

Optimal Taylor Rules in an Estimated Model of a Small Open Economy*

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Abstract

We develop a model of a small open economy with three types of nominal rigidities (domestic goods prices, imported goods prices and wages) and eight different structural shocks. We estimate the model's structural parameters using a maximum likelihood procedure and use it to compute welfare-maximizing Taylor rules for setting domestic short-term interest rates. For these computations, we use a second-order approximation around the model's deterministic steady state, which allows the Taylor rule coefficients to affect the means of consumption, leisure and real balances as well as their variances. Welfare gains from moving to the optimal Taylor rule are substantial, but require a very precise knowledge of the values of the model's structural parameters.

JEL classification: F2, F31, F33

Key words: Economic models; Open economy; Optimal monetary policy; Taylor rules

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1. Introduction

A large literature analyzes optimal monetary policy in the context of the New Open-Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM), a class of open-economy dynamic general-equilibrium models with explicit microfoundations, nominal rigidities, and imperfect competition.¹ Galí and Monacelli (1999) showed in a model with instantaneous pass-through of exchange rate changes to domestic prices that optimal monetary policy is identical in open and closed economies and involves stabilizing the overall price level, without regard to exchange rate fluctuations. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) showed that with slow pass-through this is no longer the case: it is optimal for the central bank to minimize a CPI-weighted average of markups charged in the domestic market by domestic and foreign producers. Much of this literature uses highly stylized models with analytical solutions. Recently, more fully developed models have appeared. Kollmann (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2002) showed that optimal monetary policy with sticky domestic-goods prices and imported-goods prices involves minimizing a weighted average of domestic and import price inflation.

In this paper, we analyze optimal monetary policy (within a class of simple monetary rules) in a NOEM model of a small open economy with three types of nominal rigidities: wages and both domestic and imported goods prices are set in advance by monopolistically competitive agents. The model also incorporates eight different types of structural shocks. We estimate the model's structural parameters with Canadian and U.S. data using maximum likelihood via the Kalman filter. We then use the model to compute welfare-maximizing Taylor rules for setting domestic short-term interest rates. For these computations, we use a second-order approximation around the model's deterministic steady state, thereby allowing the Taylor rule coefficients to affect the means of consumption, leisure, and real balances as well as their variances.

Our main results can be summarized as follows. We estimate most of the parameters of

¹The NOEM literature, spawned by the pioneering work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), has been successful in explaining phenomena such as high real exchange rate volatility and the strong impact of monetary policy shocks on real exchange rates. See Sarno (2001), Lane (2001), and Bowman and Doyle (2003) for recent surveys.

the model precisely. The estimates are compatible with other small open economy models in the NOEM literature, for example Bergin (2003) and Dib (2003). The optimal Taylor rule involves responding more strongly to fluctuations in GDP and money growth than the Bank of Canada has done historically. The gains from optimal monetary policy are quite substantial. The gain in unconditional welfare amounts to 2.6% of the initial average level of consumption compared to the stochastic steady state with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients. Compared to the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule coefficients, optimized monetary policy responds more strongly to fluctuations in inflation and output, and less strongly to fluctuations in real money balances.

Our results differ from those in the existing literature in three main respects. First, our estimate of the welfare gain from optimal monetary policy is larger than in other recent papers that analyze optimal monetary policy in small open economies (for example Kollmann, 2002 and Smets and Wouters, 2002). Second, we investigate the robustness of the welfare gains and find that the level of welfare is extremely sensitive to small changes in the values of the Taylor rule coefficients. As a function of the Taylor rule coefficients, the slope of the social welfare function is quite steep in the immediate neighborhood of the maximum, but it becomes quite flat beyond this neighborhood: the welfare function is like a broad plain with a small number of tall, narrow mountains. The location of the tallest peak in the plain depends on the estimated values of the model's structural parameters. This means that small errors in these estimates due to sampling error could lead monetary policy to miss the mountain entirely. Third, we show that most of the welfare gain from optimized monetary policy comes from its effects on the levels of variables rather than on the second moments of the arguments of the period utility function.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In section 3, we discuss the estimation strategy used to attribute values to the model's structural parameters and the parameter estimates themselves. We discuss the calculation of the optimal Taylor rule and present our results concerning the benefits of optimal monetary policy in section 4. Section 5 offers some conclusions.

2. The Model

The economy is small because it faces fixed prices on world markets for imported goods. Its domestic output is an imperfect substitute for foreign goods, and it faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its output on world markets. It also faces an upward-sloping supply curve for funds on international capital markets.

Different labor types are associated with particular households that act as monopolistic competitors in the labor market. Differentiated intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive domestic firms using labor and a final composite good as inputs. Differentiated intermediate goods are also imported by monopolistically competitive importers. Domestic and imported intermediate goods are aggregated by competitive firms to form a composite domestic and a composite imported good. Some of the composite domestic good is exported. The remainder is combined with the composite imported good to form the final good. As in McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), imports enter the production process rather than being consumed directly.² The final good is used for consumption, government consumption, and as an input into the production of domestic intermediate goods.

There are therefore three sources of monopoly distortion and nominal rigidities. Households set wages in advance, and both importers and producers of domestic intermediate goods set prices in advance. Following Calvo (1983), price and wage setters maintain constant prices and wages unless they receive a signal to revise them, which arrives at the beginning of each period with a constant probability. This assumption makes aggregation simple, allows us easily to vary the average duration of the nominal rigidities, and allows us to estimate the length of the nominal rigidities along with other structural parameters of the model.

2.1 Households

There is a continuum of different households on the unit interval, indexed by j . The j^{th} household's preferences are given by:

²Bergin (2003) and Kollmann (2002) develop similar models.

$$U_0(j) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u \left(C_t(j), \frac{M_t(j)}{P_t}, h_t(j) \right), \quad (1)$$

where β is the discount factor, E_0 is the conditional expectations operator, $C_t(j)$ is consumption, $M_t(j)$ denotes nominal money balances held at the end of the period, P_t is the price level, and $h_t(j)$ denotes hours worked by the household. The single-period utility function is:

$$u(\cdot) = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma - 1} \log \left(C_t(j)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \left(\frac{M_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \right) + \eta \log(1 - h_t(j)), \quad (2)$$

where γ and η are positive parameters. Total time available to the household in the period is normalized to one. This functional form of the period utility function leads to a conventional money demand equation in which the short-term nominal interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding money, $-\gamma$ is the interest elasticity of money demand, and consumption is the scale variable. The b_t term is a shock to money demand. It follows the first-order autoregressive process given by:

$$\log(b_t) = (1 - \rho_b) \log(b) + \rho_b \log(b_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{bt}, \quad (3)$$

with $0 < \rho_b < 1$ and where the serially uncorrelated shock, ε_{bt} , is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation σ_b . The household's budget constraint is given by:

$$P_t C_t(j) + M_t(j) + \frac{D_t^g(j)}{R_t} + \frac{e_t B_t^*(j)}{\kappa_t R_t^*} = (1 - \tau_t) W_t(j) h_t(j, \cdot) + M_{t-1}(j) + D_{t-1}^g(j) + e_t B_{t-1}^*(j) + T_t + D_t, \quad (4)$$

where $W_t(j)$ is the nominal wage rate set by the household. Labor income is taxed at an average marginal tax rate, τ_t . B_t^* and D_t^g are foreign-currency and domestic-currency bonds purchased in t , and e_t is the nominal exchange rate. Domestic-currency bonds are used by the government to finance its deficit. R_t and R_t^* denote, respectively, the gross nominal domestic and foreign interest rates between t and $t + 1$; κ_t is a risk premium that reflects departures from uncovered interest parity. The household also receives nominal profits $D_t = D_t^d + D_t^m$ from domestic producers and importers of intermediate goods, and T_t is nominal lump-sum

transfers from the government. The risk premium depends on the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic output:

$$\log(\kappa_t) = \varphi \left[\exp \left(\frac{e_t B_t^*}{P_t^d Y_t} \right) - 1 \right], \quad (5)$$

where P_t^d is the GDP deflator or domestic output price index. The risk premium ensures that the model has a unique steady state. If domestic and foreign interest rates are equal, the time paths of domestic consumption and wealth follow random walks.³

The foreign nominal interest rate, R_t^* , evolves according to the following stochastic process:

$$\log(R_t^*) = (1 - \rho_{R^*}) \log(R^*) + \rho_{R^*} \log(R_{t-1}^*) + \varepsilon_{R^*t}, \quad (6)$$

with $0 < \rho_{R^*} < 1$ and where the serially uncorrelated shock, ε_{R^*t} , is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation σ_{R^*} .

Household j chooses $C_t(j)$, $M_t(j)$, $D_t^g(j)$, and $B_t^*(j)$ (and $W_t(j)$ if it is allowed to change its wage) to maximize the expected discounted sum of its utility flows subject to three relationships: the budget constraint, equation (4), intermediate firms' demand for their labor type, and a transversality condition on their holdings of assets. Aggregate labor is given by:

$$h_t = \left(\int_0^1 h_t(j)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dj \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (7)$$

where σ is the elasticity of substitution between different labor skills. This implies the following conditional demand for labor of type j :

$$h_t(j) = \left(\frac{W_t(j)}{W_t} \right)^{-\sigma} h_t,$$

where h_t is aggregate employment. W_t is an exact average wage index given by:

$$W_t = \left(\int_0^1 W_t(j)^{1-\sigma} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$

³For an early discussion of this problem, see Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1984). Our risk premium equation is similar to the one used by Senhadji (1997). For alternative ways of ensuring that stationary paths exist for consumption in small open-economy models, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).

The household's first-order conditions are:

$$\frac{C_t(j)^{\frac{-1}{\gamma}}}{C_t(j)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \left(\frac{M_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}} = \Lambda_t(j) \frac{P_t}{P_t^d}; \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \left(\frac{M_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{\frac{-1}{\gamma}} \left(\frac{P_t^d}{P_t}\right)}{C_t(j)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \left(\frac{M_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}} = \Lambda_t(j) - \beta E_t \left[\frac{P_t^d}{P_{t+1}^d} \Lambda_{t+1}(j) \right]; \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{\Lambda_t(j)}{R_t} = \beta E_t \left[\frac{P_t^d}{P_{t+1}^d} \Lambda_{t+1}(j) \right]; \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{\Lambda_t(j)}{\kappa_t R_t^*} = \beta E_t \left[\frac{P_t^d}{P_{t+1}^d} \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} \Lambda_{t+1}(j) \right], \quad (11)$$

where $\Lambda_t(j)$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time t budget constraint. With probability $(1 - d_w)$ the household is allowed to set its wage. The first order condition is:

$$\tilde{W}_t(j) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \frac{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_w)^l \frac{\eta h_{t+l}(j)}{1 - h_{t+l}(j)}}{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_w)^l (1 - \tau_{t+l}) h_{t+l}(j) \Lambda_{t+l}(j) / P_{t+l}^d} \quad (12)$$

This first-order condition gives a New Keynesian Phillips curve for wage inflation (see section (2.6)). The wage index evolves over time according to:

$$W_t = \left[d_w (W_{t-1})^{1-\sigma} + (1 - d_w) (\tilde{W}_t)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \quad (13)$$

where \tilde{W}_t is the average wage of those workers who revise their wage at time t .

2.2 Goods production

2.2.1 Domestic intermediate goods

Firms have identical production functions given by:

$$Y_t(i) = X_t(i)^\phi (A_t h_t(\cdot, i))^{1-\phi}, \quad \phi \in (0, 1), \quad (14)$$

where $h_t(\cdot, i)$ is the quantity of the aggregate labor input employed by firm i and $X_t(i)$ is the quantity of the final composite good used by firm i .⁴ A_t is an aggregate technology shock that follows the stochastic process given by:

$$\log(A_t) = (1 - \rho_A) \log(A) + \rho_A \log(A_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{At}, \quad (15)$$

where ε_{At} is a normally distributed, serially uncorrelated shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ_A . The firm chooses $X_t(i)$ and $h_t(\cdot, i)$ to maximize its stock market value. When allowed to do so (with probability $(1 - d_p)$ each period), it also chooses the price of its output, $\tilde{P}_t^d(i)$. It solves:

$$\max_{\{X_t(i), h_t(\cdot, i), \tilde{P}_t^d(i)\}} E_t \left[\sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_p)^l \left(\frac{\Lambda_{t+l}}{\Lambda_t} \right) \frac{D_{t+l}^d(i)}{P_{t+l}^d} \right], \quad (16)$$

where Λ_t is the marginal utility of wealth for a representative household, and

$$D_{t+l}^d(i) \equiv \tilde{P}_t^d(i) Y_{t+l}(i) - W_{t+l} h_{t+l}(\cdot, i) - P_{t+l} X_{t+l}(i),$$

where P_t is the price of the final output good, Z_t . The maximization is subject to the firm's production function and to the derived demand for the firm's output (discussed in section (2.2.3)) given by:

$$Y_{t+l}(i) = \left(\frac{\tilde{P}_t^d(i)}{P_{t+l}^d} \right)^{-\theta} Y_{t+l}, \quad (17)$$

where P_t^d is the exact price index of the composite domestic good. The elasticity of the derived demand for the firm's output is $-\theta$. The first-order conditions are:

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t^d} = \xi_t(i) (1 - \phi) \frac{Y_t(i)}{h_t(\cdot, i)}; \quad (18)$$

$$\frac{P_t}{P_t^d} = \xi_t(i) \phi \frac{Y_t(i)}{X_t(i)}; \quad (19)$$

$$\tilde{P}_t^d(i) = \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) \frac{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_p)^l \left(\frac{\Lambda_{t+l}}{\Lambda_t} \right) \xi_{t+l}(i) Y_{t+l}(i)}{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_p)^l \left(\frac{\Lambda_{t+l}}{\Lambda_t} \right) Y_{t+l}(i) / P_{t+l}^d}, \quad (20)$$

⁴We include $X_t(i)$ in the production of domestic intermediates for two reasons. First, without $X_t(i)$, the response of the real wage to demand shocks is too highly countercyclical. Second, as shown in similar models by McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001), the presence of intermediates in the production function for domestic goods affects the correlation between the nominal exchange rate and domestic inflation.

where $\xi_t(i)$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production function constraint. It measures the firm's real marginal cost. The first-order condition with respect to the firm's price relates the price to the expected future price of final output and to expected future real marginal costs. It can be used to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship for the rate of change of domestic output prices (see section (2.6)).

2.2.2 Imported intermediate goods

The economy imports a continuum of foreign intermediate goods on the unit interval. There is monopolistic competition in the market for imported intermediates, which are imperfect substitutes for each other in the production of the composite imported good, Y_t^m , produced by a representative competitive firm. When allowed to do so (with probability $(1 - d_m)$ each period), the importer of good i sets the price, $\tilde{P}_t^m(i)$, to maximize its weighted expected profits. It solves:

$$\max_{\{\tilde{P}_t^m(i)\}} E_t \left[\sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_m)^l \left(\frac{\Lambda_{t+l}}{\Lambda_t} \right) \frac{D_{t+l}^m(i)}{P_{t+l}^d} \right], \quad (21)$$

where:

$$D_{t+l}^m(i) = \left(\tilde{P}_t^m(i) - e_{t+l} P_{t+l}^* \right) \left(\frac{\tilde{P}_t^m(i)}{P_{t+l}^m} \right)^{-\vartheta} Y_{t+l}^m. \quad (22)$$

For convenience, we assume that the price in foreign currency of all imported intermediates is P_t^* , which is also equal to the foreign price level. The elasticity of the derived demand for the imported good, i , is $-\vartheta$. The first-order condition is:

$$\tilde{P}_t^m(i) = \left(\frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta - 1} \right) \frac{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_m)^l \left(\frac{\Lambda_{t+l}}{\Lambda_t} \right) Y_{t+l}^m(i) e_{t+l} P_{t+l}^* / P_{t+l}^d}{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_m)^l \left(\frac{\Lambda_{t+l}}{\Lambda_t} \right) Y_{t+l}^m(i) / P_{t+l}^d}. \quad (23)$$

This equation can be used to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve relationship for the rate of change of intermediate input prices (see section (2.6)).

2.2.3 Composite goods

The composite domestic good, Y_t , is produced using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology with a continuum of domestic intermediate goods, $Y_t(i)$, as inputs:

$$Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(i)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} di \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}. \quad (24)$$

It is produced by a representative competitive firm that solves:

$$\max_{\{Y_t(i)\}} P_t^d Y_t - \int_0^1 P_t^d(i) Y_t(i) di, \quad (25)$$

subject to the production function (24). The first-order conditions yield the derived demand functions for the domestic intermediate goods given by (17). The exact price index for the composite domestic good is:

$$P_t^d = \left(\int_0^1 P_t^d(i)^{1-\theta} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}. \quad (26)$$

This price index corresponds to a producer price index (PPI) for the economy. The price level obeys the following law of motion:

$$P_t^d = \left[d_p (P_{t-1}^d)^{1-\theta} + (1-d_p) (\tilde{P}_t^d)^{1-\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \quad (27)$$

where \tilde{P}_t^d is the price index derived by aggregating over all firms that change their price at time t .

Composite domestic output, Y_t , is divided between domestic use, Y_t^d , and exports, Y_t^x . Foreign demand for domestic exports is:⁵

$$Y_t^x = \alpha_x \left(\frac{P_t^d}{e_t P_t^*} \right)^{-\varsigma} Y_t^*, \quad (28)$$

where Y_t^* is foreign output.⁶ The elasticity of demand for domestic output is $-\varsigma$, and $\alpha_x > 0$ is a parameter determining the fraction of domestic exports in foreign spending. Domestic

⁵This condition can be derived from a foreign importing firm that combines non-perfectly substitutable imported goods.

⁶To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path for the economy, we assume that foreign output grows at the same trend rate as domestic output.

exports form an insignificant fraction of foreign expenditures, and have a negligible weight in the foreign price index.

The foreign variables P_t^* and Y_t^* are both exogenous and, when stationarized, evolve according to

$$\log(P_t^*/P_{t-1}^*) = (1 - \rho_{\pi^*}) \log(\pi^*) + \rho_{\pi^*} \log(P_{t-1}^*/P_{t-2}^*) + \varepsilon_{\pi^*t}, \quad (29)$$

and

$$\log Y_t^* = (1 - \rho_{y^*}) \log(Y^*) + \rho_{y^*} \log(Y_{t-1}^*) + \varepsilon_{y^*t}, \quad (30)$$

where π^* is steady-state foreign inflation, and ε_{π^*t} and ε_{y^*t} are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated shocks with standard errors σ_{π^*} and σ_{y^*} , respectively.

The composite imported good, Y_t^m , is produced using a CES technology with a continuum of imported-intermediate goods, $Y_t^m(i)$, as inputs:

$$Y_t^m \leq \left(\int_0^1 (Y_t^m(i))^{\frac{\vartheta-1}{\vartheta}} di \right)^{\frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta-1}}. \quad (31)$$

It is produced by a representative competitive firm. Its profit maximization gives the derived demand function for intermediate imported good j given by:

$$Y_t^m(i) = \left(\frac{P_t^m(i)}{P_t^m} \right)^{-\vartheta} Y_t^m. \quad (32)$$

The exact price index for the composite imported goods is given by:

$$P_t^m = \left(\int_0^1 P_t^m(i)^{1-\vartheta} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\vartheta}}. \quad (33)$$

The price index obeys the following law of motion:

$$P_t^m = \left[d_m (P_{t-1}^m)^{1-\vartheta} + (1 - d_m) (\tilde{P}_t^m)^{1-\vartheta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\vartheta}}, \quad (34)$$

where \tilde{P}_t^m is a price index derived by aggregating over all importers that change their price in time t .

2.2.4 Final-goods production

The final good, Z_t , is produced by a competitive firm that uses Y_t^d and Y_t^m as inputs subject to the following CES technology:

$$Z_t = \left[\alpha_d^{\frac{1}{\nu}} (Y_t^d)^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}} + \alpha_m^{\frac{1}{\nu}} (Y_t^m)^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}} \right]^{\frac{\nu}{\nu-1}}, \quad (35)$$

where $\alpha_d > 0$, $\alpha_m > 0$, $\nu > 0$, and $\alpha_d + \alpha_m = 1$. The final good, Z_t , is used for domestic consumption, C_t , as inputs to produce domestic intermediate goods, X_t , and government purchases, G_t . The final good is produced by a competitive firm that solves:

$$\max_{\{Y_t^d, Y_t^m\}} P_t Z_t - P_t^d Y_t^d - P_t^m Y_t^m, \quad (36)$$

subject to the production function (35). Profit maximization entails:

$$Y_t^d = \alpha_d \left(\frac{P_t^d}{P_t} \right)^{-\nu} Z_t, \quad (37)$$

and

$$Y_t^m = \alpha_m \left(\frac{P_t^m}{P_t} \right)^{-\nu} Z_t. \quad (38)$$

Furthermore, the final-good price, P_t , which corresponds to the consumer price index or CPI, is given by:

$$P_t = \left[\alpha_d (P_t^d)^{1-\nu} + \alpha_m (P_t^m)^{1-\nu} \right]^{1/(1-\nu)}. \quad (39)$$

2.3 Monetary authority

Following Taylor (1993), Dib (2003) and Ireland (2003) among others, the central bank manages the short-term nominal interest rate, R_t , in response to fluctuations in CPI inflation ($\pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1}$), money growth ($\mu_t = M_t/M_{t-1}$), and output (Y_t). Its interest rate reaction function is given by:

$$\log(R_t/R) = \varrho_\pi \log(\pi_t/\pi) + \varrho_\mu \log(\mu_t/\mu) + \varrho_y \log(Y_t/Y) + \varepsilon_{Rt}, \quad (40)$$

where π , μ and Y are the steady-state values of π_t , μ_t and Y_t , where R is the steady-state value of the gross nominal interest rate, and where ε_{Rt} is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated

monetary policy shock with standard deviation σ_R . The error term arises from the fact that the central bank can control short term interest rates only indirectly by setting the Bank rate. The error term thus reflects developments in money and financial markets that are not explicitly captured by our model.

Money growth is included as an argument in the Taylor rule because of the inclusion of money demand shocks in our model. They turn out to be important empirically and account for a significant fraction of fluctuations in output and inflation. If the central bank reacted only to inflation, money demand shocks could be exacerbated by the bank's behavior since a positive money demand shock would lead to a decrease in inflation, a reduction in short term interest rates, and thereby to an endogenous increase in money demand. The inclusion of CPI inflation rather than PPI inflation is motivated by the fact that the Bank of Canada does in fact target CPI inflation; also, reacting to CPI inflation allows for an indirect channel for reacting to exchange rate movements, since exchange rate fluctuations may be passed through much more quickly to the CPI than to the PPI.⁷

2.4 The government

The government budget constraint is given by:

$$P_t G_t + T_t + D_{t-1}^g = \tau_t W_t h_t + M_t - M_{t-1} + \frac{D_t^g}{R_t}. \quad (41)$$

The left side of (41) represents uses of government revenue: goods purchases, transfers, and debt repayments. The right side includes tax revenues, money creation, and newly issued debt. The government also faces a no-Ponzi constraint that implies that the present value of government expenditures equals the present value of tax revenue plus the initial stock of public debt, D_0^g .

Because households have infinite horizons, there is Ricardian equivalence in the following sense: given the tax rate on labor income, a change in the mix between lump-sum taxes and borrowing does not affect the economy's equilibrium. We can simplify the budget constraint

⁷Ambler, Dib and Rebei (2003) present evidence that this is indeed the case for Canada.

without loss of generality to:

$$P_t G_t + T_t = \tau_t W_t h_t + M_t - M_{t-1}. \quad (42)$$

This implies that D_t^g is zero in each period. Government spending and the tax rate are determined by:

$$\log(G_t) = (1 - \rho_g) \log(G) + \rho_g \log(G_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{gt}, \quad (43)$$

and

$$\log(\tau_t) = (1 - \rho_\tau) \log(\tau) + \rho_\tau \log(\tau_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{\tau t}. \quad (44)$$

Given these stochastic processes and that the nominal money stock is determined by money demand once the nominal interest rate is set, lump-sum taxes are determined residually to balance the government's budget.

2.5 Equilibrium

There are two different stochastic trends in the model. The first is in the foreign price level, and arises from the specification of the stochastic process for P_t^* in terms of rates of change in equation (29). The second is in the price of domestic output and all other domestic nominal variables, and arises from the fact that the monetary authority adjusts the domestic nominal interest rate as a function of inflation rather than the price level, according to equation (40).

Solving the model involves using stationary transformations of variables with unit roots. We use the following transformations: $p_t \equiv P_t/P_t^d$, $m_t \equiv M_t/P_t$, $p_t^m \equiv P_t^m/P_t^d$, $\tilde{p}_t^d \equiv \tilde{P}_t^d/P_t^d$, $\pi_t \equiv P_t/P_{t-1}$, $\pi_t^d \equiv P_t^d/P_{t-1}^d$, $w_t \equiv W_t/P_t^d$, $\pi_t^* \equiv P_t^*/P_{t-1}^*$, $b_t^* \equiv B_t^*/P_t^*$ and $s_t \equiv e_t P_t^*/P_t^d$. The complete system of equations in stationary variables that characterize the model's equilibrium is given in Appendix B.

2.6 New Keynesian Phillips curves

The price- and wage-setting equations cannot be used directly to simulate the model since they involve infinite summations. By linearizing these equations around the steady-state values of the variables, and assuming zero inflation in the steady state, we obtain three New

Keynesian Phillips curves relationships that determine the rates of inflation of locally produced goods intermediates, imported intermediates, and the nominal-wage index. Defining $\pi_t^m \equiv P_t^m / P_{t-1}^m$, and $\pi_t^w \equiv W_t / W_{t-1}$, we get:

$$\hat{\pi}_t^d = \beta \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^d + \frac{(1 - \beta d_p)(1 - d_p)}{d_p} \hat{\xi}_t; \quad (45)$$

$$\hat{\pi}_t^m = \beta \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^m + \frac{(1 - \beta d_m)(1 - d_m)}{d_m} \hat{s}_t; \quad (46)$$

and

$$\hat{\pi}_t^w = \beta \hat{\pi}_{t+1}^w + \frac{(1 - \beta d_w)(1 - d_w)}{d_w} \cdot \left[\left(\frac{h}{1 - h} \right) \hat{h}_t - \hat{\Lambda}_t + \left(\frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} \right) \hat{\tau}_t - \hat{w}_t \right], \quad (47)$$

where hats over variables denote deviations from steady-state values. The New Keynesian Phillips curve for domestic output inflation is the same as in Galí and Gertler (1999). It relates inflation to expected future inflation and to the real marginal cost of output. The equation for import price inflation is analogous, with real marginal cost captured by the real exchange rate. The wage inflation equation is also analogous. The term in square brackets measures the marginal rate of substitution (the real marginal cost to workers of their work effort) minus the real wage. The household's first-order condition for the nominal wage can be interpreted as a markup over the average marginal cost of work effort over the life of the wage contract.

3. Model Solution and Parameter Estimation

In order to estimate the model's parameters we use a linear approximation around its steady state, but for welfare analysis we use a higher order approximation using the *Dynare* program (Juillard, 2002).

The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) algorithm is used to solve the linearized model. It leads to a state space representation with transition equations for the model's predetermined endogenous state variables and observation equations relating those states to observable macroeconomic aggregates. The model's forward-looking or jump state variables are eliminated from the state transition equations by the Blanchard and Kahn solution procedure.

In the notation of Ireland (2004), we have:

$$\mathbf{s}_t = A\mathbf{s}_{t-1} + B\varepsilon_t, \quad (48)$$

The model is completed by the following set of observation equations relating the model's state variables to observable endogenous variables:

$$\mathbf{f}_t = C\mathbf{s}_t. \quad (49)$$

The column vector \mathbf{s}_{t-1} contains the predetermined endogenous state variables of the model:

$$\mathbf{s}_{t-1}' \equiv [b_{t-1}, A_{t-1}, G_{t-1}, \tau_{t-1}, R_{t-1}^*, \pi_{t-1}^*, Y_{t-1}^*, w_{t-1}, p_{t-1}^m, m_{t-1}, b_{t-1}^*]$$

with all variables stationarized and measured in proportional deviations from their steady state values. With eight structural shocks in the model, we include eight variables in the \mathbf{f}_t vector in order to avoid the stochastic singularity problem discussed by Ingram, Kocherlakota and Savin (1994). This problem stems from the fact that, with more than eight observation equations, there would be exact or deterministic relationships among certain combinations of the model's endogenous variables. If these relationships did not hold exactly in the data, estimation by maximum likelihood would break down. We include the five state variables that are directly observable as well as consumption, CPI inflation, and the domestic interest rate:

$$\mathbf{f}_t' \equiv [C_t, \pi_t, R_t, G_t, \tau_t, R_t^*, \pi_t^*, Y_t^*],$$

once again with all variables measured in proportional deviations from their steady state values.

The Kalman filter is used to write down the model's log-likelihood function given its state space representation.⁸ The same estimation method is used by Dib (2003) and Ireland (2003). The parameters are then estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function over the sample period from 1981:1 to 2002:4 sample period.

⁸See Hamilton (1994, ch.13) or Ireland (2004) for detailed descriptions.

3.1 Parameter estimates

Table 1 summarizes our parameter estimates. Not counting constants in the stochastic processes for the model's forcing variables, the model has 36 structural parameters. Of these, we were unable to estimate six because they were poorly identified. These parameters were assigned calibrated values, as outlined in the following paragraph.

The subjective discount rate, β , is given a standard value, which implies an annual real interest rate of 4 per cent in the steady state. The weight on leisure in the utility function, η , is calibrated so that the representative household spends about one third of its total time working in the steady state. The α_x parameter is a normalization that ensures that the current account is balanced in the long run. The demand elasticities, σ , θ , and ϑ , influence the stochastic properties of the model in a very indirect way. After linearization, they no longer appear in the three New Keynesian Phillips curve equations. By influencing the size of the markups over marginal cost, they do influence the steady-state levels of the domestic production of intermediate goods, imported intermediate goods, and employment. Because certain coefficients in the linearized model depend on the steady-state levels of endogenous variables, the moments predicted by the model are related to these parameters. Unfortunately, the influence is so weak that it is impossible to estimate them precisely. The θ and ϑ parameters give the elasticity of substitution across different types of intermediate goods in the production of the composite domestic good and the composite imported good. Setting $\theta = \vartheta = 8$ gives a steady-state markup of 14 per cent, which agrees well with estimates in the empirical literature of between 10 per cent and 20 per cent (see, for example, Basu 1995). The σ parameter gives the elasticity of substitution across different labor types in the production of individual domestic intermediate goods. The value of six corresponds to estimates from microdata in Griffin (1992).⁹

Of the estimated parameters in Table 1, most have small standard errors and are highly significant. In particular, the nominal rigidity parameters are highly significant. They are

⁹It also agrees with the value estimated in Ambler, Guay, and Phaneuf (2003) using aggregate time series data. They succeeded in estimating the value of the equivalent parameter in their model by calibrating the equivalent of the d_w parameter.

of plausible magnitude and within the range of values in previous empirical studies and in calibrated general-equilibrium models. The estimate of d_p implies that the prices of domestic intermediate goods remain fixed for, on average, slightly more than three quarters. The other prices are revised less often on average, but still well within the range of plausibility. Import prices remain fixed for, slightly more than four quarters on average. Nominal wages remain fixed for slightly more than six quarters on average.

The estimated values of the Taylor rule imply, since the sum of ϱ_π and ϱ_μ is greater than unity, that the long-run level of the inflation rate is determinate and the model is saddlepoint stable, with a unique dynamic solution in response to shocks. The value of ϱ_y suggests that the Bank of Canada intervened only weakly if at all during the sample period to fluctuations in real output.¹⁰

The stochastic processes for the model's forcing variables highly persistent, with AR(1) parameters above 0.59. The standard deviations of the innovations to the processes vary widely in magnitude, ranging from 0.0021 in the case of foreign inflation shocks to 0.0771 in the case of money demand shocks. The volatility of foreign shocks is smaller than that of domestic shocks, which suggests the relative importance of domestic shocks for business cycle fluctuations in the Canadian economy.

4. Optimal Monetary Policy

Given the estimated and calibrated values of the model's structural parameters, we optimized over the three coefficients of the Taylor rule to find the values that maximize unconditional welfare. The maximization problem can be written as follows:

$$\max_{\varrho_\pi, \varrho_\mu, \varrho_y} E \{u(C_t, m_t, h_t)\}. \quad (50)$$

¹⁰We also allowed monetary policy to respond to real exchange rate fluctuations in some of our estimations. The coefficient was very small in magnitude and insignificant. We did not allow for regime shifts when estimating the Taylor rule coefficients.

The solution amounts to maximizing welfare in the steady state.¹¹ It ignores any costs involved in the transition between the initial stochastic steady state with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients and the new stochastic steady state with optimized Taylor rule coefficients. We address this issue in Section (4.2).

It is now clear that for the purposes of welfare evaluation in dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models, first-order approximations of the model's equilibrium conditions are not adequate. Kim and Kim (2003) provide a simple example of a model in which welfare appears higher under autarky than under complete markets because of the inaccuracy of the linearization method.¹²

To compute the welfare-maximizing Taylor rules, we used the *Dynare* program to calculate the theoretical first and second moments of the model's endogenous variables, including period utility.¹³ Our main results are presented in Table 2. The second column of the table reproduces the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule coefficients from Table 1 in order to facilitate comparison with their optimized values. The table shows the optimized Taylor rule coefficients for three different cases with the estimated degree of nominal wage and price rigidities. For the base case scenario we optimized over all three of the coefficients. The results are shown in the third column of the table. We considered two different scenarios with constraints imposed on one of the three coefficients. Results for a scenario in which $\varrho_y = 0$ are shown in column four. Results for the case where $\varrho_\mu = 0$ are shown in the fifth column. This case corresponds to the optimal Taylor rule calculated by Kollmann (2002) in a small open economy model calibrated for Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The last column of Table 2 shows optimal Taylor rule coefficients for a case where nominal wage and price rigidities are completely removed from the model.

For each scenario, we measure the welfare gain from optimal monetary policy by means of the compensating variation. This measures the percentage change in consumption given the

¹¹It has become standard practice in the literature to abstract from welfare gains and losses due to changes in real money balances. Because we find empirically that money demand shocks explain a substantial fraction of output fluctuations, we decided not to shut down the effects of money demand shocks on the model.

¹²See Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2003) for a more general discussion.

¹³We use the default option of a pure perturbation method as in Schmitt-Grohé (2002) for calculating the moments.

equilibrium with the historically estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients that would give households the same unconditional expected utility as in the indicated scenario. The compensating variation is defined as follows:

$$E \{u(C_t(1 + \zeta), m_t, h_t)\} = E \{u(C_t^*, m_t^*, h_t^*)\}, \quad (51)$$

where variables without asterisks refer to variables under the historical (estimated) values of the Taylor rule coefficients, and variables with asterisks refer to variables under the optimized Taylor rule coefficients.

The results are striking. The compensating variation for the base case is quite large. Consumption in each period would have to increase by 2.69% in the model with the historical values of the Taylor rule coefficients in order for agents to be as well off as with the optimal coefficients. The gains in the constrained cases are of course smaller. The compensating variation when $\varrho_\mu = 0$ is equal to equal 1.07% of consumption. This is close to the welfare gain calculated by Kollmann (2002). He calculates his welfare gains compared to the deterministic steady state in which the variance of each shock is set equal to zero, rather than the stochastic steady state with historical values of the Taylor rule coefficients as we do. His compensating variation is 0.39%. Note from Table 3 that in our model the deterministic steady state gives a welfare improvement over the stochastic steady state with the historical Taylor rule coefficients. The size of the compensating variation is 0.835%. The difference between this welfare gain and the welfare gain under optimized Taylor rule coefficients with $\varrho_\mu = 0$ is 0.233%, very close to Kollmann's figure.

The results indicate that, surprisingly, an optimized Taylor rule can lead to a higher level of welfare than in presence of nominal wage and price rigidities than with flexible wages and prices. The last column of Table 2 shows that welfare is higher under flexible prices and wages (with optimized Taylor rule coefficients) than in the stochastic steady state with the historical values of the Taylor rule coefficients and with the estimated values of the price and wage rigidity parameters. However, the compensating variation is equal to 0.84% of the average level of consumption in the historical case, significantly lower than the base case and slightly lower than our two constrained cases. This result is an example of the generalized

theory of the second best. Because of the presence of other distortions such as monopoly power by domestic firms and importers, and the fact that the economy's terms of trade are endogenous, there is no guarantee that the optimized Taylor rule without the distortions due to nominal rigidities will do better than the optimized Taylor rule in the presence of those distortions.

Compared to the historical values of the Taylor rule coefficients, monetary policy in the base case responds more strongly to fluctuations in inflation and output, and less strongly to fluctuations in the growth of real balances. Despite these differences, the coefficients of the optimized Taylor rule are quite close to the corresponding historical values.¹⁴ This suggests that the measured welfare gains may be quite sensitive to small variations in the Taylor rule coefficients. This is confirmed by a detailed analysis of the shape of the welfare function in the space of the Taylor rule coefficients.

Figure 1 shows the shape of the welfare function in the ϱ_π / ϱ_y plane, holding constant the value of ϱ_μ at its optimal level. The figure shows that the welfare function looks like a broad, flat plain with an area of rougher terrain in the southwest corner. The global maximum occurs at the top of a narrowly-based peak. There are several other smaller peaks (one of which is almost as tall as the global maximum) in the neighborhood of the global maximum that also have very narrow bases (and one other peak that is nearly as tall). We located the global maximum by performing a grid search with a fairly narrow grid for the values of the Taylor rule coefficients. When instead we used the MATLAB functions `_fmincon`, `_fminunc`, and `_fminsearch`, the algorithms failed completely to locate the mountain for any starting values not already on its slope. The maximization algorithms often got stuck on smaller peaks or in the plain itself. This indicates that the substantial improvement in welfare from optimizing the Taylor rule coefficients is not very robust. The location of the mountain in the plain depends in a complicated way on the underlying structural parameters of the model. Our estimates of those parameters are of course subject to sampling error, even if our structural small open economy model has no specification errors. For this reason, the

¹⁴This is no longer true for the constrained cases. For both of these scenarios monetary policy responds much more strongly to variations in inflation than with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients.

Taylor rule coefficients that are optimal for our parameter estimates may yield a value for the welfare function that is suboptimal for the model's true parameter values. Using these Taylor rule coefficients may lead monetary policy to miss the slope of the mountain entirely. On the other hand, there are no deep canyons in the plain. Using suboptimal values for the Taylor rule coefficients should at least not lead to disastrously poor results in terms of welfare.

4.1 Level effects versus stabilization effects

Because the model is solved using a second-order approximation of its equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady-state levels of its variables, both the variances of shocks and the monetary policy rule (which influences how the shocks are transmitted to the economy) can affect the **means** of the endogenous variables of the economy.

Table 3 shows the average levels of various endogenous variables, and the standard deviations of the same variables, in the deterministic steady state, the initial stochastic steady state (with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients), in the steady state with the optimal Taylor rule, and in a flexible price equilibrium with d_w , d_p and d_m set equal to zero and with the Taylor rule coefficients reoptimized given these new values.

It is also possible to summarize to what extent the gains in welfare are coming from the effects of the change in policy on the levels of consumption, leisure and real balances versus changes in the volatility of these variables. We can approximate the difference between welfare under optimal policy and the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & E(u(z_t^*)) - E(u(z_t)) \\
 & \approx u(z) + u_z E(\hat{z}_t^*) + \frac{1}{2} E(\hat{z}_t^*)' u_{zz}(\hat{z}_t^*) - u(z) - u_z E(\hat{z}_t) - \frac{1}{2} E(\hat{z}_t)' u_{zz}(\hat{z}_t),
 \end{aligned}$$

where $z_t \equiv (C_t, m_t, h_t)$ is the vector of arguments of the utility function, z is the value of these arguments in the deterministic steady state, and variables with hats measure deviations from their levels in the deterministic steady state. This implies:

$$E(u(z_t^*)) = E(u(z_t)) + u_z E(\hat{z}_t^* - \hat{z}_t) + \frac{1}{2} E(\hat{z}_t^* - \hat{z}_t)' u_{zz}(\hat{z}_t^* - \hat{z}_t).$$

This allows us to decompose the gains in welfare from optimal monetary policy into a level effect and a stabilization effect. We define the level effect as:

$$E \{u(C_t(1 + \zeta_L), m_t, h_t)\} = Eu(z_t) + u_z E(\hat{z}_t^* - \hat{z}_t). \quad (52)$$

We define the stabilization effect as follows:

$$E \{u(C_t(1 + \zeta_S), m_t, h_t)\} = Eu(z_t) + \frac{1}{2} E(\hat{z}_t^* - \hat{z}_t)' u_{zz} (\hat{z}_t^* - \hat{z}_t). \quad (53)$$

The results are shown in the last two rows of Table 3. The overall effect in all cases is such that approximately:

$$(1 + \zeta) \approx (1 + \zeta_L)(1 + \zeta_S). \quad (54)$$

The most important result is that the welfare gain from optimizing the Taylor rule coefficients comes almost entirely from the effect on the average levels of consumption, hours worked and real balances. The level effect comes from an increase in the average level of consumption of over five percent, which more than compensates for a four percent increase in hours worked and a seven percent decrease in real balances.

Our results show that there is no additional gain from eliminating wage and price rigidity from the model once the Taylor rule coefficients are optimized. Indeed, the level of steady state welfare attainable under flexible prices and wages is lower than in our base case scenario. The simple monetary rules that we analyze here go most of the way to completely eliminating the welfare costs due to the presence of nominal rigidities. However, because of the presence of additional distortions in the model (such as the economy's monopoly power over the types of goods that it sells on world markets), we do not know how close the optimized Taylor rule can come to the fully optimal monetary policy.

4.2 Transition costs

[SECTION TO BE COMPLETED LATER]

By maximizing unconditional welfare, we are implicitly comparing two different stochastic steady states. The welfare comparison ignores the possibility of losses in welfare on the

transition path from one steady state to another. The possibility is particularly acute for open economies. Welfare in the new steady state with optimal policy may be higher because a higher level of net foreign assets allows individuals to enjoy a higher level of consumption. However, acquiring the additional foreign assets implies a lower level of consumption in the short run. The short term loss may even swamp the long term gain if individuals are sufficiently impatient.

In order to guard against this possibility, we simulated the transition from the stochastic steady state with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients to the steady state with the optimal Taylor rule. We subjected the model to stochastic simulations under the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients and then simulated the implementation of the optimal Taylor rule, taking the mean values of the economy's predetermined state variables under the old rule as initial conditions for the simulations. The results are presented in Figure 1. The graph indicates that there is a modest loss in utility when the optimal policy is implemented. The reduction in utility lasts for XXX periods, and then the transition to the new steady state with a higher level of period utility is quite rapid.

These results are for the optimized Taylor rule in our base case scenario. For both constrained Taylor rules the results are quite different. In these cases, average money balances increase substantially. Most of the welfare gain comes about from this increased average level of real balances. In fact, the decomposition of the welfare gain into a levels effect and a stabilization effect shows that the component of the compensating variation coming from stabilization is strongly negative. In these cases, since the long run benefits come mainly from a large buildup of real balances, the transition costs are actually quite high. The modest costs of transition in our base case can be partly explained by the fact that agents do not have to sacrifice too much current consumption and leisure in order to build up assets that make them better off in the steady state.

It is possible that an optimization of the Taylor rule coefficients based on maximizing **conditional** welfare. However, optimizing conditional welfare is technically much more challenging, and the modest initial dip in welfare combined with the rapid transition to the new steady state level of welfare mean that the marginal gains are unlikely to be large.

5. Conclusions

This paper has shown that it is feasible to construct a fully developed NOEM model of a small open economy such as Canada, to estimate almost all of its parameters using maximum likelihood techniques, and to use the model to analyze optimal monetary policy by calculating the values of the Taylor rule coefficients that maximize unconditional welfare. The time is perhaps not far off when central banks themselves will integrate the use of such models into the formulation of their monetary policy.

Our results show that it is possible to improve welfare substantially by getting the coefficients of a modified Taylor rule right. The welfare increase is equivalent to a permanent 2.6% increase in the level of consumption between the stochastic steady states with the estimated values of the Taylor rule coefficients and the optimal values. The transition costs of moving to the optimal stochastic steady state are relatively modest. However, the welfare function is very sensitive to the values of the Taylor rule coefficients in the neighborhood of the optimum, and the location of the optimum is sensitive to the estimated values of the structural parameters of the model.

Much work remains to be done. We need to incorporate capital into the model so that it can better reproduce the persistence of some of the main macroeconomic aggregates. We need to do more work on the difference between policies that maximize conditional versus unconditional welfare. We need to work on deriving the truly optimal feedback rule and to evaluate the welfare loss from using a Taylor rule that is necessarily an **approximation** to the fully optimal rule. We need to analyze the problem of time consistency. Finally, we need to examine whether the result that welfare gains are extremely sensitive to the coefficients of the optimal policy rule and to the structural parameters of the model is robust to different types of models.

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Appendix A: Data and Data Sources

Our data set is available on request. The data are from Canada and the United States and are quarterly from 1981Q3 to 2002Q4. The Canadian data are from *Bank of Canada Banking and Financial Statistics*, a monthly publication by the Bank of Canada. Series numbers are indicated in brackets and correspond to Cansim databank numbers.

- Consumption, C_t , is measured by real personal spending on non-durable goods and services in 1997 dollars (non-durables [v1992047] + services [v1992119]).
- The CPI inflation rate, π_t , is measured by changes in the consumer price index, P_t [v18702611].
- The short-term nominal interest rate, R_t , is measured by the yield on Canadian three-month treasury bills [v122531].
- Government spending, G_t , is measured by government expenditures on goods and services (total domestic demand [v1992068] – total personal expenditures [v1992115] – construction [v1992053 + v1992055] – machinery and equipment investment [v1992056]).

- The labor tax rate, τ_t , is measured by the effective labor tax rate (calculated following the methodology of Jones 2002; and Mendoza, Razin, and Tezar 1994).
- The series in per-capita terms are obtained by dividing each series by the Canadian civilian population aged 15 and over (civilian labor force [v2062810] / labor force participation [v2062816]).

The U.S. data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, with the series numbers in brackets. The world series are approximated by some of the U.S. series.

- World output, Y_t^* , is real U.S. GDP per capita in 1996 dollars [GDPC96] divided by the U.S. civilian non-institutional population [CNP16OV].
- The world nominal interest rate, R_t^* , is measured by the rate on U.S. three-month Treasury Bills [TB3MS].
- The world inflation rate, π_t^* , is measured by changes in the U.S. GDP implicit price deflator, P_t^* [GDPDEF].

Appendix B: Equilibrium Conditions

The following system of equations defines the economy's equilibrium:

$$\frac{C_t^{\frac{-1}{\gamma}}}{C_t^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} m_t^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}} = \Lambda_t p_t; \quad (\text{B.1})$$

$$\frac{b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} m_t^{\frac{-1}{\gamma}}}{C_t^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + b_t^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} m_t^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}} = \Lambda_t p_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{R_t}\right); \quad (\text{B.2})$$

$$\frac{R_t}{\kappa_t R_t^*} = E_t \left[\frac{s_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}^d}{s_t \pi_{t+1}^*} \right]; \quad (\text{B.3})$$

$$\frac{\Lambda_t}{R_t} = \beta E_t \left[\frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}^d} \right]; \quad (\text{B.4})$$

$$\tilde{w}_t = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \frac{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_w)^l \eta h_{t+l} / (1 - h_{t+l})}{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_w)^l (1 - \tau_{t+l}) \Lambda_{t+l} h_{t+l} \prod_{k=1}^l (\pi_{t+k}^d)^{-1}}; \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$w_t^{1-\sigma} = d_w \left(\frac{w_{t-1}}{\pi_t^d} \right)^{1-\sigma} + (1 - d_w) \tilde{w}_t^{1-\sigma}; \quad (\text{B.6})$$

$$Y_t = X_t^\phi h_t^{1-\phi}; \quad (\text{B.7})$$

$$w_t = (1 - \phi) \xi_t \frac{Y_t}{h_t}; \quad (\text{B.8})$$

$$p_t = \phi \xi_t \frac{Y_t}{X_t}; \quad (\text{B.9})$$

$$\tilde{p}_t^d = \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) \frac{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_p)^l \Lambda_{t+l} Y_{t+l} \xi_{t+l}}{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_p)^l \Lambda_{t+l} Y_{t+l} \prod_{k=1}^l (\pi_{t+k}^d)^{-1}}; \quad (\text{B.10})$$

$$1 = d_p \left(\frac{1}{\pi_t^d} \right)^{(1-\theta)} + (1 - d_p) (\tilde{p}_t^d)^{(1-\theta)}; \quad (\text{B.11})$$

$$\tilde{p}_t^m = \left(\frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta - 1} \right) \frac{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_m)^l \Lambda_{t+l} Y_{t+l}^m s_{t+l}}{E_t \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} (\beta d_m)^l \Lambda_{t+l} Y_{t+l}^m \prod_{k=1}^l (\pi_{t+k}^d)^{-1}}; \quad (\text{B.12})$$

$$(p_t^m)^{(1-\vartheta)} = d_m \left(\frac{p_{t-1}^m}{\pi_t^d} \right)^{(1-\vartheta)} + (1 - d_m) (\tilde{p}_{mt}^m)^{(1-\vartheta)}; \quad (\text{B.13})$$

$$(p_t)^{(1-\nu)} = \alpha_d + \alpha_m (p_t^m)^{(1-\nu)}; \quad (\text{B.14})$$

$$Z_t = C_t + X_t + G_t; \quad (\text{B.15})$$

$$Y_t = Y_t^x + Y_t^d; \quad (\text{B.16})$$

$$Y_t^x = \alpha_x s_t^s Y_t^*; \quad (\text{B.17})$$

$$Y_t^d = \alpha_d \left(\frac{1}{p_t} \right)^{-\nu} Z_t; \quad (\text{B.18})$$

$$Y_t^m = \alpha_m \left(\frac{p_{mt}}{p_t} \right)^{-\nu} Z_t; \quad (\text{B.19})$$

$$\frac{b_t^*}{\kappa_t R_t^*} - \frac{b_{t-1}^*}{\pi_t^*} = \frac{Y_t^x}{s_t} - Y_t^m; \quad (\text{B.20})$$

$$\log(\kappa_t) = \varphi \left[\exp \left(\frac{s_t b_t^*}{Y_t} \right) - 1 \right]; \quad (\text{B.21})$$

$$\log(R_t/R) = \varrho_\pi \log(\pi_t/\pi) + \varrho_\mu \log(\mu_t/\mu) + \varrho_y \log(Y_t/Y) + \varepsilon_{Rt}; \quad (\text{B.22})$$

$$\pi_t = \frac{m_{t-1}}{m_t} \mu_t; \quad (\text{B.23})$$

$$\log(A_t) = (1 - \rho_A) \log(A) + \rho_A \log(A_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{At}; \quad (\text{B.24})$$

$$\log(b_t) = (1 - \rho_b) \log(b) + \rho_b \log(b_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{bt}; \quad (\text{B.25})$$

$$\log(G_t) = (1 - \rho_g) \log(G) + \rho_g \log(G_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{gt}; \quad (\text{B.26})$$

$$\log(\tau_t) = (1 - \rho_\tau) \log(\tau) + \rho_\tau \log(\tau_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_{\tau t}; \quad (\text{B.27})$$

$$\log(R_t^*) = (1 - \rho_{R^*}) \log(R^*) + \rho_{R^*} \log(R_{t-1}^*) + \varepsilon_{R^*t}; \quad (\text{B.28})$$

$$\log(\pi_t^*) = (1 - \rho_{\pi^*}) \log(\pi^*) + \rho_{\pi^*} \log(\pi_{t-1}^*) + \varepsilon_{\pi^*t}; \quad (\text{B.29})$$

$$\log Y_t^* = (1 - \rho_{y^*}) \log(Y^*) + \rho_{y^*} \log(Y_{t-1}^*) + \varepsilon_{y^*t}, \quad (\text{B.30})$$

where equation (B.20) gives the trade balance of the economy.

Table 1: Parameter Estimates

Parameter	Value	Standard deviation	t -stat	p -value
Stochastic processes				
ρ_a	0.5900	0.1316	4.4229	0.0000
ρ_b	0.7920	0.0257	30.8171	0.0000
ρ_g	0.8152	0.0642	12.6978	0.0000
ρ_τ	0.9502	0.0378	25.1376	0.0000
ρ_{r^*}	0.8619	0.0198	43.5303	0.0000
ρ_{y^*}	0.9832	0.0078	126.051	0.0000
ρ_{π^*}	0.7794	0.1158	6.7306	0.0000
σ_a	0.0262	0.0044	5.9545	0.0000
σ_b	0.0771	0.0054	14.2778	0.0000
σ_g	0.0071	0.0006	11.8333	0.0000
σ_τ	0.0297	0.0022	13.5000	0.0000
σ_{r^*}	0.0021	0.0002	10.5000	0.0000
σ_{y^*}	0.0065	0.0005	13.0000	0.0000
σ_{π^*}	0.0022	0.0002	11.0000	0.0000
σ_r	0.0141	0.0011	12.8182	0.0000
b	0.2961	0.0580	5.1052	0.0000
Nominal rigidity				
d_w	0.8764	0.0381	23.0026	0.0000
d_p	0.5786	0.2197	2.6336	0.0050
d_m	0.7708	0.0796	9.6834	0.0000
Interest rate rule				
ϱ_π	0.7959	0.1743	4.5663	0.0000
ϱ_μ	0.5484	0.1965	2.7908	0.0065
ϱ_y	0.0095	0.0860	0.1105	0.9123
Foreign supply/demand				
α_x	0.074	calibrated		
φ	-0.0199	0.0353	0.5637	0.5745
ς	0.7027	0.1321	5.3195	0.0000
Production				
$\nu \dagger$	0.7027	0.1321	5.3195	0.0000
α_d	0.7224	0.2297	3.1450	0.0023
ϕ	0.3173	0.0555	5.7171	0.0000
σ	6.00	calibrated		
θ	8.00	calibrated		
ϑ	8.00	calibrated		
Preferences				
γ	0.2282	0.0718	3.1783	0.0021
β	0.99	calibrated		
η	1.35	calibrated		

† — ν was constrained to equal ς

Table 2: Optimized Taylor Rule Coefficients

	Historical	Base Case	Constrained Cases		Flex-Price
			$\varrho_y = 0$	$\varrho_\mu = 0$	
ϱ_π	0.7959	0.9000	3.8000	3.8300	1.2400
ϱ_μ	0.5484	0.3300	0.0000	—	0.0000
ϱ_y	0.0095	0.2100	—	0.0700	0.2400
CV*	—	2.6906	1.0358	1.0682	0.8381

*: compensating variation in percent

Table 3: Average Values and Standard Deviations

	Deterministic Steady State	Initial Stochastic Steady State	Optimal Stochastic Steady State	Constrained Steady State 1†	Constrained Steady State 2‡	Flexible Price Equilibrium
	Averages					
Consumption	0.7308	0.7220	0.7612	0.7335	0.7337	0.7395
Hours Worked	0.3182	0.3160	0.3292	0.3193	0.3192	0.3272
Real Balances	0.5937	0.5970	0.5554	0.9936	0.9498	1.6801
Period Utility	-0.8336	-0.8419	-0.8154	-0.8317	-0.8313	-0.8336
	Standard Deviations					
Consumption	0.0000	0.0221	0.0163	0.0368	0.0348	0.0353
Hours Worked	0.0000	0.0110	0.0087	0.0103	0.0009	0.0194
Real Balances	0.0000	0.0385	0.0734	0.3125	0.2949	0.4334
Period Utility	0.0000	0.0280	0.0269	0.0469	0.0452	0.0421
	Compensating Variations (%)					
CV*	0.8350	0.0000	2.6906	1.0358	1.0682	0.8381
Level Effect	0.7488	0.0000	2.6763	1.5775	1.5383	1.9357
Stabilizaton Effect	0.0869	0.0000	0.0164	-0.5357	-0.4649	-1.0826

†: optimum with $\rho_y = 0$

‡: optimum with $\rho_\mu = 0$

*: compensating variation in percent

Figure 1: Objective Function with $\varrho_\mu = 0.33$

