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Abstract: We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.
680. Susanne Schennach (University of Chicago), Halbert White (University of California-San Diego) and Karim Chalak, "Estimating average marginal effects in nonseparable structural systems" (12/2007: 536 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: We provide nonparametric estimators of derivative ratio-based average marginal effects of an endogenous cause, X, on a response of interest, Y, for a system of recursive structural equations. The system need not exhibit linearity, separability, or monotonicity. Our estimators are local indirect least squares estimators analogous to those of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001) who treat a latent index model involving a binary X: We treat the traditional case of an observed exogenous instrument (OXI) and the case where one observes error-laden proxies for an unobserved exogenous instrument (PXI). For PXI, we develop and apply new results for estimating densities and expectations conditional on mismeasured variables. For both OXI and PXI, we use infinite order flat-top kernels to obtain uniformly convergent and asymptotically normal nonparametric estimators of instrument-conditioned effects, as well as root-n consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of average effects.
679. Richard W. Tresch and Andrei Zlate, "Explorations into the Production of State Government Services: Education, Welfare and Hospitals" (12/2007: 3 Mb, PDF)
Abstract: This paper explores the production characteristics of three important U.S. state government services--public higher education, public welfare, and state psychiatric hospitals—during the last half of the twentieth century. We estimate translog cost functions for the three services and find that their production attributes are similar in a number of respects. First, production exhibits substantial economies of scale; unexploited scale economies are so severe that the average state operates on the negative portion of its marginal cost curve. Second, the analysis of technical change indicates that public education, welfare, and hospitals are affected by severe technical regression in all states, in both the long run and short run. Third, production of all three services is overcapitalized in most states; the provision of these services is not long-run efficient. Finally, we show that the Baumol-Oates cost disease of lagging productivity growth is rampant in all three services; only the short-run productivity growth in education matches the performance of the private sector, as technical regression is more than offset by the productivity-enhancing scale effect of increased enrollments.
Abstract: Consider an observed binary regressor D and an unobserved binary variable B, both of which affect some other variable Y. This paper considers nonparametric identification and estimation of the effect of D on Y, conditioning on B=0. For example, suppose Y is a person's wage, the unobserved B indicates if the person has been to college, and the observed D indicates whether the individual claims to have been to college. This paper then identifies and estimates the difference in average wages between those who falsely claim college experience versus those who tell the truth about not having college. We estimate this average returns to lying to be about 7% to 20%. Nonparametric identification without observing B is obtained either by observing a variable V that is roughly analogous to an instrument for ordinary measurement error, or by imposing restrictions on model error moments.
677. Anthony Creane (Michigan State University) and Hideo Konishi, "The Unilateral Incentives for Technology Transfers: Predation by Proxy" (09/2007: 280 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: In 1984 GM and Toyota began the joint production of automobiles to much controversy over its anti-competitive effects. The argument for the joint production was the considerable efficiency gains GM would obtain. Since then, the anti-trust controversy has died, but a question remains: why would the most efficient manufacturer (Toyota) transfer to its largest rival the knowledge to transform itself into a very efficient rival? We examine when such transfers could be unilaterally profitable, finding that it can serve as a credible way to make the market more competitive, forcing high cost firms to exit (or preventing future entry). This is not without a cost to Toyota since such a transfer also makes the remaining rivals more efficient. Despite this, we find a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for it to be profitable to predate "by proxy": the market satisfies an entry equilibrium condition. Further, we find that it is then optimal to predate on every firm that is vulnerable and so a market with many firms can become a duopoly. Profitable predation implies higher prices, to the detriment of consumers. Yet the improved production efficiency outweighs this loss, resulting enhanced social welfare. In contrast, profitable non-predatory joint production (or technology transfers) may reduce welfare. Paradoxically, the potential for predation could encourage entry ex ante.
676. Xiaohong Chen (Yale University), Yingyao Hu (Johns Hopkins University) and Arthur Lewbel, " Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Nonclassical Errors-in-Variables Models Without Additional Information" (08/2007: 276 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: This paper considers identification and estimation of a nonparametric regression model with an unobserved discrete covariate. The sample consists of a dependent variable and a set of covariates, one of which is discrete and arbitrarily correlates with the unobserved covariate. The observed discrete covariate has the same support as the unobserved covariate, and can be interpreted as a proxy or mismeasure of the unobserved one, but with a nonclassical measurement error that has an unknown distribution. We obtain nonparametric identification of the model given monotonicity of the regression function and a rank condition that is directly testable given the data. Our identification strategy does not require additional sample information, such as instrumental variables or a secondary sample. We then estimate the model via the method of sieve maximum likelihood, and provide root-n asymptotic normality and semiparametric efficiency of smooth functionals of interest. Two small simulations are presented to illustrate the identification and the estimation results.
675. Xiaohong Chen (Yale University), Yingyao Hu (Johns Hopkins University) and Arthur Lewbel, " Nonparametric Identification of Regression Models Containing a Misclassified Dichotomous Regressor Without Instruments" (07/2007: 132 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: This note considers nonparametric identification of a general nonlinear regression model with a dichotomous regressor subject to misclassification error. The available sample information consists of a dependent variable and a set of regressors, one of which is binary and error-ridden with misclassification error that has unknown distribution. Our identification strategy does not parameterize any regression or distribution functions, and does not require additional sample information such as instrumental variables, repeated measurements, or an auxiliary sample. Our main identifying assumption is that the regression model error has zero conditional third moment. The results include a closed-form solution for the unknown distributions and the regression function.
674. Susanne Schennach (University of Chicago), Yingyao Hu (Johns Hopkins University) and Arthur Lewbel, "Nonparametric identification of the classical errors-in-variables model without side information" (07/2007: 277 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: This note establishes that the fully nonparametric classical errors-in-variables model is identifiable from data on the regressor and the dependent variable alone, unless the specification is a member of a very specific parametric family. This family includes the linear specification with normally distributed variables as a special case. This result relies on standard primitive regularity conditions taking the form of smoothness and monotonicity of the regression function and nonvanishing characteristic functions of the disturbances.
673. James E. Anderson, "Economic Integration and the Civilizing Commerce Hypothesis" (09/2005: 189 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Economic integration lowers one form of trade costs, tariffs, and stimulates changes in other trade costs. This paper offers a model in which integration may raise or lower the important trade cost associated with insecurity. The model can help to explain the varied experience with integration and it points to the usefulness of combining enforcement policy integration with trade policy integration.
672. James E. Anderson, "Does Trade Foster Contract Enforcement?" (07/2007: 261 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development.
671. Erich Battistin (University of Padova), Richard Blundell (University College London) and Arthur Lewbel, "Why is Consumption More Log Normal Than Income? Gibrat's Law Revisited" (07/2007: 577 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Significant departures from log normality are observed in income data, in violation of Gibrat's law. We identify a new empirical regularity, which is that the distribution of consumption expenditures across households is, within cohorts, closer to log normal than the distribution of income. We explain these empirical results by showing that the logic of Gibrat's law applies not to total income, but to permanent income and to maginal utility. These findings have important implications for welfare and inequality measurement, aggregation, and econometric model analysis.
Abstract:Are today's youngest retirees following in the footsteps of their older peers with respect to gradual retirement? Recent evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) suggests that most older Americans with full-time career jobs later in life transitioned to another job prior to complete labor force withdrawal. This paper explores the retirement patterns of a younger cohort of individuals from the HRS known as the "War Babies." These survey respondents were born between 1942 and 1947 and were 57 to 62 years of age at the time of their fourth bi-annual HRS interview in 2004. We compare the War Babies to an older cohort of HRS respondents and find that, for the most part, the War Babies have followed the gradual-retirement trends of their slightly older predecessors. Traditional one-time, permanent retirements appear to be fading, a sign that the impact of changes in the retirement income landscape since the 1980s continues to unfold.
669. Arthur Lewbel, "Shape Invariant Demand Functions" (06/2007; 150 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Shape invariance is a property of demand functions that is convenient for semiparametric demand modelling. All known shape invariant demands are derived from utility functions that, up to monotonic transformation, are called IB/ESE (independent of base - equivalence scale exact) utility functions, because they yield IB/ESE equivalence scales, which are widely used in welfare calculations. This paper provides a counterexample, i.e., a shape invariant demand system that is not derived from a transform of IB/ESE utility. A general theorem is then provided that characterizes all shape invariant demand systems. The usual practice of equating shape invariance with the IB/ESE utility class is shown to be not quite right, but it can be made valid by testing for the small class of exceptions noted here. In particular, all the exceptions have rank two, so any rank three or higher shape invariant system must be derived from transforms of IB/ESE utility.
668. Stefan Hoderlein (Universität Mannheim) and Arthur Lewbel, "Price Dimension Reduction in Demand Systems With Many Goods" (06/2007; 210 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Estimation of demand systems with many goods is empirically difficult because demand functions depend, flexibly and usually nonlinearly, on the prices of all goods. The standard solution is to impose strong, empirically questionable behavioral restrictions on price elasticities via separability. This paper proposes an alternative based on applying statistical dimension reduction methods to the price vector, and deriving the resulting restrictions on demand functions that remain due to Slutsky symmetry and other implications of utility maximization. The results permit estimation of the effects of income and of prices of some goods on the demand functions for every good without imposing any separability. We illustrate the results by reporting estimates of the effects of gasoline prices on the demands for many goods.
667. Christopher F Baum, Mark E. Schaffer (Heriot-Watt University) and Steven Stillman (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research), "Enhanced routines for instrumental variables/GMM estimation and testing" (09/2007; 410 Kb, PDF; published, Stata Journal, 7:4, 465-506, 2007)
Abstract: We extend our 2003 paper on instrumental variables (IV) and GMM estimation and testing and describe enhanced routines that address HAC standard errors, weak instruments, LIML and k-class estimation, tests for endogeneity and RESET and autocorrelation tests for IV estimates.
666. Eren Inci, "Occupational Choice and the Quality of Entrepreneurs" (05/2007: 747 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: This paper focuses on the quality of entrepreneurs when individuals, who differ in terms of entrepreneurial ability and wealth, choose between entrepreneurship and wage-earning. A loan is required to become an entrepreneur. Four wealth classes form endogenously. Banks' inability to identify the ability of individuals leads them to offer pooling contracts to the poor and the lower-middle classes. Regardless of ability, all poor class individuals become workers and all lower-middle class individuals become entrepreneurs. Banks are able to offer separating contracts to the upper-middle and the rich classes. High-ability individuals in these wealth classes become entrepreneurs and their low-ability counterparts become workers. Equilibrium contracts may entail cross-subsidies within or between occupations. In some economies, a small success tax on entrepreneurs used to subsidize workers can increase the average quality of entrepreneurs and welfare by changing the thresholds of the wealth classes. In some others a reverse policy is required. Since the aggregate level of investment is fixed, the reason for these policies is not under- or overinvestment by entrepreneurs, as it often is in previous literature.
665. Richard Arnott and John Rowse (University of Calgary), "Downtown Parking in Auto City" (04/2007: 241 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: This paper develops and calibrates a model of downtown parking in a city without mass transit, and applies it to investigate downtown parking policy. There is curbside and garage parking and traffic congestion. Spatial competition between private parking garages determines the equilibrium garage parking fee and spacing between parking garages. Curbside parking is priced below its social opportunity cost. Cruising for parking adjusts to equalize the full prices of on- and off-street parking, and contributes to traffic congestion. The central result is that raising curbside parking fees appears to be a very attractive policy since it generates efficiency gains that may be several times as large as the increased revenues raised.
664. Christopher F Baum, James G. Bohn (UHY Advisors) and Atreya Chakraborty (University of Massachusetts-Boston), "Securities Fraud Class Actions and Corporate Governance: New Evidence on the Role of Merit" (rev. 01/2008: 440 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: We examine the relationship between outcomes of securities fraud class action lawsuits and board turnover rates. Our results indicate that the outcome of a class action is a good indicator of the underlying, unobservable merit of the action. Consistent with the merit hypothesis, board turnover rates are higher in the period following the filing of a lawsuit that is ultimately settled than one that is dismissed. Turnover propensities are more sensitive to outcome for CEOs and for individuals named as defendants in the lawsuits. Turnover rates of both inside and outside directors are higher when external equity ownership is more concentrated.
663. Giuseppe Fiori, Giuseppe Nicoletti (OECD), Stefano Scarpetta (OECD) and Fabio Schiantarelli, "Employment Outcomes and the Interaction Between Product and Labor Market Deregulation: Are They Substitutes or Complements?" (rev. 07/2007: 310 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: This paper provides a systematic empirical investigation of the effect of product market liberalization on employment when there are interactions between policies and institutions in product and labor markets. Using panel data for OECD countries over the period 1980-2002, we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labor market regulation is high. Moreover, there is evidence in our sample that product market deregulation promotes labor market deregulation. We show that these results are mostly consistent with the basic predictions of a standard bargaining model (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)), once one allows for a full specification of the fall back position of the unions.
662. Peter N. Ireland, "On the Welfare Cost of Inflation and the Recent Behavior of Money Demand" (04/2007: 256 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Post-1980 U.S. data trace out a stable long-run money demand relationship of Cagan's semi-log form between the M1-income ratio and the nominal interest rate, with an interest semi-elasticity of 1.79. Integrating under this money demand curve yields estimates of the welfare cost of modest departures from Friedman's zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money that are quite small. The results suggest that the Federal Reserve's current policy, which generates low but still positive rates of inflation, provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving all the way to the Friedman rule.
661. Richard Arnott and Elizaveta Shevyakhova, "Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance" (04/2007: 612 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to 'show' it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.
660. Richard Arnott, "Congestion Tolling with Agglomeration Externalities" (03/2007: 244 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Consider an urban economy with two types of externalities, negative traffic congestion externalities and positive agglomeration externalities deriving from non-market interaction. Suppose that urban travel can be tolled, that non-market interaction cannot be subsidized, and that non-market interaction is stimulated by a reduction in travel costs. Then the optimal toll is below the congestion externality cost. This paper explores this line of reasoning.
659. Matteo Iacoviello and Stefano Neri (Banca D'Italia), "Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model" (rev. 01/2008: 447 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: Using U.S. data and Bayesian methods, we quantify the contribution of the housing market to business fluctuations. The estimated model, which contains nominal and real rigidities and collateral constraints, is used to address two questions. First, what shocks drive the housing market? We find that the upward trend in real housing prices of the last 40 years can be explained by slow technological progress in the housing sector. Over the business cycle instead, housing demand and housing technology shocks account for roughly one-quarter each of the volatility of housing investment and housing prices. Monetary factors account for about 20 percent, but they played a major role in the housing market cycle at the turn of the century. Second, do fluctuations in the housing market propagate to other forms of expenditure? We find that the spillovers from the housing market to the broader economy are non-negligible, concentrated on consumption rather than business investment, and they have become more important over time, to the extent that financial innovation has increased the marginal availability of funds for credit-constrained agents.
658. Matteo Iacoviello, Fabio Schiantarelli and Scott Schuh (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston), "Input and Output Inventories in General Equilibrium" (rev. 11/2007: 533 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: We build and estimate a two-sector (goods and services) dynamic general equilibrium model with two types of inventories: finished goods (output) inventories yield utility services while materials (input) inventories facilitate the production of goods. The model, which contains neutral and inventory-specific technology shocks and preference shocks, is estimated by Bayesian methods. The estimated model replicates the volatility and cyclicality of inventory investment and inventory-target ratios. When estimated over subperiods, the results suggest that changes in the volatility of inventory shocks, or in structural parameters associated with inventories, play a minor role in the reduction of the volatility of output.
657. Christopher F Baum, Mustafa Caglayan (University of Sheffield), Dorothea Schäfer (DIW Berlin) and Oleksandr Talavera (DIW Berlin), "Political Patronage in Ukranian Banking" (rev. 02/2008: 133 Kb, PDF; forthcoming, Economics of Transition; earlier version published (in German) as "Ukrainische Banken: Politische Patronage von Bedeutung", Wochenbericht Nr. 23/2007, DIW Berlin, pp. 367-371.)
Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the link between political patronage and bank performance for Ukraine during 2003Q3-2005Q2. We find significant differences between politically affiliated and non-affiliated banks. The data suggest that affiliated banks have significantly lower interest margins. The gap between affiliated banks' and non-affiliated banks' capitalization ratios, is narrowing over time. Parliamentary deputies might use financial institutions to achieve political goals which reduces their banks' performance.
656. Margarita Sapozhnikov, "Mergers and Government Policy" (11/2006: 280 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: It has long been thought that government antitrust policy has an effect on aggregate merger and acquisition activity, but the empirical support for this hypothesis has been weak and inconsistent. This paper uses a new empirical specification and a new dataset on mergers and acquisitions to provide support for this conjecture. Regression analysis shows that government policy has a significant influence on mergers and that the nature of the effects depends on the type of merger. Fitting the time series into a two-state Markov switching model shows that conglomerate and horizontal time series follow different dynamics for the last half century, which is most likely caused by the dissimilar treatment of the two types of merger by the government. Only the conglomerate merger and acquisition time series is well described by a two-state Markov switching model. In contrast, the horizontal time series has a break in the early 1980s that may be attributed to the dramatic change in government policy.
655. Hideo Konishi, "Tiebout's Tale in Spatial Economies: Entrepreneurship, Self-Selection, and Efficiency" (rev. 01/2008: 270 Kb, PDF; forthcoming, Regional Science and Urban Economics)
Abstract: This paper establishes the existence and efficiency of equilibrium in a local public goods economy with spatial structures by formalizing Hamilton's (1975 Urban Studies) elaboration of Tiebout's (1956 JPE) tale. We use a well-known equilibrium concept from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976, QJE) in a market with asymmetric information, and show that Hamilton's zoning policy plays an essential role in proving existence and efficiency of equilibrium. We use an idealized large economy following Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame (1999, Econometrica) and Allouch, Conley and Wooders (2004). Our theorem is directly applicable to the existence and efficiency of a discrete approximation of mono- or multi-centric city equilibrium in urban economics with commuting time costs even if we allow existence of multiple qualities of (collective) residences, when externalities due to traffic congestion are not present.
654. Hideo Konishi and Margarita Sapozhnikov, "Decentralized Matching Markets with Endogenous Salaries" (rev. 01/2008: 264 Kb, PDF; forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior)
Abstract: In a Shapley-Shubik assignment problem with a supermodular output matrix, we consider games in which each firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it salary offer to one applicant, and a match is made only when the offer is accepted by her. We consider both one-shot and multistage games. In either game, we show that there can be many equilibrium salary vectors which are higher or lower than the minimal competitive salary vector. If we exclude artificial equilibria, applicants' equilibrium salary vectors are bounded above by the minimal competitive salary vector, while firms' equilibrium payoff vectors are bounded below by the payoff vector under the minimal competitive salary vector. This suggests that adopting the minimal competitive salary vector as the equilibrium outcome in decentralized markets does not have a strong justification.
653. Bariş K. Yörük, "How Responsive are Charitable Donors to Requests to Give?" (10/2006: 520 Kb, PDF)
Abstract: People tend to contribute to a charity only when they are asked to. Although this so-called 'power of asking' is a well-known technique among fundraisers, the existing literature does not pay much attention to the role of donation requests in charitable giving. We estimate the causal effects of charitable solicitations on both the propensity to give and the amount of charitable contributions using a unique data set, which was designed to measure the giving behavior in the United States. In order to address the endogeneity of the donation requests due to non-random solicitation of charitable donors, we link this data set to IRS data on charitable organizations and the 2000 Census and propose identifying instruments. After controlling for the endogeneity, we find that people are both more likely to contribute to a charity and also donate more when they are asked to. This effect is robust under different specifications and with different sets of instruments and is much larger compared with the estimates of univariate models. Furthermore, we argue that some identifiable characteristics of individuals are associated with the higher probability of being solicited. In particular, we find some evidence that income, age, education, and race play significant roles in explaining the selection of potential charitable donors.
652. David Jacho-Chavez (Indiana University), Arthur Lewbel and Oliver Linton (London School of Economics), "Identification and Nonparametric Estimation of a Transformed Additively Separable Model" (09/2006: 3.3 Mb, PDF)
Abstract: Let r(x,z) be a function that, along with its derivatives, can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. This paper discusses identification and consistent estimation of the unknown functions H, M, G and F, where r(x, z) = H[M (x, z)] and M(x,z) = G(x) + F(z). An estimation algorithm is proposed for each of the model's unknown components when r(x, z) represents a conditional mean function. The resulting estimators use marginal integration, and are shown to have a limiting Normal distribution with a faster rate of convergence than unrestricted nonparametric alternatives. Their small sample performance is studied in a Monte Carlo experiment. We empirically apply our results to nonparametrically estimate and test generalized homothetic production functions in four industries within the Chinese economy.
651. Arthur Lewbel and Krishna Pendakur (Simon Fraser University), "Tricks With Hicks: The EASI Implicit Marshallian Demand System for Unobserved Heterogeneity and Flexible Engel Curves" (rev. 06/2007: 2.2 Mb, PDF)
Abstract: We invent Implicit Marshallian Demands, a new type of demand function that combines desirable features of Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions. We propose and estimate the Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) Implicit Marshallian Demand system. Like the Almost Ideal Demand (AID) system, EASI budget shares are linear in parameters given real expenditures. However, unlike the AID, EASI demands can have any rank and its Engel curves can be polynomials or splines of any order in real expenditures. EASI error terms equal random utility parameters to account for unobserved preference heterogeneity. EASI demand functions can be estimated using ordinary GMM, and, like AID, an approximate EASI model can be estimated by linear regression.
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