**

Dept. of Economics, Uni. of Toronto: Assistant Professor (1985–1990), Associate Professor (1990–1992), Professor (1992–1994).

University of Western Ontario: Professor (1994–2000).

Boston College: Professor (1999–).

Visiting positions: Nuffield College, University of Pennsylvania, UCLA, CalTech, UCSD, UC Irvine, Tel Aviv University, IDC (Israel).

Short visits: Hebrew University (Economics, Law), Tel Aviv University (Economics, School of Management, Law), Ecole Normale Supérieure De Cachan, Paris II.

**PUBLICATIONS IN REFEREED JOURNALS**

1. On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons (with A. Rubinstein). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 147 (2012), 2483–2491.
2. No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (with J. Ostroy). *Social Choice and Welfare*, 39 (2012), 697–719.

3. Transitive regret (with Sushil Bikhchandani). *Theoretical Economics*, 6 (2011), 95–108.
4. Risk aversion in the small and in the large: Calibration results for betweenness functionals (with Zvi Safra). *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty*, 38:1 (2009), 27–37.
5. Calibration results for non-expected utility theories (with Zvi Safra). *Econometrica*, 76:5 (2008), 1143–1166.
6. A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36:3–4 (2008), 571–585.
7. Unanimous subjective probabilities (with Kim Border and Paolo Ghirardato), *Economic Theory*, 34:2 (2008), 383–387.
8. The ambiguous nature of ambiguity and crime control (with Anat Horowitz). *NYU Journal of Law and Liberty* (2007), 542–557.
9. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 136:1 (2007), 197–216.
10. Ambiguity aversion and the criminal process (with Alex Stein), *Notre Dame Law Review*, 81:4 (2006), 1495–1551.
11. Fair bias, *Economics and Philosophy*, 22 (2006), 213–229.
12. Democratically elected aristocracies (with David Heyd), *Social Choice & Welfare*, 27 (2006), 103–127.
13. Ex-post egalitarianism and legal justice (with Alon Harel and Zvi Safra), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 21 (2005), 57–75.
14. Super majoritarianism and the endowment effect (with Uriel Procaccia), *Theory & Decision*, 55 (2004), 181–207.
15. Min, max, and sum (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 106 (2002), 126–150.
16. Coherent odds and subjective probability (with Kim C. Border), *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 46 (2002), 253–268.
17. On the Economic meaning of Machina’s Fréchet differentiability assumption (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 450–461.

18. Rank dependent preferences without ranking axioms (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 35 (2001), 547–562.
19. Let's agree that all dictatorships are equally bad, *Journal of Political Economy*, 108 (2000), 569–589.
20. Don't fool yourself to believe you won't fool yourself again *Economics Letters*, 67 (2000), 1–3.
21. Criminal law and behavioral law and economics: Observations on the neglected role of uncertainty in deterring crime (with Alon Harel), *American Law and Economics Review*, 1 (2000), 276–312.
22. Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (with Louis Makowski and Joseph M. Ostroy), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 85 (1999), 169–225.
23. Constant risk aversion (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 83 (1998), 19–42.
24. Punishment schedules for capital flight (with D. Vincent), *The World Economy*, 21 (1998) 629–638.
25. Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problem (with Kim C. Border), *Econometrica*, 65 (1997), 1–18.
26. Dynamic consistency and reference points, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 72 (1997) 208–219.
27. First-order risk aversion and non-differentiability (with A. Spivak), *Economic Theory*, 9 (1997), 179–183.
28. How complicated are betweenness preferences? (with Z. Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 24 (1995), 371–381.
29. Observing orders of risk aversion (with G. Loomes), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 9 (1994), 239–256.
30. Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility (with K. Border), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 63 (1994), 170–188.
31. A sufficient condition for additively separable functions, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 23 (1994), 295–303.
32. The projective independence axiom (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Economic Theory*, 4 (1994), 189–215.

33. Stochastic transitivity and quadratic representation functions, *J. of Mathematical Psychology*, 38 (1994), 102–114.
34. Dutch book arguments and subjective probability (with K. Border), *Economic Journal*, 104 (1994), 71–75.
35. Order indifference and rank-dependent probabilities, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 22 (1993), 373–397.
36. The measure representation: A correction, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 6 (1993), 99–107.
37. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and generalized utility theories: Theoretical predictions and empirical observations (with L.R. Keller and T. Wang), *Theory and Decision*, 34 (1993), 83–97.
38. Dominance axioms and multivariate nonexpected utility preferences (with Z. Safra), *International Economic Review* 34 (1993), 321–334.
39. Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning (with S. Bikhchandani and S. Sharma), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 352–377.
40. Quadratic social welfare functions (with L.G. Epstein), *Journal of Political Economy*, 100 (1992), 691–712. Reprinted in J. Wood (ed.): *Amartya Sen: Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists*, Routledge (2006).
41. Additively separable representations on non-convex sets, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 89–99.
42. Mixture symmetry and quadratic utility functions, (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Econometrica*, 59 (1991), 139–163.
43. Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences, (with E. Dekel and Z. Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 55 (1991), 229–246.
44. Two stage lotteries without the reduction axiom, *Econometrica*, 58 (1990), 349–377.
45. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and nonexpected utility: A testable approach, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 3 (1990), 177–190.

46. Preference reversals and nonexpected utility behavior, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *American Economic Review*, 80 (1990), 922–930.
47. First order versus second order risk aversion (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 51 (1990), 111–125.
48. Firm size and optimal growth rates (with A. Spivak), *European Economic Review*, 33 (1989), 159–67.
49. Anticipated utility: A measure representation approach, *Annals of Operations Research*, 19 (1989), 359–73.
50. Probabilistic insurance and anticipated utility, *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, LV (1988), 287–97.
51. Precautionary saving and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach (with A. Spivak and J. Zeira), *Economics Letters*, 27 (1988), 223–227.
52. Non-expected utility risk premiums: The cases of probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, (1988) 1, 333–347.
53. Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? *American Economic Review*, 78 (1988), 233–36.
54. The Ellsberg paradox and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach, *International Economic Review*, 28 (1987), 175–202.
55. Some remarks on Quiggin’s anticipated utility, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*, 8 (1987), 145–54.
56. On the single member constituency and the law of large numbers (with A. Spivak), *Public Choice*, 49 (1986), 183–90.
57. On lexicographic probability relations, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 11 (1986), 195–99.
58. On the separability of the quasi-concave closure of an additively separable function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 14 (1985), 129–134.
59. A theorem on the additivity of the quasi-concave closure of an additive convex function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 11 (1983), 261–266.

## CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

1. Distributive justice, in U. Procaccia (ed.): *A Handbook of Law and Economics* (in Hebrew), forthcoming.
2. Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds? The case against the harmonization of private law (with Uriel Procaccia), in K.J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch (eds.): *Capital Markets and Company Law*, 639–659. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
3. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility, in L. Luini (ed.): *Uncertain Decisions*, 39–52. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1999.
4. The independence axiom versus the reduction axiom: Must we have both? In W. Edwards (ed.): *Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications*, 165–183. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1992.

## BOOKS

1. Mathematics for Economists 1 (with A. Rubinstein). Jerusalem: Academon, 1981 (In Hebrew).
2. Mathematics for Economists. Tel Aviv: Everyman University, 1993 (in Hebrew).

## EDITORIAL BOARDS

- Econometrica (Associate Editor 1995–2010)
- Journal of Economic Theory (Associate Editor 2012–)
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Advisory Editor 1991–94, Associate Editor 1994–)
- Theoretical Economics (Associate Editor 2005–)
- Program committee, Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2009.

## OTHER

- Fellow of the Econometric Society (2012).
- Economic Theory Fellow (2011).

## RESEARCH GRANTS

- Connaught Fund #3-370-156-90, 1987 (two years).
- SSHRC #410-87-1375, 1987 (one year).
- SSHRC #410-88-0558, 1988 (two years).
- SSHRC #410-90-1494, 1990: Applications of non-expected utility models (two years).
- SSHRC #410-92-0622, 1992: Theoretical foundations of experimental decision theory (three years).
- SSHRC #410-95-0168, 1995: Decision theory and preferences for fairness (three years).
- SSHRC #410-98-0486, 1998: Decision theory, preferences for fairness, and mechanisms (three years).
- NSF, 2001: Quasi-Concave Social Welfare Functions.
- NSF, 2006: Are Universal Preferences Possible? Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories.