

**Curriculum Vitae — UZI SEGAL**  
**March 2008**

**Office:** Dept. of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. Tel. (617) 552-1567.

Email: [segalu@bc.edu](mailto:segalu@bc.edu)

Homepage: <http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec/Segal.php>

**Home:** 71 Broadview Ave., New Rochelle NY 10804. Tel. (914) 235-0973.

**DEGREES**

B.Sc. in Mathematics, Economics and Statistics with distinction. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978.

M.A. in Economics with distinction. Hebrew University, 1980.

Ph.D. in Economics. Thesis: “The connection between beliefs and preferences in economics.” Supervisor: M.E. Yaari. Hebrew University, 1984.

**RECENT PROFESSIONAL CAREER**

Dept. of Economics, Uni. of Toronto: Assistant Professor (1985–1990), Associate Professor (1990–1992), Professor (1992–1994).

California Institute of Technology: Visiting Associate Professor (1991–1992), Visiting Professor (1992–1993).

University of Western Ontario: Professor (1994–2000).

Boston College: Professor (1999–).

**PUBLICATIONS IN REFEREED JOURNALS**

1. Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories (with Zvi Safra). *Econometrica*, forthcoming.
2. The ambiguous nature of ambiguity and crime control (with Anat Horowitz). *NYU Journal of Law and Liberty*, forthcoming.
3. A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity (with Joel Sobel). *International Journal of Game Theory*, forthcoming.

4. Unanimous subjective probabilities (with Kim Border and Paolo Ghirardato), *Economic Theory*, 34:2 (2008), 383–387.
5. Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 136:1(2007), 197–216.
6. Ambiguity aversion and the criminal process (with Alex Stein), *Notre Dame Law Review*, 81:4 (2006), 1495–1551.
7. Fair bias, *Economics and Philosophy*, 22 (2006), 213–229.
8. Democratically elected aristocracies (with David Heyd), *Social Choice & Welfare*, 27 (2006), 103–127.
9. Ex-post egalitarianism and legal justice (with Alon Harel and Zvi Safra), *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 21 (2005), 57–75.
10. Super majoritarianism and the endowment effect (with Uriel Procaccia), *Theory & Decision*, 55 (2004), 181–207.
11. Min, max, and sum (with Joel Sobel), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 106 (2002), 126–150.
12. Coherent odds and subjective probability (with Kim C. Border), *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 46 (2002), 253–268.
13. On the Economic meaning of Machina’s Fréchet differentiability assumption (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 104 (2002), 450–461.
14. Rank dependent preferences without ranking axioms (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 35 (2001), 547–562.
15. Let’s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad, *Journal of Political Economy*, 108 (2000), 569–589.
16. Don’t fool yourself to believe you won’t fool yourself again *Economics Letters*, 67 (2000), 1–3.
17. Criminal law and behavioral law and economics: Observations on the neglected role of uncertainty in deterring crime (with Alon Harel), *American Law and Economics Review*, 1 (2000), 276–312.
18. Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (with Louis Makowski and Joseph M. Ostroy), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 85 (1999), 169–225.

19. Constant risk aversion (with Zvi Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 83 (1998), 19–42.
20. Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problems (with Kim C. Border), *Econometrica*, 65 (1997), 1–18.
21. Dynamic consistency and reference points, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 72 (1997) 208–219.
22. First-order risk aversion and non-differentiability (with A. Spivak), *Economic Theory*, 9 (1997), 179–183.
23. How complicated are betweenness preferences? (with Z. Safra), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 24 (1995), 371–381.
24. Observing orders of risk aversion (with G. Loomes), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 9 (1994), 239–256.
25. Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility (with K. Border), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 63 (1994), 170–188.
26. A sufficient condition for additively separable functions, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 23 (1994), 295–303.
27. The projective independence axiom (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Economic Theory*, 4 (1994), 189–215.
28. Stochastic transitivity and quadratic representation functions, *J. of Mathematical Psychology*, 38 (1994), 102–114.
29. Dutch book arguments and subjective probability (with K. Border), *Economic Journal*, 104 (1994), 71–75.
30. Order indifference and rank-dependent probabilities, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 22 (1993), 373–397.
31. The measure representation: A correction, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 6 (1993), 99–107.
32. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and generalized utility theories: Theoretical predictions and empirical observations (with L.R. Keller and T. Wang), *Theory and Decision*, 34 (1993), 83–97.
33. Dominance axioms and multivariate nonexpected utility preferences (with Z. Safra), *International Economic Review* 34 (1993), 321–334.

34. Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning (with S. Bikhchandani and S. Sharma), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 352–377.
35. Quadratic social welfare functions (with L.G. Epstein), *Journal of Political Economy*, 100 (1992), 691–712. To be reprinted in J. Wood (ed.): *Amartya Sen: Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists*, Routledge (2006).
36. Additively separable representations on non-convex sets, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 56 (1992), 89–99.
37. Mixture symmetry and quadratic utility functions, (with Chew S.H. and L.G. Epstein), *Econometrica*, 59 (1991), 139–163.
38. Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences, (with E. Dekel and Z. Safra), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 55 (1991), 229–246.
39. Two stage lotteries without the reduction axiom, *Econometrica*, 58 (1990), 349–377.
40. The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and nonexpected utility: A testable approach, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 3 (1990), 177–190.
41. Preference reversals and nonexpected utility behavior, (with Z. Safra and A. Spivak), *American Economic Review*, 80 (1990), 922–930.
42. First order versus second order risk aversion (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 51 (1990), 111–125.
43. Firm size and optimal growth rates (with A. Spivak), *European Economic Review*, 33 (1989), 159–67.
44. Anticipated utility: A measure representation approach, *Annals of Operations Research*, 19 (1989), 359–73.
45. Probabilistic insurance and anticipated utility, *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, LV (1988), 287–97.
46. Precautionary saving and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach (with A. Spivak and J. Zeira), *Economics Letters*, 27 (1988), 223–227.

47. Non-expected utility risk premiums: The cases of probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty (with A. Spivak), *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, (1988) 1, 333–347.
48. Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? *American Economic Review*, 78 (1988), 233–36.
49. The Ellsberg paradox and risk aversion: An anticipated utility approach, *International Economic Review*, 28 (1987), 175–202.
50. Some remarks on Quiggin’s anticipated utility, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*, 8 (1987), 145–54.
51. On the single member constituency and the law of large numbers (with A. Spivak), *Public Choice*, 49 (1986), 183–90.
52. On lexicographic probability relations, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 11 (1986), 195–99.
53. On the separability of the quasi-concave closure of an additively separable function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 14 (1985), 129–134.
54. A theorem on the additivity of the quasi-concave closure of an additive convex function, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 11 (1983), 261–266.

## CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

1. Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds? The case against the harmonization of private law (with Uriel Procaccia), in K.J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch (eds.): *Capital Markets and Company Law*, 639–659. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
2. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility, in L. Luini (ed.): *Uncertain Decisions*, 39–52. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1999.
3. Punishment schedules for capital flight (with D. Vincent), *The World Economy*, 21 (1998) 629–638.
4. The independence axiom versus the reduction axiom: Must we have both? In W. Edwards (ed.): *Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications*, 165–183. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1992.

## **EDITORIAL BOARDS**

- *Econometrica* (Associate Editor 1995–)
- *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* (Advisory Editor 1991–94, Associate Editor 1994–)
- *Theoretical Economics* (Associate Editor 2005–)

## **RECENT RESEARCH GRANTS**

- SSHRC #410-92-0622, 1992: Theoretical foundations of experimental decision theory (three years).
- SSHRC #410-95-0168, 1995: Decision theory and preferences for fairness (three years).
- SSHRC #410-98-0486, 1998: Decision theory, preferences for fairness, and mechanisms (three years).
- NSF, 2001: Quasi-Concave Social Welfare Functions (one year).
- NSF, 2006: Are Universal Preferences Possible? Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories (two years).