

Curriculum Vitae — UZI SEGAL
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DEGREES

B.Sc. in Mathematics, Economics and Statistics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978.

M.A. in Economics, Hebrew University, 1980.

Ph.D. in Economics. Thesis: “The connection between beliefs and preferences in economics.” Supervisor: M.E. Yaari. Hebrew University, 1984.

PROFESSIONAL CAREER

Dept. of Economics, Uni. of Toronto: Assistant Professor (1985–1990), Associate Professor (1990–1992), Professor (1992–1994).

University of Western Ontario: Professor (1994–2000).

Boston College: Professor (1999–).

Visiting positions: Nuffield College, University of Pennsylvania, UCLA, CalTech, UCSD, UC Irvine, Tel Aviv University, IDC (Israel).

Short visits: Hebrew University (Economics, Law), Tel Aviv University (Economics, School of Management, Law), Ecole Normale Supérieure De Cachan, Paris II.

PUBLICATIONS IN REFEREED JOURNALS

1. On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons (with A. Rubinstein). *Journal of Economic Theory*, 147 (2012), 2483–2491.
2. No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods (with J. Ostroy). *Social Choice and Welfare*, 39 (2012), 697–719.

3. Transitive regret (with Sushil Bikhchandani). *Theoretical Economics*, 6 (2011), 95–108.
4. Risk aversion in the small and in the large: Calibration results for betweenness functionals (with Zvi Safra). *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty*, 38:1 (2009), 27–37.
5. Calibration results for non-expected utility theories (with Zvi Safra). *Econometrica*, 76:5 (2008), 1143–1166.
6. A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). *International Journal of Game Theory*, 36:3–4 (2008), 571–585.
7. Unanimous subjective probabilities (with Kim Border and Paolo Ghirardato), *Economic Theory*, 34:2 (2008), 383–387.
8. The ambiguous nature of ambiguity and crime control (with Anat Horowitz). *NYU Journal of Law and Liberty* (2007), 542–557.
9. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 136:1 (2007), 197–216.
10. Ambiguity aversion and the criminal process (with Alex Stein), *Notre Dame Law Review*, 81:4 (2006), 1495–1551.
11. Fair bias, *Economics and Philosophy*, 22 (2006), 213–229.
12. Democratically elected aristocracies (with David Heyd), *Social Choice & Welfare*, 27 (2006), 103–127.
13. Ex-post egalitarianism and legal justice (with Alon Harel and Zvi Safra), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 21 (2005), 57–75.
14. Super majoritarianism and the endowment effect (with Uriel Procaccia), *Theory & Decision*, 55 (2004), 181–207.
15. Min, max, and sum (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 106 (2002), 126–150.
16. Coherent odds and subjective probability (with Kim C. Border), *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 46 (2002), 253–268.
17. On the Economic meaning of Machina’s Fréchet differentiability assumption (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 450–461.

18. Rank dependent preferences without ranking axioms (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 35 (2001), 547–562.
19. Let's agree that all dictatorships are equally bad, *Journal of Political Economy*, 108 (2000), 569–589.
20. Don't fool yourself to believe you won't fool yourself again *Economics Letters*, 67 (2000), 1–3.
21. Criminal law and behavioral law and economics: Observations on the neglected role of uncertainty in deterring crime (with Alon Harel), *American Law and Economics Review*, 1 (2000), 276–312.
22. Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (with Louis Makowski and Joseph M. Ostroy), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 85 (1999), 169–225.
23. Constant risk aversion (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 83 (1998), 19–42.
24. Punishment schedules for capital flight (with D. Vincent), *The World Economy*, 21 (1998) 629–638.
25. Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problem (with Kim C. Border), *Econometrica*, 65 (1997), 1–18.
26. Dynamic consistency and reference points, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 72 (1997) 208–219.
27. First-order risk aversion and non-differentiability (with A. Spivak), *Economic Theory*, 9 (1997), 179–183.
28. How complicated are betweenness preferences? (with Z. Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 24 (1995), 371–381.
29. Observing orders of risk aversion (with G. Loomes), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 9 (1994), 239–256.
30. Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility (with K. Border), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 63 (1994), 170–188.
31. A sufficient condition for additively separable functions, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 23 (1994), 295–303.
32. The projective independence axiom (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Economic Theory*, 4 (1994), 189–215.

33. Stochastic transitivity and quadratic representation functions, *J. of Mathematical Psychology*, 38 (1994), 102–114.
34. Dutch book arguments and subjective probability (with K. Border), *Economic Journal*, 104 (1994), 71–75.
35. Order indifference and rank-dependent probabilities, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 22 (1993), 373–397.
36. The measure representation: A correction, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 6 (1993), 99–107.
37. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and generalized utility theories: Theoretical predictions and empirical observations (with L.R. Keller and T. Wang), *Theory and Decision*, 34 (1993), 83–97.
38. Dominance axioms and multivariate nonexpected utility preferences (with Z. Safra), *International Economic Review* 34 (1993), 321–334.
39. Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning (with S. Bikhchandani and S. Sharma), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 352–377.
40. Quadratic social welfare functions (with L.G. Epstein), *Journal of Political Economy*, 100 (1992), 691–712. Reprinted in J. Wood (ed.): *Amartya Sen: Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists*, Routledge (2006).
41. Additively separable representations on non-convex sets, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 89–99.
42. Mixture symmetry and quadratic utility functions, (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Econometrica*, 59 (1991), 139–163.
43. Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences, (with E. Dekel and Z. Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 55 (1991), 229–246.
44. Two stage lotteries without the reduction axiom, *Econometrica*, 58 (1990), 349–377.
45. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and nonexpected utility: A testable approach, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 3 (1990), 177–190.

46. Preference reversals and nonexpected utility behavior, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *American Economic Review*, 80 (1990), 922–930.
47. First order versus second order risk aversion (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 51 (1990), 111–125.
48. Firm size and optimal growth rates (with A. Spivak), *European Economic Review*, 33 (1989), 159–67.
49. Anticipated utility: A measure representation approach, *Annals of Operations Research*, 19 (1989), 359–73.
50. Probabilistic insurance and anticipated utility, *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, LV (1988), 287–97.
51. Precautionary saving and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach (with A. Spivak and J. Zeira), *Economics Letters*, 27 (1988), 223–227.
52. Non-expected utility risk premiums: The cases of probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, (1988) 1, 333–347.
53. Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? *American Economic Review*, 78 (1988), 233–36.
54. The Ellsberg paradox and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach, *International Economic Review*, 28 (1987), 175–202.
55. Some remarks on Quiggin’s anticipated utility, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*, 8 (1987), 145–54.
56. On the single member constituency and the law of large numbers (with A. Spivak), *Public Choice*, 49 (1986), 183–90.
57. On lexicographic probability relations, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 11 (1986), 195–99.
58. On the separability of the quasi-concave closure of an additively separable function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 14 (1985), 129–134.
59. A theorem on the additivity of the quasi-concave closure of an additive convex function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 11 (1983), 261–266.

CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

1. Distributive justice, in U. Procaccia (ed.): *A Handbook of Law and Economics* (in Hebrew), forthcoming.
2. Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds? The case against the harmonization of private law (with Uriel Procaccia), in K.J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch (eds.): *Capital Markets and Company Law*, 639–659. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
3. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility, in L. Luini (ed.): *Uncertain Decisions*, 39–52. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1999.
4. The independence axiom versus the reduction axiom: Must we have both? In W. Edwards (ed.): *Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications*, 165–183. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1992.

BOOKS

1. Mathematics for Economists 1 (with A. Rubinstein). Jerusalem: Academon, 1981 (In Hebrew).
2. Mathematics for Economists. Tel Aviv: Everyman University. 1993 (in Hebrew).

EDITORIAL BOARDS

- Econometrica (Associate Editor 1995–2010)
- Journal of Economic Theory (Associate Editor 2012–)
- Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Advisory Editor 1991–94, Associate Editor 1994–)
- Theoretical Economics (Associate Editor 2005–)
- Program committee, Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2009.

OTHER

- Fellow of the Econometric Society (2012).
- Economic Theory Fellow (2011).

RESEARCH GRANTS

- Connaught Fund #3-370-156-90, 1987 (two years).
- SSHRC #410-87-1375, 1987 (one year).
- SSHRC #410-88-0558, 1988 (two years).
- SSHRC #410-90-1494, 1990: Applications of non-expected utility models (two years).
- SSHRC #410-92-0622, 1992: Theoretical foundations of experimental decision theory (three years).
- SSHRC #410-95-0168, 1995: Decision theory and preferences for fairness (three years).
- SSHRC #410-98-0486, 1998: Decision theory, preferences for fairness, and mechanisms (three years).
- NSF, 2001: Quasi-Concave Social Welfare Functions.
- NSF, 2006: Are Universal Preferences Possible? Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories.